

DR. J. J. POORTMAN

VEHICLES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

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VEHICLES
OF
CONSCIOUSNESS
THE CONCEPT OF HYLIC PLURALISM
(OCHĒMA)

by

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VOLUME ONE

1978

UTRECHT

ADYAR - MADRAS LONDON WHEATON

Originally published in Dutch under the title "Ochēma"
by Van Gorcum & Comp. N. V., Assen,
The Netherlands, in 1954

Translated by N. D. Smith

© Foundation Pylaemenes, The Hague.

Published by
The Theosophical Society in the Netherlands,
Utrecht, in association with
The Theosophical Publishing House,
Adyar - Madras, London, Wheaton 1978.
Printed at the
Kalakshetra Publications Press,
Madras-600 041, India.

IBSN : 0 8356 0240 0

PREFACE

Dr. G. R. S. MEAD (1863-1933) said in 1910 that a history of the development of the doctrine of the subtle body would require "a very bulky volume". The author set himself the task of writing such a history. Judging by the thirty or more reviews he received of the Dutch version he succeeded in arousing considerable interest in the subject. But he felt that his task would not be completed, until the book was published in one of the principal languages of the world.

All persons or institutions who have been a help to him in his study of the subject in many different ways are mentioned in the original Dutch version (see Ochēma VI p. 5).

J. J. POORTMAN

FOREWORD

I regard it as a great privilege to have been asked to write a brief foreword to this English translation of J. J. Poortman's work. Over the years, I came to know the author as an original and independent thinker who went his own way with great courage, in the knowledge that, in so doing, he would encounter a great deal of controversy.

Poortman was a man who was averse to all dogmatism and always inclined to doubt—the very essence of a philosopher. In his "Repertory of Dutch Philosophy" (*Repertorium der Nederlandse wijsbegeerte*, Amsterdam, 1948)—generally considered to be a standard work in academic circles—he called himself a theosophist and by this he meant that his aim was to achieve a synthesis of all man's faculties in an experience of unity. This aspiration is on the one hand directed towards God, who is contemplated and worshipped as the unity underlying the world, and, on the other, towards the world, with the purpose of considering this as a unity. His philosophical work, *Tweeërlei Subjectiviteit* (Haarlem, 1929), is a striking testimony to this aspiration.

As a theosophist too, he was interested in those phenomena and faculties that are often called "occult". This concern he developed in

thoroughly scientific research. His continued preoccupation with and desire to promote parapsychological research was, of course, closely connected with this.

For many years, he was a contributor to the Dutch parapsychological journal, the *Tijdschrift voor Parapsychologie*, conscious as he was of the fact that philosophical reflection about the results of parapsychological research was bound to lead to a view of man that was in conflict with a purely materialistic world-view. It was for this reason that he devoted himself to the study of a subject which was, in his opinion, neglected by philosophy, namely pluralistic materiality or "hylic pluralism", the existence of a metaorganism which is believed to be the vehicle or *ochēma* of our being after the death of the cellular body. This inevitably led him to study the problem of the relationship between the body and the soul (spirit).

This standard work, which will become a source for further study, is a testimonial to the author's great erudition and to his critical spirit. The way in which he has dealt with the many subjects contained in these volumes is beyond all praise.

PROF. DR. W. H. C. TENHAEFF
*Director of the Parapsychological Institute
of the State University of Utrecht*

EDITORS' NOTE

This work of Prof. Dr. J. J. Poortman appears at a time in which, owing to the results of the investigations of modern science, the signs of a fundamental change in our *Weltanschauung* get more and more attention with the public; thus the interest in metaphysical problems has noticeably increased. In view of the new problems and of the broad discussions of parapsychological phenomena in public, phenomena for which a consistent and comprehensive explanation and a theoretical basis have still to be found, Poortman's work serves to prove that the concept of *hylic pluralism* (which explains many of these phenomena) has played at all times and in many cultures an important and not to be underestimated part in the thinking of mankind. In other words: our world does not only consist of matter which is directly perceptible to our senses, as many materialists assert, but comprises also a number of forms of subtler matter which serve as vehicles of an immaterial, ensouling consciousness. The Greek word *Ochēma*, vehicle, stands for these various forms of matter which are contained in the concept of "hyle" and which the ultimate consciousness, the ensouling principle, in short, the soul, makes use of. This is a subject which until now had never been treated to such a great extent by a modern philosopher.

In the world of books a special place is always given to those which can be considered as the "life-work" of an author, usually the fruit of years of work on a particular theme. Such a life-work is exemplified by the different parts of this book, until now accessible to only a relatively small circle of readers, since it was published originally in Dutch under the title "*Ochēma*" in the years 1954-1967, but are now being presented for the first time to the English-speaking public. Among Dutch readers however, "*Ochēma*" has become in the meantime a much-discussed and much cited work. The language barrier could not prevent the title of the work, and in particular the concept of *hylic pluralism*, from being introduced into international scientific debates. Distinguished scholars; above all in the field of parapsychology, such as Prof. W. H. C. Tenhaeff, have contributed much to the dissemination of Poortman's ideas and to the exposition of his concept of *hylic pluralism* outside the Netherlands. The result of Poortman's efforts has been clearly recognized in its various aspects as being particularly fruitful and theoretically fundamental; not only philosophers but also psychologists, psychotherapists, parapsychologists and physicists have expressed their praise for the stupendous work which has since become

more widely known through a series of public debates, some of which have been televised. Prof. Poortman unfortunately was not able to complete all the parts of his great work, which according to the original plan was to be in six volumes. The original (Dutch) edition consists of parts I, II, VIA, VIB, VICD; in this English edition they are numbered consecutively from I to IV. In the remaining uncompleted or unprepared parts of the original edition the following topics were to have been dealt with: Hyllic Pluralism in Ancient Greece and Rome (III), in Israel, Christianity and Islam (IV) and in the New Era (V). Part VI A of the original edition (Vol. II of this English edition) contains however "Historical Summaries" of the periods and cultures which were not treated in detail, and thus there are no gaps in the line of argument. It must be considered a fortunate decision of the author that after concluding Part II of the original edition, he first wrote the concluding part, which deals with the sense and truth of hyllic pluralism. The work as a whole has thus not remained a fragment but contains a complete and comprehensive conclusion.

The philosophical foundation of "Ochēma" had been laid in Poortman's excellent work *Tweeërlei Subjectiviteit. Ontwerp eener "Centrale Philosophie"* (Twofold Subjectivity. Outline of a "Central Philosophy"), which he had written while still a student and published in 1929. The author himself refers in various places in "Ochēma" to this fundamental work, thus making an account of the basic positions which are developed there unnecessary. The attention of English-speaking readers is also drawn to a collection of Poortman's essays, published by Sythoff in 1965 in Leiden (Holland) under the title "Philosophy—Theosophy—Parapsychology", which demonstrates the broad spectrum of the author's interests. For the reader of "Ochēma" this book contains a particularly interesting lecture, "The Fundamental Paradox", which Poortman gave at the Tenth International Congress of Philosophy in Amsterdam in August 1948 and the title of which was also given to the second comprehensive collection *De Grondparadox en andere Voordrachten en Essays* (The Fundamental Paradox and other Addresses and Essays), published in Assen in 1969.

Detailed accounts of Poortman himself and his significant contribution to philosophy and parapsychology are to be found in various publications, as for instance by Prof. A. A. Prins in the *Jaarboek der Maatschappij der Nederlandse Letterkunde te Leiden* 1970-1971 and Prof. W. H. C. Tenhaeff in the *Tijdschrift voor Parapsychologie*.

Why a new title for this English edition? The editors have the feeling that the original title "Ochēma" would not convey to the

English reading public the real content of this study. *Ochēma* is used by the author in the sense of "vehicle of the soul", but he also writes that one should be on one's guard against confusion with regard to the term "soul", which he himself uses with a special connotation (see Vol. I, § 14). Therefore the editors have taken the liberty of using for this English edition the title "Vehicles of Consciousness", also denoting the plurality of *hyle*, as the author wants us to understand it.

During recent years too, more difficult studies are read by a large number of people. Works such as this are appealing to an increasing number of readers and young academics in particular are showing themselves to be responsive to the systematic and scientifically established form of the treatment of a subject. So these volumes may now hope to attract great interest. The particular concern of the Foundation Pylaemenes, whose task it is to publish and disseminate Prof. Poortman's works, was to make the publication of "*Ochēma*" possible at a moderate price. In times of worldwide inflation this task is not easy to accomplish. The printer of these volumes, Mr. C. T. Nachiappan of Kalakshetra Publications, Madras, India, is therefore to be thanked all the more for helping to put into effect the plan of an English edition. Together with the Foundation Pylaemenes, The Hague, the Theosophical Society in the Netherlands, Utrecht, is also responsible for the publication, since Prof. Poortman—a long-standing and prominent member of this Society—had expressed the wish before his death that the English edition of "*Ochēma*", which he helped initially to prepare, should appear in a theosophical publishing house. In fulfilling this wish the Dutch Section of the Theosophical Society was happy to be able to finance this publication, as a contribution to the centenary of the international Theosophical Society. Very special thanks are in particular due to Mr. N. D. Smith, who carried out on behalf of the Foundation Pylaemenes the translation into English with great responsibility to the work of the author. He and Mrs. Ilse von Tresckow are both to be thanked for reading the difficult proofs.

The Hague/Utrecht, 17 November 1978

Foundation Pylaemenes
Prof. Dr. P. Meyer-Dohm

The Theosophical Society
Dutch Section
Drs. H. M. Brandt

Short Biography of J. J. Poortman

Born at Rotterdam 26th April 1896.

Member of The Theosophical Society (Adyar) since 1915.

Studied philosophy and psychology under Prof. G. Heymans at Groningen University. Took a degree there corresponding to a M.A. in 1919.

Subsequently followed classes at the Universities of Hamburg, Geneva, Paris (Sorbonne) and Vienna.

Member of the Board of the Netherlands Society for Psychical Research 1932-38.

Research Fellow in Philosophy in Harvard College, Cambridge, Mass., 1935-36.

Co-editor Theosofia, Organ of the Netherlands Section, Theosophical Society 1938-59.

Co-editor Winkler Prins Encyclopedia 1944-50.

External Lecturer in Metaphysics in Leiden University 1945-53.

Doctor's degree at Amsterdam University 1954.

Member of the Board of the Netherlands Theosophical Research Centre 1954-1968.

Professor of Metaphysics in the Spirit of Theosophy on behalf of the Foundation "Proclus" in Leiden University 1958-1967.

Died in The Hague 21st December 1970.

Other writings of J. J. Poortman

Tweeërlei Subjectiviteit, Amsterdam 1929. (Twofold Subjectivity).

Drei Vorträge über Philosophie und Parapsychologie, Leiden 1939.
(Three lectures on Philosophy and Parapsychology).

Variaties op één en meer Themata, Leiden 1947 (Variations on One
and More Themes, Collected Essays).

Repertorium der Nederlandse Wijsbegeerte, Amsterdam 1948; supplement
1958 (Repertory of Dutch Philosophy).

De Theodicee, het Continuïteitsbeginsel en de Grondparadox, Leiden
1951 (Theodicy, the Principle of Continuity and the Fundamental
Paradox).

De Grondparadox en andere Voordrachten en Essays, Assen 1961
(The Fundamental Paradox and Other Addresses and Essays).

Philosophy-Theosophy-Parapsychology. Some Essays on Diverse
Subjects, Leiden 1965.

Raakvlakken tussen Oosterse en Westerse Filosofie, Assen/Amster-
dam 1976 (Tangent Planes of Eastern and Western Philosophy).

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PART I
INTRODUCTION

1. MONISTIC AND DUALISTIC MATERIALISM

In 1866, F. A. Lange (1828-1875) published a history and critical study of materialism entitled *Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart*, which has been described in W. Ziegenfuss' *Philosophen-Lexikon* as one of the most influential philosophical works of the second half of the nineteenth century.¹ What is remarkable about this book is that, although the author described the history of materialism throughout the centuries, he did not himself accept the materialistic point of view. As a Kantian, he believed that materialism had been in principle refuted by Kant and he was, as such, one of the important thinkers of the eighteen-sixties who called for a "return to Kant" and thus helped to found the neo-Kantian movement. Lange provided a very detailed history of materialism in his book, however, precisely because he regarded it as a point of view, a method and a principle of research that was useful and indeed indispensable to the natural sciences,² and because this usefulness had, in his opinion, been revealed again and again in the history of philosophy and of science.

Very few people would disagree with this brief outline of Lange's work. One characteristic of it, however, has struck me forcibly—his neglect of one particular aspect of materialism, namely *dualistic* materialism. Indeed, a better title for his book would have been *The History of Monistic Materialism*. What, then, is meant by dualistic materialism and what is meant by monistic materialism? According to the (characteristically monistic) materialism of such nineteenth century authors as Vogt (1817-1895), Moleschott (1822-1893) and Büchner (1824-1899), nothing existed except matter and, what is more, only one kind of matter—ordinary matter, as known by us and as studied in the natural sciences. The psyche, the soul or the consciousness—these did not exist at all. The phenomena of the consciousness could either be completely ignored or they were simply an epiphenomenon of the material processes. In any case, for these thinkers, there was only one kind of matter, with the result that matter was regarded as monistic. In addition to this view, however, another form of materialism, which is known as "dualistic" materialism,³ is met with in

1 B 184, II, p. 14.

2 See, for example, Falckenberg (B 41), p. 629.

3 See, for example, B 151, p. 266.

the history of philosophy. Heymans¹ also said of this dualistic materialism that it "regards all being as material nature. It presupposes, however, in living bodies, apart from universal matter, another and special kind of the same matter which may be defined as warm vapour, as small, smooth, round atoms or in some other way and which it thinks of as being closely associated, to the exclusion of all other phenomena, with the phenomena of life and of the consciousness..."

Although he did not, in so many words, distinguish between monistic and dualistic materialism, Lange was not entirely silent about this latter form of materialism. He observed, for example, that, according to Democritus,² the soul consisted of a special matter—fine, smooth, round atoms, that, according to the Stoics,³ it was corporeal, that, according to Epicurus,⁴ it was a fine body and that Francis Bacon⁵ regarded it in the ancient sense as a fine matter and his own contemporary and friend, the well-known historian of philosophy, F. Überweg,⁶ thought of the soul as dispersed in space and as material. It would, however, hardly have been possible for him to omit the first four views from a history of materialism and Überweg's was a very singular view and it is, moreover, open to doubt whether it can be called dualistic. Lange also mentioned the doctrine of the *spiritus animales et vitales*,⁷ the animal and vital spirits, which have played such an important part in medicine since the time of Galen, which were also regarded as material and of which traces of various kinds can be found in, for example, Melanchthon, Paracelsus and the alchemists.⁸ The result, however, is very poor—only a few pages or parts of pages devoted to dualistic materialism in such a detailed work.

As the reader proceeds with his reading of this book, it becomes more and more apparent to him how much more Lange might have been able to say about this subject. One example is that Lange had nothing to say about the view that the soul was thought to possess an organ of finer matter, an "ethereal" or "soul" body, which had so many supporters among the romantics, a doctrine that is explicit, for instance, in Lange's elder contemporary, I. H. Fichte (1796-1879), the son of the famous J. G. Fichte. Another example is that he did not consider

1 B 68, p. 103.

2 B 89, I, p. 19.

3 B 89, I, p. 73.

4 B 89, I, p. 80.

5 B 89, I, p. 199.

6 B 89, II, p. 491

7 B 89, I, p. 194.

8 B 89, I, p. 195.

the materialistic psychology that is so frequently met with in Indian and Buddhist thought¹ or the connection between dualistic materialism and theology. Similar ideas are to be found in the work of so many theologians, not only in the writings of early Christian authors and Fathers of the Church such as Tertullian (ca. 160-222) and Origen (ca. 185-251), Lactantius (ca. 250-325) and Ambrose (340-397), but also in the work of eighteenth and nineteenth century theologians such as F.C. Oetinger (1702-1782), R. Rothe (1799-1867), J. Hamberger (1801-1885), J. T. Beck (1804-1878) and others. In view of this, it is clear that Lange, whose expressed aim was to write a history of materialism, should not have neglected these aspects of his study.

The Dutch author, Dr. K. H. E. de Jong, who has so often argued in support of dualistic materialism, was right when he said, in the foreword to his book, *Die andere Seite des Materialismus* (1932), that an act of scientific justice had to be carried out here. In this sense, then, I propose to write a monograph in an attempt to do justice to a subject that has been neglected by Lange and certainly not by him alone. It is quite remarkable how seriously this subject has been neglected in manuals and lexicons when there has been every reason to mention it. It is all rather arbitrary—the subject was fairly regularly mentioned in R. Eisler's lexicon of philosophy whenever it arose in connection with a particular thinker, but W. Ziegenfuss' later lexicon leaves it out, if it is at all possible. If the theme occurs in connection with a philosopher, it is not usually to be found in any survey of his ideas or in a selection from or a concise edition of his works. Either the most detailed histories of philosophy and similar works have to be consulted in order to find the subject, or one has to go back to the sources themselves the original works of the philosopher concerned.

But why should this idea of a finer matter—a rarefied body closely connected with the soul—which G. R. S. Mead has called "one of the oldest persuasions of mankind"² have been overlooked and so to speak pushed into an obscure corner? The answer to this question is in one way obvious. It has almost become a commonplace that the historian is less concerned with description or reflection than with *selection*. In most cases, selection is inevitable and the principle, on which he bases his choice, comes from himself—his own interests, opinion and philosophy. Lange had no interest in the soul conceived as fine matter or in the idea of an organ of fine matter of the in itself

¹ B 124, I, p. 400.

² B 99, p. 145.

immaterial psyche. In his brief notes on dualistic materialism, he wrote scornfully about the material soul of the astrologers, alchemists, spiritists and theosophists.¹ In this, he showed that he was clearly part of the tendencies that prevailed round about the middle of the nineteenth century—on the one hand, materialism (either as a “principle of research” or not simply as such) and, on the other hand, the revival of Kantianism, which regarded things in themselves as unknowable. Other and later scholars, the compilers of lexicons and anthologies, clearly continued to put the principles of selection to which they adhered into practice.

But selective principles are not necessarily eternally valid and interest can change. The modern age is characterised by, on the one hand, in comparison with the previous period, increasing secularisation and, on the other hand, looking into the future, increasing positivism. In other words, there is a tendency today to concentrate more and more on one particular *part* of reality, the visible and tangible part, and to be less and less interested in the *background*.

It is possible that an important change is taking place here, especially insofar as natural science, as the science which is concerned with the visible and tangible, is tending to deal more and more with phenomena which are only indirectly perceptible or are only remotely related to perception. I would mention only one of these tendencies to concentrate less on what is obvious—the rise of *parapsychology*. In the nineteenth century, and especially in the second half of that century, there was a widely held view, which was the result, on a large scale, of ideas inherited from the eighteenth century Enlightenment, that belief in so-called occult phenomena, to which men in previous centuries had been so attached, was simply based on illusion and had to be regarded as superstition. On the other hand, study of the phenomena of the consciousness, insofar as these were regarded as independent (and not simply as epiphenomena), had to confine itself to pure data, in other words, psychology had to be a “psychology without the soul”. There was, however, a reaction against this even in the nineteenth century in the emergence of the concept of the unconscious and the demand, hesitant at first and confined to a limited circle, for scientific study of these “occult” phenomena. This science, which was initially known as metapsychics or psychical research, but is now usually given the name of parapsychology, has now justified its right to exist and there

¹ See, for example, B 89, I, p. 194-196.

are far fewer people who challenge this either on *a priori* grounds or because they still regard the results achieved by parapsychological research as insufficient. If, however, parapsychology has really succeeded in establishing certain categories of facts, such as 'extrasensory perception' (ESP), telepathic and psychokinetic phenomena as so on, while the correctness of other phenomena such as the occurrence of "excursion"¹ is being seriously considered, this cannot fail to have a deep influence on philosophy.² This in turn is bound to shake some of the foundations of the view of the world which has been held for several centuries. At the same time, however, it can be expected that the selective principles that have been used to describe the history of human thought will begin to change. A point of view which was automatically ignored by a nineteenth century scholar may well be of interest, possibly of renewed interest, to a twentieth century historian of philosophy. This is, in my opinion, so in the case of the point of view of "dualistic materialism".

It should, in itself, be possible to attempt to build up a theory to explain the facts established by parapsychology with a greater or lesser degree of certainty on the basis of this point of view. I do not, however, propose to follow this course, but rather to undertake a different and *philosophical* investigation. In this, I will *firstly* examine *historically* the form in which dualistic materialism was adhered to and which thinkers and schools adhered to it, both during the period before negative selection took place in connection with this doctrine and in the period of selection by elimination, during which it continued to exist as an undercurrent. *Secondly*, I shall carry out a more concise investigation into the philosophical *possibility* and *meaning* of the views concerned. It is therefore up to the practical parapsychologists themselves to make use of the ideas previously held and expounded, to supplement the opportunity offered to them here and to substantiate the hypothesis concerned.

2. DUALISTIC MATERIALISM OR HYLIC PLURALISM

Up till now, I have spoken only of "dualistic materialism". This is the obvious term insofar as only two kinds of matter are presup-

¹ See, for example, Hornell Hart, *Traveling ESP. Report I* Conference Utrecht 1953, cf. *Tomorrow II*, 2, p. 81 ff.

² See C.D. Broad, "The Relevance of Psychical Research to Philosophy," *Philosophy*, 1949.

posed, in other words, a dualism. But, on closer inspection, is the term "materialism" entirely tenable? This is undoubtedly the case insofar as many thinkers and schools of thought have taught that a second great subdivision of matter exists and no more than this—that there is, in their opinion, nothing higher than this. In the meantime, however, their assumption of this *second* category of matter has, in their case, remarkable consequences. Dr. de Jong, for example, has pointed out that, with this "other side of materialism", the acceptance of a continued existence after death is in no sense excluded.¹ On the other hand, however, the monistic materialists, such as Büchner and those like him, would, de Jong has indicated, have nothing to do with this. He has also pointed out that this can also be accompanied by religious convictions and a religious attitude, with the result that it is possible to speak, in the case of the Stoics, for example, and in a few other cases, of a *religious materialism*. All the same, it remains true that the *highest* form of existence was, for the Stoics, for example, matter, so that, in a case such as this, it is correct to apply the term "materialism".

It is, however, very doubtful whether the word "materialistic" can also be correctly applied to the ideas of *other* schools of thought and thinkers who certainly also accepted two great subdivisions of matter, ordinary, coarser matter and a finer, more subtle matter, closely connected with the soul, but did this in a different way. After all, the well known neo-Platonic school taught, on the one hand, that the soul had an *ochēma* or vehicle,² composed of finer matter; on the other hand, the neo-Platonists were involved in polemics with the Stoic school and rejected Stoic materialism explicitly. In other words, neo-Platonism accepted the idea of twofold matter, of twofold corporeality (*duplex corporalitas*), the finer corporeality serving as the vehicle of the soul, but regarded the soul *itself* not as of material nature, but as immaterial. For the neo-Platonists, then, matter was not the highest reality that existed—in this context, we have only to think of Plotinus' teaching about *to en*, the One.

But, by definition, materialism teaches that *the highest reality is material*. What, then, do I really have to investigate? Where does the idea that the soul is nothing more than a finer matter occur in the

1 See B 76, p. 1 ff.: "Materialismus und Seelenfortdauer".

2 *Ochēma* from *Ocheō* to bear, carry, in the passive, to ride, sail; hence *Ochēma*, vehicle or vessel (*vehiculum, currus*) in general. See, for example, Hermias (in Plat. Phaedr., p. 130 fin.): *to aidion ochēma tēs psuchēs*, the lasting vehicle of the soul. See. Thesaurus linguae graecae, under *Ochēma*).

history of dualistic materialism (a point of view which Lange ignored in connection with the spread of this idea)? Not at all—I am interested not only in the occurrence of this idea, but also, and more generally, in the opinion that matter is divided into several greater categories, one of which is especially connected with the soul, even though this opinion is *not* accompanied by the conviction that no reality exists which is higher than any other form of matter. In this case, the problem, where does dualistic materialism occur and what is its meaning, is, however, too narrow. We are not only concerned with the Stoic viewpoint, but also with that of neo-Platonism, because the interesting aspect, even in connection with the rise of the new science of parapsychology, is to be found more in the acceptance of these two categories of matter, a coarser and a more rarefied matter, than in the possible interpretation that matter is the *highest* reality.

It is clear that those who speak of a finer, more subtle matter in connection with the soul thus expose themselves to the suspicion of being regarded as materialists. It is thus customary to refer to the “materialistic psychology” of a number of Church Fathers and Christian writers,¹ of Buddhism and many Hindu philosophical systems and of modern theosophy and anthroposophy. The term materialistic psychology can certainly be applied to these psychologies insofar as there is *any question* of (a finer) matter in connection with the soul. But, strictly speaking and viewed philosophically, the term “materialistic” does not *need* to be correct in these cases, since, in philosophy, “materialism” implies that no reality exists that is higher than the material reality. This clearly does not apply in the case of the neo-Platonists—they rejected the materialism of the Stoics. For them, the material in connection with the soul was no more than the vehicle of the soul. The soul itself was immaterial and the deepest reality was also not material, but was transcendent with regard to the material. Hence, the idea of *duplex corporalitas*, twofold corporeality, a coarser and a finer corporeality, can occur *both* in the case of a background according to which the deepest reality is spiritual and in the case of a point of view which must rightly be called dualistic materialism, because there is, according to this view, also twofold matter, but nothing higher than matter in any form.

If this is indeed the case, then to call the subject of my study dualistic materialism, even though this is the term that is commonly used in philosophy whenever materiality in connection with the soul is referred

1 Indeed, as we shall see, everything that exists is material for *some* of these authors.

to, is certainly too narrow and a wider term must be found. I would therefore suggest the term *hylic pluralism*.¹ By *hyle* is meant matter in a very broad sense,² thus embracing both ordinary matter and this possible finer, more subtle matter. In reversing the order of the words in this term, I am attempting to give expression to the fact that it is not in the first place a question of matter as a philosophical point of view ("materialism"), but rather a question of *several* forms or subdivisions of matter. I do not therefore refer to *hylic dualism*, so as not to confine myself to *two* subdivisions. The view that the soul does not possess one *ochēma* or vehicle, but several *ochēmata* or vehicles of finer matter, of decreasing density, is sometimes encountered, for example, in the case of the neo-Platonist Proclus. For this reason, I prefer, very generally, the term *pluralism*.

As I have already observed, Lange rejected materialism as an ultimate point of view, even though he wrote a history of (monistic) materialism. There is another point of similarity here between the present study and his work—in my case too, there is reference to materialism, in this case, dualistic materialism—but I do not agree with this point of view either. As will become apparent in the later part of this book, I am far more in sympathy with the varieties of *hylic pluralism* which do *not* regard matter as the highest reality than with the variety which is correctly known as dualistic materialism. I shall certainly discuss this materialism, but I shall go further than Lange in my rejection of it. In accordance with this, the word "materialism", which adorns the title of Lange's work, is transferred in my book to the explanatory subtitle: "*so-called*, that is, commonly, but only partly correctly called in philosophy, *dualistic materialism*".

In order to avoid giving this study a long and awkward title, I have, moreover, called it as a whole *Ochēma*,³ in accordance with a very

1 See my *Tweeërlei Subjectiviteit* (B 114), 45, "Noisch monisme, hylicsch pluralisme".

2 I am bound to admit that *hyle* is sometimes used for matter in the lower sense (see, for example, B 177, p. 318), but in "hylemorphism", for example, in an extremely wide sense.

3 It may be asked whether a treatise which is called *Ochēma*, in accordance with the vehicle of the soul, may not be regarded as the counterpart to a treatise which took the soul itself as its point of departure and was therefore entitled *Psyche*, as in the case of Erwin Rohde's well-known work (B 132). On closer inspection, however, there is no sharp antithesis between my aim and that of Rohde. Rohde did not, in the word "psyche" have anything like the "consciousness" in mind, but an older concept of the soul, an *eidōlon*, which "repeats" (see B 132, p. 6, n. 1) the visible ego of man while the *psuchē* of the Greeks was to be conceived as something "aerial" or "breath-like" (p. 3). There is, then, little *antithesis* between *psyche* and *ochēma* in a view of this kind.

characteristic form of hylic pluralism, the teaching of neo-Platonism, many analogies with which can be found elsewhere, about the *vehicle* of the soul which is in itself non-material and different in kind.

But, although I propose to abandon "materialism" as the main theme of this study, there is yet another analogy between Lange's aim and mine. The obvious question that arises is why Lange, who, on the one hand, explicitly rejected materialism as the ultimate philosophical point of view,¹ yet, on the other hand, gave so much attention to the same point of view and went into the whole history of philosophy with regard to its occurrence. He did this because he regarded this point of view as so useful *as a method* and believed that the regeneration of the sciences has often been accompanied by a return of materialistic views, as, for example, at the time of the Renaissance,² and that materialism was "the first and the lowest, but also comparatively the firmest step in philosophy".³ This consideration might now emerge convincingly in a rather wider context. I do not assume *a priori*, nor do I tend towards the affirmation that the theory of the existence of a finer matter connected with the consciousness and distinct from the ordinary body, that is, the existence of a subtle body, might be a panacea for the theoretical difficulties of parapsychology. This is not probable even in anticipation. In any case, other views, proceeding more from "life" than from the form or from a body, would no doubt arise quite soon in addition to a view that is inclined to give more prominence to seeing from the outside, to objectivisation in the form of bodies, in other words, of things, and to substance rather than to function. Nonetheless, even though it may not be crowned with success, the attempt to classify these rather fleeting "occult" phenomena under the heading of body or thing or—finer—matter may in itself prove useful for the purpose of clarification, even though it will become apparent that the process has its limitations. I shall, then, keep to Lange's method, but, *mutatis mutandis*, with a wider field in view. And, just as the great breadth of (monistic) materialism became apparent to Lange in his historical investigation, so too will it become clear to the reader that very many thinkers have, in the course of their examination of the problems of that wider field, come to accept views that have tended towards a dualistic materialism or at least towards an objectivisation.

1 B 89, II, p. 512.

2 B 89, I, p. 178.

3 B 89, II, p. 512.

3. PROBLEMS OF HYLIC PLURALISM

I propose therefore to embark upon a study of hylic pluralism—to keep to the suggested terminology. Up to the present, however, this hylic pluralism has not yet been sufficiently clearly defined. The term could, for example, be equally well applied to ordinary chemistry, to the many chemical elements—a true pluralism of matter. It is true that I have spoken of two *great* subdivisions of matter, a coarser and a finer. But even in the ordinary physical-chemical states of aggregation—the solid, liquid and gaseous states of matter—there are great subdivisions with differences in fineness or density. These subdivisions are, however, clearly not meant when what is under discussion is a subtle body or vehicle of the soul of which the soul is said to make use after death or after the disintegration of the body of “coarser” matter. What is, however, striking in this context is the content, not of the modern teaching about chemical elements, but of the ancient teaching about the elements, both in the West and in the East. Generally speaking, five such elements occur—earth, water, air, fire and ether (or *ākāśa*.) At least three of these apparently correspond with the states of aggregation of solid, liquid and gaseous matter. On the other hand, however, an explicit distinction is made between two kinds of “air”, *aēr*, ordinary air, the wind and so on, and a higher form, *aither*, in the firmament.¹ Just as everything sublunary was regarded as inferior in quality, so too were these two forms of air seen as very different in quality. This distinction sometimes went even further—in Indian thought, there are the *sukṣma-bhūtas*, the great or cosmic elements, a subdivision which is apparently more radical than the difference between vapour, water and ice. Windisch referred to the “fine, transcendent form” of the elements in connection with the fine body (*linga-sarira*) of the soul in Sāṅkhya and Vedānta philosophy.² It is also possible to ask whether it is probable that Thales accepted that everything, including the visible earth and so on, came from visible water or that he took the view that, of everything that the Indians called the *sukṣma-bhūtas* or cosmic elements, only the one that corresponded in sequence to the visible “element” water existed, and nothing higher, with the result that everything came from this. Furthermore, there would appear to be a connection, for example, bet-

¹ E. Rohde, *Psyche* (B 132), II, p. 258, n. 3. According to Aristotle, the ether was “more subtle than the others” (Verbeke, B. 174, p. 59).

² *Buddha's Geburt* (B 178), p. 81, 82 ff. See von Glasenapp (B 53), p. 207, 387.

ween the various spheres in which, according to Proclus, the soul descended—each time taking on a different and less fine vehicle—and the ancient teaching about the elements, which he clearly regarded as *sukṣma-bhūtas*. Whatever the case may be, it is not possible to go into the ancient teaching about the elements in great detail in this introduction at least. What can be done, however, is to define pluralism a little more closely. With these great subdivisions of matter, to which, on the one hand, our ordinary body belongs and to which, on the other hand, possibly one or more subtle bodies also belong, I have *ex hypothesi* factors in mind which are mutually related as solid matter is related to liquid, or solid and liquid matter is related to gaseous, but on a much greater scale than this, in which the ordinary states of aggregation (that is, solid *plus* liquid *plus* gaseous) form as a whole one term of comparison and the other great subdivision(s) of matter—of more rarefied matter, from which the vehicle(s) of the soul, quite apart from the ordinary coarse body and from life “here”, might be formed—constitute a following term or terms. A conception, so to speak, of great or cosmic, of *sukṣma-states of aggregation*. I have therefore built up a framework of concepts with regard to which it will be a question of establishing, in the first place, in the case of which thinkers or schools of thought ideas have occurred which fit into this framework and, in the second place (in the later part of this book), to what extent these concepts and ideas are philosophically possible and tenable.

In the meantime, the following point must be made. There is a clear need to distinguish between three different points of view. Firstly, some thinkers have confined themselves to the idea of a finer matter of a radically different kind without any special agglomeration in the form of a body. Secondly, there are those who do refer explicitly to a body, vehicle or *ochēma* and thirdly, there is the point of view which maintains that this finer matter or more rarefied body is apparently found in a world with its own space, a more rarefied “sphere” or some other framework.

Democritus is representative of the first point of view. According to him, all being consisted of atoms, but the soul consisted of the finest atoms—small, round, smooth atoms, fire atoms and so on. This, in brief, is his “finely worked out materialistic psychology”.¹ Although it is possible to find, in the extant fragments of Democritus’ work,

¹ Windelband (B 177), p. 128.

ideas which may properly be called parapsychological¹ in the immediate context of his teaching about the finest atoms, there is no mention of a subtle *body* or vehicle of the soul. A similar, but more fundamental idea can be found not only in the medieval thinkers who followed the Augustinian tradition, but also in the thought of others of the same period. Whereas Thomas Aquinas and those of his school simply regarded the soul as the form of the body and the body as the matter of the soul,² the other thinkers postulated the existence of a *materia spiritualis*, that is, that spiritual substances consisted, in themselves and, for example, after death, of both form and matter.³ This antithesis was the subject of the well-known controversy about *uniformity* and *pluriformity* with regard to the relationship between soul and the body. The question was, did the body still have a form when the soul was no longer united to it and did the soul still have a matter when body and soul had become separated? The Augustinian tradition replied "yes" to this question. But these thinkers generally postulated this matter of the soul after death, this *materia spiritualis*, only as a principle. In most cases, this germ of matter, this principle, was not thought of as a spiritual *body*.

Many other thinkers, however, did accept the existence of what has sometimes been called a *meta-organism*.⁴ that is, that the finer matter or matter of a different kind was organised into a subtle body, a real vehicle of the soul or *ochêma*. I have set myself the special task of investigating the occurrence of this teaching; in that way shall I conceive hylic pluralism, first of all.

A certain limitation is necessary here in view of the very extensive material. In principle, however, the *third* point of view mentioned above must also be discussed in this context, if I am *not* to confine myself to anthropology and psychology, to the aspect of the human *soul* as composed of fine matter, but am to consider also the cosmological framework within which this soul, insofar as its aspect of fine matter is concerned, may be found (in this context, one is reminded of the "*sukşma* states of aggregation"), that is, in a distinctive world of a different kind, characterised—because the material is so closely connected with the extensive—by a distinctive space of a different kind. In this way, I would be able to provide a survey of the views about *different, finer*

1 See B 176, I p. 74.

2 See B 140, pp. 229-230.

3 See B 171, p. 381 etc.

4 See, for example, L. von Hellenbach (B 184, under "meta-organism").

worlds or "spheres" and come to what Mattiesen² has called the beginning of a "science of the beyond". This, however, would take me too far. The doctrines of the finer bodies are more concrete, but the framework within which they are supposed to be found is clearly an abstraction, a generalisation. The authors who have been concerned with this type of consideration have had much more to say about the first than about the second. I shall, however, not entirely neglect the second, the cosmological point of view, which is interesting enough in itself (I am reminded here, for example, of the point of spatiality) and sufficiently interesting and important in principle and shall mention the relevant doctrines in passing. In the main, however, I shall confine myself to the anthropological aspects of hylic pluralism. This is, moreover, advisable, as I have already said, because of the extensiveness of the subject.

4. PSYCHOHYLISM

The anthropological problem can and must be even more sharply defined. Is there, for example, a connection between our problems and what is usually known as *hylozoism*? Hylozoism maintains that matter itself is living, that the atoms, for example, are not simply dead matter, but that they possess, as an original quality, a certain consciousness, a vague striving, weak sensations or something similar. This is therefore a *more primitive* connection between consciousness and matter than that which is given in the relationship between the human consciousness (a soul is often referred to in this context) and the ordinary body (whether this is regarded as a psychophysical parallelism, as a psychophysical interaction or in some other way). Is this hylozoism perhaps connected with our hylic pluralism? It is and it is not. Hylozoism views everything as coming from matter, as perceived or known by us, and maintains that, not only in the case of living beings, there is, contrary to our expectations, a lasting connection between consciousness and perceptible matter. Our problem, however, is precisely the reverse. It proceeds from the consciousness or the psyche or the soul and it is put forward that here too there is in fact a lasting connection between the consciousness and the material appearance or body, *even where this is not expected*, as, for example, when

¹ Modern theosophy refers here to "planes". The term for this is, according to E. R. Dodds, B 33, p. 303, *to platos*, the "literal equivalent," in neo-Platonism.

² B 98, III, p. 338.

by death, the psychophysical unity is disintegrated. All this is seen from the point of view of the consciousness and what is postulated is that this is constantly accompanied by some matter or a body, even apart from the living composite unity as known to us in our everyday experience. But, despite the similarity between our problem and that of hylozoism—the lasting, close and fairly uncomplicated connection between consciousness and matter—there is, however, also such a great difference in point of view and approach that our problem cannot be included under the heading “hylozoism”. I should therefore like to introduce a new term for my point of view —*psychohylism*. This implies the view, not that matter paradoxically also has lasting consciousness—this is known as hylozoism—but that consciousness constantly has a material and corporeal aspect. This view is encountered, in a more or less strict form, in many thinkers, whereas other thinkers explicitly reject it in principle. Leibniz formulated what I call psychohylism felicitously in the statement: “souls never leave all their bodies”.¹ The extent to which Leibniz himself was thinking of finer bodies here will be examined later. In the meantime, however, his statement expresses my intention very well—if the soul loses or leaves its one body, it still has a body or it has another body, for example, a subtle body.² This, then, is precisely the subject of this study, with everything that is implied by this psychohylism. “Psychohylism” is therefore a more precise definition of my subject, that is, hylic pluralism seen from the anthropological point of view.

5. TERMINOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

There is good reason to go more deeply now into this finer body of man, and especially into its *nature*. It is seen in contrast to the ordinary body of coarser matter, but divergent views of the supposed subtle body are clearly possible and it can be seen as being situated at a different level.

In a well-known Pauline text, we read: *Ei estin sōma psuchikon estin kai pneumatikon*. translated in the Authorised Version as “there is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body”.³ Thus, *psuchikos* is rendered here, in

¹ B 91, VI, p. 601.

² Origen, for example, was one of those who was of the opinion that the soul was never without some body (see B 29, III, c. 1895; B 22, II, p. 429). The same applies to Hierocles (see B 22, II, 393). Fechner wondered whether the soul could ever completely do without a corporeal bearer (*Zend-Avesta*, B 42, II, p. 201).

³ 1 Cor. 15. 44.

the Dutch State Bible and in the new Dutch Protestant translation¹ by "natural", in the Revised Standard Version by "physical" and in some Dutch translations by "soul body".² What is meant by this *sōma psuchikon*—the ordinary body of coarse matter or another, finer vehicle? And what is meant by the spiritual or "pneumatic" body, which is contrasted with this and to which Paul refers in the same passage³ as the body that is to be resurrected? It is possible to conclude, on the basis of these texts, that Christianity accepts a hylic pluralism—unless the most literal exegesis of the resurrected body is accepted, man apparently rises with a different body—a spiritual body.⁴

Many different views concerning the nature of the finer body have been put forward. I shall try to put them into some kind of order and to classify them under definite headings. I shall, moreover, try to do this on the basis of the word or concept *pneuma*.

Pneuma, in Greek, (in Latin *spiritus* and in English "spirit") is a term which has many different meanings. On the one hand there is methylated spirit, spirit of salt (or hydrochloric acid) and spirit of sal-ammoniac (or ammonia). On the other hand, there is the Holy Spirit, the third person of the Trinity, thought of as characteristically immaterial. Then there are, on the one hand, those "spirits" which haunt rooms and are invisible, except to those who claim to be clairvoyant, and, on the other hand, Hegel's subjective spirit, objective spirit and absolute spirit. We have, therefore, to establish what is meant by *pneuma* or spirit and which use of the word we are to follow. In this way, we may be able to find a thread which will lead us through the maze of the finer bodies.

Before doing this, however, we have to take into account a number of terminological considerations, both in general and in connection with our subject. The confusion that can arise with regard to terminology can be illustrated by the following example. The words *reason* and *intellect* have been used alternately in the history of philosophy for the relatively higher function. Hegel and Bolland, for instance, regarded reason or *Vernunft* as a much deeper faculty than the purely analytical intellect. In "rationalism" and in the "cult of reason" of

1 B 18, 1951; see also the Dutch State Bible.

2 In the Leiden translation, in A. M. Brouwer's translation and in the Catholic Petrus Canisius translation. See F.M. Grosheide, *Het Nieuwe Testament in zes Nederlandse vertalingen*, Amsterdam, 1950.

3 1 Cor. 15. 44. More about Paul later.

4 Included among the *dotes* or gifts attributed to the glorified body since earliest times by the Church is *subtilitas*, permeability. See B 147, IV, p. 933; B 29, III, c. 1887.

the French Revolution, reason is equal to the intellect. In mediaeval philosophy, however, and in the case of Cusanus,¹ the intellect or *intel-ligentia* was regarded as the higher faculty, which was later known as speculative reason, whereas the *ratio* was the lower faculty, the analytical intellect. This is precisely a reversal of the order of priority and it shows how careful one should be in one's use of terms and how necessary it is to question what is meant by them in a given context and how far their validity—for example, in the absolute or in the relative sense—extends.

In the context of our subject too, there are cases of a complete change in meaning. Many early thinkers accepted a threefold division, a tri-*chotomy*, of spirit, soul and body. In the case of most of these thinkers, the soul acted as the link between the spirit and the body, the spirit being regarded very often as immaterial and the soul—mediating between the spirit and the body of coarser matter—being regarded as possessing a finer materiality. In the case of Pico della Mirandola, however, the reverse is true—he regarded the spirit, a fine, luminous substance, as the *vinculum* or link between the immaterial soul and the body.² It is obvious that a similar relationship between the three factors is intended in both cases, but the terminology is different.

A different use of the same term is also to be found elsewhere in the history of hylic pluralism. The term “ethereal body” is used regularly to render the teaching of the neo-Platonists about the vehicle of the soul—*ochēma*, but, in their case, also *sōma aitherōdes* which is used by the soul after death and this term is also commonly used by the Romantics for the same purpose.³ Rudolf Steiner and the anthroposophists (as well as the theosophists) use the term “ethereal body”, however, in a much more limited sense—the “ethereal body” (*Ätherleib*), the “life body” (*Lebensleib*) or the “formative power body” (*Bildekräfteleib*) is, in their case, certainly of fine matter, but has to do with physical growth. The term “astral body” (*Astral-leib*) is used by them for the vehicle of the soul after death.⁴ In this context, other thinkers, such as du Prel, also prefer to speak of an

1 See B 41, p. 21.

2 See B 38, under the relevant heading.

3 See B 39, under the heading *Atherleib*.

4 The term *ochēma astroeides* also occurs in neo-Platonism, though here is no general agreement about the neo-Platonic who first used it. Dr. K. H. E. de Jong was of the opinion that *astroeides* was first used in this context by Damascius (see B 73); Prof. Dodds, on the other hand (see B 33, p. 313, n. 4), believed that it was Proclus. Certainly the term is encountered in Proclus: *In Plat. Tim.*, 41 A (ed. Teubner, III, p. 195, 5; see also p. 265, 1).

"astral body". It is therefore important to make clear distinctions and to observe the *level* that is intended more than the terms used. It will also be necessary to establish a definite terminology and to keep strictly to this.

What is striking in this context is that the terms are sometimes used in a relative sense and sometimes in an absolute sense. When Buddhism speaks of an *Arūpa-loka*, for example, a world of "non-forms",¹ is this meant only in a relative sense, especially as there is reference to a *loka*, a world, or is it meant in an absolute sense? A similar question arises also in Christianity and in Western thought in general. Is "immaterial" to be regarded as completely immaterial or not? "Immaterial," *ahulon*, is also apparently used there in the relative sense—immaterial with regard to the coarse body, but therefore of a finer matter. As far as neo-Platonism is concerned, Proclus explicitly spoke of the *ochēma*, the vehicle of fine matter of the soul, as *ahulon*² and this was clearly intended to be relative—immaterial with regard to the coarse matter of the ordinary human body. In addition to this, "corporeal" may also be taken in a narrower or in a broader sense. In German, it is possible to make a distinction between body as *Leib* and body as *Körper* and this has frequently been done. *Körper* is simply the ordinary body of coarse matter, whereas *Leib* is the generic term for various kinds of bodies. In this way, the terms *Ätherleib*, *Nervenleib* and *Astralleib* occur frequently, but *Ätherkörper* or *Astralkörper* far less frequently, although the distinction is not rigidly adhered to. There is also a similar hesitation between a narrower meaning and a wider meaning in connection with the word *corporel* in French. In his book, *Le Thomisme*, chapter VIII, "Les Anges", E. Gilson wrote: "The angels are therefore quite incorporeal (*incorporel*). May we go further and regard them as quite immaterial? There are many philosophers and teachers who deny this".³ He was using the word *corporel* here in the narrow sense—the angels do not, according to these thinkers, have an ordinary (coarse) body. He uses "immaterial" in the absolute sense, however—in the sense of completely immaterial. He also points out that there is a fairly widespread view that the angels consist of a certain (finer) kind of matter. In that case, "matter"—like our *hyle*—includes various forms. The word *corporel*, however, was used by Gilson only for the body of coarse matter. A wider use

1 B 53, p. 331.

2 In *Elementa theologika*, Prop. 208. See B 33, p. 306.

3 1922, p. 127.

of the word can, on the other hand, be found in the following statement in the article on "Ange", in connection with the Latin Fathers of the Church in the *Dictionnaire de Théologie catholique*: "The true formula for the greatest number would be: compared with man, the angel is spiritual; compared with God, he is corporeal (*corporel*)."¹ In this case, the word *corporel*, *corporalis*, corporeal, is taken in the wider sense of embracing several kinds of body, including a subtle form. In these distinctions (or failures to distinguish), the Christian authors were following classical antiquity. As Rüsche (B 137, p. 41) has written, "The word *asōmatos* (incorporeal) does not always mean something purely immaterial or incorporeal in the real sense, but often something of fine matter, such as air, fire, light and ether (all this conceived as a fine fluid)."² If all this is true, if the terms immaterial and incorporeal are so often used in a relative sense, this can easily give rise to confusion—all the more so because there is an inclination to read the present-day absolute meaning into these terms when considering the ancient authors. It is therefore important to pay constant attention to the context when reading the works of earlier writers—the full sense in which the term is used will be apparent from its context.

In addition to this, it is also clear that these terms are also used at very different levels. "Spirit", *spiritus* and *pneuma* are, as previously indicated, a good example of this.

What emerges from this, then, is the necessity of establishing the sense in which one wishes to use these various terms and of keeping strictly to the established terminology.

As I have already indicated, I prefer to use, for material in the wider sense, thus including both ordinary "coarse" matter and other finer or more subtle forms of matter, the word "hylic". What is more, I shall use the word *pneuma* (on the basis of which I shall investigate the various levels) only in the material or hylic sense and the English word *spirit* only in the strictly immaterial sense.

I shall, then, use the word "hylic" as the generic term for all kinds of matter and, at the same time, the word *pneuma*, which, although it is rather unusual in English, is really quite suitable for the purpose, for the various finer forms of matter. In this, I shall be departing from the practice of many authors, such as G. Verbeke,³ who, recogni-

¹ B 29, I, col. 1199.

² See also Verbeke (B 174), p. 17; Cudworth (B 22), p. 473.

³ *L'évolution de la doctrine du Stoïcisme à S. Augustin*, 1945 (see B 174).

sing that the Holy Spirit is known in Greek as *to pneuma hagion*, tend to write about the concept of *pneuma* in a more spiritual sense.¹

I shall also use the word "body" both in the wider and in the narrower sense—no distinction can be made in English that is similar to that which is possible in German, between *Leib* and *Körper*.

Finally, I shall use the word "immaterial" not in a purely relative sense, but only in the absolute sense. This concept of immaterial will include, in the first place, *immaterial being*. There is a view that the highest deity, including the three persons of God, one of whom is the Holy Spirit, is completely immaterial and is a reality which is *above* that of the world which is divided into many parts, either of ordinary matter or of some form of finer matter. My concept of immaterial will, in the second place, include *immaterial noetic or ideal relationships*, such as the connection, in accordance with their content, between, for example, two geometrical patterns (without regard to how many real triangles or circles in the concrete are included in the concept of these patterns) or the relationship between, for example, Hegel's subjective, objective and absolute Spirit.

In a history of hylic pluralism, it will be a question of looking for the occurrence of all these concepts (or rather of intentions lurking behind constantly changing terms!)—of looking for the acceptance of various kinds of finer matter or *pneuma*, situated at different levels, against a background—sometimes accepted, but sometimes denied—of immaterial being which may be more or less extensive.

6. SPECIES OF PNEUMA—PHYSICAL PNEUMA

Let us, then, first of all consider the difference between various kinds of *pneuma*—finer matter, either organised or not organised into a body or vehicle—in accordance with the level at which they are situated.

In this, I would distinguish between (*physical pneuma*), *physiological pneuma*, *psychological pneuma* and *pneumatological pneuma* or, to avoid this term, *sublime pneuma*.

I have placed *physical pneuma* between brackets—this is, in brief, the air or the wind. The root of the word *pneuma* is *pne*, meaning

¹ If Verbeke had concentrated less on the use of the word *pneuma* and more on the occurrence of the concept of the immaterial in the period of his research, he might I believe, have come to a different conclusion. I will go into this question in greater detail later.

"blow", and this is not without good reason.¹ Insofar, however, as it is simply a question of the movement of the ordinary air, this physical *pneuma* does not present any problem to hylic pluralism and even the monistic materialist or any other scientist or natural philosopher accepts the air, whether this is called "physical *pneuma*" or not. Insofar, however, as *pneuma* has been used quite differently, as for example by the Stoics, as a finer matter penetrating the whole world and of which the soul also consists, then it is useful to define the limits between this physical *pneuma* and other kinds of *pneuma*. In itself, however, physical *pneuma* does not give rise to any questions of dualistic materialism or hylic pluralism.

Physical *pneuma* or the phenomenon of the outside air does, however, give rise to a number of observations. Air, the most familiar gas and therefore, in wider terms, the state of aggregation of gaseous matter, has, in general, two striking qualities—it is, in the first place, in itself invisible and, in the second place, it cannot easily be grasped. Unless it is contained in a special way, gas has the quality of eluding our grasp—it is much more elusive than, for example, a liquid. In other words, gas is *relatively subtle*. There is clearly an affinity here with the qualities that are usually ascribed to "spirits" and demons—they are invisible, at least to the ordinary eye, rarefied and difficult to grasp and they pass through solid matters. There are therefore two possibilities—either the "spirits" have been incorrectly regarded, as a result of this apparent affinity, as material, although consisting of a very fine matter, or the subtlety of air can be regarded as an anticipation of, or an analogy in this world with a much greater subtlety in other worlds. I shall, however, not discuss this problem at the moment, since I am at present only concerned with an investigation of the occurrence of ideas about a finer materiality. In any case, however, it may be affirmed that ideas about a materiality that is much finer than that of air have been regularly held and that there are many cases of material air serving as a prototype in these ideas.

Air, then, occurs frequently in the ancient teaching about the great elements. It is a fairly obvious assumption that one of the reasons for this is because it is intangible and invisible. I have already questioned (see above, p. 10 ff.) whether what was meant in antiquity by

1. See B 174, p. 1. The same applies to *spiritus* and apparently also to the equivalents of *pneuma* in various other ancient languages (see below, p. 120). This meaning is also retained in such modern terms as pneumatic tyres (that is, tyres filled with air), pneumatic brakes, pneumatic drills and so on.

water, fire and so on was the same as ordinary water or ordinary fire.¹ As for air, an explicit distinction was made between a lower form, the *aēr*, and a higher form, the *aithēr*. This ether or *ākāśa* played a very important part in all kinds of earlier cosmologies. Here too, the question arises as to whether this ether was an incorrect extension, a projection of the ordinary air, or whether it was an independent factor which simply displayed certain analogies with the lower air.

Another analogous reasoning has also struck me—radio and radar, the navigation of aircraft and rockets by radiography, all these recent inventions have made a deep impression. Several people who have not been naturally disposed to attach much importance to unusual phenomena such as telepathy, extra sensory perception and so on have been heard to remark that, since all this has appeared to be possible, it is not impossible that parapsychological phenomena are also based on truth. Here too, then, the possibility of a more distant activity arises from the one activity that is not directly visible and tangible. Is this a projection or an essential affinity? I shall not try to decide this here, but simply make the observation that what is being compared here is something that can, with a little good will, be called physical *pneuma*, but in a more complicated form than ordinary air, even though it does definitely come within the scope of ordinary natural science.

In another respect, ordinary air has certainly been used as a spring-board. I am thinking here of the *breath*—in breathing, air is breathed in and then breathed out again. Anyone who has ever observed how conclusively and finally the “last breath” is, in some cases, breathed out, can easily understand why many people, especially in the past, connected man’s breath and his soul together. For them, the soul escaped with the last breath—the soul *was* this breath or *pneuma*. And, according to Gen. 2. 7, God blew the breath of life² into Adam’s nose.

In such cases of identification, as, for example, that of breath and the soul, what is apparent is a failure to differentiate between and a treating alike of different levels which modern man has learnt to keep separate. This can be observed in many thinkers and schools of thought. It is important, however, that I should try to keep separate everything that *appears* to coincide with something else.

1 The Stoics therefore made a distinction between two kinds of fire—ordinary fire and a creative fire. See for example, B 174, p. 21.

2 Translated in the Septuagint (B 20) as *pnoē zōēs*.

As far as breath is concerned, this has, in the form of *prana*, also played an important part in Indian thought, but, like *pneuma*, *prana* has been used at apparently very different levels of meaning. In the Vedic period, the five *pranas* were regarded as the five immortal parts of man—thought, reason, breath, seeing and hearing,¹ but breath was thought of as the “central life-force” of these five. Much later, in Sāṅkhya and Vedānta, *prana* or the “breath of life” was regarded as the organising principle of the coarse body.²

7. THE PHYSIOLOGICAL PNEUMA

This almost brings us back again to the level of ordinary matter, but not quite. We must pause for a moment and consider another concept of *pneuma* that is not ordinary physical *pneuma*, namely *physiological pneuma*.³ Breath is, of course, also a question of physiology, but we must go a little further and see, not how modern man views things, but how earlier physiologists and medical men viewed them. This at once brings us to the subject of the *spiritus animales et vitales*, the animal spirits. This theory flourished for a very long time indeed. The term “animal spirits” is still sometimes heard and is applied especially to children. Whenever it is used, it calls not so much their soul as a definite physiological function to mind. These animal spirits were in the past regarded as very fine, dynamic particles which were secreted by the blood, entered the brains and, from the brains, circulated through the nerves and muscles in order to move the body.⁴ The name that is especially associated with this view is that of Galen (c. 131-201 A.D.), who contributed a great deal to its spread, but this and similar ideas can be found much earlier, in the Hippocratic writings, in Aristotle,⁵ the Stoics and various medical schools.⁶ Later, the teaching was introduced into the West via the Arab doctors and became widely accepted. The Renaissance believed firmly in the animal spirits—Fernel’s manual is an example of this. The doctrine was seriously considered in modern times and many of its aspects were

¹ B 53, p. 33.

² Ibid., p. 393.

³ This expression can be found, for example, in Siebeck (B 155), p. 380, n. 2., and in Rüschke (B 137), p. 75, 84.

⁴ See, for example, B 36, under *Lebensgeister*; T. H. Schlichting, “De leer der spiritus of levensgeesten”, *Bijdragen tot de Geschiedenis der Geneeskunde* 1939 (B 149).

⁵ *De anima* 457, a 11.

⁶ See Siebeck, B 155, p. 130 ff.

disputed or replaced, but it did enjoy favour until the emergence of the science of physiology round about the year 1840, when it was finally abandoned. Since it concerned a generally accepted physiological theory, it can be found in philosophers of very different shades of opinion and as such it is not interesting and not a good criterion for us to ascertain which philosophers show a tendency towards hylic pluralism. In themselves, however, the animal spirits do come within the scope of hylic pluralism, in that the theory presupposes the existence of a finer matter (*spiritus* or *pneuma*) which plays a part in the human organism, especially as a link between the soul and the visible body. Also, within the animal spirits, a distinction is made between various kinds of *pneuma*, the one kind finer than the other. In this, one doctor or medical school has, in the past, taken a different point of view from the other. In general, however, it is possible to say that a distinction was made between three kinds of "spirits". Firstly, there were the *spiritus naturales*, which, it was thought, originated in the liver, played a part in the digestion and the circulation of matter and belonged to the arterial blood. Secondly, these *spiritus naturales* were distilled in the heart into *spiritus vitales*, the real principle of life. In the meantime, the outside air, when inhaled into the body, was also a factor in this transformation. Thirdly, the *spiritus animales* were distilled in the brain from the blood, and these were responsible for the conductivity of the nerves, which were believed to be hollow.¹ Primitive ideas about the circulation of matter in the blood can be recognised in the first, about the factor of oxygen in the body in the second and about the conductivity of the nerves in the third. These last ideas prevailed the longest.

This doctrine of the nerve or animal spirits is therefore quite obviously at the psychical or physiological level and the term physiological *pneuma* is thus perfectly appropriate. It is also clear that, despite the fact that these "spirits" were thought of as subtle matter, it is still a question of something, the level of which is not really different from that of physical *pneuma*, from the fact that this doctrine also occurs in the case of explicitly (monistic) materialistic thinkers. Lamettrie (1709-1751), the author of *L'homme machine*, was a typical materialist, but he taught the existence of animal spirits, a teaching which Lange summarised as follows: "A fluid circulates in the tubes of the nerves, the animal spirit, the existence of which Lamettrie regarded as estab-

¹ B 149, p. 42.

lished by experiments".¹ The doctrine of the animal spirits is also to be found in Descartes (in connection with Fernel).² One might be inclined to regard this, in his case, as an encroachment on his strict dualism of soul (thought) and body (extensiveness), but one must be careful here—Descartes tried to make an interaction between soul and body plausible despite his dualism, but the point of contact for this is the pineal gland as the seat of the soul rather than the animal spirits.³ For Descartes, the animal spirits were purely material, as Lange has observed, "authentic matter, thought of as material".⁴

The animal spirits, although subtle, may therefore be included within the physical level. This does not mean, however, that the contrast with a level that may possibly follow was as sharp in the case of all thinkers as it was in the case of Lamettrie and Descartes. It is, on the contrary, probable that all kinds of transitions will be met with. Nonetheless, in the case of the physiological *pneuma*, the emphasis is always on the physical level. As long as there is life, there is, as far as those who hold this view are concerned, always physiological *pneuma*. When there is no more life—at death—the animal spirits cease to exist—they evaporate or are dissolved. Even though, in the case of the various authors, all kinds of gradations and intermingling of different levels can be met with—something that I am inclined to regard as conceptual confusion—I should like to make a clear distinction between a continued existence of the soul by its own efforts—possibly with an *ochêma* or covering of fine matter, a psychological *pneuma*—and a possible continued existence of the physiological *pneuma*. I admit that ideas are sometimes met with which apparently accept a continued existence of a physiological *pneuma*. This, however, is thought of in this case as being for only a short time, after which the human person disintegrates irrevocably. This gives the strong impression—for example, in the case of Epicurus⁵—of being an extension of the physiological *pneuma*, which is separated from the further body, and not an independent continued existence of the soul. In this connection, one is reminded of the old popular belief in the graveyard ghost which could be seen by a freshly dug grave, but which, unlike other kinds of ghosts, apparently soon vanishes. Finally, modern occultism, for

1 B 89, I, p. 332.

2 See E. Gilson, *Etudes sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien*, Paris (1930), p. 52 ff.

3 See B 141, p. 160.

4 See Lange (B 89), I, p. 201.

5 See B 132, II, p. 332; B 62, p. 21.

example, theosophy and anthroposophy, has the concept of the etheric double,¹ which is thought of as a finer part of the ordinary material body through which life-force or *prana* pours and which does not survive death or at least only survives for a very short time.

All this can be fitted into the same framework. It is true that it is then necessary to think of the concept of the physiological *pneuma* as broader in content than the theory of the animal spirits that prevailed for so many centuries, but this is also useful. There are also other views which clearly referred to the same level. F. A. Mesmer (1733-1815) and others who practised what is known as *animal magnetism* believed that they were exercising a power which, even though they may have imagined that its origin was higher than it really was, displayed, in its effect on the human organism and on man's health especially, an affinity with the level at which the animal spirits were assumed to operate. Associated with this are also the theories of others, for example, about a force "Od" (C. von Reichenbach, 1788-1869) in general—a *fluid*.² I shall return to some of these theories later, but the level to which the concept of the physiological *pneuma* refers is therefore quite clear—views concerning a finer, invisible materiality, but directly connected with the ordinary body of coarse matter and hardly or not at all removed from it.

This can also be expressed in a different way. Assuming that, as a medium of telepathy, a fine kind of ray were ascertained, this medium would act at the same level as the physiological *pneuma* in the somewhat wider sense that we have established (that is, wider than purely that of the "animal spirits"). This would, however, also link up with the physical *pneuma* in the rather wider sense which can be attached to it (see above, p. 36), namely, not simply air or gas, but an invisible and intangible materiality.

Both this physical *pneuma* and the physiological *pneuma* would then remain at the same level, within this world.

8. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PNEUMA

Turning now to the next level, that of the *psychological pneuma*, it will be obvious that there are transitions between the ideas of physio-

1. Not to be confused with the "etheral body" of the romantic movement which was conceived at a different level. See above, p. 16.

2. See the special number of the *Revue métapsychique*, January—February 1953 (B 47) on "Le Fluide".

logical and psychological *pneuma*. In this, we have first of all to consider the highest kind of animal spirits, the *spiritus animales*, which had to do with the conductivity of the nerves and which persisted for the longest time as an idea. The psychological *pneuma* too has often been regarded as a link between the soul (or spirit, according to the terminology used¹) and the functions of the body. But proof that it was possible to make a clear distinction between the various levels is given in a passage by Lavater on "impressions made by the nerve and animal spirits on the ethereal machine of Bonnet".² Bonnet's³ "ethereal machine" was precisely the "ethereal body"⁴ of the later romantics which was believed to be present in man, to serve as the vehicle of the soul which continued to exist independently after death and which, according to many of the romantic thinkers, contained within itself the germ of the later body of the resurrection. This distinction thus implies an emancipation from the physical and physiological level. According to this view, death does not in any sense mean an end. What continues to exist is independent of the physical body of coarse matter. It is also not pure spirit (as Thomas Aquinas and others conceived it), but either it is itself of fine matter or what continues to exist is itself purely spiritual or immaterial, but has a vehicle of finer matter, possessing a subtle body. (I will, of course, go into this alternative later). However this may be, something of a finer materiality does continue to exist. This is precisely what I have called "psychohylism"⁵—where it is not expected, the psyche nonetheless has a material aspect. This finer materiality, the *pneuma* at this level of the psyche, is organised into a new body, a rarefied vehicle or *ochēma*. Research into the occurrence of this idea brings us to the very heart of our subject. The physiological *pneuma* was only the first introduction to this. It is true that this amounts to a finer materiality, but this was distilled, or thought to be distilled, from the blood—the animal spirits or a life-force flowing through the physical body (animal magnetism or *prana* in the lowest sense) and thus closely associated with the ordinary body (thus accounting for its acceptance by certain monistic materialists such as Lamettrie) and either not surviving integrated existence at all or else only surviving it for a very short time. Now, however, we

1 See above, p. 16.

2 *Aussichten in die Ewigkeit* (1773), I, p. 83.

3 More will be said about Bonnet later.

4 This must be distinguished from the theosophists' and anthroposophists' "etheric double". See above p. 25.

5 See above p. 14.

are concerned with the view—as we shall see, a widespread view in very different environments and periods—of something of finer matter, existing independently of the body of coarse matter, leading a hidden existence perhaps during life—and perhaps even existing before life—but, after death, after the dissolution of the body, continuing to live on its own and, in all this, either consisting of a fine, rarefied or subtle kind of matter or possessing a vehicle of such matter. Very different names have been given to this—the Indian thinkers called it, among other things, the *linga—śarīra* and the neo-Platonists referred not only to *to ochēma tēs psuchēs*, the vehicle of the soul, but also to *to aitherōdes sōma*, the ethereal body. Professor Dodds, writing about this concept of the neo-Platonists, used yet another term—the “astral body”.¹ Paracelsus used the term “sidereal body”, the romantics “ethereal body”² and later writers such as du Prel and Matthesen “astral body”. It will therefore be important for us to keep constantly in mind, in this very divergent nomenclature, what is really meant as far as the level is concerned. It should, in the meantime, be sufficiently clear what is meant by the psychological *pneuma*—the level of a finer materiality which has emancipated itself, on the occasion of death, from the materiality of the ordinary visible body (or a finer materiality which is closely connected with this). I propose to investigate the occurrence of this idea of this *ochēma* of the soul.

A few observations have, however, to be made in connection with this description of my project.

In the first place, emancipation from the ordinary body of coarse matter does not necessarily imply a completely unlimited further existence, that is, immortality in the strict sense. What it does imply is a continued existence *for some time*, otherwise we would revert to that apparently short continued existence which is sometimes postulated of the physiological *pneuma*.³ Although it does not need to imply an endless continued existence of the *ochēma*, it *can* and does mean this in the case of some thinkers, whereas, in the case of others, it implies the idea of a *second death* after a lapse of time.

What is more, it is also a question of the modes of being of “spirits” and therefore, in particular, of the view that accepts that, in this state too, the spirit never occurs without a material aspect (psychohyлизм).

1 *The Astral Body in Neo-Platonism. Appendix II to Proclus' Elements of Theology* (B 33). For the origin of this term, see above, p. 16, note 4.

2 See p. 26 note 4.

3 See p. 24.

This, however, does not only concern the spirits or souls of men which have discarded their body of coarse matter at death. Popular belief and almost all religions recognise, in addition to this, the existence of other "spirits"—*demons, angels* and similar beings. The possession of a rarefied materiality is often attributed to these as well. Here too, we must make a clear distinction between a material body (of coarse matter) which these "spirits" would assume if they had a task or message to perform in the ordinary world (*angelos* is, of course, messenger) and the possession of a material body (of finer matter) at the level at which they normally exist. Even Thomas Aquinas, who regarded angels and human souls as completely immaterial substances, accepted that the angels assumed, in the first case, a material body.¹ No, it is a question of whether the demons or angels in themselves (in which case it is a question of the level of the psychological *pneuma*) also have bodies—of a finer matter—at their disposal. This has been confirmed by many writers. According to Hopfner,² for example, it was generally accepted in the popular belief of the Greeks that the demons³ did not originally have a human form, but that they did have a "pneumatic body". The Hellenistic philosophers also generally felt, as Psellos was later to set out in detail,⁴ that the demons had bodies at their disposal. Many of the Church Fathers were in agreement with them on this point.⁵ At the time of the Reformation, a similar opinion was met with in men of such opposite views as Cardinal Cajetan and the unfortunate Michel Servet as well as in Hugo Grotius.⁶ A history of hylic pluralism (so-called dualistic materialism) would not be complete without an investigation into the occurrence of the attribution of subtle bodies to non-human spirits.

A discussion of the attribution of vehicles of fine matter at the level of the psychological *pneuma* takes us, of course, to the very centre of our subject. The psychological *pneuma* constitutes the main aspect of this and I have dealt, by way of introduction, separately with the physiological *pneuma* on the one hand and will deal in the following

1 *Summa Theologiae* (B 166), Ia, q. LI; see also B 29, I, c. 1231.

2 *Griechisch-Ägyptischer Offenbarungszauber* (B 70), I, p. 46.

3 Before Christianity, this word had a neutral meaning.

4 See K. Svoboda, *La démonologie de Michel Psellos*, Bron 1927 (B 159).

5 The *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* (B 29) says about this: "In a word, the spirituality of angels has not been precisely affirmed by the Fathers" (I, c. 1195). It also says that the opinion that angels had rarefied bodies is to be found especially among the Greek Fathers of the Church and moreover that "this opinion has found representatives at all periods of history" (I, c. 1249).

6 Psalm 104. 4 was frequently quoted in this context.

section with the sublime *pneuma* on the other. I am, however, aware of the possibility of other subdivisions and these have in fact been made by various thinkers and philosophical schools. Proclus, for example, distinguished between several *ochēmata* and even between a series of *chitōnes* or coverings of the soul.¹ The Indian thinkers also made a distinction between different *śarīras* or *kośas*. This makes it clear that I was wise not to speak of "hylic dualism", but of "hylic pluralism"—even the distinction that I have already made between physiological, psychological and sublime *pneuma*, all three of them of fine matter, implies a pluralism. I will not, however, deal with any further possible divisions of vehicles and levels in this introduction, of that the "psychological *pneuma*" may definitely remain the main subject of my study.

9. THE SUBLIME PNEUMA

In one respect, that is, in the direction which is opposite to that of the physiological *pneuma*, another division must, however, be made. If we review the various affirmations that have been made about fine vehicles of the soul, one characteristic strikes us—all kinds of authors speak, among other things, about an *ochēma* or *pneuma* in a definite sense of a sublime quality which is difficult to surpass. According to these writers, there is, on the one hand, a psychological *pneuma* either with neutral qualities or with lower qualities—as the bearer of desires, as the vehicle of demons of an undesirable kind, as a finer body, in which the soul is supposed to suffer punishment in the underworld and so on. On the other hand, however, there is also a vehicle or body which in this respect represents the *ne plus ultra*. In the words of Paul, there is a psychical body, but there is also a pneumatic body,² a house in heaven,³ when the mortal has put on immortality.⁴ A similar antithesis is also to be found among the neo-Platonists. In his survey of their teachings, Mead⁵ explicitly contrasts their "spirit-body" with their "radiant body", to *augoeides ochēma*. Various neo-Platonic writers ascribed no immortality to the first, but immortality to the

1 See Dodds (B 33), p. 320.

2 1 Cor. 15. 44. The great confusion of terms is clear from the fact that, in the case of Proclus and other writers, the *sōma pneumatikon* is lower than the *Sōma augoeides*. See B 99, p. 47.

3 2 Cor. 5. 1.

4 1 Cor. 15. 54.

5 B 99, p. 45 ff; p. 75 ff.

second.¹ What is remarkable in this connection is that Proclus affirmed, on the one hand, all the *chitōnes* or coverings of the soul (including the most external, that of coarse matter) and, on the other, the immortal soul with its *sumphues ochēma*, its inborn or naturally given vehicle. The soul received its vehicle at the same time as it received its existence,² but the various *chitōnes* could be discarded. This highest vehicle was even *akinēton*, motionless, *ahulon*, immaterial (apparently meant in the relative sense,³ since it remained a vehicle or *ochēma*) and *apathes* or impassive.⁴ As we shall see, the medieval thinkers attributed precisely these characteristics to the (bodies of the) angels. In any case, the neo-Platonists acknowledged a great qualitative difference between the various categories of *ochēmata*.

Subtle bodies of high quality also occur elsewhere. In the preface to his edition of the Chinese "Mystery of the Golden Flower",⁵ Jung has pointed to the "idea of the diamond body, the incorruptible breath-body which originates in the golden flower", occurring in this writing.⁶ Buddhism refers to the *Sambhoga-kaya*, the body of blessedness, the "supraterrestrial body of salvation", with which the Buddha lives in the heavens.⁷ In the Hellenistic Gnosis, there is repeated reference to a "garment of light", a "robe of glory", in the *Corpus Hermeticum* of an immortal body, a body of fire.⁸ A mysticism of light, in which there was regular reference to a body of light, flourished in many different centuries. In this, light was not ordinary, physical light, but a supraterrestrial, indescribable light, a kind of metaphysiological phenomenon. The aureole, which people believed that they saw round the heads of saints and which became a traditional theme in art, is a light of this kind. The prototype is apparently the transfiguration of Jesus on the mountain as recounted in Mark 9. 3. But the idea of lustre or light also occurs in *to augoeides*⁹ *ochēma* of the neo-Platonists and Cudworth translated this expression by *vehiculum luciforme*.¹⁰

1 See Kissling, B 85, p. 324-325.

2 This was therefore conceived psychohylistically—the soul was *never* without a vehicle.

3 See Kissling (B 85), p. 325; Dodds (B 33), p. 304 and elsewhere.

4 *Das Geheimnis der goldenen Blüte*, edited by R. Wilhelm and C. G. Jung, Berlin, 1929.

5 *op. cit.*, p. 5.

6 See H. von Glasenapp, *Buddhistische Mysterien* (1940) p. 13.

7 See Dodds (B 33), p. 308, 314; Mead (B 99), p. 133; B 93, p. 171, etc.

8 Among the Cathari, for example. See F. Wiersma-Verschaffelt, *De Catharen. Mens en Kosmos*, 1953.

9 See Suidas, under this word.

10 B 22, p. 388.

In the meantime, one has the feeling that this theme returns partly in Christianity under the heading of the *resurrection of the flesh*, which takes place in the form of the glorified body (*corpus gloriosum*). The resurrection has frequently been taken quite literally by theologians, as the bringing to life again of the dead physical body. This idea gave them many difficulties. When an old man died, did he rise again as an old man? Did a dead child rise as a child? Or did everybody rise again with a body aged about thirty or so? The most difficult case in this context was that of cannibals,¹ who had eaten each others, bodies. To which of the two did the consumed flesh belong? As I have already indicated,² there can be no problem in the case of a completely literal resurrection. Most theologians, however, have not gone as far as this. The theme of preserving the identity of the person in the resurrection certainly necessitated postulating a resurrection in the most literal sense possible, but, on the other hand, there were also important reasons for accepting differences between the dead body and the resurrected body. The paradigm for man's resurrection was clearly the resurrection of Christ, who was raised as the first-fruits.³ But Christ, after his resurrection, passed through closed doors⁴ and sometimes suddenly disappeared. No wonder, then, that the traditional theologians attributed *subtilitas* and even *agilitas*, *claritas* and so on⁵ not only to his glorified body, but also to that of ordinary mortals. This, then, gives rise, here too, to the problem of *duplex corporalitas*, twofold corporeality, in other words, to the problem of hylic pluralism.

Various shades of opinion can, however, be found in the different views of the resurrected or glorified body. On the one hand, there are those views which are closely connected with the aspect of coarse matter. Among these is the opinion that the resurrected body possesses all the ordinary human organs, including, for example, the genital organs, even though these are not used. On the other hand, however, the glorification or transfiguration of the new form in which the body appears after resurrection is constantly stressed. In this, the *corpus gloriosum* of traditional Christian teaching is clearly completely in accordance with the other examples of the "sublime *pneuma*" which I

1 For even bad men were raised from the dead, for the purpose of eternal punishment in hell.

2 See above, p. 15.

3 See 1 Cor. 15, 20

4 See John 20, 26.

5 See above, p. 15 note 4.

have already quoted. It corresponds closely with these in the quality of imperishableness.

In connection with these shades of opinion, however, attention must be paid to certain points. I am certainly not the only author who sees the question of Christian resurrection in the context of a finer materiality. Professor K. Dijk has discussed this in his survey of the various doctrines of the resurrection and of a possible intermediate state between dying and being resurrected. He himself adopts the standpoint of literal resurrection. Among the doctrines which he rejects is the so-called "false teaching of the new corporeality" which maintains that the soul receives an ethereal body during this intermediate state. This doctrine of an intermediate body has found favour among some Lutheran theologians.¹ I shall examine the teaching of these Lutheran theologians, who seem to have been influenced by, among others, the romantics, later. It would, however, seem that my subject is, in various ways, connected with theology—views are held, not only about the substance of angels, but also about the resurrection, which come under the heading of hylic pluralism. And since philosophical and theological views often went hand in hand, especially in the past, it is not surprising that hylic pluralism has occurred not only in philosophy, but also in theology.

It is important, then, to make the following observation. Different things may be meant by "new corporeality" in connection with the resurrection. What K. Dijk means by this is "intermediate corporeality", which was rejected by him. When, however, "new corporeality" is discussed in a well-known eschatological manual such as P. Althaus' *Die letzten Dinge* (B 2), what is *not* meant is an intermediate state of fine matter (which was in any case rejected by Althaus), but the state of the body on resurrection itself. Althaus was able to speak *here* of new corporeality because his view of this state was far less literal than that of Dijk and others. This term could also be applied to the Roman Catholic views of *subtilitas*, *agilitas* and so on. These points of view make a more or less clear distinction between the state of the body resurrected at its time and that of the ordinary body. The Lutheran theologians referred to above—and C. W. Bonnet, for example, as well—do not do this. For them, the ethereal body which is used by the soul in the intermediate state is a *preparation* for the later resurrection, present in embryo during ordinary life and growing, by a certain

¹ K. Dijk, *Tussen Sterven en Opstanding*, Kampen, 1951, I, p. 43 ff. (B 35).

natural development into a glorified body. These two ideas are encountered again and again—on the one hand, the idea of the sublime *pneuma* as a natural extension of the psychological *pneuma*¹ and, on the other hand, the idea of a sharp gulf between the sublime *pneuma* and all other corporeality. A gulf of this kind has already been noted in the case of Proclus²—on the one hand, he accepted an immortal *ochēma* which always accompanied the soul and, on the other hand, many *chitōnes*, coverings or garments, which could be discarded. The same sharp division between the sublime *pneuma* and all other corporeality also occurs again and again in Christianity. Many theologians have certainly accepted a higher corporeality, which they have frequently called “spiritual corporeality”³ and regarded as a partial realisation of Christ’s glorification, but have *not* accepted any preparation for this by what I have called psychological *pneuma* and others have called an “ethereal body”. This point of view was put forward, for example, by J. Hamberger in his work with its significant title, *Physica sacra, or the Concept of Heavenly Corporeality*,⁴ in which he discussed *only* heavenly corporeality (the sublime *pneuma*) and not an ethereal body. He provided a historical survey, but did not discuss authors whose idea of a finer matter did not have any connection with sublime *pneuma*. His thought can be traced back to that of F. von Baader, F. C. Oetinger and J. Boehme.

It goes without saying that the angels also, insofar as they were thought to consist of finer matter, shared in the sublime *pneuma*.⁵

10. THE METAPHYSICAL BACKGROUND

I have therefore distinguished between three kinds of *pneuma*, three levels of fine materiality.⁶ In this way, I have formed certain concepts

1 The sublime *pneuma* can, to this extent, be regarded as a part of the psychological *pneuma*, in which case the psychological *pneuma* in this wider sense is contrasted with the psychological *pneuma* in the narrower, more neutral and lower sense. I therefore prefer to use the term “sublime *pneuma*” as the highest *pneuma* of fine matter in contrast with the psychological *pneuma* in a narrower sense.

2 See above, p. 30.

3 See, for example, W. von Schröder, *Christliche Theosophen* (1922), p. 7 ff: “Das Prinzip des Geistleiblichen” (B 154).

4 *Physica sacra, oder der Begriff der himmlischen Leiblichkeit*, 1869 (B 62).

5 See above, p. 30.

6 In addition to *pneuma* in this material sense, there is also the concept of *pure spirit*, thought of as non-material, the immaterial being. I do not want to use the word *pneuma* for this (see above, p. 18).

on the basis of which the views of the authors which I shall investigate can be classified. It is hardly necessary to observe that these levels have not always been clearly kept apart in the way in which I shall distinguish them as a means of fixing the various ideas and discovering the same pattern behind the divergent terms that have been used.

Another important question, however, also arises in this connection, that of the metaphysical *background* against which the various writers have seen their views of a finer materiality and the philosophical assumptions underlying their use of these concepts. Our answer to this question may make an important contribution to the determination of the different forms in which hylic pluralism occurs in the history of philosophy.

It is obvious that the various metaphysical¹ standpoints that may occur in connection with hylic pluralism have to be considered in turn and defined. There are two extreme standpoints. The first of these is that of monistic materialism, which holds that all reality is material and indeed consists of ordinary matter. The other extreme view is that of psychical monism or absolute spiritualism. This standpoint denies the reality of all matter and regards everything that exists as spiritual or psychical. To these two extremes I shall give the name of *Alpha standpoint* and *Zeta standpoint*.

Between these two extremes, there are many transitions—especially with regard to hylic pluralism—and I shall call these standpoints *Beta*, *Gamma*, *Delta* and *Epsilon*. It will be seen that, of these six standpoints, the Beta, Gamma and Delta are the most important and characteristic standpoints in which hylic pluralism occurs and that hylic pluralism is either entirely absent or else is only met with in a very limited or improper sense (as in the form of "animal spirits") in the Alpha and Epsilon standpoints.

Let us now review each of these six standpoints in turn and briefly introduce some of the characteristic representatives of each.

11. THE ALPHA STANDPOINT

This includes monistic materialism—the doctrine that the whole of reality consists of matter, ordinary matter that is known to us in our everyday experience. This doctrine was proclaimed in the West by the

¹ I use metaphysics here as the science of being, the science of reality, both in the deepest sense, as concerned with the absolute, and in the sense of concerning the relationship between spirit and matter.

eighteenth century French materialists and by writers such as Büchner, Vogt and Moleschott in the nineteenth century. Since that time, materialism has become very widespread in a popular form and has at the same time also had a great influence in scientific circles. It appears to be flourishing once more in the United States under the name of physicalism, while behaviourism is also not free from materialistic presuppositions. In the middle of the nineteenth century, Lange found it necessary, on the basis of the considerations already referred to, to carry out a detailed historical investigation into the occurrence of entirely or partially materialistic considerations. According to materialism, the spiritual, the psyche, the consciousness do not, in principle, count at all—this is either pure appearance or an epiphenomenon of matter. The onus of proof must here rest with the protagonists of materialism; the antagonists, on the other hand, regard not matter, but consciousness as the first datum. In connection with our theme, however, what is especially characteristic of this standpoint is the categorical denial of the materialists of any continued existence after death. According to them, no survival is accorded to a—non-existent—psyche when the ordinary body, which consists of matter, disintegrates.

What we have in mind, then, with this alpha standpoint—as the one extreme of our series of standpoints—is strictly monistic materialism. Anyone who adheres to this doctrine nowadays is bound to acknowledge the reality of all kinds of physical activities which are not ordinarily perceptible—such as radar and so on—but he automatically regards these as an extension of matter that is known to him. It is not clear how this standpoint is situated with regard to a series of divergent phenomena which have been firmly established by parapsychology, but we have no need to go into this question here.¹

The physical *pneuma*² or wind is, of course, no problem to monistic materialism—it forms a part of ordinary, material nature. The existence of the psychological *pneuma*—a soul continuing to exist in a vehicle of fine matter—is rejected by monistic materialism as absurd and, of course, no value is attached to the idea of a sublime *pneuma*. One can only wonder whether the physiological *pneuma*, if it is accepted,

¹ An attempt is made to reduce one thing and another to a form of physical radiation. In the meantime, the well-known parapsychologist J. B. Rhine attributes the significance of a refutation of (monistic) materialism to parapsychological results; see *Journal of Parapsychology* XIII, p. 208; *The Reach of the Mind*, p. 204, ff.

² See above, p. 19 ff.

for example, in the form of animal spirits, detracts in any way from the consistency of this alpha standpoint. But, as I have already observed,¹ this doctrine of the animal spirits was so widespread and so widely regarded as natural physiology that it occurred in the case of very divergent thinkers. In the case of Descartes, who was not a materialist himself, this doctrine came within the material half of his standpoint, within the mode of extensiveness and the animal spirits were thought of as purely material.² We need not therefore be surprised that La-mettrie, the author of *L'homme machine*, also assumed it.² Thinkers of this kind, then, see no connection at all with another *pneuma* of fine matter, the psychological *pneuma*, which is possibly situated behind the physiological *pneuma* and leaves room for a continued existence after death. Most thinkers, who accept a physiological *pneuma* of a different kind from the theory of animal spirits as physiological, tend to look for a connection between their idea and some psychological *pneuma*. But perhaps there are also magnetisers or those who are magnetised, who assume that a favourable effect proceeds from this treatment and that in this context a kind of transference of power takes place and are therefore of the opinion that it is in this case a question of a purely physical process which is tied to life, while death means the end to such an effect and to all life. It is clear therefore that the physiological *pneuma*, in whatever form it may be, can be classified if necessary under the heading of ordinary, known matter. To this extent, the alpha standpoint is negative with regard to every form of hylic pluralism in the true sense of the word.

12. THE BETA STANDPOINT

Materialism is not, however, limited to its monistic form. There is also a metaphysical standpoint which distinguishes *two* great subdivisions of matter—ordinary matter and a finer type of matter—while continuing to regard matter as the highest reality. Although it is still a materialistic standpoint, this doctrine of another materiality, which is specially connected with the soul, makes it different from the first, the alpha standpoint. The first, the materialistic assumption, distinguishes it from other standpoints (others forms of hylic pluralism, which have still to be discussed), which also accept a *duplex cor-*

¹ See above, p. 22 ff.

² See above, p. 23.

poralitas and for the protagonists of which matter is not the highest reality—according to these thinkers, an immaterial being can occur, which is something that is denied by the dualistic materialists. The second, the acceptance of another or second materiality, which is usually invisible to ordinary sight and is connected with the soul, or rather, is the soul, distinguishes it from monistic materialism, which rejects the soul and, since it only recognises one form of matter, is outside the sphere of *hylic pluralism*. The standpoint with which we are concerned here, the standpoint which is on the one hand clearly materialistic,¹ but on the other clearly dualistic, will be called here the *beta standpoint*.

Dr. K. H. E. de Jong, for example, pointed to this difference from ordinary or monistic materialism in his book, *Die andere Seite des Materialismus* (1932, B 76). This author may be included among those who support the beta standpoint. Dr. de Jong, one of the pioneers in the Netherlands of what has become known as parapsychology, drew attention to the fact that it is possible to accept a continued existence after death with this form of materialism and that this has also taken place.² Religiosity can also be combined with it and also the acceptance of God or of gods, not simply as a vague incentive or a "task", but as existing beings, even though they are material.³ To this extent, then, it remains a materialistic standpoint.

In antiquity, the beta standpoint is encountered in thinkers such as Democritus, Epicurus and Lucretius. For Democritus, atoms and empty space were the highest being and his materialism is to be found in this. According to him, however, the soul consisted of a totally different, finer species of atoms, quite different from the atoms of which ordinary things consist. There were also gods, Democritus believed, but these were mortal demons⁴ who made themselves known by means of the same *eidōla* of fine matter, which were also involved in perception, including *crytaesthetic* perception.⁵ Epicurus too believed that the soul was corporeal and consisted of fine particles. The gods were invested with a rarefied body.⁶ They were hardly con-

¹ It is a real materialism, not simply a so-called dualistic materialism. I do not deny that dualistic materialism occurs, simply that all *hylic pluralism* may be called dualistic materialism. This is why the words "so-called" dualistic materialism appear in the sub-title to this book.

² B 76, p. 1 ff.

³ See B 76, p. 29 ff.

⁴ See Überweg (B 170) I, p. 108.

⁵ See Bidez (B 12), p. 135 ff; de Vogel (B 176) I, p. 74.

⁶ See Cicero, *De natura deorum*, L. I, c. 18.

cerned with men. According to Lucretius as well, the soul similarly consisted of fine matter.

The metaphysics of the Stoa, the school of Greek philosophers to which many Romans felt drawn, is also very typical of this beta standpoint. According to the Stoics, a fine matter, the *pneuma*, penetrated the whole world and even the soul consisted of *pneuma*. Whereas the philosophers mentioned above did not accord a very central place to the gods and ought really to be called atheists, the Stoics spoke clearly of God ("in whom we live and have our being") and their mood was often explicitly religious. For this reason, doubt has often been cast on the materialism of the Stoa,¹ but it is quite clear—the Stoic deity was immanent, and consisted of fine matter. The Stoic conception was materialistic, even though it was not a *coarse* materialism.

These thinkers were either not clear or rather hesitant about the continued existence after death. Panaetius, for example, did not accept an existence after death, whereas the other members of this school apparently did, although only for a limited time.

The Stoa exerted a considerable influence on a series of early Christian writers, among whom Tertullian is a striking example of the beta standpoint. For him, the soul was of fine matter and the angels had "corporeality", though this was not "coarse".² He taught that man rose in due course with an etheric body.³ What is, however, especially characteristic of his teaching and makes it necessary to include it within the beta standpoint is his doctrine that God is also material or corporeal.⁴ This is certainly a very important idea for this standpoint—it was not possible to think of anything at all as being or as either effective or real unless it was of a material nature. This consideration was also present among the Stoics.

Among more recent thinkers, Thomas Hobbes is, in my opinion, representative of the beta standpoint. For him, everything was material and he is therefore well known as a materialist. He was, however, not a dualistic materialist—for him, the spirit was a body, but a rarefied body.⁵ He quoted places in the Bible where the angels are called

1 According to Lange (B 89 I, p. 72), the Stoics lacked "the purely material nature of matter". But Lange did not make sufficient distinction between monistic and dualistic materialism and the differences from monistic materialism are certainly great in the case of the Stoics.

2 B 29, I, col. 1196.

3 *De carne Chr.*, c. 6.

4 "Nihil est incorporale, nisi quod non est": *De carne Chr.*, c. XI. See Verbeke (B 174), p. 444.

5 "Spiritus: corpus quidem, sed tenue": *Leviathan* (Opera 1658 VIII, p. 344).

spiritus, sed non incorporeos.¹ God too was, according to Hobbes, a body.² This is typical materialism, but not the materialism of the nineteenth century!

Nineteenth century materialism gave no place to God, to the soul, to gods or angels consisting of a finer matter, to religiosity or to any continued existence after death. Since the earlier form of materialism, however, accepted a *special* species of matter, more rarefied than ordinary matter, in connection, among other things, with the soul, this dualistic materialism has to be regarded as a variation of hylic pluralism and is termed in this book the beta standpoint.

13 THE GAMMA STANDPOINT

I have already indicated several times that, in addition to dualistic materialism within hylic pluralism, there is a view, according to which the soul does, it is true, possess a vehicle or *ochēma* of fine matter, but is itself immaterial. There is, furthermore, a *transitional* view between this standpoint and that of dualistic materialism, which are, so to speak, the two antitheses within hylic pluralism. This transitional standpoint, which I propose to call the gamma standpoint, is, like dualistic materialism, strongly under the impression of the affirmation—put forward, among others, by the Stoics—that everything that is real must also be material. The soul too is material, although of a finer matter, but it is *not* immaterial. There is, however, according to the adherents to this gamma standpoint, one exception to this rule—*only God* is not material or corporeal. He is immaterial, a pure spirit in the modern sense. In one respect, then, there is an immaterial being, namely God.³ For the Stoics, for Tertullian and for Hobbes, God, too was material. In the case of the gamma standpoint, this is not so and justice is done to God's transcendence. The affirmation that everything that really exists must be material is, in this standpoint, confined to everything

1 *Ibid.*, p. 289 ff.

2 Writing about himself, he said: "affirmat quidem Deum esse corpus"; *ibid.*, p. 360.

3 Whenever I speak in the context of this discussion about "the immaterial", what I have in mind is always an immaterial *being*. In addition, there is also the question—see above, p. 33—of immaterial relationships according to the content of thought, for example, the relationship between geometrical figures as such, independent of the question as to how many copies (and how purely realised) of each of these figures occur in reality. It is possible to attribute a meaning to these relationship in *various* cases of the standpoints dealt with in this book, even though some scholars have gone a long way to deny this possibility. I do not propose to go into the question of these immaterial relationships (which I have also called "the eidetic", see *Twoërlei Subjektivität*, B 114) here and now.

that is *created* or, in philosophical terms, to the *multiplicity* of things. Hugo Grotius formulated this quite well in his *Opera theologica omnia*. His attribution of bodies to the angels came from his having read "the Greeks" (in other words, the Greek Fathers of the Church), who asserted that only the uncreated was incorporeal, as Origen, for example, had said, that only God was without a body, and as Bernard of Clairvaux had later maintained.¹ Bernard—thus a writer of significantly later date—believed that absolute immateriality could only be ascribed to God, since it was clear that every created spirit needed a material being.² Ambrose, another Father of the Church, had also previously asserted that, apart from the Trinity, everything that was created was material.³ The *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* summarises it thus—for many Fathers of the Church, "absolute spirituality only belongs to God".⁴ In this respect, then, these authors differ considerably from those whom I have grouped under the beta standpoint.

In connection with the gamma standpoint, one is moreover reminded of the sharp contrast which regularly occurs in Indian philosophy, for example, in the *Bhagavadgītā*,⁵ between the one Spirit or *Puruṣa* on the one hand and the whole of nature in a wide sense which also includes finer matter or *prakṛiti* on the other hand.

In more recent thought, modern theosophy clearly accepts the gamma standpoint. On the one hand, there is the Absolute, Parabrahman, outside all revelation, space and time, and, on the other, all that is revealed, that exists, that, however sublime, appears materially and that can therefore as such, at its own level, be in principle perceived. This accounts for the theosophical doctrine of a series of "higher bodies" of man and "higher spheres" of the cosmos.

Beginning with the gamma standpoint, an important theme is introduced into philosophy, that of fundamental monism. The beta standpoint sometimes inclines towards unity, as for example, in Stoic teaching, but this unity remains immanent. Dr. K. H. E. de Jong, who adheres to the beta standpoint, is explicitly a pluralist.⁶ Now,

1 IV, 676 (1732): "Quod angelis corpora tribui, non aliunde venit, quam quia tunc Graecos legebam, quia ita loqui solent et dicere, *monon to aktiston ahulon* (solum increatum incorporeum): sic *monon Theon as 4maton* dixit Origenes: solum Deum in corporeum Bernardus. Et speciatim angelos esse corporeos tradit...."—here a series of statements by Christian writers on the corporeality of the angels follows.

2 Hom. 6 cant. See de Mirville (B 107) I, p. 435.

3 B 29, I, c. 1197.

4 B 29, I, c. 1195.

5 See von Glasenapp (B 53), p. 171.

6 See my *De Theodicee, het Continu'teitsbeginsel en de Grondparadox*, Leiden (1951), p. 6.

however, a fundamental counter-balance to hylic pluralism, as the possible ultimate standpoint, emerges—at a deeper level than that of temporal and spatial multiplicity, an absolute point of reference is postulated for this multiplicity, for all that is created, in the form of the transcendent God, of the one Spirit or *puruṣa*, of the Absolute or the One. We may summarise this factor in the name *noic* aspect and then go on to speak of a counterbalance having been found to hylic pluralism in a “noic monism”.¹ The proper place for these considerations, however, is the third part of this study, which will deal with the sense and *meaning* of hylic pluralism.

Here I will confine myself to the following remarks. The gamma standpoint, which affirms that what exists in multiplicity is to a great extent material—even though this is partly rarefied matter—which is not evident to us because of our limited ability to perceive, is a standpoint which allows scope for a far-reaching *mechanistic* and *deterministic* view of the world. On the other hand, however, we shall also see that the supporters of freedom of the will are more at home in the following species of hylic pluralism, the delta standpoint.

We may also ask whether the gamma standpoint can include a vehicle or *ochēma* of the soul. According to this standpoint, the soul *is* essentially matter and we cannot therefore really say that it *has* an *ochēma*. This objection, however, forgets that the one (the material) *can* be the vehicle for the other (of finer matter). Precisely in connection with the undistinguished being of the material in a finer sense of the subjective or psychical² at the same level, whereas at a *lower* level a body, for example, of ordinary coarse matter, is clearly distinguished, there is sufficient reason to speak of a vehicle or *ochēma* of the soul in the context of the gamma standpoint.

14. THE DELTA STANDPOINT

There can be no doubt that the term *ochēma*, the vehicle of fine matter that is used by the soul which is in itself immaterial, is completely applicable to the standpoint to be discussed in this section. This, the delta standpoint, takes us a step further—the soul is no longer regarded as something which (in contrast to the deity as the only immaterial being) is essentially material, although of a subtle materiality. On

¹ See my *Tweeërlei Subjectiviteit* (B 114), §45.

² See *Tweeërlei Subjectiviteit* (B 114) 47: The relatively psychical and physical.

the contrary, the soul is here regarded as immaterial with possibly, in the second place, a vehicle of fine matter, something by means of which it can move and express itself. This may or may not be accompanied by a consistent psychohylism. Psychohylism (see above, p.13ff) is the doctrine that the soul, even where this is not expected, also has an aspect of fine matter. This doctrine can be complete and consistent and can include the fact that *everywhere*, at any level, wherever the psychical element, consciousness exists, it also appears as material and has a material aspect. This doctrine, then, postulates a complete "spiritual corporeality". It also expresses the view that the soul does not assume a subtle vehicle until it descends to a certain level, when it clothes itself with garments of rarefied matter; above this level it can exist as a purely spiritual substance. These are two aspects of the delta standpoint, but, according to this standpoint, the soul always makes use of some vehicle or *ochēma* of finer matter at some level and in certain senses, which are situated at a higher level than that of coarse matter and are especially concerned with life after—ordinary—death. In this, the emphasis should fall on "a level higher than that of coarse matter", since, if the soul uses only the body of coarse matter as a vehicle—and what objection is there to speaking about this body as about a vehicle or *ochēma*?—we are no longer concerned with the problem of hylic pluralism, but with a widespread view which is more fully discussed in the following section, the epsilon standpoint or anthropological dualism, which says that there is, on the one hand, consciousness, the psychical element, which is completely immaterial, and, on the other, the corporeal, material and extended element, which has nothing psychical.¹ The latter is the standpoint of those who in principle oppose hylic pluralism.

To return, however, to the delta standpoint, those who adhere to this maintain that the soul, either always or at certain levels (calculating downwards) and above the level of coarse matter (thus also after death), certainly has one or more subtle bodies at its disposal as an *ochēma*. What this standpoint has in common with the gamma standpoint discussed in the preceding section is that the highest deity is regarded as an immaterial being, but the delta standpoint does go a step further in insisting that the soul also has its immateriality, even though it does

¹ The "physiological *pneuma*": the animal spirits and so on can therefore be included among the ordinary material body and regarded as ceasing when that body dies (see above, p. 23-24).

make use, either in due course or constantly (one of the two) of a vehicle of fine matter.

The fact that the soul is, according to this standpoint, essentially immaterial—and in this sense analogous to the deity—makes it possible to ascribe many different qualities to it. Thus, unity and indivisibility and, in connection with these, fundamental immortality have frequently been attributed to the soul, in other words, not relative and only temporary survival after the death of a conglomerate of perhaps fine, but certainly transient matter, but unlimited duration or eternity. Furthermore, there is also room within this view for freedom—sometimes called “intelligible” freedom—of will, so that this view marks a break with mechanistic determinism.

All these ideas of course—unity and indivisibility, immortality and freedom of the soul—occur similarly in standpoints which will have nothing to do with hylic pluralism or vehicles of fine matter. They are, however, also encountered in the context of hylic pluralism—and this is the case with the delta standpoint. There is, as we shall see, no shortage of representatives of this standpoint.

Up till now, I have used a fairly common combination of words, the immaterial *soul*. It is, however, advisable to be on one's guard against terminological confusion. Three factors clearly play a part in the delta standpoint—the ordinary body of coarse matter, something of fine matter and something immaterial. What emerges is that the factor of fine matter and the immaterial factor are alternately called¹ the “spirit” and the “soul”. What is meant by the “immortal soul” is the immaterial factor, while in that case the factor of fine matter, which acts as a link between the immortal, immaterial soul and the terrestrial body, is often meant by *spiritus*, the spirit or the animal spirits.² On the other hand, however, the word “spirit” frequently indicates the highest factor and the word “soul” the lower factor, the intermediate link, in which case the *nous* or spirit, which is related to the deity, is contrasted with the *psyche* or soul, which is half connected with the natural or animal element. It is therefore more a question of taking care of the intention conveyed by the words than of the terms used.

At least three factors, then, are involved in the delta standpoint. Instead of the usual dichotomy which occurs so often in the history of philosophy, in which spirit and soul are together contrasted with the

1 Cf. the alternation of reason and intellect in a different context (p. 26).

2 This concept also occurs in a rather deeper sense than simply that of the physiological *pneuma* which ends with death—as a transition to the psychological *pneuma*.

body, what we have here is a threefold division or *trichotomy*, in which one factor acts as a transition between the other two. "At least three"—even more links than this may possibly be accepted, but, in any case, in the delta standpoint, there is no longer any question of a twofold division.

Among which thinkers is the delta standpoint to be found? As there are so many, I will simply indicate a number of typical representatives. This standpoint is, for example, characteristically met with in the neo-Platonic school. Plotinus engaged, on the one hand, in polemics against the "materialism" (the beta standpoint) of the Stoics.¹ He acknowledged a transcendent deity, raised above the world.² He also had quite a different view of the soul from that of the Stoics. The functions of the soul were, as such, non-material and it was in itself undivided and immortal.³ Nonetheless, Plotinus also spoke explicitly, on the other hand, about a *pneuma* of fine matter which was connected with the soul and which was, in his opinion, ultimately discarded.⁴ The later neo-Platonists agreed with him in his criticism of the Stoics and his view of the transcendence of God and the immateriality of the soul.⁵ They went into greater detail, however, in their elaboration of the school's teaching about the *ochêma* and the *pneuma*.⁷ This neo-Platonic doctrine thus became one of the elements in the history of hylic pluralism which has been most exhaustively discussed and which is mentioned in almost all the manuals.

As far as Indian thought is concerned, let me quote von Glasenapp: "According to Sāṅkhya and Vedānta philosophy, the soul is clothed in a covering of fine matter so long as it belongs to the Samsāra. . . ."⁸ This covering is only discarded when the soul is redeemed from Samsāra. In itself, the soul is a "purely spiritual being".⁸ According to Vedānta philosophy at least, Brahma, who penetrates everything, but who cannot become world, is above the whole world.⁹

1 Ennead. IV, 7, 2-11. See Verbeke (B 174), p. 352; Rüsche (B 136), p. 48.

2 See, for example, Windelband (B 177), p. 327; H. R. Schwyzer (B 110), part 41, p. 559.

3 See, for example, Siebeck (B 155), pp. 317-320.

4 *To pneuma to peri ten psuchēn*. See, among others, Verbeke (B 174), p. 359 ff.

5 Porphyry, the editor of Plotinus' *Enneads*, followed his master closely. For Iamblichus and Proclus, see, among others, Windelband (B 177), pp. 333 and 337.

6 See R. C. Kissling, "The *Ochêma*—*Pneuma* of the Neo-Platonists" (B 85); E. R. Dodds, *The Astral Body in Neo-Platonism* (B 33).

7 See von Glasenapp (B 53), p. 382.

8 *ibid.*, p. 390.

9 *ibid.*, p. 192.

To return to the West, Paul regarded God, in accordance with the prevalent view, as a pure spirit and the human spirit as immaterial. He too had a trichotomy, consisting of the spirit on the one hand, the body on the other and between them explicitly a pneumatic body.¹ Man either received this at the resurrection or he was "clothed" with this "heavenly dwelling" very soon after death.²

Unlike Tertullian, for example, and Origen, the Church Father Augustine was one of the first Christian writers to give pure expression in the theoretical sense to a "spiritualisation" which went back to biblical themes or—and indeed also—to the influence of neo-Platonism. In his case, however, this spiritualisation of the *pneuma* was by no means complete—he accepted a plastic *pneuma*³ which apparently went considerably further than a purely physiological *pneuma* or pure animal spirits and he played again and again with the idea that the demons possessed aerial bodies and in any case, although he did not accept a complete body in the case of the angels, he did accept a *materia spiritalis*.

As we shall see, those thinkers and schools of thinkers in the Middle Ages—and there were many of them—who differed from the teaching of Thomas Aquinas and accepted a material basis in the spirits—either of men who had died or of the angels—followed the Augustinian tradition again and again.

What we find, then, again and again in all the thinkers mentioned above is a combination of the themes that occur in the delta standpoint—both God and the soul as immaterial and, apart from the body of coarse matter another, finer materiality.

With the Renaissance and the advent of humanism came a revival of hylic pluralism and—with a few exceptions, such as Hobbes, who adhered to the beta standpoint—once again an occurrence of this combination of the same themes. Whether it is Cardinal Cajetan attributing aerial or etheric bodies to the demons or natural philosophers like Telesius and, following him, the great Francis Bacon ascribing materiality to the soul, that is, to the lower soul or *anima sensitiva*, or whether it is Paracelsus writing about a sidereal or an astral body or J. Boehme writing about a "tincture" body—what is encountered everywhere at this period, in addition to the explicit hylic pluralism and this

1 1 Cor. 15. 44.

2 2 Cor. 5. 1 ff.

3 See Verbeke (B 174), p. 503.

duplex corporalitas, is the idea that God himself is immaterial and the immortal soul is also immaterial.

During the romantic period and its aftermath the idea of hylic pluralism emerged once again. Baader and Schelling and later Carus, I. H. Fichte and Fechner all wrote either about the "etheric body" or an "aerial body", a "soul body" or a "further body". In the case of these thinkers too, the soul was apparently not merged into such a body of fine matter—they did not adhere to the gamma standpoint. As far as the theme of the immaterial, transcendent deity is concerned, some care is needed if these thinkers are simply to be grouped under the delta standpoint. It is clear that they belong to the delta standpoint in their combination of clear transcendence (as in the case of Plotinus) or explicit theism with immateriality of the soul together with the possession of some vehicle of fine matter. On the other hand, to classify them under the delta standpoint is often rather dubious because of the inclination on the part of several of the romantic thinkers towards pantheism. Since they often refer to the world as "God's body", care has to be taken to verify whether they attribute a special existence to the deity apart from that deity's immanence in the world—in other words, whether they are panentheists—before including them completely among those who adhere to the delta standpoint. Insofar as they do not accept a really transcendent and immaterial deity, they form a transition to the beta standpoint, which does not acknowledge a transcendent, immaterial deity, although they also remain quite close to the delta standpoint in regarding, like the delta, but unlike the beta standpoint, an *immaterial being*—that is, the soul, consciousness, the psychical element—within the world, within multiplicity, as existing, in addition to some body of fine matter.

It is moreover important to point to the possible appearance, *within* the delta standpoint, of variations in connection with the antithesis between the psychological *pneuma* and the sublime *pneuma*. A thinker or school of thinkers may accept both of these or only one. The neo-Platonists clearly accepted both a "spirit-body" and a radiant or *augoeides body*.¹ Christian theologians, who, on the one hand, emphasise the difference between the resurrected body and the ordinary terrestrial body (and to this extent display a clear hylic pluralism²), frequently reject any intermediate body between death and resurrection. Thus they reject a psychological *pneuma*, a vehicle of the soul after

¹ See B 99 and above, p. 29.

² See about, pp. 15, 31.

death, but not the sublime *pneuma*. On the other hand, there are others who do accept a finer body—after death or even already present during life here on earth—and regard this as an anticipation of, a germ of the resurrected body. These thinkers thus accept both a psychological *pneuma* and a sublime *pneuma*. Since both groups, however, accept both a transcendent God and an immaterial, immortal soul, they both come within the delta standpoint.

Finally, another fundamental variant of the delta standpoint has also to be mentioned, one which also forms a transition to the epsilon standpoint, which will be discussed in the next section. The view that the soul is not in any sense of fine matter and thus immaterial, but nonetheless possesses *spatial* qualities is quite frequently met with. Spatiality has in general been attributed by all the thinkers who have regarded the soul as of fine matter to the soul as the natural consequence of this. The fine materiality is therefore dropped, but the spatial qualities are to some extent retained. Some thinkers during the Enlightenment, such as Rüdiger and Crusius, took this standpoint, which I will call the delta standpoint. In antiquity, Speusippus, Plato's nephew, at least attributed extensiveness to the soul.¹ This standpoint is also widespread in angelology. Dr Abraham Kuiper, for example, thought that the angels were absolutely incorporeal and immaterial,² but that they were tied to a particular place.³ This idea also occurred frequently in earlier authors, for example, in the Middle Ages.⁴

In the detailed treatment of the history of hylic pluralism, we shall regularly encounter examples of these different forms of hylic pluralism—the beta, gamma and delta standpoints—as well as the variants mentioned above and we shall, on the other hand, also verify and classify the doctrines of the various authors in accordance with these characteristic points of view.

15. THE EPSILON STANDPOINT

We have, however, not yet reached that point—there are still two possible standpoints to discuss. What is more, we are now about to consider a view of our problems which is completely negative with

1 See C. J. de Vogel, "On the Neo-Platonic Character of Platonism and the Platonic Character of Neo-Platonism", *Mind* LXII (1953), p. 56.

2 *De Engelen Gods*, p. 48.

3 *ibid.*, p. 160.

4 See, for example, Petrus Olivi, *Quaestiones* (1922), p. 571.

regard to them. It is what is usually known as *anthropological dualism*, a view which occurred very seldom in a pure form in antiquity,¹ but which, in modern times, is especially associated with the name of René Descartes. According to Descartes, spirit and matter, soul and body were essentially different. The attribute or basic quality of the soul was thought. The soul was moreover singular and immortal and completely immaterial. The attribute of the material substance, on the other hand, was, in Descartes' opinion, extensiveness and spatiality; matter was moreover not qualitatively, but only quantitatively determined (that is, by form and size, movement and so on).² It is at once clear that this anthropological dualism is a standpoint which is diametrically opposed to what I have called "psychohylism", according to which the soul is never without a material aspect (of perhaps fine matter) *even in its own sphere*. Descartes, however, postulated an essential difference between the soul and the body, by virtue of which the soul can never of itself be material. Whenever the idea of a material aspect (of fine matter) of the soul has been unquestioningly rejected in the modern period since the time of Descartes, whenever men have as a rule refused to listen to the ideas of dualistic materialism—what I call "hylic pluralism"—and whenever all affirmations of this kind have again and again been regarded as meaningless, this can all be traced back to various reasons. One of these has been a tendency to accept what was positive and tangible and to concentrate on the most obvious aspect of reality, often resulting in a loss of attention to the background of things and such vague factors as agents of fine matter.³ Another reason has been an instinctive inclination to take up the standpoint of anthropological dualism, which maintained that spirit and matter, soul and body, were two completely heterogeneous elements which could never or hardly ever come into contact with each other. In this process, the one division, that between what was tangible and the background, has encouraged the other, that between material extensiveness and the thinking, immaterial soul. There was no place for anything in between and the possibility that the soul itself might be of a finer kind of matter (since all reality, everything that operates—

¹ In my opinion, a weak form of the dualist standpoint is encountered in Plato. I shall discuss this in more detail later. Dualism of another kind of course occurred in antiquity—for example, the religious and ethical dualism of the Persians, in various Gnostic sects, among the Manichees, the Cathari and so on.

² See, for example, B 141, p. 157 ff.

³ See above, p. 4.

according to an earlier view—was bound to be matter) or that it might possess one or more vehicles of fine matter in which it expressed itself after death was completely rejected. For anyone who held this view, such a thing simply could not happen. This anthropological dualism, which was first formulated in the West by Descartes, but which also occurs in other forms—for example, in the psychophysical parallelism of Spinoza and others, which teaches that the psychical and the physical run parallel to each other and can never come into contact—has exerted an enormous influence and still does so under the surface, even though there has been a tendency in recent years to abandon this Cartesian dualism. The unquestioning manner in which anthropological dualism has been and still is accepted has been, in my opinion, together with the tendency mentioned above to accept what is positive and secular, the cause of the very slight and indeed decreasing appreciation of the contrary and opposite movement in the modern age, which I have called *hylic pluralism*, and of the scant recognition, or indeed complete absence of recognition of *hylic pluralism*—usually known as dualistic materialism—as a great movement which has been prominent throughout the centuries in very divergent societies and civilisations.

Because of its content, the epsilon standpoint or anthropological dualism is the fundamental opponent of this movement. This dualism is also, of course, a great historical movement and, insofar as it is concerned with the soul, it can be regarded as part of the tendency to extend the sphere of immaterial being. This tendency has also been called the movement in metaphysics and anthropology towards *spiritualisation*, whether, in this case, the terms *pneuma* and *spiritus* are envisaged and the spiritualisation of the *pneuma* is therefore discussed or whether *concepts* rather than terms are meant in this context. We were also able to observe this tendency in connection with the succession of metaphysical standpoints which I have called the alpha, beta, gamma and delta standpoints. In the case of the alpha standpoint or monistic materialism, there was no question of spiritualisation—the consciousness, the spirit and so on was here simply an epiphenomenon, the insoluble difficulties of which were, remarkably enough, simply not felt as such. The beta standpoint or dualistic materialism regarded the whole of reality as of material nature, but a certain dualism was apparent in this standpoint, namely between the ordinary, coarse matters and a finer form of matter of which the soul was thought to consist and which was, for the Stoics, for example, at the same time the *pneuma* which penetrated the whole world and also constituted the being of the

deity. It is possible to say that an incipient spiritualisation is apparent in this distinction between different species of matter. A fundamentally important step was then made by the gamma standpoint—although everything else that exists—in multiplicity—was regarded as material, with the same differences in fineness as in the beta standpoint, *something immaterial did exist, namely God*. A further stage was reached with the delta standpoint—although the soul made use, according to this standpoint, of one or more vehicles of fine matter, either permanently or temporarily, it was itself, like God, its image, immaterial. This was, of course, an important step, but it is now followed by a step which is in principle just as important—according to the epsilon standpoint, the contrast between immaterial and material being runs *straight through man* and not, for example, as in the gamma standpoint, between God and the whole of creation. The whole life of the consciousness, the psyche, is in principle completely immaterial and, in contrast to this, there is what is fundamentally spatial, extended and mechanistic—body and matter. I do not propose to discuss here what becomes of man's unity and of the mutual influence of the consciousness or soul and the body (the *influxus*). I should like, however, to point to some of the the historical consequences of Descartes' standpoint. He himself regarded animals (although, in his later writings, he appears to have modified this view to some extent¹) as pure machines, in other words, as being entirely on the side of matter. The logical development of philosophical standpoints then led to the tendency to extend this to man and one of the results of this was, in fact, Lamettrie's book in the eighteenth century, *L'homme machine*. Descartes' dualism, taken so far, led to the temptation to get rid of the other half, consciousness, and the natural consequence of this was (monistic) materialism.

Conversely, there has also been a tendency to get rid of the material half as really being. In this, the point of departure may be Spinoza's psychophysical parallelism, according to which the series of conscious ideas and of material processes always run parallel to each other without ever touching or influencing each other. This means that this metaphysical doctrine is a kind of anthropological dualism or epsilon standpoint. *Both* series are accepted as really existing and for this reason this view is often called *realistic* psychophysical parallelism. It is, however, possible to come to the ultimate conclusion that the reality of the material series is not (directly) apparent from anything

1 See W. A. J. Meyer, *Descartes' Entwicklung*, p. 20.

to the other series, that of conscious thought, and that the material series can therefore be abandoned.¹ This standpoint—and here I am anticipating the next of my series of standpoints, the zeta standpoint—is that of *idealistic* psychophysical parallelism, which Heymans called psychical monism. According to this point of view, no material being at all exists, all being is immaterial and what we call matter is really something psychical, simply appearing in a seemingly material manner. This is the ultimate point of spiritualisation. This zeta standpoint is the ultimate point of view and the counterpart of the alpha standpoint at the beginning of the series. According to the alpha standpoint, all being is material; according to the zeta standpoint, all being is immaterial.

To return, however, to the epsilon standpoint, this has certainly had an epilogue in the historical movement since Descartes to regard the psychical and the physical elements as in principle impossible to combine and therefore either to accept them both alongside each other or else to develop one of the two at the expense of the other, a process which has resulted either in monistic materialism or else in psychical monism. This, then, is the *epilogue* to anthropological dualism. But there was also a historical *prologue*.

The movement towards spiritualisation made itself felt even in antiquity.² In this sense, neo-Platonism went a stage further than the Stoa, for example. But even earlier than this many aspects of this tendency were noticeable. It was, for example, said of Anaxagoras that he was the first to contrast the *nous* with all the rest, but his *nous* was also far from immaterial. It was Plato, however, who discovered the pure, immaterial spirit. Aristotle also spoke about purely spiritual substances from time to time. In the case of Plotinus, the immaterial was very fundamental. Christian thought, following the theme of God's transcendence in the Old Testament, also fostered this process of spiritualisation. Turning to the Christian authors of the first centuries, however, one would not say this. Although Augustine took spiritualisation seriously and was, in this respect, clearly influenced by neo-Platonism,³ he did not carry spiritualisation to its ultimate, full conclusion, as we have already seen.⁴

The teaching of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) was also an important milestone in the pre-history of Cartesian dualism. I am not in any

1 See Heymans (B 68), pp. 156, 198, 225.

2 The opposite tendency towards materialism and positivism was also present in antiquity. See, for example, Lange (B 89).

3 See B 174, for example, p. 517; B 137, p. 67.

4 See above, p. 45.

sense claiming that he completely advocated anthropological dualism. On the contrary, he regarded the soul and the body as very closely connected, since the soul was for him the form, the entelechy, and the body was the matter.¹ In this, of course, Thomas was going back to Aristotle. What is remarkable is that both Aristotle and Thomas shrank from a *strict* hylemorphism or correlativism of soul and body as entelechy and matter. As I have already pointed out, Aristotle did from time to time refer to purely spiritual substances. What is more, the idea of a *pneuma* of fine matter also occurs in his writings,² which is why Siebeck called his psychology "wavering".³ As far as Thomas is concerned, it is less important that animal spirits also occur in his writings, in other words, the physiological *pneuma*. What is more important is that he ascribed the four well-known *dotes*—*claritas*, *subtilitas* and so on—to the resurrected body.⁴ In my opinion, this amounts to a certain hylic pluralism.⁵ All that it is possible to say is that it does not necessarily imply a renunciation of hylemorphism, but a continuation along new lines. Moreover, Thomas added a doctrine to his psychology which made him one of the fundamental opponents of hylic pluralism and a predecessor of Cartesian dualism—his correlativism of the soul as entelechy and of the body as matter did not prevent him from upholding the independence of the soul from the body. The soul, according to Thomas, had its own immaterial activity and continued to exist as an immaterial being after death, even though it continued to be orientated towards a connection with matter, namely in the resurrection.⁶ The angels too were, in Thomas' opinion, purely spiritual substances.⁷ For him, there could not be any question of the angels having bodies of finer matter or of their having any material basis consisting of a *materia spiritualis*. During the Middle Ages, great controversy raged around these questions.⁸ Those who opposed this standpoint—principally those who followed the Augustinian tradition—argued that everything that was created, not only man in this life as a unity of soul and body, had to consist of both form and matter. They reasoned, in other words, on the one hand, that *only God* was pure form

1 See, for example, B 140, p. 230.

2 See *De an. gen.* II, 3; this will be discussed more fully later.

3 B 155, II, p. 124.

4 B 166: III suppl. q. LXXXIV; see also B 29, III, col. 1898.

5 See above, p. 15.

6 See B 140, p. 230.

7 See, for example, B 29, I, col. 1228.

8 See, among other places, B 133, p. 108 ff.

without matter—Aristotle had made a similar affirmation (see the gamma standpoint) that only God was purely immaterial—and, on the other hand, that the souls of the departed and the angels had therefore to have a germ of materiality in them (the *materia spiritualis*) and that the ordinary body was also not without form immediately after death. Alongside the soul as the form of the body, there also had to be a *forma corporeitatis* in the narrower sense, without which the body would be bound to collapse at once. Thomas and the fervent Thomists, however, continued to maintain that the human soul, which was directed towards itself, and the angels were completely immaterial. A clear anticipation of Cartesian dualism is bound to be visible in this doctrine, which is really quite inconsistent if viewed in the light of hylemorphism, or, to put it the other way round, Descartes further elaborated this idea consistently. According to Descartes, the soul was already contrasted with the body in principle even during life and there was no intense, although to some extent mysterious unity between the two, as Thomas had maintained. Although the soul and the body had, in Descartes' view, to interact with each other in some equally mysterious manner, they were nonetheless completely heterogeneous substances which were always opposed to each other. In this context, J. Maritain has made the pregnant comment that Descartes made angels of human souls even during life,¹ in other words, permanent spiritual substances, Thomas' conception of the angels.

There is no doubt in my mind that this doctrine of Thomas about the angels and the human soul, in which he was, by virtue of a strict hylemorphism, inconsistent, should be regarded as a stage in the development of thought towards increasing spiritualisation. I have already briefly outlined the post-Cartesian development of this process—the emphasis on one of the two substances which anthropological dualism teaches resulting, on the one hand, in monistic materialism and the stressing of the other substance leading, on the other hand, to complete spiritualisation or psychical monism. Both Thomas, insofar as he advocated the doctrine of complete immateriality of spiritual substances, and Descartes must therefore be included among those who were fundamentally opposed to hyllic pluralism—both taught the very opposite of “psychohylism”. What is more, I am bound also to point out that anthropological dualism had an offshoot in another philosophy, that

¹ See *Le Songe de Descartes* (1932), p. 275: “an angel inhabiting a machine”; *Religion et Culture* (1930), 1946, p. 49 n.: “an angel driving a machine”.

of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Among the many different aspects of Kant's philosophy, what I have especially in mind in this instance is his antithesis between the world of experience on the one hand and the intelligible world on the other. Kant maintained that metaphysics could never cross the boundaries of experience—the thing in itself, the noumenon behind the phenomena, was for ever unknowable. It is true that Kant believed that it was possible to get to know something indirectly and with the help of "practical reason" of man's "intelligible" freedom, his immortality and so on, but he remained convinced that "pure reason" was limited to the boundaries he had defined. This in fact amounts to a form of anthropological dualism! It was, Kant claimed, impossible to have any certain knowledge concerning man's spirit proper. Earlier thinkers, for example, the neo-Platonists with their various doctrines about, for example, the descent of the spirit to different levels of (finer) matter, had had quite a different opinion! At the gamma and the delta standpoints, it is quite an obvious claim that everything that is manifest or created (and this is often thought of as material or as of fine matter) can, in principle, be known. Kant, however, set a fundamental limit to knowledge, maintaining, for example, that nothing could in principle be known—unless by a very uncertain and long circuitous route—about continued existence after death. In this, he took up his position in the ranks of those who were fundamentally opposed to hylic pluralism, which insists, after all, that the soul of man, especially after death, has a material aspect (perhaps of fine matter). This aspect of fine matter, with which psychohylism is concerned, was not only rejected by Kant—this philosopher also denied that it was possible to know anything of the kind. An assertion like this is, of course, grist to the mill of those who think dualistically. We shall see later that what happened after Kant was that those thinkers, such as I. H. Fichte and G. T. Fechner, who were concerned with the question of hylic pluralism, did not interest themselves in the theme of the unknowability of the soul and that others who were, like Schopenhauer with his inclination towards Indian thought and his interest in "parapsychology", not very far removed from hylic pluralism, were deterred from accepting psychohylism by Kantianism. I shall have something to say later about the special place occupied by C. du Prel. The same also applies, of course, to a great deal of what I have to say here—it is only possible to provide a very brief outline in this introductory survey and a more detailed study must be left to the later discussion of separate thinkers and schools of thought.

In connection with anthropological dualism, then, we have made acquaintance with three great opponents of hylic pluralism as such—Thomas Aquinas, Descartes and Kant. Or it would perhaps be better to call these three opponents Thomism, Cartesianism and Kantianism, as movements which, in turn, put forward the immateriality of spiritual substances, the fundamental dualism of soul and body and the unknowability of the thing in itself. After all, as far as the three philosophers themselves are concerned, the meal was not eaten as hot as it was served. Thomas accepted a certain hylic pluralism in connection with the resurrection. As far as Kant is concerned, a number of remarkable passages, to which du Prel has referred, can be quoted and, what is more, many thinkers have taken over his theme of unknowability, but not his circuitous way of escaping from it via “practical reason”, thus, in the matter of abandoning a “hereafter”, going further than Kant himself did. Finally, as for Descartes, he himself mitigated his dualism by accepting an interaction of soul and body despite the heterogeneity of both substances.

The fundamental opposition between hylic pluralism and anthropological dualism can be expressed schematically as follows:

The first accepts a *trichotomy* :

spirit \times soul (entirely or partly of fine matter) \times body.

In the second, this is narrowed down to a *dichotomy* :

spirit + soul (undistinguished) \times body.

For Kant, this becomes:

the unknowable, intelligible (including the soul) \times the phenomenal.

For hylic pluralism, the theme of unknowability occurs at a different place:

the immaterial deity, never completely knowable \times all the manifest, many, knowable.

For anthropological dualism, there is, however, in principle, a gap *within* revelation or creation and certainly within man:

(God, the spirit + the soul) \times the body, experience.

While the fundamental division can also be situated elsewhere:

the one deity or the “noic”¹ \times the hylic, that is, the psychical (viewed psychohylically) + the physical (viewed hylozoistically).

This final remark, however, anticipates what will be discussed in the later part of this book.

¹ See above, p. 41.

16. THE ZETA STANDPOINT

I have already anticipated the content of this standpoint.¹ It is the counterpart to materialism insofar as it regards all being as completely immaterial, in other words, matter and the body simply as appearance. To this extent, the zeta standpoint is the final point in the series of points of view which began with the alpha standpoint. It represents the culmination of spiritualisation, in which immaterial being is completely victorious over material being, an absolute idealism over material realism.

There are relatively few supporters of this standpoint—clearly, it is regarded as too paradoxical. It always has the task of explaining the appearance of the existence of matter. In my opinion, this explanation, in the form, for example, of Heymans' ingenious psychical monism, is more successful than that of monistic monism, in its attempt to deduce that unpleasant epiphenomenon, consciousness. All the same, materialism has had far more supporters throughout the history of philosophy than immaterialism—it is clear that there has been a greater tendency to believe in the unique reality of matter than in that of the spirit.

When considering the various exponents of the zeta standpoint, one thinks in the first place of the Irish bishop, G. Berkeley and the Dutch philosopher, G. Heymans. There are also parallels in Indian thought,² especially in the case of those thinkers who believed that the whole of the outside world was *māyā*, appearance.

What is striking, moreover, is not only that immaterialism is the counterpart to materialism, but also that there is a certain connection between the zeta standpoint and the gamma standpoint. The gamma standpoint, it will be remembered, maintained that God or the "noic" aspect was the only immaterial being, while the whole of the rest of reality—creation, multiplicity—was material (partly coarse, partly fine matter). Thus, although material being was all-embracing, it was not regarded, in the gamma standpoint, as the most profound reality, as it was in the alpha and beta standpoints. According to the gamma standpoint, it was related in all its forms to something more profound—to God, as immaterial being. All matter was, in other words, of a lower kind of reality than that of the one, immaterial point of reference; it was, in a certain,

1 See above, pp. 50-51.

2 See, for example, the Vedānta system of Śaṅkara; B 53, p. 183 ff.

deeper sense, only appearance, *māyā*. If the protagonists of the zeta standpoint have to explain the appearance of matter which does not, in their opinion, exist and thus have to accept matter at least in one sense, namely as appearance, this may possibly be an analogy with the gamma point of view of the whole of the rest of reality that is material (partly coarse, partly fine matter), which is of a lower reality than that of the (only) immaterial being, God or the noic aspect.

In any case, the zeta standpoint has, despite its postulation of the immaterial being as the only reality, to be concerned with (the appearance of) matter. In this case, we are at once faced with the question as to whether this (apparent) matter is of one species or whether it is divided into one or more great zones. In other words, we are confronted, here too, with the problem of hylic pluralism or hylic monism.

In connection with this problem, the zeta standpoint can be divided into two parts, according to whether (apparent) matter is viewed monistically or pluralistically, thus in analogy with the division of materialism (its counterpart) into monistic and dualistic materialism. For this kind of subdivision, however, the systems which are included among the zeta standpoint are not numerous enough. What can be done here is to take a few significant representative cases of these subdivisions of the zeta standpoint and examine whether they tend towards a monistic or a pluralistic view of matter (which is, in all cases of the zeta standpoint, regarded as pure appearance).

It does not mean very much in itself that Berkeley assumed the animal spirits as existing.¹ In this, he was a child of his time and even pure materialists did the same. He did, however, especially in the work that he wrote in his old age, *Siris*, discuss in some detail the teachings of the neo-Platonists and took a wider view of the animal spirits, seeing them in the context of the "pure aether or invisible fire" (§ 171), writing about "this tunicle of the soul, or luciform vehicle, or animal spirit", which moved the coarser organs, comparing it with the *augoeides ochēma* and discussing the "immediate vehicle of the soul" (§86, § 205). It is therefore possible to conclude that Berkeley was more sympathetic towards hylic pluralism than towards hylic monism.

Turning now to Heymans, it is at first sight clear that he accepted only one mode of "different appearance" of the psychical, in other words, one species of matter. There is, however, a remarkable passage in an article that he wrote on Psychical Monism and "Psychical

¹ See, for example, his *Siris*, § 86, § 156.

Research",¹ in which he discussed possible continued existence after death, for which there was, in his opinion, a place in psychical monism. His argument was, briefly, as follows. Just as our individual memories can leave the centre of our consciousness, enter its periphery and continue to exist there, in the subconscious, so too is it possible for the various complexes, of which human personalities consist, to continue to exist in the peripheral part of the world consciousness as memories and to make themselves, from time to time, known to the central part of that world consciousness, possibly in the form of appearances. Heymans then went on to put forward various conjectures about the mode of continued existence of these memory complexes in the world consciousness—suggesting that they merged more easily with each other, for example, and permeated each other more than they did during life—and then continued: "What we may ultimately expect is that a perfected natural science can establish parallel physical appearances for the memory complexes in the world consciousness as it can for individual memories".² "As for individual memories" means, in this case, in the psychical sphere, which appears (according to psychical monism) as the brains. Heymans, however, was here discussing the state of the personality (which he called the "memory complex in the world consciousness") after death, when what appeared as the brains had ceased to exist, although the then existing "parallel physical appearances" could nonetheless be demonstrated. *This, in my opinion, is a hylic pluralistic view.* It is no longer a question, for example, of demonstrating physical traces of the mysterious phenomenon of telepathy between living beings, as has been attempted at various times. These traces could be included, if these attempts were successful among the "physiological" *pneuma* or some finer materiality at the ordinary physical level. However, what we are concerned with here is the case of the brains no longer existing—which was precisely our criterion for the distinction between the "psychological" and the "physiological" *pneuma*—and nonetheless of "physical appearances". What is, then, thought of here is a second great sub-division of (what appears as) matter or the hylic element.

In principle, this kind of observation by Heymans really ought to be regarded as a possibly acceptable hylic pluralistic variant of the zeta standpoint, but it is no more than an observation and, if a distinction

¹ *Zeitschrift für Psychologie* (1913), p. 1ff and *Gesammelte Kleinere Schriften* (B 69), I, p. 341 ff.

² *op. cit.*, p. 355.

has to be made, at the level of existence after death, between existence as psyche and physical appearances,¹ everything becomes extremely complicated. This kind of observation can also, in my opinion, be applied to a doctrine such as that outlined by F. Ortt in his *Superkosmos*, a work which clearly includes a theory based on a hylic pluralistic zeta standpoint, but which is rather more fully elaborated than Heymans' attempt.

It is, however, sufficient at this stage to have pointed to the occurrence of this variant. The zeta standpoint as a whole, as represented by Berkeley, Heymans and Ortt, does not, in any case, reject the idea of hylic pluralism or psychohylism so firmly as the alpha and the epsilon standpoints do².

17. THE PLAN OF THIS BOOK

By distinguishing the various *levels* of the (physical and) physiological *pneuma*, the psychological *pneuma* and the sublime *pneuma* and the various *standpoints*, from alpha to zeta, we have now constructed an *apparatus* for the analysis and classification of the material of hylic pluralism as it has occurred in the history of philosophy. In this, it will of course emerge that there has often been a transition from one level or standpoint to another or that these levels or standpoints have not been sufficiently clearly distinguished. The physiological *pneuma* and the psychological *pneuma* have frequently been confused—the animal spirit which rose from the blood was, for example, often at the same time the astral body or vehicle after death and the term etheric body was used for both. Similarly, there has often been uncertainty as to whether the word air (or *pneuma*) or light was intended to denote what we mean by physical phenomena or something of a much higher and finer nature. A distinction has sometimes been made between the two (*aër* as opposed *aithēr* or ordinary fire as opposed to heavenly fire), but very often no distinction has been made. This is, however, not unexpected and we can now turn to a consideration of the different thinkers and schools of thought.

It is, of course, obvious that my arrangement of the book will be chronological, although it will be necessary to depart from this from

¹ In contrast to direct perception, thus without the "opposite side", of the *content* of the psychical element.

² Sankara (see above, p. 97, note 1 and below) is also for a hylic pluralism. See B 53, p. 190.

time to time in order to deal with a specific sphere of thought as a whole. The list of contents will clarify what I mean by this.

In discussing the occurrence of a definite theme in the history of thought—in this case, hylic pluralism—it is possible to fall into *two extremes*. The first of these is a dry reproduction of the relevant places in the various authors. The other extreme is an attempt to write a history of the whole of philosophy on the basis of that one theme. Lange did this to a very great extent in his *Geschichte des Materialismus*. I shall try to avoid falling into these two extremes. The first would be tiresome reading and the second would mean that the theme of hylic pluralism, however interestingly it might be presented, would not be sufficiently central.¹ I shall, however, at least strive to situate the statements of the various thinkers about hylic pluralism within a certain *framework*, either that of their own period or that of a certain tendency or school.

I certainly do not undertake this task with complete self-confidence. The history of hylic pluralism has points of contact with the most divergent spheres of thought and civilisations—differing in time and attitude, concept and linguistic usage. To reproduce the many different views and opinions that are encountered in this vast study correctly, to place them in their proper context and to determine their meaning and importance is really too great an undertaking for one man. I hope therefore that specialists in the various spheres concerned will take this into account if they are inclined to voice detailed criticisms.

I shall give more attention to one category among the thinkers whose work is examined and among the various movements and schools than to others—this category is that of philosophy and this choice will mean that prominence will be given to the philosophical significance of hylic pluralistic considerations. This does not, however, mean that no attention at all will be given to other groups and sciences. It is obvious, for example, that psychology and philosophical anthropology, which have always been concerned with the essence of the soul and the various parts or functions of man, will be considered, especially as, in the past, these branches of learning were regarded as parts of philosophy. Attention will also be given to theology, between which and philosophy there has often been a lively exchange at various periods of history. Furthermore, the theological idea, based on the popular faith, that angels and demons possess a finer body is a typical example of hylic

¹ See above, p. 9.

pluralism. The teachings of natural philosophers and physicians are rather more peripheral. I shall only discuss cosmological generalisations, as I have already said, in passing.¹ As far as the physicians are concerned, I shall reproduce some of their views, but these are principally concerned with the level of the physiological *pneuma* and, although they were for centuries accepted as true, they have now been completely superseded. Other ideas which are also concerned with the level of the physiological *pneuma* are, on the one hand, those of animal magnetism (for example, the views of Mesmer and those like him) and, on the other, attempts, like those of Reichenbach and others, to demonstrate the existence of various finer radiations which might perhaps play a part in the phenomenon of the divining rod. I do not wish to go too deeply into these ideas—there does not seem to be very much evidence to support them and their philosophical content is very slight. As for occultists in general, I shall refer to them in passing, since hylic pluralistic doctrines are very common in this sphere. One is often tempted to ask whether this is perhaps because of their practical experience with cryptaesthetic powers and their acquaintance—more or less esoteric—with states after death. However this may be, it is more striking if hylic pluralism or psychohylism does not occur in their writings than if it does. The first is the case with the development during recent years of parapsychology as a form of occultism which is adapted to modern thought. Although fine materiality was frequently discussed when this new science first emerged and was known as psychical research, this theme has been pressed very much into the background in modern parapsychology. This question will also have to be discussed when we concern ourselves, in the later part of this work, with the connection between hylic pluralism and the philosophical background to parapsychology. Finally, hylic pluralistic ideas are often encountered in primitive peoples, in poets and in mystics. By way of illustration, I shall very briefly consider the extent to which several well-known writers and poets have seen anything in these ideas, in other words, the extent to which there is any change in their writings from some metaphors to a realism in the psychohylistic sense. By including a number of illustrations—of a more literal kind—I hope to be able to demonstrate that there has not been a complete absence of similar themes in the plastic and graphic arts.

¹ See above, pp. 12-13.

18. EXTANT LITERATURE

To conclude this introduction, the question of the extant literature dealing with what I have called "hylic pluralism" must be discussed. It will, of course, be clear that the prevailing mental attitude in modern times towards dualism on the one hand and positivism on the other will have prevented any comprehensive, detailed and systematic treatment of the theme of hylic pluralism as such. Nonetheless, it is also equally evident that a great deal must have been written at various times about a subject that has occurred and recurred so frequently in the history of thought.

The extant literature is, in fact, very varied. It consists in the main either of independent and variously entitled discussions of the subject which either tend to provide a full or fundamental treatment of the theme or only deal with part of it, both of these approaching the subject either from a historical point of view or not, as the case may be, or else expositions of the same theme which are included in works of a different kind.

It is possible that such expositions which have been included in other works are more detailed than other, shorter discussions of the subject which have appeared independently. This is, for example, the case with the writings of Ralph Cudworth (1617-1688), the most well-known of the "Cambridge Platonists", about our theme. In his *True Intellectual System of the Universe* (1678; B 21), Cudworth devoted many pages¹ to the idea of subtle bodies as this occurred in neo-Platonic and Christian writers. This is clear simply from a glance at the headings above some of the pages in the Latin translation of his work by J. L. Mosheim (1733): *Veterum sententia de duplici corpore animae; Corpus animae coeleste ex mente Platoniorum; Consensus Christianorum et Philosophorum in dogmata de corpore animae; Animae num corpus natura adjunctum sit;*² *Plerique Patres Angelis corpora tribuunt; Controversiae recentiores de corporibus Angelorum* Later writers on the subject apparently went back to Cudworth in many cases. It should also be mentioned here that, as Mead has correctly pointed out,³ Cudworth's translator, Mosheim, accompanied the arguments of the author, who was apparently sympathetic towards hylic pluralism, with sharp criticism, in the very detailed notes which he added to Cud-

1 Especially pp. II 375-484 in Mosheim's translation (B 22).

2 This is concerned with what I have called "psychohylism".

3 B 99, p. 58, note 1.

worth's text and that later generations have, generally speaking, been more in agreement with Mosheim's rejection of the idea of hylic pluralism than with Cudworth's advocacy of it. This does not mean, however, that additional material connected with the theme cannot be found in Mosheim's notes.

In contrast with Cudworth's detailed considerations included in a much more extensive work, there is also a little book by G.R.S. Mead (1863-1933) entitled *The Doctrine of the Subtle Body in the Western Tradition* (1919; B 99, 146 pp.). This is one publication which was entirely devoted to hylic pluralism. Apart from a foreword and afterword, it contains three chapters: "The Spirit-Body" (which amounts to what I have called the psychological *pneuma*), "The Radiant Body" (cf. the sublime *pneuma*) and "The Resurrection-Body". Mead also dealt especially with the neo-Platonists and a number of Church authors, but it is clear from his contents that he has chosen too wide a title, since hylic pluralism has occurred in more writers in the West than simply in these. He had nothing at all to say about the "doctrine of the subtle body" during the Renaissance and the romantic period (if we ignore his note on Cudworth mentioned above). It is clear that he chose this title to cover a collection of several articles for journals. Although Mead's book is to this extent unsatisfactory,¹ it is nonetheless one of the few independent treatises which refers directly to the theme of hylic pluralism.

There are, of course, several others. In an old series of books, the *Museum Bremense Historico-Philologico-Theologicum* of 1729, there is an essay of twenty-six pages by the otherwise unknown author H. C. Trichorius, entitled *Ochematologia* (B 167). In this, the writer attempted to deal more *geometrico* with the doctrine of the vehicle of the soul or *ochema*.

Another remarkable book, written by an Amsterdam physician, H. M. Duparc (1817-1905), appeared in 1845. The title, *Voorstelling van een stoffelijkheid der ziel* (64 pp., B 32) or "The Idea of a Materiality of the Soul" does sound very materialistic, but the author in fact took the delta standpoint.²

In the Netherlands, it is especially Dr. K. H. E. de Jong (b. 1872-1960) who has again and again advocated hylic pluralism, above all in the

¹ Mead was himself aware of the inadequacy of his title, since he says (on p. 11): "The history of the development of the doctrine of the subtle body . . . even if it were confined solely to Western tradition, would require a very bulky volume. . . ." This should be noted.

² See *op. cit.*, p. 46.

form of dualistic materialism (the beta standpoint), his most important work in this sphere being *Die andere Seite des Materialismus* (1932; 39 pp. B 76), a work which I have already mentioned several times.

Returning to discussions of hylic pluralism within the framework of writings dealing with wider subjects, I can, for example, mention the first part, *Het Astraallichaam* ("The Astral Body"), of Prof. W. H. C. Tenhaeff's first work, *Beknopte Handleiding der Psychical Research* ("Concise Manual of Psychical Research"; 1926; B 162). C. du Prel¹ and E. Mattiesen² have also written quite comprehensive and partly historical studies of the question of the astral body.

Returning once more to independent discussions of the theme, the most comprehensive study that has as yet appeared is by A. E. Powell. This consists of four works: *The Etheric Double and Allied Phenomena* (1925; 2nd edition, 1930, 140 pp.; B 118); *The Astral Body and Other Astral Phenomena* (1926, 273 pp.; B 116); *The Mental Body* (1927, 331 pp.; B 119) and *The Causal Body* (1928, 355 pp.; B 117). These works are, however, compilations, mainly from the works of A. Besant and C. W. Leadbeater, and they provide little more than the theosophical doctrines of these two writers.

The special number of the *Revue métapsychique* of January and February 1953 also forms a monograph dealing with our theme. This issue of the journal includes a number of articles grouped under the collective name of "Le Fluide". In connection with the level of the physiological *pneuma*, many different publications have appeared at various times. Some have dealt with the animal spirits³ and others with so-called animal magnetism.⁴ There have also been works like that of R. Montaudon, *Les radiations humaines* (1927; B 108).

R. Eisler's *Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe* (1927-1930; B 39) included a detailed article on the *Ätherleib*⁵ and another on the *Astral-leib*. Fechner also provided a brief review in his *Zend-Avesta* (B 42, II, p. 336 ff.) and Scheeben—Atzberger provided a short survey of theologians who put forward a doctrine about an "intermediate body" in their manual of Catholic dogma (B 147, IV, p. 918). It would, however, be too lengthy a task to enumerate all the books and articles which deal, like the works of B. Révész (B 128) and Siebeck (B 155), with the

1 For example, B 120; B 122.

2 *Der jenseitige Mensch* (B 97), p. 568 ff.

3 For example, B 149.

4 For example, B 152.

5 His data apparently go back to those at the conclusion of a treatise by M. Offner (B 109).

history of psychology or those which deal with occultism, like those of Hennings (B 66), Kiesewetter (B 82, B 83, B 84), Ludwig (B 96) and Aram (B 4).

A certain number of works, however, deal with definite aspects of hylic pluralism and certain periods during which it occurred a great deal. Questions concerning the theory of knowledge in connection with hylic pluralism were discussed in a particularly meaningful way by Wilhelm Haas (b. 1883) in his *Die psychische Dingwelt* (1921, 216 pp.; B 61). With regard to the theological aspect of our subject, I have already mentioned J. Hamberger's *Physica sacra oder der Begriff der himmlischen Leiblichkeit* (1869; B 62). The history of the concept of heavenly corporeality is also outlined in this book. J. C. Loersius also considered a special aspect of this in his little book *De angelorum corporibus* (1719; B 94). Kliefoth (1886; B 86) mentioned Lutheran theologians who put forward a doctrine of "intermediate corporeality".

Remarkably little has been written about the occurrence of the doctrine of hylic pluralism in modern times, either during the Renaissance or, for example, during the romantic period, when these views were frequently advocated. One may also look in vain for works dealing with the existence of these views in Indian thought, at least as far as summaries are concerned, yet, according to all the manuals, hylic pluralism has often been adhered to in India. The best authors in this sphere are Windisch (B 178) and von Glasenapp (B 52, B 53).

By far the most detailed accounts that have been written in connection with what I have called hylic pluralism, however, deal particularly with the Hellenistic period. As I have already said, both Cudworth (B 21) and Mead (B 99) devoted much of their attention to this period and to the works of these two authors must be added R. C. Kissling's *The Ochēma - Pneuma of the Neo-Platonists...* (B 85, 13 pp.), which is philologically orientated, and a summary by the professor of Greek (at Oxford), E. R. Dodds, "The Astral Body in Neo-Platonism", published as Appendix II in his edition of *Proclus' The Elements of Theology* (1933; B 33). Apart from the works of the ancient writers themselves and from treatises such as the one by Psellos (d. 1096) on the demonology of antiquity,¹ there have been several publications which, frequently on the basis of the concept of *pneuma*, discuss in detail, either directly or less directly, the teachings of classical antiquity concerning fine materiality. These include, for example, H. Leisegang,

1 See K. Svoboda (B 159) for this question; see also Hopfner (B 70).

Der Heilige Geist (1919, 267 pp.; B 92), which takes Philo as a point of departure; F. Rüsche, *Blut, Leben und Seele* (1930, 471 pp.; B 136) and by the same author, *Das Seelenpneuma* (1933, 84 pp.; B 137); above all, G. Verbeke, *L' Evolution de la doctrine du pneuma du Stoïcisme à S. Augustin* (1945, 544 pp.; B 174). Although, in my opinion, Verbeke places too much emphasis on the use of the expression *pneuma*,¹ this is a very useful book, if only for its detailed quotations from the sources. The works of Rüsche and Verbeke are related (see Verbeke, p. 5), but they have been to some extent differently planned and only partly cover the same ground. It is precisely this kind of book, referring to other periods in history in which hylic pluralism has occurred, which is so lacking.

One comment has to be made explicitly, however, about the last-mentioned authors—they have a great deal to say about hylic pluralism, but their treatment of the subject is only indirect. They are more directly interested in the question of *spiritualisation*—in the development of the conceptual content of *pneuma*, *spiritus* and spirit in the direction of the immaterial. For this reason, they try again and again to establish where a more spiritual meaning *already* appears. My problem is quite the reverse—I aim to establish in which cases hylic pluralism, or psychohylicism, or the idea of fine materiality *still* occurs or occurs *again*. It is, I believe, useful to pose this problem, even though it may only be because a plan which regards hylic pluralism as a view which has to be overcome, and the sooner the better, will automatically go less deeply into the essence and the variants of hylic pluralism. In an impartial treatment of the material, however, the result is bound to be more or less the same—even though full agreement about certain interpretations will probably never be reached, the same limits of “already” and “still” in respect of the immaterial and of fine materiality will, generally speaking, be brought to light in the different thinkers and schools of thought. A fruitful interchange may thus come about between those who are doing research into the subject.

1 See above, p. 19, note 1.

PART II
THE HISTORY OF HYLIC PLURALISM

A. PLAN OF THE HISTORICAL PART

19. In Section 17, I noted that the obvious way of dealing with the history of hylic pluralism was to proceed chronologically, but that it would be necessary to depart from this method in a number of cases.

Thus, with regard to, for example, physicians and poets, about whom less will be said than about philosophers, greater periods will be grouped together, whereas it will often be possible to deal with philosophers one after the other in the right chronological order. Similarly, it may perhaps be advisable to take the theologians, for example, of a greater period together as a whole, with the result that we may already be considering a later period with regard to one group than with regard to another, although there may well be contemporary links between the two.

It may be necessary for a similar infringement of pure chronological development to take place on an even greater scale if certain civilisations are dealt with as a whole. In itself, of course, there is a great deal to be said in favour of this. It is not so drastic an infringement if these civilisations, for example, those of China and India, have developed in relative isolation from each other (in relative isolation, since, in this case, Buddhism has played a part in both), but it is more serious if, for example, the whole of "pagan" antiquity is first considered together with Hellenistic gnosticism and and is afterwards seen as a whole "Israel and the beginning of Christianity", in which one has to go back for the Old Testament to a period long before that of, for example, neo-Platonism, while the first Christian authors, the Church Fathers and the Christian gnostics only appeared at the time of the dying "ancient" world.

An even more radical deviation from purely chronological order, in which the end seems to touch the beginning, will be encountered in the case of *primitive man*. Good history always begins at the beginning and this, in our case, means beginning with the hylic pluralistic views which man possibly held during the first stages of his development. But the more primitive these views are and the farther back in time, the less one can know, the less certain one can be about them and the less one is able to penetrate, by means of "empathy", into these ideas. Some time ago, however, a way of overcoming this difficulty was found and it has long been accepted that those people who live in our own age in a primitive, perhaps "natural" state have the same mental attitude as the spiritual ancestors of our own civilisation and of other

ancient societies. This assumption appears to have been confirmed by research and even quite striking similarities have apparently been brought to light. Contemporary "primitive" man is, however, much easier to reach, to interrogate and to examine than the Greek who lived before the Homeric period or the Vedic Indian. I shall therefore begin my history of hylic pluralism—and this will be my most radical reversion of chronology—by enquiring whether anything emerges from the data of modern ethnography and ethnology which points in the direction of hylic pluralistic views in the case of the people concerned.

After doing this, I will then go back to the beginning of each civilisation and consider the more or less primitive ideas, although this will only be a very brief survey, made for the sake of completeness, since my aim is, after all, mainly to consider hylic pluralism in developed thought and therefore especially in philosophical thought.¹ I use the phrase "more or less primitive ideas" deliberately, because the religious notions which were deeply experienced and frequently worked out in many forms (mythological forms, for example) during the very early stages of human development can, in many cases, hardly be called "primitive."

This raises a new question as to whether this aspect of *non-contemporary* primitive history should perhaps be regarded as a whole or whether it should be considered in the separate context of the civilisation of which it forms the first stage. In order to be able to deal continuously with each of the various civilisations in turn, I shall follow the second course.

There is also good reason for a further distinction to be made. There have been civilisations, such as those of India and Greece, and also of China, which have, after a primitive beginning, developed a philosophy to a considerable level. There are others which have, like Israel and Christianity, given rise to a systematic theological tradition. On the other hand, however, there have been societies which, although they can in no sense be called primitive, have not in fact developed any characteristic theoretical reflection, at least as far as we know, about the ideas to which they adhered. Examples of such civilisations are ancient Egypt and Persia. The obvious way of dealing with these civilisations, therefore, is to take them as a whole in a chapter C: "Hylic Pluralism in a Few Ancient, More or Less Primitive Civilisations" and then to go on to a further chapter D: "Hylic Pluralism in a Series of

¹ See above, p. 60.

Ancient Civilisations which have produced a Systematic Theology or Philosophy". In the case of the latter, however, each section will have to be introduced by a short survey of primitive thought in the conscious environment.

Together, chapters C and D deal with hylic pluralism up to the modern age.

Within the modern age, the thought concerned forms in the Renaissance and within the romantic period fairly sharply contrasted and typical periods. Yet the division with regard to other tendencies and separate figures outside these is far less clear here. In the modern age, however, all kinds of contrasting points of view constantly appear alongside each other.

There is, however, one objection to this treatment of hylic pluralism according to civilisations and periods. It will be obvious that certain themes, such as the various species of *pneuma* that I have distinguished¹ or the ancient elements or the materiality of demons and angels, tend to recur again and again in history. They will, however, always be viewed, in my historical account, within the context of a definite period, as a result of this period and not as one and the same theme. I shall also try to meet this objection by providing, at the end of this historical part, summaries and cross-sections of a number of themes which have been discussed in this part. This will also provide an opportunity of considering their *content* more deeply. These chapters will thereby also provide a suitable transition to the third part of my investigation, which will deal with the possible sense or meaning of hylic pluralism and in which the *quaestio juris* will be asked after the discussion of the *quaestio facti*.

B. HYLIC PLURALISM AMONG PRIMITIVE PEOPLES

20. SOME ETHNOGRAPHICAL NOTIONS

Before discussing the extent to which hylic pluralistic views occur among primitive peoples, I should like to look around in the sciences that are concerned with them, whether these are known as ethnology, ethnography, psychology of nations or cultural anthropology. These sciences are concerned with particular aspects of these primitive peoples—their bodily structure, their clothing and the articles they use, their

¹ See above, sections 6-9.

customs and morals or their myths and religious ideas. Our special concern here is with their ideas of spirit and matter and of the relationship between body and soul or, if this is too abstract a formulation for these primitive peoples, their opinions about these subjects insofar as these can be deduced from other and more concrete ideas that they have. Scholars in this sphere have tried to summarise these and similar opinions held by primitive peoples and believe that it can be established that all kinds of primitive peoples from many different parts of the world, as far removed from each other as North and South America and Melanesia or Indonesia, have very similar views. Care is needed here, of course—it is possible for the science of descriptive ethnography to slide imperceptibly into the sphere of an ethnology which attempts to prove certain theories concerning primitive peoples on the basis of special material. We shall certainly come across this problem of interpretation. Now, however, I simply wish to indicate a number of notions or concepts which research workers in this field have shown, with a great degree of agreement, to occur, at least in embryo, among very different primitive peoples.

Van der Leeuw,¹ for example, has pointed to the *blood* as the “important bearer of the soul”. Wilhelm Wundt devoted a chapter in his *Völkerpsychologie*² to “the blood as the bearer of the soul”, claiming that the idea was quite understandable because the man who was wounded in battle lost his life with the blood that streamed from the wound. Kruyt³ wrote: “It is generally reported that the witch preys on blood”. Hellpach⁴ recalled the popular belief that a spirit or ghost—sometimes known as a “vampire”—tried to draw blood from sleeping men.

In addition to blood, *breath* is a very important factor in primitive ideas about the relationship between body and soul. Van der Leeuw wrote that one “inferred the quality of one’s soul from one’s disappearance at the moment of death”.⁵ At the same time, however, he also pointed out that, on the positive side, an independent life was also seen in breathing, in the movement up and down of the breast, even during sleep.⁶ He concluded therefore: “The idea of power in the

1 *Phänomenologie der Religion* (B 90), 39, p. 258.

2 (B 181 IV, p. 93 ff. See also in the index under “Blut und Seele”.

3 *Het Animisme in den Indischen Archipel* (B 87), p. 118.

4 W. Hellpach, *Einführung in die Völkerpsychologie*, Stuttgart (1938), p. 91.

5 B 90, p. 257; see also above, p. 21.

6 *Ibid.* E. B. Tylor also wrote about the importance attached to the breath by very different peoples in his *Primitive Culture* (B 168a) I, p. 432 ff.

breath, the so-called breath-soul, has had the most enormous influence in the psychology of almost all peoples and times up to the present day. The most important words for the soul have been derived from this idea—*ātman*, *spiritus*, *anima*, soul, *pneuma*, *rūah*¹. Wundt wrote in great detail about this “breath-soul”, “Die Psyche als Hauchseele”,² and also about *Hauchzauber* or “breath-magic”. According to Wundt, even the *kiss* was originally regarded as a transfusion of breath-souls between living beings, just as, when a blood-pact was concluded, a ceremony involving the exchange of blood took place.³ In Indonesia, one of the words denoting the soul, *njawa*, literally means breath. This *njawa* must always remain with the person, otherwise he will die.⁴ Hidding⁵ also translated *njawa* by “animal” or “life” spirit or by “breath of life” which was breathed out with the “last breath”. The Maoris likewise regard the soul, among other things, as breath.⁶

Apart from these conceptions of the blood-soul and the breath-soul as formulations of widespread ideas among primitive peoples, ethnologists also provide a few other concepts of the soul as characteristic of these peoples. There is, for example, the *soul of the body* on the one hand and the *external soul* on the other. It is obvious that the blood-soul and the breath-soul are aspects of the soul of the body, but for the moment I will leave aside the possible link between the first two and the soul of the body.

Wundt wrote about the soul of the body on page 82 ff. of his work, calling it the concept of the bound soul, “since in this concept the soul is a quality of the living body itself”.⁷ In this connection, of course, we must not think of *our* ideas of soul and body. Just as what we think of as “dead” nature—water, rocks and celestial bodies—are, for primitive man, directly living and “animated”, so too is the body something that is, for him, directly living and this is what Wundt called the “soul of the body”. It is this idea that explains, according to Wundt, the attempt on the part of many tribes in Oceania and Africa to keep the corpse intact for a short or even a long time—these people believe that the soul still continues to work in the “dead” body. The

¹ See note 6 above.

² B 181 IV, p. 127 ff.

³ B 181, IV, p. 134-135.

⁴ Kruyt (B 87), p. 6.

⁵ *Gebruiken en Godsdienst der Soendanezen*, Batavia (1935), p. 50.

⁶ J. G. Frazer, *The Belief in Immortality*, II, p. 11.

⁷ B 181 IV, p. 78.

idea of a life-soul or soul of the body has also been considered by other authors.

In addition to this, Wundt also spoke about an entirely different concept of the soul, which he called the *free soul* or *psyche*,¹ and Frazer spoke about the *external soul*² as an idea that occurs among many primitive peoples. This soul is separate from the body—it can be absent from the body and yet still continue to inspire it. According to some tribes, it can even be kept elsewhere, for example, in a box. One is here reminded of the recurring theme in various fairy tales about kings and giants who have no soul in their bodies—this is somewhere else. The early ethnologist, F. Schultze, spoke, on the one hand, about a soul as “the really animating element of the body”³ and, on the other hand, about “the soul outside the body”, the *psyche* (*psuchē* means not only breath, but also butterfly), which can “emigrate”.⁴ Van der Leeuw discusses the external soul in some detail in section 42 of his *Phänomenologie der Religion*, provides an extensive bibliography and compares it with other concepts of the soul. This external soul was not, he claimed, “affected by death”.⁵

The same idea is also to be found in Hellpach, although this author does not refer explicitly to an external soul. According to primitive man, every human being has something in him which forms part of him, but which at the same time survives him and which can leave the body during life and return again. This idea is, in Hellpach's opinion, so widespread that there can be no doubt that this belief in the soul is the pivot of all “faith in the hereafter”⁶

A few examples of these views may be helpful. A tribe of bush dwellers in Surinam, the so-called Djoekas, has the idea of *akra*, a kind of higher self of man, which, at death, goes to the spirit kingdom. During sleep, this *akra* is outside the body.⁷ Kruyt also gave many

1 *Ibid.*, p. 78; 125 ff.

2 *The Golden Bough* II, p. 94 ff.

3 F. Schultze, *Psychologie der Naturvölker*, Leipzig (1900), p. 270.

4 *op. cit.*, p. 275.

5 *ibid.* See also E. B. Tylor, who similarly mentioned various peoples who distinguish either between a soul which went to the land of the dead or the spirit kingdom, temporarily or for good, and another which was more closely linked to the body and stayed with the corpse or in the grave at death (see B 168a, I, p. 434). Tylor did not contrast the soul of the body so sharply with the external soul as later authors have done, but he did discuss in detail the journeys that the soul was believed to make (I, p. 436 ff; see also II, p. 49 ff.) and, conversely, the widespread belief that the “spirit” remained with the corpse or in the grave (II, p. 29 ff.).

6 *op. cit.*, pp. 89-90.

7 W. F. van Lier, “Aanteekeningen over het geestelijk leven en de samenleving der Djoeka's in Suriname”, *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*. . . . (1940), p. 128 ff.

examples of the Indonesian belief that something left the body when a man fainted or was sleeping. It was thus possible for something belonging to man to come into contact with dead blood-relations and to have other experiences.¹ Hidding also mentioned the idea of man's double which, during sleep, unconsciousness or death, left the body.² This phenomenon was even more powerfully expressed, Hidding maintained, in ecstasy, during which, so these primitive peoples believed, there was a complete transference into another sphere with a very special life.³ Fischer has reported⁴ that, according to the Bataks, the *tondi* can fly out of the body and experience various adventures during sleep. The sleeping man must therefore not be roused too quickly, so that the *tondi* may have time to return to the body.

As long as life continues, there is a certain link between the external soul and the ordinary body. But what a difference there is between this idea of the soul and that of the body-soul, which is a quality of the living body itself! Those who have done research in this field have strongly emphasised this difference. Wundt, for example, wrote explicitly about the "twofold origin of concepts of the soul"⁵ and said: "According to its origin, the concept of the psyche is basically different from that of the soul of the body".⁶ Primitive people themselves also contrast these two kinds of soul. Frazer, for example, quoted the report made by a missionary, C. Keysser, who said of the Kai tribe which inhabits the part of New Guinea that previously belonged to Germany, that it distinguished between two species of human soul, firstly, a soul which continued to exist after death and, apart from no longer having a body, resembled man on earth and, secondly, a soul which permeated the body as sap permeates a tree.⁷ The ethnologist and missionary, Kluin, also made a distinction between the two concepts of the soul: "The animistic pagan acknowledges a "soul" in the body of the living person and speaks about the soul of a dead man. The first, however, is called by a different name from the second. For the

1 B 87, for example, pp. 14, 72.

2 *op. cit.*, p. 50.

3 *op. cit.*, p. 95.

4 H. T. Fischer, *Inleiding tot de culturele anthropologie van Indonesië* (1953), p. 182.

5 B 181, IV, p. 78.

6 *ibid.*, p. 125.

7 J. G. Frazer, *The Belief in Immortality*, I, p. 267. The report by Keysser himself will be found in R. Neuhauss, *Deutschn Neu-Guinea*, Berlin (1911), III, p. 112. According to the Kai tribe, the first mentioned soul "always had a certain corporeality"; to describe the second, Keysser followed Kruyt and used the term *Seelenstoff*, "soul-matter", which perished at the same time as the body at death.

soul of the living person, the word *sumangat*, for example, is used in the Moluccas, the word *tondi* among the Bataks and the word *tanoana* in Celebes. The soul of the dead is called, among the same people, respectively *njawa*, *begoe* and *angga*. This distinction between two kinds of soul also occurs outside the Indonesian archipelago. As will therefore appear directly, according to the view of the animistic pagan, the soul of the dead and the soul of the living are not the same."¹ Kluin went on to say that this idea, which is so unquestioningly accepted by primitive man, strikes modern civilised man as very strange indeed. The soul which lives in the body is nothing but the personal embodiment of man's life-force. The soul which survives after death has definitely to be separated from this first soul.²

Kruyt's contrasting *animism* and *spiritism* is clearly connected with this concept of two kinds of soul that occurs among primitive peoples. In the introduction to his great work, he wrote that the Indonesians have *two* terms for concepts which we call simply "soul". "The one 'soul'", he said, "which plays a part in everyday life is the life-force which fills the whole of nature".³ The second notion of the soul was concerned with belief in the afterlife. Kruyt dealt with the first concept of the soul in the first part of his work, *Het Animisme* (pp. 1-232), and with the second concept in the second part, *Het Spiritisme* (pp. 233-514).

Care is needed, however, in the use of the word animism. It was introduced by E. B. Tylor in 1867 and what this writer meant by it was belief in souls (*animae*) which left the body at death or temporarily before death. In other words, Tylor meant precisely the "external soul", which Kruyt later classified under spiritism. Animism, then, has for a long time had a second meaning—the attribution of a soul to all things, both organic and inorganic. Thus nothing is said here about the independence of the soul, and Wundt's "soul of the body"—the counterpart of the "external soul"—clearly comes within this category. What this amounts to, then, is what is called in philosophy *hylzoism*—the directly animated or living being of all matter, *not* what

1 H. Kluin, *Het Geestesleven der Natuurvolken*, The Hague (1924), p. 80. A. W. Nieuwenhuis, in *Die Veranlagung der malaischen Völker des ostindischen Archipels*, Int. Archiv für Ethn. (1923), pp. 130-131, has extended these two concepts, as occurring among various Indonesian peoples, providing several more examples. Prof. J. J. Fahrenfort, however, in his "Animistische volksbegrippen der Dajaks", *Kolon. Tijdschrift* XX, p. 162, expresses his doubts as to whether Nieuwenhuis has correctly made this distinction, which he identified with a distinction between spirit and soul.

2 *ibid.*, p. 90.

3 B 87, p. 1.

is only animated by way of psychophysical effect. It is clear from his definition of "the life-force which fills the whole of nature" that Kruyt was following *this* use of the word "animism". It may also be observed in this context that the expression in parapsychology—"either an animistic or a spiritistic explanation of certain phenomena"—is clearly based on a distinction such as the one that Kruyt, for example, makes, since, in parapsychology, an animistic explanation means one which is satisfied with the medium's own soul, whereas a spiritistic explanation postulates the influence of spirits which presumably exist outside the medium. This does not mean, however, that Tylor and others did not use the word "animism" in a much wider sense,¹ namely in the sense of the worship of spirits among primitive peoples, thus introducing the religious element and the idea of spirits as independent of man. What is more, there has also been reference to *dynamism*, as belief in *impersonal* powers and forces. In these cases, we are clearly moving in the sphere of *ethnology* and less in that of *ethnography*, in other words in the sphere of the interpretation of discovered views. Hellpach² refused to go too deeply into these "learned terms".

A similar controversial issue is that concerned with the *primitive mentality*. In his book, *De primitieve mensch en de religie* (Groningen, 1937), Van der Leeuw discussed the different characteristics of this mentality and the different theories about it. I prefer to remain to some extent aloof from interpretations which are not directly concerned with the question that I am investigating here. It is also possible for a considerable change to take place in these theories. There has, for example, been a great deal of opposition to the doctrine of the *pre-logical* thinking of primitive peoples, which gained so much support through the work of L. Lévy-Bruhl and with which Van der Leeuw for example, in the Netherlands was in partial agreement. Prof. J. J. Fahrenfort, for example, in his book *Dynamisme en logies denken bij natuurvölker* (1933), defended in great detail and with a number of arguments the view that there was no essential difference in disposition between primitive and civilised peoples: "Despite the great difference that undoubtedly exists between primitive and civilised peoples, there is... the great similarity in disposition".³ Prof. Fischer also said quite frankly: "The so-called 'primitive mentality', Lévy-Bruhl's construction, which is (apparently still) not accepted by any ethnologist

¹ See Kluin, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

² *op. cit.*, p. 89.

³ *op. cit.*, p. 169.

in the sense in which it was intended by this French scholar, is still finding favour among many who are not ethnologists. Ethnographers also do not recognise any primitive mentality that is of a completely different nature".¹ Something else that must also be taken into account in connection with research such as mine, which is concerned with the essence of hylic pluralism and which casts doubt on the unquestioning acceptance of a number of fairly general assumptions (such as, for example, those of anthropological dualism), is that it may also, in the long run, be able to throw a different light on views which are rather casually called "primitive". It may, for example, throw a fresh light on the way in which Heymans' psychical monism returns to the "primitive" idea that the heavenly bodies are souls which appear to us as light and so on. It is therefore important that I should keep as far as possible to a description of the various views that may occur, at least in this part of my work, and not go too deeply into all kinds of theoretical interpretations. In order to avoid misunderstanding, then, I must state at once firstly that I shall always strive only to place a part of the primitive views concerned in a different and better perspective (these views will moreover always continue to be saturated with the most strange and frequently most harmful superstition) and secondly that it will probably continue to be necessary to speak to some extent of a primitive mentality (in the sense, for example, of "participation"² and so on), even though it may be possible to point in some respects to a similarity with mysticism here (perhaps in the manner of an equality of the beginning and the end).³

As far as ethnographical concepts are concerned, then, I will not go any further into such general problems, but will rather consider a number of special conceptions of primitive man, especially those of the soul as a shadow, of the form of the soul (as a double, as a "mannikin" or as an animal, a bird and so on) and of *mana* or *orenda*.

Under the concept of the psyche, the free soul, Wundt also includes both the breath-soul and the "shadow-soul". Before going more fully into this, however, there is one question which I must attempt to answer: does the breath-soul not come, according to Wundt, within the category of the body-soul? Surely breath is very closely connected with

1 In "Ethnologie en Parapsychologie", *Tijdschrift voor Parapsychologie*, XII, p. 13.

2 See G. van der Leeuw, *op. cit.*, p. 38 ff. It should, however, be pointed out that participation as non-objectivisation (see Van der Leeuw, *ibid.*) and hylic pluralism as objectivisation (see above, p. 16.) are diametrically opposed to each other.

3 See C. H. van Os, *Moa-Moa* (1951), p. 32.

the ordinary body? If the body-soul is not directly the body itself (or its organs), then it is obvious that the body-soul is very closely associated with the blood-soul and the breath-soul, that these two are two aspects of the first. When I first mentioned the possible link between them, I deliberately set aside this point for the time being.¹ The answer to our question, however, is that Wundt did *not* regard the breath-soul as a part or an aspect of the body-soul. For him, both the breath-soul and the shadow-soul were two forms—the first being related to the perception of the “last breath” of the dying man and the second, rather less concretely, being linked to images of the memory and the imagination both of life when awake and, more especially, of man’s dream-life—of the same psyche, the free soul, which is, according to Wundt, set *over and against* the body and distinct from it.² The conclusion must be, then, that the contrast between the two concepts of the soul, the body-soul and the external soul, at least in the case of Wundt, does not entirely hold good. Despite this, however, many other ethnologists are in the habit of setting the body-soul and the external soul over, and against each other. If the matter is considered carefully, however, it is not so very surprising—no one can really intend this contrast to be so far-reaching that it leads to a complete division. There must always continue to be a clear connection between the two souls, at least during life. This is apparent, for example, from the fact not only that the external soul leaves the body, according to these views, during sleep and unconsciousness, in order to undertake who knows what kind of journey,³ but also that it returns to the body. As Kluin has remarked, it would be claiming too much to say that there is no connection at all between the two species of soul. For us, however, such a great difference between the soul of a living person and the soul which survives after death is surprising enough in itself.⁴ It seems to me that the breath-soul, which Wundt wished to classify under the “free soul”, forms a kind of transition between the body-soul which, taken in the narrowest sense, is no more than the direct life-force of the body (which primitive man is not able to regard simply as matter) and the really free psyche, which flutters round as a butterfly. The image of the breath is, however, derived from the ordinary body. At the mo-

1 See above, p. 72.

2 B 181, IV, p. 125.

3 See above, p. 73.

4 *op. cit.*, p. 90.

ment of death, this breath (soul) appears to escape—this is where emancipation begins. Now the emphasis can be placed either on the character of the breath as body, in which case the breath-soul is very close to the body-soul, or on the apparent act of liberation, in which case the breath-soul—that so widespread conception¹—is the first form of the external soul. Wundt favoured the second view, so that the difference of opinion is not really so great as it first appeared to be.

The careful reader will, in the meantime, have noticed something else. One of the terms used in Indonesia is *njawa*, which is, according to Kruyt, man's breath that must always remain with him.² Hidding also translated *njawa* as life-breath or life-spirit. In other words, in the contrast between the two kinds of primitive notions of the soul, this *njawa* seems to be on the side of the soul of the body.³ Yet, in the lists provided by Kluin of the names for these two concepts of the soul (and something similar is also given by Fischer⁴), *njawa* appears on the side of the external soul, that of the souls after death⁵! The opposite occurs in the case of the idea of the *tondi* of the Bataks. Kluin has placed it on the side of the life-soul, the soul in the body of the living person.⁶ Elsewhere, however, the *tondi* is said to be capable of flying out of the body and experiencing adventures,⁷ which really means that it should be on the side of the external soul. But, in these cases of the *njawa* and the *tondi*, we are bound to think, as with regard to the position of the breath-soul, of the occurrence of transitions within a wider context. The *njawa* is, in the first place, the life-breath or life-spirit, the soul of the body of the living person. Once it has escaped at death, it becomes the external soul. It is therefore not a question of hopeless confusion, but of a shift of emphasis and a change of function, in which the sharp contrast between the notions of the soul of the body and the external soul still remains.

Something similar can probably be observed with regard to the *tondi*. The literal meaning of the word is "image".⁸ In other words, this soul is in the first place extremely closely connected with man, even if it is not man himself, as closely connected with him as the body-

1 See above. p. 121 f. and Van der Leeuw (B 90), p. 257.

2 B 87, p. 6; see above, p. 72.

3 This is why there were objections to the translation of our word "soul" by *njawa* in the Malay translation of the Bible. See Kruyt, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

4 *Inleiding tot de culturele anthropologie van Indonesië*, p. 184.

5 *op. cit.*, p. 80; see above, p. 75.

6 *ibid.*

7 Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 182; see above. p. 125.

8 Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

soul. This explains why Kluin placed it in the first series. In the second place, the *tondi* is man's image, but in a much looser context. I am not simply dragging this consideration in for its own sake, but am mentioning it because it brings us to another very widespread notion of the soul, that of the double, the soul which is the image of the ordinary, living person. This is therefore the question of the *form* of the soul, in which a distinction has to be made between the difference with the ordinary human shape in general—this new shape is only a more or less inessential shadow or shade compared with the ordinary human appearance—and the special form of the new shape. This special form can be thought of either as very similar to the old shape or as very different from it. The first is so in the case of the *double* and of the *man-nikin* and the second is so whenever the external soul is believed to take on the shape of some animal, especially that of a *bird* or *butterfly*, which are freely moving beings *par excellence*.

As species of the psyche or free soul, Wundt contrasted this "shadow-soul" with the breath-soul, saying that the second idea occurred obstinately and was easily adapted to the gradual spiritualisation of the concept of the soul whereas the first was more vivid and had had a great influence on all kinds of myths.¹ Frazer also wrote about "the soul as a shadow and a reflection"² and Hellpach about "soul-shadow" and the "shadow-soul".³ Kruyt pointed out that primitive man liked to imagine the ordinary, normal shadow as something real—it had the shape of man himself, but was intangible.⁴ This is clearly the origin of the notion of the shadow-soul. Like man's breath, which is invisible, but palpable, his shadow, which is visible, but intangible, has qualities which appear to indicate a transition to a different form of existence. As we shall see, not only contemporary primitive man, but also primitive man in many different earlier periods of development has thought of the soul as a shadow. Among other things, this is clear from the words that have been used to denote the souls of the dead, the "spirits"—words like *skia* and *umbra*, which literally mean "shadow".⁵ Even the word that the Greeks often used for "appearance"—in what we would call the parapsychological sense—

1 *op. cit.*, pp. 125-126.

2 *The Golden Bough*, III, § 77, p. 77.

3 *op. cit.*, p. 92.

4 B 87, p. 68.

5 Tylor (B 168a, I, p. 430) mentioned a number of primitive tribes which also used a word for the soul that at the same time meant "shadow". The Dutch word, *schim*, is also distantly related to *skia*, shadow.

that is, the word *eidōlon*, had a secondary meaning of shadow, silhouette or shade ("in general use since Homer", the dictionary says).

On the other hand, *eidōlon* means image or form. What we have here, then, is two sides of the same coin—on the one side, the "spirit" or ghost which has a more fleeting and less real existence than ordinary man, like his shadow, and, on the other, it has shape or *form*.¹

This shape or form of the soul is frequently thought of as being very closely connected with the ordinary form of man, the shape that he has during life, in other words, it is usually regarded as a human shape which strongly resembles the person concerned (whether he is dead or not yet dead). This, then, brings us to the concept of the—rarefied—*double*.² As Hidding said, this was "a finer, one might say more spiritual double of man"³ which, according to the Sundanese, left the body during sleep and unconsciousness, but was not in principle invisible.

The soul, then, is thought to resemble man and to be a kind of double of the living person, very frequently, however, only in diminished size. This theme of the soul as a *homunculus* or *mannikin*⁴ is very widespread among primitive peoples. Frazer wrote about this idea of "the soul as a *mannikin*" which inhabited the body and moved it.⁵ *Tanoana*, the word that the Toradjas use for "soul" literally means "little man".⁶ In Kruyt's book,⁷ we find a quotation from W. W. Skeat's *Malay Magic* (1900), p. 47 ff.: "The Malay conception of the human soul . . . is that of a species of thumbling, a thin unsubstantial human image, or *mannikin*, which is temporarily absent from the body in sleep, trance, disease, and permanently absent after death. This *mannikin*, which is usually invisible, but is supposed to be about as big as the thumb, corresponds exactly in shape, proportion and even in complexion to its embodiment or casing (*sarong*), i.e. the body, in which it has its residence. It is of a vapoury, shadowy or filmy essence. . . ." This idea of the soul in the form of a *mannikin* as big as a thumb will also be met with in early Indian thought.

1 See Van der Leeuw (B 90) p. 41: "Gestalt der Seele".

2 See, for example, Van der Leeuw (B 90), p. 267. For the assumed resemblance between the appearance of the soul and man in the flesh, see also Tylor (B 168a), I, p. 450 ff.

3 *op. cit.*, p. 50.

4 See Van der Leeuw (B 90), p. 267.

5 *The Golden Bough*, III, p. 26.

6 See, for example, Kluin, *op. cit.*, p. 85; Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

7 B 87, p. 67. For the "thumbling", see also Tylor (B 168a), I, p. 450, note 1.

If the soul is thus frequently thought of in a form which is virtually identical to that of the living person, then Wundt's free soul can, according to primitive man, also assume other shapes, for example, the shape of certain animals. The favourite shape is that of a bird¹ or of other fast moving and flying creatures. According to Van der Leeuw, this form of the external soul, the idea of the soul-bird, is "extraordinarily widespread".² It is for this reason that Prof. C. H. van Os called his book on "Modern Thought and Primitive Wisdom" (*Het Moderne Denken en de Primitieve Wijsheid*, 1951) *Moa-Moa*. This Polynesian word means "bird", but it is also used for the human soul, "which has at all times been compared with a bird".³ The human soul has also been thought of as a fly, a snake or a mouse.⁴

To conclude my survey of a number of current ethnographical notions, I should like to draw attention to the concept of *mana* or *orenda*. In the thought of primitive man, *mana* is a power that is different from ordinary natural powers,⁵ the power *par excellence* of which everyone and everything, including lifeless objects and "spirits", possess some part, but in differing degrees —princes and strangers, for example, possess a great measure of it. The negative aspect of *mana* is *tabu*. Fischer called it an impersonal power which was especially attached to certain objects, such as amulets. The term is of Melanesian and Polynesian origin.⁶ A similar belief occurs in Indonesia, but in a rather wider sense, more resembling the idea of *orenda* that is prevalent among the Huron Indians.⁷ The Sioux Indians speak, in a similar context, of *wakonda*,⁸ and other tribes of *manitu*. This *mana* (a term which has come to be applied to similar ideas even when they occur outside Melanesia) cannot, however, be equated with soul or spirit.⁹ E. Arberman was also of this opinion—the soul was, according to Durkheim, at the most "individualised *mana*, but *mana* was, in Arberman's view, also in man, "in no sense simply will-power or psychical power", but rather a "mystical potentiality behind this", a "spontaneous principle in man as a part of his personality".¹⁰

1 See Wundt (B 181), IV, p. 157: "Der Seelenvogel und andere Seelentiere".

2 B 90, p. 272. See also plate 2 in this book.

3 *op. cit.*, p. VII.

4 Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

5 Kluin, *op. cit.*, p. 20 ff.

6 *op. cit.*, p. 190.

7 Kluin, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

8 *ibid.*, p. 24.

9 Kluin, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

10 Ernst Arberman, *Seele und Mana: Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* (1931), p. 293ff.

21. HYLIC PLURALISM AMONG PRIMITIVE PEOPLES

In the preceding section, I have outlined a number of current ethnographical ideas. I now propose, in this section, to go on to examine the extent to which hylic pluralistic conceptions occur, in connection with or even in isolation from these ethnographical ideas, among primitive peoples. What may we expect from this investigation? It will to some degree be obvious that we cannot expect to find anything like the epsilon standpoint, anthropological dualism, among these peoples, since the concept of an immaterial soul undoubtedly goes beyond the capacity of primitive man to think in the abstract. It is even questionable whether he can go so far as to accept the concept of a finer *body* as distinct from the soul. However this may be, we must now examine in detail, once again on the basis of ethnographical findings, what sort of ideas primitive man does hold.

All those who have done research in this field are apparently in agreement about one point, namely that there is hardly any question of a dualism, a contrast between soul and body, occurring among primitive people. Fischer has observed that the dualism of body and soul which is so automatically accepted by most of us is far less clearly present among the Indonesian peoples.¹ Hidding wrote: "The antithesis between matter and spirit does not fit into this mentality".² Arbman stated: "The twofold division into body and soul is unknown among the primitive peoples"³ and Van der Leeuw said: "Primitive thought does not recognise a dualism between body and soul"⁴ and elsewhere that, for primitive man, the psychical was physical and the physical psychical.⁵ Lévy-Bruhl's comment was: "For minds orientated in this way, there is no purely physical fact".⁶ Only Kruyt's voice is raised in dissent, in that he discussed the idea of a continued existence of *spiritual* man, the soul, in the second part of his book, which dealt with "spiritism" in the Indonesian archipelago.

If, then, the primitive peoples are, according to this almost unanimous testimony, so averse to a dualism between the body and the soul, what sort of ideas do they in fact have about the body and the soul? The native words, which we are in the habit of translating as "soul" or

1 *op. cit.*, p. 187.

2 *op. cit.*, p. 50.

3 *op. cit.*, p. 371.

4 B 90, p. 256.

5 *De primitieve mens en de religie*, p. 29.

6 *La mentalité primitive*, p. 511.

"spirit", have quite a different conceptual meaning from our words "soul" and "spirit", according to Fischer.¹ What is this meaning, then? It is obviously not true that the primitive peoples are not aware of any difference at all between what we call the psychical and the physical—the clear distinction that they make between the body-soul and the external soul² excludes this. The primitive peoples do not hold the ordinary materialistic point of view that "only this visible world and this ordinary body exist and when this body no longer functions everything is over for man". No, as Van der Leeuw said,³ the external soul is "not affected by death" and the view that it can leave the body during life—for example, during sleep—and experience adventures in another world occurs again and again among primitive peoples. Primitive man is therefore certainly aware of some difference between the purely physical aspect and another sphere which can be more precisely defined. I therefore repeat my question—*how* does primitive man regard this other sphere which we call the psychical?

Ethnographers have also expressed their views about this, of course, although some have discussed this point more fully and have been more positive in their opinions than others. I have deliberately avoided mentioning these various statements until now.

Frazer, for example, wrote in his well-known work *The Golden Bough*: "The savage thinks of it (the external soul) as a concrete material thing of a definite bulk, capable of being seen and handled".⁴

De Jong (B 76, p. 1) referred to two earlier ethnologists, B. Robinson and F. Schultze, and concluded, as a summary of their opinions, that the primitive peoples regarded the soul as something material, even though they still believed in some form of continued existence. Schultze expressed his view thus: "What must in the first place be emphasised here is that the soul is not regarded at this primitive stage of development as an immaterial being, but, in accordance with its nature, as completely material".⁵ Is the soul, then, simply material? Schultze's reply to this was that it was not a real materialism, but the "indifferent preliminary stage" of the antithesis between materialism and spiritualism (or immaterialism), which is known as hylozoism.⁶

1 *op. cit.*, chapter X, "Ziel en Geest".

2 See above, p. 72 ff.

3 See above, p. 73.

4 *op. cit.*, II, p. 95.

5 *Psychologie der Naturvölker* (1900), p. 266.

6 *ibid.*

Other authors have been more precise in their definitions of how primitive man represents this material soul. Tylor, for example, said: "The Tongans imagined the human soul to be the finer or more aërial part of the body, which leaves it suddenly at the moment of death; something comparable to the perfume and essence of a flower as related to the more solid vegetable fibre". The Greenlanders, for example, describe the soul, as it appears to them in their visions, as pale and soft and the Caribbeans thought that it was visible, "but said it was subtle and thin like a purified body". "Turning to higher races", Tylor wrote, "we may take the Siamese as an example of a people who conceive of souls as consisting of subtle matter escaping sight or touch, or as united to a swiftly moving aerial body".¹

Hidding reported that the Sundanese name for the external soul (in contrast to the *njawa*, the life-spirit or life-breath) was *lelemboetan*, which meant "the fine".² This is, in my opinion, clearly a hylic pluralistic conception—the *lelemboetan* is "a finer, one might say more spiritual double of man" which leaves the body during sleep and unconsciousness and at death, but is certainly regarded as material.³ "During ordinary life, this *lelemboetan* is a quiet, but indispensable guest, whose existence only becomes public in dreams and similar states".⁴ Another word is also used—*pangatjian*, "the finest of all", the nucleus of the *lelemboetan*, which leaves the body more easily than the *lelemboetan*, but from desire always returns to the *lelemboetan*.⁵ The *lelemboetan* is also always attracted by the *njawa*. At times of distraction, the *lelemboetan* is absent from the body. During complete unconsciousness, both the *lelemboetan* and the *pangatjian* are absent.

What is interesting in this context is that the word *sukma* is also used as a synonym for *lelemboetan*.⁶ As we shall see, Indian thought denotes the covering of the soul, among other things, by the term *sukṣma-śarīra* or "fine body".⁷ Bearing in mind the period of Hindu influence on Java, there is clearly a connection here.⁸ Like *lelemboetan*, *sukma* also includes the idea that the soul is fine or subtle.

Kluin has also made a contribution of a similar kind to our theme: "The concept of the soul held by the animist should not be thought

1 B 168a, I, p. 455-456.

2 *Gebruiken en godsdienst der Soendaneezen*, p. 50. See also Kruyt (B 87), p. 11.

3 *ibid.*

4 *op. cit.*, p. 51.

5 *ibid.*

6 Hidding, *op. cit.*, p. 50; see also Kruyt (B 87), p. 11.

7 See, for example, von Glasenapp (B 53), p. 392.

8 For *sukma*, see J. Gonda, *Sanskrit in Indonesia* (1952), p. 155.

of in a purely spiritual sense, as in Christianity. The soul is the 'fine' aspect of the body, as the word *aluse*, which the Javanese use for soul, literally means".¹

The various authors whom we are considering differ, however, in the extent to which they were interested in a precise definition of these primitive ideas. W. Wundt (1832-1920), Frazer (1854-1941) and Lévy-Bruhl (1857-1939) showed practically no inclination in this direction. Was the influence of the nineteenth century, with monistic materialism on the one hand and Kantian idealism on the other, perhaps decisive here? This did not, however, prevent E. B. Tylor (1832-1917), who was always most conscientious in taking the sources into account, even though he habitually referred to the "lower races" with their "delusions", from pointing out the views of some tribes about fine matter (see above, p. 144-145). Other writers, however, simply overlooked this point. Not even Van der Leeuw (1890-1950) gave attention to this question of *fine* matter. He did write that the primitive mode of thought did not imply materialism, since matter was always at the same time power in primitive society,² but he did not go further and say that it was a question of a *finer* matter. As a theologian, however, he was undoubtedly averse to an "intermediate body",³ an etheric body which the dead person might use as a vehicle during the period between his death and resurrection. In his publication *Onsterfelijkheid of Opstanding*, (1936; 4th ed. 1947), he spoke out openly against the Greek—Platonic conception of an immortal soul in a mortal body and in favour of the doctrine that there was *only* the one resurrection. According to him, the whole person died, both soul and body,⁴ both of which were in due course resurrected together. In this—so he maintained—Old Testament and early Christian view, there was no place for an intermediate state or a finer body as a vehicle for the soul after death. It is not surprising, then, that he involuntarily suppressed those primitive ideas which tended in that direction, all the more so because, although these ideas certainly do, as we have seen, occur, they can hardly be regarded as analogous with conceptions from other sources.

Rather than consider these authors, then, who have disregarded hylic pluralistic ideas among the primitive peoples (and the fact that these authors have failed to stress them does not mean that they do

1 *op. cit.*, p. 85. See Kruyt, p. 10: *rāgā alus*: "fine body".

2 B 90, p. 256.

3 See above, p. 46-47.

4 *op. cit.*, p. 32.

not exist), I prefer to turn to those *ethnographers* who have given concrete examples of hylic pluralistic views, such as Tylor, Hidding, Kluin and Kruyt. It is not the case that we only have isolated statements such as those made by the authors named at our disposal—many authors, both earlier research workers like Tylor and scholars whose work has been done more recently have undoubtedly written in the hylic pluralistic sense, generalising about the views of the primitive peoples about the soul. In the first place, of course, there is Tylor himself, even though one is well aware that he had no intention of enquiring about the sense or meaning of what I have called hylic pluralism: "Among rude races, the original conception of the human soul seems to have been that of ethereality, or vaporous materiality. . . ." According to Tylor, this view continued, on the one hand, to exist for a long time, whereas, on the other hand, the later metaphysical concept of immateriality was developed. This second, metaphysical concept meant nothing, however, to the savage. The thin, ethereal body of the soul was, for him, an easy explanation for appearances and so on.¹ Tylor also made a distinction between belief in souls (of men) and belief in spirits (angels and so on). He gave a number of details of belief in these spirits and added: "Such details as these may justify us in thinking that the lower races are apt to ascribe to spirits in general that kind of ethereal materiality which we have seen they attribute to souls".²

Several more recent authors are of a similar opinion. Thus, T. Danzel has said: "The psychical seems to approximate to the material and objective aspect in that primitive man regards it as resembling fine matter and as transferable".³ W. Hellpach, the well-known writer of, among other books, *Geopsyche*, gives a view which sums up much of the foregoing. He first discusses the ideas that primitive man has of *forces*—that they are not lost at death, but simply escape, that corporeal forces, for example, those that are present in the blood and the breath,⁴ and spiritual forces are mixed together and that what proceeds from living men is the bearer of force or power. After this, he goes on to say: "In addition to this doctrine of the material power of the soul, there is another power of the soul of 'fine matter', an 'ethereal'"

1 B 168a, I, p. 457; see also II, p. 24.

2 B 168a, II, p. 198.

3 *Kultur und Religion des primitiven Menschen* (1924), p. 50.

4 There is, he claims, no need to accept a separate breath-soul—after all, a separate "sweat-soul" is not accepted. He clearly regards a possible breath-soul as something that is very closely connected with the physical aspect. The idea can, however, begin to change (see above, p. 79).

power, as it were, which is equally indestructible and which recurs in the "astral body" of fashionable tendencies. A more delicate form of human appearance lives in man which can leave the body and migrate, but can also return to the body during life, leaving it again, however, at death to lead its own continued existence. This existence is admittedly often so "shadowy" that the shadow is driven by constant longing to the lost body and its massive forces. This longing can be appeased by the shadow appearing (as a ghost) in the vicinity of the resting place of the buried body, by its attempting (as a vampire or nightmare) to suck blood or breath from living beings during sleep, by entering other bodies, either those of animals, those of other human beings (the phenomenon known as the transmigration of souls or metempsychosis) or those of descendants (rebirth, as a grandchild—the German word *Enkel*, grandchild, is philologically the diminutive of *Ahn* and thus means, by derivation, "little ancestor") or finally by receiving a new body which is nonetheless similar to the old one (in other words, resurrection). This soul-shadow has, from the very beginning, capacities which are different from those of the body, for example, life-forces which are less than those of the body, but which can overcome time and space. Around this shadow revolves that aspect of magic which has to do with spirits and their conjuration and with ghosts and similar phenomena."¹

Up till now, I have only discussed the views of the well-known Dutch missionary and research-worker A. C. Kruyt (1869-1949) in passing. Kruyt's views in connection with this subject, however, merit special consideration. In his great book, *Het Animisme in den Indischen Archipel* (1906), he contrasted rather sharply "two terms which the Indonesians have for concepts which we call simply 'soul'".² The one concept of the soul is entirely related to man's life here on earth, the other is concerned with the life after death. It is not that the Indonesian is aware of having two souls—he only has one soul at any time. There is, however, a great difference between the two. The first, which plays a part in everyday life is the life-force which fills the whole of nature. "This soul is a fine, etheric matter which inspires the whole of nature and makes it live. For this reason, I prefer to call this soul 'soul-matter', to distinguish it from man who continues to live spiritually after death and whom I call 'soul'".³ Kruyt added a note to the word

¹ *op. cit.*, p. 91 ff.

² B 87, p. 1 f.

³ *op. cit.*, p. 2.

"soul-matter": "I originally used the word 'life-fluid', but 'soul-matter', a word for which I am indebted to Prof. P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye of Leiden University, expresses much better what primitive man means by this aspect of the soul". Kruyt distinguished "two threads"—*animism* proper, the thread of soul-matter, which filled the whole of nature and which, when it became personal, still preserved its impersonal character, and that of *spiritism*, of the soul continuing to live independently in the hereafter, the soul which was feared and therefore worshipped. Kruyt discussed animism in the first part of his book and spiritism (in the Indonesian archipelago) in the second part.¹ I have already pointed out² that "animism" is used in two senses—not only in the sense that all things are inspired, but also in the sense of belief in souls (*animae*) which leave the body at death or temporarily before death. Kruyt used the term "animism" in the first sense. For the second sense—the sense of the "external soul"—he used the word "spiritism".

What is important in connection with our subject, however, is that the two concepts of the soul which he contrasted were the concept of "soul-matter" as opposed to that of the soul proper which continued to exist after death, the concept of "spiritual man". What can be said about Kruyt's distinctions in the context of hylic pluralism?

As far as the notion of the soul proper is concerned, I have already noted³ that Kruyt especially seemed to differ from the other ethnographers, who, almost without exception, have stressed primitive man's ignorance of the typical dualism between body and soul. Kruyt, however, wrote about the soul proper which survived after death, *spiritual man*. We gain the impression from this author that primitive man certainly acknowledged an immaterial concept of the soul, but, on the other hand, I suspect that Kruyt tended to arrange his material too strictly according to a modern and typically Western contrast. The other ethnographers have practically nothing at all to say about this "spiritual man" according to the views of primitive man. One may put it more strongly—if one looks more closely at Kruyt's book, one sees that he climbs down as soon as he begins to provide concrete, views. For example, he says that the surviving soul, spiritual man, is a kind of extract of the body.⁴ "The shape in which the soul is ima-

1 B 87, p. 4.

2 See above, p. 75.

3 See above, p. 83.

4 *op. cit.*, p. 3.

gined to be is that of man's own body, with all the defects and all the qualities of that body."¹ But, Kruyt adds, "that soul [the soul which survives after death] is so material that, in the case of certain tribes, such as the Olo Ngadju of Borneo, the soul-matter is still regarded as necessary to re-animate the soul after death".² This certainly overthrows Kruyt's distinction, not, it is true, as far as the contrast between the body-soul and the external soul is concerned, but undoubtedly as far as a possible contrast between materiality and immateriality is concerned. He also says that the word *gurumi* is used on Halmahera for soul-matter. This soul-matter leaves the body when the person faints.³ He also quotes an author⁴ and summarises what he says as follows: "It is reported that the Hovas of Madagascar imagine the soul-matter to be an ethereal body which leads an astral existence and which can be separated from the material body in order to be re-united with it afterwards". In both of these cases, we clearly have to do with *transitions* between the concepts "soul-matter" and "soul". The "soul-matter" certainly seems to resemble closely what other authors have called the body-soul—the direct inspiration of the body. But, as soon as this soul-matter leaves the body, something else puts in an appearance which clearly displays features of what those who have done research into the field of primitive ideas have called the "external soul". We have, however, already ascertained from the concepts of *njawa* and *tondi* that there is a strong tendency for the meaning of all kinds of terms to shift from a close connection with the body to a more dynamic flexibility and a greater emancipation.⁵ Even though it might be against his will, Kruyt cannot be exempted from the ascertainment of such transitions. The fact that he wrote, under the heading of "spiritism", the section of his book in which he dealt with the surviving soul, especially about the shape of the soul, whereas he repeatedly referred, in the section on "animism", in which he dealt specifically with the soul-matter, to the *tanoana*, the mannikin which has the shape of the living man,⁶ although the proper place for this was clearly in the second section (on spiritism), also points in this direction. As for Kruyt's "soul proper", "spiritual man who continues to live after death", we are bound to conclude that he really failed to extend his sharp contrast as far as this.

¹ *op. cit.*, p. 235.

² *op. cit.*, p. 3, note 1.

³ *op. cit.*, p. 14.

⁴ J. Hora Adema, *Losse schetsen uit Madagaskar*, Ind. Gids (1899): Kruyt, p. 14.

⁵ See above, p. 126

⁶ *op. cit.*, p. 66.

What is the position now with regard to the other half of his anti-thesis, the *soul-matter*? Do not those who are looking out for hylic pluralistic ideas have reason to rejoice here? Or did Kruyt perhaps go too far in this respect as well? I will turn my attention to Kruyt's soul-matter now.

A term such as "soul-matter" does seem to fit completely into the framework of hylic pluralism. It is reminiscent of the term "mind-stuff", which we shall encounter later on in connection with W. K. Clifford (1845-1879) and also in the polemics of William James. The term "soul-stuff" is also met with in ethnologists other than Kruyt. I have, for example, already quoted Frazer¹ on the two concepts of the soul held by the people of the Kai tribe—one of the soul after death and the other of a soul which permeates the body as sap permeates a tree. He wrote about the second concept of the soul² as "a spiritual essence or soul-stuff, which pervades the body as sap pervades the tree, and which diffuses itself like corporeal warmth over everything with which the body is brought into contact".³ Radin has also written about "soul-stuff" or "soul-matter", to some extent following Kruyt in this.⁴ Kruyt's term has apparently achieved some success and, what is more, there is good reason for us to acclaim him as an ethnologist who has done much to indicate hylic pluralism among primitive tribes. After all, he said himself that he originally intended to use the term "life-fluid"⁵ which has frequently been employed in the hylic pluralistic sense—for example by Mesmerism. He further characterised this concept of the soul as a "fine, ethereal matter" or an "ethereal essence in man"⁶ and pointed out that the concept of soul-matter had various names in Java, such as *rāgā alus*, "fine body", and *sukma* (cf. Sanskrit *sukṣma*), "fine."⁷

A certain care is needed, however, in assessing Kruyt's achievement, because he did change his point of view⁸ from that of animism to that of dynamism, which places greater emphasis on belief in an impersonal power (*dunamis*) than on a soul-matter. In so doing, he ceased to use the term soul-matter. We may ask in this context whether Kruyt

1 See tabove, p. 74.

2 Although the first is "not indeed absolutely incorporeal".

3 *The Belief in Immortality* I, p. 268.

4 *Gott und Mensch in der primitiven Welt*, Zurich (1953), p. 75.

5 *op. cit.*, p. 2, note 1.

6 *op. cit.*, p. 2.

7 *op. cit.*, p. 10; see also above, p. 146, note 4.

8 In three papers in *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Ned. Indie* (1918 ff). See also Kluin, *op. cit.* pp. 17, 20.

himself perhaps realised that he had made too sharp a contrast between soul and soul-matter, even with regard to the "soul-matter". Did he do this because he was under the influence of nineteenth-century Western thought, which clung so obstinately to materialism on the one hand and to the immaterial aspect of the psyche or the consciousness, as in Kantianism, on the other? Just as Kruyt's idea of the external soul which continues to live as the "spiritual man" may amount to the illicit interpolation of a Western concept into the primitive mind, so too is it possible that he may have provided too material an interpretation of the other concept of the soul, which relates to life on earth and the ordinary body. It is possible that Kruyt went too far sometimes with his explanations by means of a "soul-matter". I do not, however, think that he went so far wrong with this aspect of his contrast as he did with the other aspect, that of the surviving "spiritual man". As soon as he begins to discuss his "spiritistic" concept of the soul, there is little evidence of immateriality of the soul according to the ideas of the primitive peoples—on the contrary, there too, there is constant reference to (fine) materiality.¹ The other ethnographers have no room for any possible immaterial conceptions of the soul among the primitive peoples.² Kruyt, on the other hand, quoted many concrete examples of ideas of a soul-matter among the primitive peoples. In this, he was obviously working, not as a theoretician, but as an ethnographer. Even though he may have gone too far sometimes and even though—perhaps when he was back in the Netherlands—he ceased later on to use the term "soul-matter", he nonetheless introduced a term which is characteristic of the hylic pluralism of primitive peoples and which would not have aroused such a response if he had not expressed these ideas so felicitously.

What is remarkable in this connection is that Van der Leeuw did not express admiration for Kruyt's change of attitude. He wrote that Kruyt had "coined the fine term *soul-matter*"³ and that he had been "rather precipitate" in his withdrawal of the term soul-matter when he wanted to give first place in primitive thought to the idea of power and dynamism. Van der Leeuw believed that power and matter were very closely connected in the primitive mind and that it was therefore

¹ See above, p. 90. He tends to regard the materiality of the soul-matter in a more dualistic materialistic perspective, thus as fine materiality, than as monistic materialism, in the Western tendency.

² See above, p. 83.

³ B 90, p. 255.

possible to speak both of "soul-power" and of "soul-matter" in this case.¹ What is equally remarkable, however, is that Van der Leeuw did not, in this context, arrive at a definition of the concept of fine or subtle materiality.²

It almost goes without saying that, in discussing the question of primitive man's idea of a soul-matter, we should at the same time go into his conception of *mana* or *orenda*.³ *Mana* is a Melanesian notion. It is not a concept which occurs as such among the Indonesian peoples. Kruyt, who wrote primarily about the Indonesian archipelago, used it rarely, but his soul-matter contained many qualities which are connected with the concept of *mana*. According to the views given by Kruyt, not only every man, but also every plant and animal has soul-matter, although not to the same degree. In addition to personal soul-matter, there is also impersonal soul-matter. It resides in parts of the body such as the nails and the teeth. A man can add to his soul-matter by eating and drinking. There is a danger that a man can become afraid if he eats venison. The importance of the head as the seat of soul-matter is expressed, for example, in the practice of head-hunting, the aim of which is to gain control of the enemy's soul-matter.⁴ All kinds of objects possess soul-matter, for example, beads, rice and metals, especially precious metals.⁵ Ideas of this kind, then, are met with in connection with *mana*, which is, however, regarded as more than simply power.⁶ At one point in his book, Kruyt explicitly linked this Melanesian concept of *mana* (which he was clearly not using in the wider sense, that is, outside the context which he was discussing) with his concept of soul-matter: "A special phenomenon in nature must have a special soul-matter (called *mana* by the Melanesians) from which power proceeds".⁷ In the same context, he went on to refer to the importance of bezoar stones (about which Rumphius wrote as early as 1741) as fetishes. Kruyt's conclusion was that these stones formed the concentration, the embodiment of a person's soul-matter.⁸ Kluin also mentioned several objects, such as bezoar stones, which served as fetishes and in which *mana* power was reputed to be accu-

¹ *ibid.*

² See above, p. 86 ff. Van der Leeuw does mention "a finer matter" on p. 282 (of B 90), but in the context of Greek thought.

³ See above, p. 82 ff.

⁴ B 87, p. 17 ff. and *passim*.

⁵ *op. cit.*, p. 160 ff.

⁶ See above, p. 82 ff.

⁷ *op. cit.*, p. 201.

⁸ *op. cit.*, p. 202.

mulated.¹ It would therefore not be rash to say *mana* and "soul-matter" are very closely related ideas. There is, however, a different emphasis in each—in the case of the soul-matter, the substance or the matter (the finer matter?) is stressed, in the case of *mana*, the element of power or force. In this connection, it is worth recalling that Van der Leeuw said that it was possible to speak both of "soul-power" and of "soul-matter"²—in his opinion, it did not make much difference to primitive man.

I should now like to try to analyse these two concepts or, to use another and perhaps better term, these two aspects a little further and to do so by comparing them with more modern ideas. Whenever it is said that the *mana* and soul-matter of princes and strangers is especially great, what is stressed here is the aspect of power. Viewed in a modern context, what is immediately called to mind here, apart from outward power, is the power of *suggestion*.³ Respect for, belief in and the fame of certain beings and objects must have a certain effect and influence, which, in our case, is usually known as suggestive. In ceasing to use the concept of soul-matter and in abandoning animism in favour of "dynamism", the theory that belief in a power or force which was sometimes impersonal and sometimes personal was the most striking characteristic of primitive man's views, Kruyt had clearly come to the conclusion that insufficient justice had been done to the aspect of power in the use of the term "soul-matter". He had clearly gone too far with his theory of matter and had neglected the aspect of power (that is, belief in power) in his earlier period, when he had spoken of a fetish simply as a concentration of soul-matter. Nonetheless, Van der Leeuw wrote that Kruyt had been "rather precipitate" in abandoning the term soul-matter and that it was equally possible to speak both of matter and of power. I should like to suggest, however, that it cannot be correct to *equate* power and matter, as Van der Leeuw is inclined to do here,⁴ and that it is advisable to *distinguish* an aspect of power (and suggestion) from another aspect which is related to materiality and especially to fine materiality and to recognise that these two aspects of power and of matter do *not* cover exactly the same area.

1 *op. cit.*, p. 41.

2 B 90, p. 255; see also above, p. 158.

3 For the susceptibility of primitive man to the power of suggestion, see Kluin, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

4 B 90, p. 255.

There may therefore be an area where they do coincide. Arbmán wrote about *mana* as a more or less supernatural power which was, in the case of man, in no sense simply will-power or soul-power, but rather a "mystical potentiality behind this".¹ Referring to A. M. Brouwer, Kluin said that, in attempting to explain the idea of *mana*, too little attention had been given to "latent psychical forces to which "magnetism", for example, owes its origin". Primitive man who, as Andrew Lang observed, seems to have a much greater capacity for clairvoyance, telepathy and so on than civilised man, is clearly more susceptible to the effects of these forces, for good or for evil.² Danzel also said something similar, recalling, in connection with primitive man's idea of *mana*, a statement by Prentice Mulford, one of the leaders of the so-called New Thought Movement, that every object is charged with the being of the one who has possessed it.³ This is, of course, well-known to be the opinion of many modern occultists. Psychometrists also claim that it is possible to ascertain various things that have happened to an object in the past from its "magnetism" and theosophists and anthroposophists also talk about the "good" or "bad" magnetism of certain places, buildings and so on.⁴ I shall have to leave aside the question as to whether such assertions may perhaps be correct in this part of the book, which deals with the history of hylé pluralism. It is, however, obviously important to indicate here the similarity between these views and the ideas held by primitive peoples. In these primitive ideas, we have therefore to be careful to distinguish between an aspect of pure power—as an important part of the primitive concept of *mana* and one which I would prefer to classify under the heading of "suggestion"⁵—and another factor which is more of a material nature. This aspect of matter may perhaps exercise a certain power—which is therefore common to both aspects—or it may be present without exercising power. I will not go into the question as to whether what is involved here is an objective influence of the aspect of matter. According to what both primitive man and the modern occultist believe, however, this is certainly the case. Only the power, the *mana*, that is attributed to certain objects or persons, such as fetishes

1 *Seele und Mana*, *op cit.*, p. 307.

2 Kluin, *op. cit.*, p. 28. Kluin was here referring to Andrew Lang, *Making of Religion* (1909). See also Fischer, *Tijdschrift voor Parapsychologie*, XII, p. 4.

3 *Kultur und Religion des primitiven Menschen*, p. 50.

4 See, for example, C. W. Leadbeater, *The Hidden Side of Things* (1913), I, p. 171 ff.

5 This, of course, raises the question of "magic", but I do not want to discuss here whether the apparent results of actions intended to be magic can only be attributed to the effects of suggestion or can perhaps not be entirely ascribed to these.

or princes, is apparently so great that it far exceeds the possible influence of the material aspect. We are obviously reminded here of the part played by suggestion. As far as the material aspect in itself is concerned, this matter is clearly regarded by both groups to a great extent as *fine* matter. This is certainly the case with the "magnetism" of the modern occultist. Ever since Mesmer, the so-called "animal magnetisers" have spoken of a "fluid", of certain, normally invisible and finer emanations of which the magnetiser should avail himself. An author such as Leadbeater, for example, referred to "etheric" or "astral" matter as the "counterpart" of the physical objects to which the magnetic influence could be attributed and from which the psychometrist derived his data.¹ As far as primitive man is concerned, there are many authors who have written about the matter concerned as "etheric", as an "ethereal fluid" and so on. Kruyt, for example, thought first of using the term "life-fluid" instead of "soul-matter"—"it is a fine, ethereal matter which inspires the whole of nature".² Clearly, he went too far, not only in aiming to classify the whole of primitive man's belief in *mana* under this category, but also in seeking later to explain everything as power or dynamism. He was probably partly correct in claiming that primitive man's views related to a "soul-matter" or fluid. Writing about *mana* as a "mystical potentiality",³ Arbman defined its being later in his book more precisely as a "fine fluid, an invisible essence" and said that primitive man believed that gods and spirits did not have a soul proper, but "an invisible fluid, a fine distillate".⁴ Hellpach also wrote in this way.⁵ Kluin, following A. M. Brouwer, recalled the doctrines of the magnetisers as something that could be compared with the views of primitive man. He was, however, not alone in this—Prof. Gebhard Frei also pointed to the analogy between Mesmer's teaching about a "fluid of fine matter" as the magnetic power used by him and the ideas of the primitive peoples: "In the primordial, magical mind of primitive man, this power is known as *mana* or *orenda*".⁶ Robert Amadou has also written, in his article

1 *op. cit.*, I, passim.

2 B 87, p. 2. See also above, p. 151.

3 *op. cit.*, p. 307. See also above, p. 162.

4 *op. cit.*, p. 368.

5 See above, p. 149 f. Karutz ("Der Emanismus", *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*, 1913, p. 578 ff; see also Fahrenfort, *Dynamisme en logies denken bij natuurvölker*, p. 166) was also of the opinion that, according to primitive man, matter emits emanations which can be compared with the activity of radium.

6 "Der Doppelgänger und das Problem des Feinstofflichen", *Neue Wissenschaft. Zeitschrift für Parapsychologie*, IV, 2 Jan. 1954, p. 49 (B 50).

entitled "Esquisse d'une histoire philosophique du fluide", about "the *mana* of primitive peoples" having the characteristics of the magnetisers and vice-versa.¹ Both these authors, however, regard *mana*, in my opinion, too exclusively as fine matter. A close parallel to Kruyt's later attempt to replace the whole matter of the soul by dynamism is the attempt to reduce the "animal magnetism" of Mesmer and others entirely to the effect of suggestion. It is possible to point to several other concrete similarities between doctrines. Kruyt, for example, equated the blessing with which, according to the Indonesians, the priest or witch-doctor manipulated, with soul-matter.² The modern occultist also regards a blessing as power of a certain (limited) scope, but consisting of fine matter. *Mana* is especially linked in the primitive mind to certain objects which do service as amulets.³ Leadbeater also attributed a certain value to talismans, for example, to special precious stones which were charged with magnetism.⁴ He always made an explicit distinction here, however, between this factor and that of suggestion. To illustrate this, he told the story of what happened to a lady when the horse that she was riding bolted—she was able to preserve her presence of mind by thinking of the talisman that she was wearing. Leadbeater makes it clear that this was more the result of the suggestion that proceeded from it for her than of the power of the talisman itself—even though he seems to some extent to believe in the possible power of talismans. This is the difference, then, that clearly emerges between the views of primitive peoples and those of modern occultists—the primitive peoples are almost entirely filled with such possible influences, hardly ever transcend them and poison their lives with them. (We cannot discuss here all the consequences which this belief has for primitive man in the sense of all kinds of superstitions and undesirable practices, but these consequences are, of course, undeniable.) Leadbeater at least ends with a "better way" to protect himself against such "undesirable magnetism" than going on worrying about it.⁴

My conclusion with regard to *mana* and *orenda*, then, is that two aspects must be distinguished in it—an aspect of power and an aspect of

1 B 47, pp. 7-8.

2 B 87, p. 89 ff.

3 Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 190; see also above. p. 140.

4 *op. cit.*, II, p. 206 ff.

fine matter.¹ The importance attached to the first aspect can to a great extent be explained by suggestion. Insofar as a certain influence may proceed from the aspect of fine matter (an influence which is clearly felt by primitive man, but is grossly exaggerated), the two aspects partly coincide. There are also parallels of both these aspects which can be known to exist in the views of modern occultists (such as Mesmerists, theosophists and so on).

Insofar as belief in "etheral" factors, the aspect of fine matter, does occur in the views of primitive man, then what we have to do with here is a clear case of hylic pluralism.

In this connection, then, it is not simply a question of two sub-divisions of matter—ordinary matter and one finer matter—which would, of course, amount to a hylic dualism. On the contrary, we come across views of more than one species of finer matter. We have seen that certain ethnologists distinguish between the body-soul and the external soul. In the views of primitive man, there is certainly a great contrast, although not an absolute contrast, between these two.² For primitive

1. Fahrenfort is inclined to accept the aspect of power as exclusively valid in explaining the concept of *mana*. In this way, he believes, the views concerned are more capable of being understood by us and thus show evidence of being expressions of a spirit which is essentially similar to our own (see *Dynamisme en logies denken bij natuervolken*, p. 119 ff; see also above, p. 130). He goes on: "Various authors are, however, of the opinion that *mana* means a kind of fluid and that belief in it might there indicate an essentially different way of thinking" (*ibid.*, p. 124). This is, however, not accepted by Fahrenfort. I should like to take the liberty to say, if belief in *mana*—insofar as it is belief in a fluid—should appear to be a special case of hylic pluralism which occurs in very divergent civilisations, including many of a much higher degree of development (as will become apparent to us), it does not, in that case, necessarily point to the existence of a different way of thinking among the primitive peoples. In his book, *Mana, der Begriff des "ausserordentlich Wirkungs-vollen" bei Südseevölkern*, Leipzig. 1922), F. R. Lehmann provided a very good survey of the various interpretations of the concept of *mana* up to and including 1921. He himself agreed with Marett: "*Mana* is a universal concept for every extraordinary activity" (p. 84). He was clearly in sympathy with those who first and foremost saw the factor of power in *mana*, but he also mentioned various scholars who explained primitive man's concept of *mana* in the sense of fine matter. These included N. Söderblom who, in his early period, regarded *mana* as a "vital fluid" or "vital electricity" or "psychical matter" (p. 84), the French ethnological school, Durkheim and others, who spoke of a material and spiritualistic fluid which circulated between various objects and also between people (p. 95), the highest communities of whom arrived at the concept of a universal *mana*, which brought unity into the universe (p. 96; this may be compared, I may add, with the cosmic *pneuma* of the Stoics!) and finally Andrew Lang, who called *mana* magical ether (p. 101) and Karutz, whose view of emanism I have already referred to; (see above, p. 165, note 2). It is impossible to escape the impression that, when so many scholars in this field have explained *mana* in this way, *mana* not only really has the meaning of the suggestion of power in the mind of primitive man, but that it is also, at least sometimes, regarded by him as a fine materiality that is closely associated with objects and people.

1 *op. cit.*, I, p. 478.

2 See above, pp. 72-73.

man, the body-soul is very closely connected with the body, but it is by no means entirely identical with it: it permeates the body and escapes from it with the last breath. Over and against this life-spirit or life-breath, however, there is the external soul, the free soul, which is able to leave the body even during life. The body-soul, on the other hand, is regarded as dying at the same time as the body, after which the external soul becomes the real soul of man. There is, of course, a great deal in connection with this idea that is vague and the concepts and terms change from one ethnic group to the other. There are also many transitions. Nonetheless, one cannot escape the impression that the ideas of the body-soul and of the breath-soul (in its original form) that do occur among primitive peoples are at the level of what I have called the *physiological pneuma*.¹ *Pneuma* (like the term *prana* in Indian thought) means breath. In addition, however, something also occurs at a different level—belief in the emancipated, free soul (*psuchē*) or external soul, which certainly lives after death. This is strongly reminiscent of what I have distinguished, as the *psychological pneuma*,² from the physiological *pneuma*, in other words, *pneuma* or breath in an extended, wider sense. According to the ethnologists, primitive man is aware of a strong contrast between these two concepts of the soul.³ Kluin, for example, expressed surprise at this sharp contrast. If what I have put forward as the difference between two levels of physiological and psychological *pneuma* is in fact real and if it has in fact been recognised many times, then this distinction has clearly been sensed as such by primitive man. I would recall in this context Frazer's quotation of the report by the German missionary, about the people of the Kai tribe, who made an explicit distinction between an "essence or soul-stuff, which pervades the body as sap pervades the tree" and the surviving soul, which is no more than the other "absolutely incorporeal".⁴ This is clearly a case of *two* levels, both of fine matter, being kept apart. Hidding has provided an example of this as well—he mentioned the *lelemboetan*, which means "the fine" and the *pangatjian*, which means "the finest of all" and is the nucleus of the *lelemboetan*.⁵ This too is obviously a difference of level.

I should like to conclude this discussion of the question of levels with two comments. The doctrine of the *spiritus animales et vitales*

1 See above, section 7.

2 See above, section 8.

3 See above, p. 72.

4 See above, p. 74; *op. cit.*, I, p. 267.

5 *op. cit.*, p. 51.

is also, as we have already seen, in a more advanced stage of thought, included under physiological *pneuma*. According to this doctrine, both the blood and the breath play a part in these spirits.¹ It is possible to call the ideas of the primitive peoples concerning the blood-soul and the breath-soul²—aspects of the body-soul—in accordance with their content, *precursors* of the doctrine of the *spiritus*. After all, *njawa* is translated as “life-breath” or “life-spirit” and, in any case, both—the blood-soul and breath-soul on the one hand and the *spiritus* on the other—seem to be at the level of the physiological *pneuma*.

My second comment is this. Early in this book, I distinguished between a continued existence *for some time* and one that can hardly be called a survival at all.³ What is, in my opinion, remarkable in this context is that there are sometimes *two burials* of the same person in Indonesia—the second taking place when the “parts of the flesh have decayed and the spirit is presumed to have departed to the hereafter”.⁴ It seems as though it is only then that the body-soul (which is certainly closely associated with the ordinary body, but does not entirely coincide with it) is really dead and the external soul is free. Conversely, the Indonesian accepts that the dead person remains in the vicinity of the grave before the second burial,⁵ and earlier in this book⁶ I have connected the “graveyard ghost” with a very *brief* continued existence of the physiological *pneuma*.

We may now go on to ask not only whether primitive man distinguished between different levels in this way, but also whether it is possible to speak, in connection with his views, of a certain *metaphysical* theory. This can, however, hardly be expected. If the content of primitive man's views were extended to a definite theory, it is certainly possible to say that this would not in any case result in the epsilon standpoint or anthropological dualism. With the exception of Kruyt, whose views I have, I believe, refuted,⁷ all the ethnologists whom we have considered in this context have agreed that there can be no question in primitive thought of any contrast between the body as the phy-

1 See above, p. 23.

2 See above, p. 72.

3 See above, p. 27.

4 Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 186. See also Kluin, *op. cit.*, p. 91. Another tendency—which occurs in ancient Egypt and elsewhere—is to preserve the corpse intact for as long as possible (see above, p. 122).

5 Fischer, *ibid.*

6 See above, p. 24.

7 See above, p. 89 ff.

sical aspect and the soul as the immaterial aspect of man.¹ The zeta standpoint, which explains everything as psychical and is certainly not a popular point of view, lies entirely outside the sphere of primitive man. He also has no inclination at all towards the alpha standpoint, that of monistic materialism, which is diametrically opposed to the zeta standpoint and which only accepts ordinary matter as real and regards death as the end of everything. Primitive man, insofar as he reflects at all, is inclined to accept a *finer* materiality alongside ordinary materiality and, in connection with this, a continued existence after life on this earth. In other words, he is inclined towards the *beta standpoint*, dualistic materialism. One may say that, if he were capable of philosophising, something similar to Stoic metaphysics would emerge. There is certainly hardly anything which might indicate that he might be inclined to develop the beta standpoint further in the direction of a gamma standpoint and to postulate an immaterial deity above material multiplicity or to go even further in the direction of the delta standpoint and add an immaterial soul (*accompanied* by a vehicle or *ochêma* of fine matter) to the foregoing views. It might be possible to ask him, as soon as he reached the point where he accepted one God behind nature, whether he imagined this God to be spiritual or whether he still imagined him to be material, but once he had reached this point, he would clearly no longer be primitive.² The beta standpoint therefore clearly remains the best philosophical or metaphysical expression of what the primitive peoples experience with regard to the relationship between the soul and the body, between what I have called the psychical and the physical aspects.

This, then, is, in general, my answer to the question as to the extent to which hylic pluralistic conceptions occur among the primitive peoples.³ We should not be surprised that primitive man so seldom reaches the point where he can accept the existence of a subtle *body*, because his power of abstraction is so slight.⁴ Precisely in connection with this, however, we must say something else about the theme of the *shape of the soul*, a subject which arises again and again when primitive man is discussed. As we have already seen,⁵ the soul is, for example, often thought of as only a *shadow* or a *shade* compared with man's

1 See above, p. 83.

2 See Kruyt (B 87), p. 464 ff.

3 See above, p. 83.

4 See above, p. 86, note 1.

5 See above, pp. 79-82.

ordinary appearance. It bears a striking *resemblance* to man, either as his "double" or, diminished in size, as a "mannikin". At times, the form of the soul is seen by primitive man as that of a bird or some other creature. Is this theme of a shape or definite form of the soul reconcilable with hylic pluralism? Are these two ways of thinking closely connected or is this theme of the form of the soul hostile to the idea of fine materiality? I should like to discuss this question now.

Van der Leeuw, for example, devoted a chapter of his *Phänomenologie der Religion* to the "Gestalt der Seele", the shape or form of the soul.¹ In this chapter, he says that the soul-matter (which he incidentally nowhere refers to explicitly as consisting of fine matter²) has no other shape than that of the body or of a part of the body. The soul does not acquire its true shape until man sees himself in a mirror, when what Van der Leeuw calls the "numinous Narcissus-experience" takes place. The significance of all kinds of images or representations of the soul is connected with this experience. Van der Leeuw then goes on to speak of the meaning of the name, the shadow, the double and the *homunculus* or mannikin. All this looks rather ideal and immaterial—despite his comment about the soul-matter, it is clearly *not* envisaged as real and as (fine) matter. In this context, we may now ask whether this whole question of the shape or form of the soul should not be regarded as typically *immaterial* and whether it is not, as such, in conflict with hylic pluralism. The form of the soul, as multiplied in many different images, does seem to be typically something that cannot be contained in real and material representations. But, in my opinion, a clear distinction must be made here. Earlier in this book, I have contrasted the immaterial or material *being* and immaterial, "noetic" or ideal *relationships according to the content*.³ This distinction is also valid here. Of course, the "shape" (square or round, human or animal form) has an "ideal" content which is also the content of reflecting about it and which recurs in many representations of it. In addition to this, however, there are also shapes as *being*, for example, the represented *object*. There is, of course, no doubt that there are shapes which *only* occur "noetically", as, for example, those of a centaur, of the muses or of the valkyries. We must, however, be on our guard against automatically attributing the same character of pure ideality to the souls of the departed as well, often called by a name that seem

1 B 90, S 41, p. 265 ff.

2 See above, pp. 86, 93.

3 See above, p. 19.

to point to something that is purely ideal—a shadow, or *umbra*, an image, *eidolon*, mannikin or double and so on—and against not seeing these as primitive man sees them. We must, then, guard against this typically modern practice, which betrays the widespread influence of anthropological dualism. Van der Leeuw and many other authors have certainly been to some extent under the influence of this way of thinking. This is why their rendering of the ideas of the primitive peoples often make such an unsubstantial impression—they strike us as quite pleasant stories, but we cannot take them seriously because they do not seem to have any basis of truth. We must above all ask ourselves this question—how did primitive man regard these shapes? Without any doubt he regarded them as real. Furthermore, *this reality which he accepted at the same time meant fine materiality to him*. It meant *fine* materiality because he certainly saw or accepted a difference from ordinary matter. But certainly these shapes did not mean simply something ideal to him,¹ although it can be shown that the shape as such also had a special significance for him, as magic, for example, by means of images or representations (such as the casting of a spell on a person by using a wax or other image in his shape—hence primitive man's fear of being photographed) or by means of the *name*.² These shapes were moreover something concretely real and of fine matter for him. This can be shown by examples. The *lelembotan*, which was discussed by Hidding, is, for the Sundanese, Hidding wrote: “A *finer* [my italics], we [we !] might say more spiritual double of man”.³ It is therefore at the same time subtle and, as a double, a shape. Hellpach wrote about the “power of the soul of fine matter”, the “ethereal power” as “a more delicate form” of man.⁴ All these ideas of fine materiality and of shape or form are clearly very close to each other. This may be expressed even more generally—if the primitive peoples are as averse to a fundamental dualism between the body and the soul as I have indicated earlier on that they are,⁵ then these shapes or forms of the soul—whether they are known as *tondi* (literally “likeness” or “image”) or by another name—are at the same time material and not of coarse matter, but of fine matter. In this way, it becomes possible to understand that, as we shall see later on, the ancient Greeks used,

1 We may further assume that an ideal *being*, of the kind that anthropological dualism proposes, is beyond the horizon of primitive man. (See above, pp. 100-101.)

2 See B 90, pp. 266 and 17. The “name” is, as it were, somebody's shape in sound.

3 *op. cit.*, p. 50.

4 *op. cit.*, p. 91. See also above, p. 88.

5 See above, p. 83.

for what later occultists were to call the astral body, the word *eidōlon*—uniting the little “image” and the subtle body in one concept.

There were, of course, for primitive man, also all kinds of shapes which had *only* an imaginative, ideal, mythological, symbolic or metaphorical character. In connection with our theme of continued existence after death, the soul is often, for example, imagined to be a bird.¹ This quite certainly contains a good measure of symbolism—birds are obviously freely moving beings, whose element is the air (cf. *pneuma*) It is, however, frequently thought of as real: “This little cloud, which escapes from the mouth at the last breath, merges into a white bird”.² One is reminded here of the plasticity which is so frequently ascribed to finer matter. In a word, just as we shall later have to point out views of a “biblical realism” which changes the emphasis of many different things—but by no means all things!—that are usually regarded as imaginary, so that they are looked upon as existing (subtle) realities, so too is it necessary now to guard against regarding everything, when rendering the views of primitive man, simply as things of the mind or fantastic products of the brain. Very much is certainly thought by primitive man to be objective and real and what is more, he does not in any way regard his gods as Western man sees them, namely as fantasies, but as really existing and as animating images, for example, and being expressed by these images. In any case, this certainly applies to the “shades” or spirits of the dead. For primitive man, these shades are quite real and their shapes are regarded as being (not simply as ideal) and, furthermore, of a materiality which is not that of ordinary coarse matter, but of a different, finer matter. In this way, the idea of a finer body occurs quite frequently among the primitive peoples—whenever they speak of shape, they usually at the same time think of finer materiality.

Strangely enough, modern parapsychology³ has a number of ideas which display a certain affinity with those of primitive man in this respect. At the International Parapsychological Conference at Utrecht in 1953, there was a debate about whether it was not possible to speak of a “projected body” in cases of appearances of living persons (“traveling ESP”) and Prof. Hornell Hart of Duke University later discussed this question in an article published in *To-morrow*.⁴ In this, he gave

1 See, for example, Wundt (B 181, IV), p. 157, Van der Leeuw (B 90), p. 272.

2 Wundt (B 181, IV), p. 157.

3 Not, however, modern occultism. Parapsychology must, of course, be clearly distinguished from occultism.

4 II, 2, p. 81 ff.: “Man outside his body?”

the case of a doctor who, travelling by boat in Florida, had a strange feeling at night, as though he was "walking through the air". Suddenly he was conscious of standing with one of his friends in a room. The friend turned to him and said: "What are you doing here? I thought you were in Florida!" (Florida was a thousand miles away.) The doctor later had the impression that his body was once again entering his body in the cabin of the boat. The next day, he wrote to his friend reporting the incident and what he believed that he had heard him say. This letter crossed a letter from his friend who confirmed that he had perceived the appearance and had spoken the words. It is worth noticing two points in connection with appearances such as this one, which are known by the name of *excursions* in contemporary parapsychology.¹ In the first place, we have here a connection between "shape" or appearance and corporeality or materiality and we are inclined speak of a "projected body" which can, for example, perceive and be perceived at the place where it appears. This corporeality must therefore be a subtle one, uninfluenced by all kinds of impediments. What is more, the shape is here also regarded as real, just as in the view of primitive man, although this reality is of rather a different kind than ordinary reality. If the appearance is a shade, then, it is certainly not simply a shade produced by the brain.

In the second place, it is a striking fact that this theme of excursion is also very common in the ideas of primitive man.² Hellpach summarised it thus: this "more delicate form" of man's appearance can, according to primitive man, "leave the body and migrate".³ According to Fischer, the Bataks believe that the *tondi* can fly out of the body and experience various adventures on its journey.⁴ Hidding has reported that, according to the Sundanese, the *lelemboetan*, the finer double, leaves the body during sleep and unconsciousness.⁵ This would take place even more characteristically during states of ecstasy.⁶ Kruyt also wrote in detail about the soul-matter during dreams. According to the Indonesians, he said, the soul-matter is able to leave man. This happens most frequently during sleep—when the soul-matter removes itself, man falls asleep. What the soul-matter experi-

1 Mattiesen, B 98, II, p. 196 ff, also discusses this question in great detail, but he goes too far in his conclusions.

2 See above, p. 73.

3 *op. cit.*, p. 91; see also above, p. 150.

4 *op. cit.*, p. 182; see also above, p. 125.

5 *op. cit.*, p. 50.

6 *op. cit.*, p. 95.

ences on its wanderings, man dreams. This is why dreams have a very real significance for primitive man.¹ There were, however, Kruyt believed, "other reasons why the soul-matter leaves the body".² Leaving aside particularities, there is certainly a striking similarity in general between the ideas of primitive man and what is now discussed by parapsychologists as excursion. Furthermore, modern occultists also speak about the wanderings of the "astral body" during sleep, although, when he wakes up, man can only partly remember these journeys, which are at the most assimilated into the content of his dreams.

This of course gives rise to the question as to whether the parapsychologists have really thoroughly confirmed such cases of excursion and whether primitive man—who is no doubt more naturally disposed to "primitive and original clairvoyance" than civilised man, who has presumably repressed this capacity—does in fact report real events (it is, of course, probable that his interpretation of these events is partly wrong). I cannot, however, discuss these questions seriously here. All that I can do is to point out that modern ethnologists take quite a different view of such questions from their earlier—for example, nineteenth century—colleagues, who were frequently inclined to dismiss all this as nonsense and as "nothing more than pure superstition". Even Kruyt, however, pointed to a similarity here with clairvoyant phenomena.³ A recent ethnologist such as Prof. H. T. Fischer of Utrecht University has written, in his article "Ethnologie en Parapsychologie", about a clear turning-point in our ideas about these questions which began with the ethnologist Andrew Lang (1844-1912).⁴ Even though the number of cases of deceit among primitive peoples is great, there is, according to Fischer, a core of cases which cannot be set aside as deceit⁵ or explained in any other way.

We therefore probably cannot reason simply as follows: modern man who goes in for occultism is simply behaving as primitive man and this primitive behaviour is just without foundation and superceded. All these ideas, which both primitive man on the one hand and modern parapsychology and modern occultism on the other apparently have

1 B 87, p. 72 ff. This, however, seems to be more closely related to the (external) soul than to the soul-matter. Or was Kruyt perhaps admitting here that the external soul was really also of (fine) matter?

2 *op. cit.*, p. 75 ff.

3 See especially N. Adriani and A. C. Kruyt, *De Bare'e-sprekende Toradja's van Midden-Celebes*, I, p. 392.

4 See his *Making of Religion* (1909). See also above, p. 95.

5 *Tijdschrift voor Parapsychologie*, XII, p. 12.

at least partly in common,¹ will therefore have to be investigated once more from a more profound and a less prejudiced point of view and, in this, care will have to be taken that we are not automatically guided by the influence of anthropological dualism.

My conclusion, then, is that there is no reason² to regard the frequent occurrence of the theme of the *shape* or form of the soul among the primitive peoples as an argument against the occurrence among these peoples of hylic pluralistic views. On the contrary, there is every reason for combining the two.

C. HYLIC PLURALISM IN A FEW ANCIENT, MORE OR LESS PRIMITIVE CIVILISATIONS

22. ANCIENT EGYPT

After having spent rather a long time considering the ideas, in connection with our subject, of those primitive peoples who are approximately our own contemporaries, we must now turn to ancient or primitive societies in the past. I have already indicated³ how very difficult it is to find out anything about the way in which primitive man in the past imagined the soul and the relationship between the soul and the body to be. In adopting a true chronological approach, it is therefore necessary to begin with societies which were only more or less primitive. In many cases, these societies can certainly hardly be regarded, both from the quantitative and from the qualitative point of view, as primitive—we have only to think of the impressive buildings of ancient Egypt, of the libraries in cuneiform of Babylonia or of the sacred books of the Persians. There can be no question of contemporary primitive man being able to produce anything of this kind. Yet we are bound to begin with civilisations which had already attained quite a high level of development, because everything that preceded them is shrouded in obscurity. On the other hand, however, I have made a division between these civilisations and others which reached the stage of theoretical reflection, either in philosophy or in theology, even though it will be possible to point to a primitive phase in the case of these as well.⁴

1 See also C. H. van Os, *Moa-Moa*.

2 See above, p. 102.

3 See above, p. 68.

4 See above, section 19.

The first of these "more or less primitive" civilisations to be discussed, then, is ancient Egypt, the history of which, as far as we know, goes back the farthest, farther even than that, for example, of ancient China.

Thanks to the earlier hieroglyphics on the sepulchral monuments of ancient Egypt and the later records in papyrus manuscripts, such as those of the Book of the Dead, a good deal is known about the ideas that the ancient Egyptians had about the soul. (The ideas of the later Egyptians, insofar as these are expressed in the so-called magic papyri and in the *corpus hermeticum*, will be discussed at the same time as those of the contemporary Hellenistic writers.) Nonetheless, although we know so much, a serious difficulty presents itself at once. Despite the fact that the ideas of the ancient Egyptians do not strike us as in any way "primitive" in the sense of pertaining to primitive man, here is very little rhyme or reason to be seen in the content of these ideas, especially in connection with our theme. This may be because of the local origin of these ideas and their stubborn persistence locally. It may, on the other hand, be because too few clear distinctions are made or conversely because there are too many and their significance is obscure to us. It may even be because the terms used have changed in meaning (as in the case of *pneuma*, "spirit"). Van der Leeuw said quite frankly: "The precise meaning of *ka*, *ba*, *ach*, *shm* and so on is no longer at all clear to us. Well-meaning scholars try again and again to force the Egyptian idea of the soul into our traditional categories without enabling us to understand even a little of it any better".¹ L. J. Cazemier wrote in his thesis:² "It is, in my opinion, impossible to make an essential distinction between the two ideas of the soul", that is, between *ka* and *ba*. Verbeke said: "*Ka* is one of the most obscure notions in the whole of Egyptian thought and . . . the most varied hypotheses have been put forward about it".³ Mead, it is true, gave a list of what man, according to the ancient Egyptians, possessed—"a physical body (*khat*), a soul (*ba*), a heart (*ab*), a double (*ka*), an intelligence (*khu*), a power (*sekhem*), a shadow (*khaibit*), a spiritual body (*sah*), a name (*ren*), a glorified body (*sahu*)",⁴ but he concluded: "the precise meaning is not known". The Egyptian *gnosis* of man has still to be deciphered.⁵

1 B 90, p. 262.

2 *Oud-Egyptische voorstellingen aangaande de ziel*, Wageningen (1930).

3 B 174, p. 336.

4 B 93, I, p. 89, note 2. See also Budge, *Gods of the Egyptians*, II, p. 299 ff.

5 *op. cit.*, III, p. 326.

A great deal has nonetheless been written about what can be called ancient Egyptian psychology and anthropology. It is, however, greatly to be feared that, in connection with our subject; we shall, on the one hand, only be able to reach a few very general conclusions and, on the other, only be able to point to a number of themes which are known from elsewhere and which tend in the direction of hylic pluralism. What is certainly not possible is to say that *ka*, for example, corresponds with what I have called the physiological *pneuma*, *ba* corresponds with the psychological *pneuma* and so on. A clear division of this kind is, in this case, out of the question. We shall, however, also meet with a similarly confusing effect in the case of pre-philosophical thought in India and if we recall the many different senses in which *pneuma* was used in Greek civilisation, the many centuries of ancient Egyptian civilisation and the great extent to which we have to rely in this case on indirect interpretation as well as the fact that there is little possibility here of entering the ancient Egyptian mind by means of empathy and little opportunity of questioning or explanation, then this result is hardly surprising.

In this case, I propose to begin with the general conclusions. As in the case of the primitive peoples, there is almost no evidence in ancient Egypt of anthropological dualism or the epsilon standpoint, of a purely immaterial conception. As Cazemier has said, "The ancient Egyptian did not possess any purely spiritual, immaterial ideas about the place where he was to continue to live, about the manner in which he was to reach this place or about the everlasting character of his being".¹ Cazemier disputed F. Lexa's somewhat different interpretation:² "Both the *ka* and the *ba* are ideas which are neither purely spiritual nor purely material" and "the primitive mind does not recognise the distinction between matter and spirit".³ Cazemier here shows himself to be more positive in the matter of non-immaterial ideas on the part of the ancient Egyptians than his professor, Van der Leeuw, although the latter also wrote: "We know that the *ba* is sometimes more akin to the soul-matter and sometimes more like a soul with a shape. . . ."⁴ In any case, it is possible to conclude that, from the known facts, there is no evidence at all among the ancient Egyptians of a concept of an immaterial soul, of anthropological dualism. The

1 *op. cit.*, p. 55.

2 *op. cit.*, p. 124.

3 *ibid.*

4 B 90, p. 263.

same impression is gained from H. Bonnet's *Reallexikon der Ägyptischen Religionsgeschichte*,¹ which had not been published when Cazemier was doing his research.

It therefore very much looks as though the views of the ancient Egyptians about the relationship between the body and the soul tend in the same direction as those of the primitive peoples—not in the direction of the epsilon standpoint, but rather in that of the beta standpoint which accepts fine materiality in connection with the soul and its continued existence. This is clear in various ways. Bonnet said, for example, that the *ka* appeared as a “body-like being”.² It was “the sum total of all physical and psychical powers”.³ The *ka* has frequently been characterised as a double—a well-known theme in connection with our subject!—especially by the Egyptologist Maspéro, whose opinion has been summarised thus: “What the ancient Egyptians called the *ka* was a kind of soul, a second copy of the human body composed of less dense matter and reproducing in every feature the individual to whom it belonged—hence the name of *double* which Maspéro gave to it”.⁴ “Less dense matter”—in other words, fine or subtle matter—with reference to the double—this once more brings together the *shape* or form of the soul and its character of *fine matter*. Cazemier also quoted Lexa's interpretation of the pyramid text 244 (= 663): “Just as an insect (a butterfly or beetle) leaves its pupa (or chrysalis), so too does the human body which is intended for heaven leave the corpse”. This must therefore be, Cazemier added, “a *new body*, which must be distinguished both from the corpse and from the ordinary body”,⁵

In the book which I have quoted earlier and which I shall mention again quite frequently, Verbeke asks whether the concept of *pneuma*, and especially that of the Hermetics, can be explained in the light of Egyptian anthropology. This was not completely possible in his opinion, “even though the Egyptian *ka* is strikingly similar to the *pneuma* as a vital force scattered throughout the world and shared by all men”.⁶ *Ka* is clearly regarded here as an impersonal power, as in the expression

1 Berlin (1952).

2 *op. cit.*, under *ka*.

3 *ibid.*

4 See Cazemier, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

5 *op. cit.*, p. 103 (my italics).

6 B 174, p. 314. In this, the concept of the *pneuma* as presented by the magic papyri was, for Verbeke, in no sense a spiritualised concept; it was, on the contrary, of a “coarse materialism” (*ibid.*, p. 337).

in ancient Egypt—the “*ka* of all gods”. In connection with this impersonal use of *ka*, Cazemier points to the similarity between this and the Melanesian *mana*.¹ Another author, F. Preisigke, elaborated this idea even further in an attempt to find an equivalent of the magic *pneuma*, the theme of the later magic papyri alluded to previously in this section, in the ancient Egyptian views of *ka*.² According to Preisigke, *ka* was a fluid, a “spiritual sun-matter”, a “power-matter of the body of the primordial gods which overflowed into the body of the king as well as into the bodies of every other living being, although in a different measure in each case” (p. 19). Later in his book, Preisigke wrote: “The connections become clear if the *ka* is explained as fluid. The fluid permeates the whole of man, penetrating even the smallest parts and folds of his body, even the tips of his hair, since everything that lives in the body only lives because it is filled with the divine fluid . . . According to the same principle, the *ka* permeates, as a fluid, the cultic image of a god”. (p. 54). Verbeke summarised this as follows: “It is therefore seen as a material fluid which originates with the deity and spreads throughout the world, allowing men to share in the power and the life of the divine being”.³ This kind of explanation of *ka* certainly reminds us powerfully of the Stoic teaching about the *pneuma* which animates everything and I have moreover already pointed to the fact that primitive man’s thought also seems to tend in the direction of Stoic metaphysics.⁴ Verbeke remained, however, unconvinced that this was the only true meaning of *ka* and, precisely in this context, he pointed to the obscurity of this concept among the ancient Egyptians.⁵ If, however, such an explanation of the concept of *ka* is at least possible, then it is also possible to understand why various authors—without going too deeply into the matter—are of the opinion that this *ka* is fully in accordance with what I have called hylic pluralism. Thus Gebhard Frei wrote: “The ancient Egyptians called this shape of fine matter, which could make excursions as a double, the *ka*”.⁶ E. Mattiesen also wrote that “the doctrine of the *sōma psychikon*, of the sidereal or astral body” had been “previously indicated in many religions and philosophies of antiquity” and illustrated this in a note:

1 *op.cit.*, p. 31.

2 *Vom göttlichen Fluidum nach ägyptischer Anschauung*, Leipzig and Berlin. (1920)
See also Verbeke (B 174), p. 335.

3 B 174, pp. 335-336.

4 See above, p. 101.

5 B 174, p. 336; see also above, p. 108.

6 B 50, p. 44.

"Cf. the *ka* of the Egyptians, *linga śartra* and *kumarupa* of the Indians, *fravashi* of the Persians, *nepheš* of the Hebrews, *eidōlon* of the Greeks, *pneumatikon* or *augoeides ochēma* of the neo-Platonists and so on".¹ Amadou was rather more cautious, although he did point out the similarity between *ka* and the concept of *mana*.² Erwin Rohde, however, in a note in his *Psyche*, mentioned *ka* together with other concepts, not, it is true, explicitly in the sense of fine matter, but in the sense of "an idea according to which man's "other self" or *alter ego* lives as his psyche in the living, fully inspired man like a strange guest, a weaker double . . . but this is precisely the belief of the so-called primitive peoples throughout the whole world".³ He added, moreover, in note 1 on this page of his book: "It was also the belief of the civilised peoples of antiquity. In their original meaning, the *genius* of the Romans, the *fravashi* of the Persians and the *ka* of the Egyptians were nothing other than such an *eidōlon* repeating man's visible self, a second ego".⁴ Rohde did not write this primarily with fine matter—although the concept of fine matter was not given prominence in his work, it was nonetheless not completely absent⁵—but rather with shape in mind. I am, however, inclined to think that, if the idea of fine matter of one or more of these concepts is established by the peoples concerned, it is also probable, because of their close connection, that the same was the case with the other.

Similarly, Verbeke, discussing the concept of the soul put forward by the early Christian author Tertullian who regarded the soul—and neither Verbeke himself nor anyone else has disputed this—as very material, wrote: "This idea"—of a soul which possesses limbs and organs and all kinds of corporeal qualities such as colour—"is less reminiscent of the pneumatology of the Stoics and is far closer to the Egyptian doctrine of the *ka*, which is represented as a double of the human body, a shadow which is projected by the body and which we find in many Egyptian paintings".⁶ This idea of the soul put forward by Tertullian, in other words, is less like that of the Stoics—a school which, as far as we know, went less deeply into the question of the shape of the soul—than like that of ancient Egypt. Thus, Verbeke places

1 B 97, p. 570.

2 B 47, p. 8.

3 B 132, I, p. 6.

4 *Ibid.*

5 See *op. cit.*, p. 3: "breath-like"; see also above, p. 14, note 1.

6 B 174, p. 446.

side by side a very material concept of the soul and the Egyptian idea of *ka*.

We may therefore suitably conclude that ancient Egypt not only inclined towards a non-immaterial concept of the soul—and not towards an immaterial concept, as in the case of anthropological dualism—but also that all kinds of direct and indirect indications are to be found in the available data which point to a view of the soul as consisting of fine matter, in other words, a hylic pluralistic view. It would, however, not be at all easy to establish whether this hylic pluralism coincided with the beta standpoint or dualistic materialism or whether it perhaps tended more towards the gamma standpoint, according to which only the deity is regarded as immaterial, or even towards the delta standpoint, according to which the soul is also regarded as immaterial, but as possessing a vehicle of fine matter.

As soon as we try to answer the question of the various levels, however, and to show that the one concept of the soul held by the Egyptians was at the level of the physiological *pneuma* and the other concept at that of the psychological *pneuma*, then we once again find ourselves confronted with the difficulties and contradictions alluded to at the beginning of this section. On the one hand, *ka* seems to be the physiological *pneuma*—Kristensen and Erman called it the personified life-force,¹ thus Wundt's "body-soul" or the *njava* of the Indonesians,² which Kruyt called the "soul-matter".³ What is more, according to a well-known inscription, the *ka* is made at the same time as the child—the God Chnum forms the king with his *ka* and Hathor hands over the sign of life.⁴ On the other hand, however, the Egyptians also spoke of dying as of "going to one's *ka*"—it was at death that the *ka* first became powerful.⁵ The Book of the Dead pointed the way "for you and your *ka*".⁶ No wonder that Van der Leeuw wrote about *ka* as about an external soul.⁷ Among the primitive peoples, however, the body-soul and the external soul formed, at least to some extent, a contrast, which, as we have seen, coincided in some measure with the contrast between the physiological and the psychological *pneuma*.

1 See Bonnet, *op. cit.*, p. 317.

2 See Hidding, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

3 See above, p. 89 ff.

4 Bonnet, *ibid.*, plate 86.

5 Bonnet, *op. cit.*, p. 361; Van der Leeuw, B 90, p. 276.

6 Cazemier, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

7 Cazemier, *op. cit.*, p. 33; see also B 90, pp. 277-278.

There are similar difficulties in the case of the *ba*, which, generally speaking, seems to have a rather higher function than the *ka*, so that it is more often translated by "soul" than *ka*. Cazemier for this reason devoted a chapter to the *ba* entitled "The *Ba* in connection with Eternity". There are, for example, texts which say: my *ba* is in heaven with Re, the gifts of *ka* with the gods, the body continues to exist in the night-heaven or *duat*, the name continues to exist on earth.¹ We are reminded here in the first place of the psychological *pneuma*—*ba* is namely the "soul continuing to exist in a new shape", the free soul²—but also of our "sublime *pneuma*". After he has flown up to heaven as *ba*, the king becomes the "luminous" one.³ But then we suddenly fall down from this heaven. Cazemier also examined the texts in which there was reference to the blood as the bearer of the soul,⁴ and to the breath, in other words, to the breath-soul.⁵ All this is, moreover, included under the heading of *ba*, not under that of *ka*.⁶ If *ka* amounted to the physiological *pneuma* and *ba* to the psychological *pneuma*, then it would have to be a question of the blood and breath as bearers of the soul (cf. the *spiritus animales et vitales*) and the opposite would be the case with *ka*. The same comment has to be made with regard to the following—in procreation, the ancient Egyptians believed that the *ba* force was transferred from father to son.⁷ We shall come across a similar affirmation several times with regard to the ancient *pneuma*. But if *ba* is the higher factor and *ka* the lower, it would have been more obvious to have translated *ka* by *pneuma*, since *ba* was added from outside. Similarly, it is said that *ba* is obtained by the consumption of food.⁸ (This is also said of the Hindu *prana*.) But this more resembles a function of a lower form of *pneuma*, namely the physiological *pneuma*, than a function of a higher form, as *ba* appeared to be. Cazemier therefore seems to have been quite right when he wrote, at the conclusion of his chapter on "The Relationship between *Ka* and *Ba*", that it is impossible to make an essential distinction between the two ancient Egyptian concepts of the soul.⁹ According

1 *op. cit.*, p. 102 ff.

2 See Bonnet, *op. cit.*, p. 76. See also the picture of "the dead man with his *ba*" in C. J. Bleeker, *De overwinning op de dood naar Oud-Egyptisch geloof* (1942), p. 33.

3 Cazemier, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

4 *op. cit.*, pp. 56, 84.

5 *op. cit.*, pp. 58-59, 116.

6 *op. cit.*, p. 93.

7 *ibid.*

8 *op. cit.*, p. 95.

9 *op. cit.*, p. 123; see above, p. 186.



Plate 2

to the Egyptians, life was therefore closely bound both to the *ka* and to the *ba* and loss of one or of both brought death in its wake.¹ It was possible, he thought, that these ideas were local, that they had arisen independently and that they had continued to exist alongside each other.

If, then, functions are attributed to these two concepts of the soul which are more or less contradictory because they are at different levels, these functions are in themselves very reminiscent of what we have encountered elsewhere, for example, among the primitive peoples. The *same* is apparently found in the one group and in the other. This applies both in general to an attitude towards the relationship between the body and the soul, which may be called hyllic pluralistic, and to more particular ideas such as the shape or form of the soul or the double of fine matter or that of the bound soul or life-force over and against the free, surviving soul and other ideas.

Of these more special ideas, which are also known elsewhere, I should like, in conclusion, to point to the following. The *ka* is sometimes represented as a *small shape*, small in relation to the person to whom it belongs.² Cazemier here reminds us of the "mannikin" of the Malays: the *tanoana* of the Toradjas and so on. The idea of the soul as a bird was also very common in ancient Egypt.³ It was also possible for someone, especially the king, to have several *kas*. Whereas the Bataks sometimes referred to one person having seven *tondis*,⁴ the God Re had as many as seven *bas* and fourteen *kas*.⁵ One is here involuntarily reminded of the idea of a series of finer bodies at different levels, a pluralism which occurs in Indian thought. Proclus also taught something similar.⁶ Yet is it possible to speak of a pluralism in the same sense in ancient Egypt? In order to do this, these *bas* and *kas* would have to be differentiated qualitatively and it is not certain whether this was done. The Egyptian Book of the Dead does, however, refer to dressing the dead in a pure garment.⁷ What is meant precisely

¹ *ibid*

² Cazemier, *op. cit.*, p. 20 ff.

³ *ibid.*, pp. 54, 61. See also Van der Leeuw, B 90, p. 272. See also my plate 2, "The Soul of Aní visiting its Mummified Body"—this is taken from the *Facsimile of the Book of the Dead*, edited by P. le Page Renouf, London (18190), Plate 17c; see Preface, p. 14. The editor says: "a very favourite picture upon mummy cases".

⁴ Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

⁵ Bonnet, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

⁶ See above, p. 29.

⁷ Chapter CLXXI, *The Egyptian Book of the Dead*, translated by P. le Page Renouf, London, 1904, p. 347.

by this? Does it perhaps allude to the *inner* garments of the soul? This is, in any case, a theme that is met with again and again elsewhere.¹

23. ASSYRIA AND BABYLONIA

Finds and the study of these discoveries have helped to increase our knowledge of this similarly very ancient civilisation and those that succeeded it—the Sumerians, Akkadians, Amorites or Babylonians in the narrower sense and the Assyrian rulers—but this knowledge is still very slight in comparison with what we know about ancient Egypt. The same is certainly true of the Babylonian ideas about man's constitution. Bottéro has said of this: "They did not trouble themselves at all to explain it to us systematically. We are therefore obliged to deduce it for ourselves and the data that we have for this task are few and obscure".² Moreover, it is my firm impression—although it may be due to our fragmentary knowledge of this civilisation—that these peoples were far more extroverted than introverted. This is in complete contrast to Indian thought, which, even in ancient times, created all kinds of psychological distinctions, and to the civilisation of ancient Egypt, in connection with which we certainly experience difficulties in understanding the meaning of *ba* and *ka*, but which displayed an intense interest in the soul. If, for example, the famous Gilgamesh epic³ is compared with the Iliad and the Odyssey, what emerges at once is that Homer was far more concerned with psychological situations and above all with introspection than the author of the national heroic epic of Babylonia.

This makes it very difficult for us to carry out our task of showing whether or not hylic pluralistic ideas were present in this civilisation. The result will also be extremely fragmentary. On the basis of fragments, scholars have constructed a picture which may be regarded as a reliable whole as far as political history, the names of gods and artistic style are concerned. But, if the extreme scarcity of psychological and anthropological data means that, in general, a rather uncertain insight has been gained into this sphere, then our grasp of the problem of the relationship between the body and the soul will be even less secure.

¹ See, for example, above, p. 49 f. and below, p. 204.

² *La religion babylonienne*, Paris (1952), p. 7.

³ *Het Gilgamesj-epos*, translated and with a commentary by F. M. T. de Liagre Böhl, Amsterdam (1952).

If all this is taken into account, the indications which have been found may after all prove to be better than we expected.

Bottéro has written that an earlier tradition apparently looked for the source of "mobility" and life in the *blood*—in an ancient text, we find that the god-man originated from the blood of a god who was sacrificed expressly for that purpose.¹ In addition to this, there is also explicit reference to the *breath*: "The *breath of life*, the *good breath* which *Marduk*, the creator-god, possessed and which *gives life*".²

This breath even seems to have been the original meaning of *napistu*, a word which finally came to mean simply "life".³ These are, of course, ideas which we have encountered elsewhere—blood and breath were regarded as important and "breath" acquired a wider significance.

The theme of the bird also occurs in this civilisation—for example, the angel of death appears in the shape of a bird.⁴ Another passage in the *Gilgamesh* epic is also striking in this connection:

"Suddenly" he made me change shape:

my arms became 'wings' like those of a bird."⁵

Enkidu is here giving an account of his vision of life in the kingdom of the dead, or, expressed in a different way, of the journey of the soul to that kingdom. What is remarkable is that a change into a winged being is described in this passage. It has often been said that the soul has probably been so frequently imagined as a bird because movement through the rarefied element of the air is so easy and quick for this creature. Here we encounter the link in a very ancient source—as soon as man is transferred to a different, less coarse world, he grows wings and moves like a bird.

The Babylonians had very little to say about the soul itself, but they did refer to the underworld, a dwelling-place of the dead, similar to the Greek Hades.⁶ Those who lived there were, like the Greek heroes of Homer, rather disconsolate. What remained of man was no more than "a vague and vaporous tracing of what man had been—the *etimmu*, the *etukku*, which may be translated by the 'spectre'".⁷ This airy copy of man, as rarefied as vapour, is clearly the subtle real shape which resembles man himself.

1 *op. cit.*, p. 99; see also p. 85.

2 *op. cit.* p. 100.

3 *ibid.*

4 Böh1, *Gilgamesh-epos*, p. 129.

5 VII, IV, 31 (Böh1, p. 56).

6 See, for example, Böh1, *Opera minora*, p. 315.

7 Bottéro, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

An idea also occurred in the civilisation of Babylonia which was more or less psychological. According to J. J. A. van Dijk,¹ this concept of ME which, insofar as it can be defined, means "a divine immanence in dead and living matter", was central. It was impersonal and can best be compared with *mana* or *orenda*.²

The gods had it at their disposal, but "even the gods must again and again eat their food of the gods, in order to preserve their life-force for ever".³

According to Aram,⁴ there was "no sharp division between this world and the next" for the Babylonians and Bottéro wrote: "It seems as though they (the Babylonians), like the ancient Hebrews, did not divide man into two complementary parts which we usually designate nowadays as the 'body' and the 'soul' ".⁵ One is therefore inclined to say that they were not disposed to accept what we call anthropological dualism. Thirdly, a very well-known Assyriologist of an earlier generation, A. Jeremias (1864-1935), with whom Prof. Böhl sometimes agrees and sometimes disagrees, summarised the Sumerian view of the world in eight propositions. One of these was: "The world is the 'becoming matter' of the deity and the deity becomes matter in a gradual succession of stages—gods, geniuses, men, animals, plants and stones are each one phase further removed from the heavenly."⁶ If this is considered in connection with Bottéro's affirmation, quoted above, that no division was made between the body and the soul, then it would seem probable that this civilisation also regarded the "shades" (*etimmu*, *etukku*) not as fantastic inventions of the mind or chimeras, but rather as beings of rarefied shape and fine materiality which existed and continued to exist, as a stage of more or less coarse matter. If this reasoning is correct, the Babylonians may also be regarded as hylic pluralists.

I should like to conclude this section with a few remarks. In Assyria and Babylonia, we encounter, apart from the earlier ideas about an underworld or Hades, the belief that the soul "which is also of an

1 *La sagesse suméro-accadienne*, Leiden (1953). In this thesis submitted to his professor, Böhl, van Dijk used the concept *sagesse*, wisdom, less in its introspective sense than in the sense of the so-called "sapiential texts".

2 *op. cit.*, 19 III.

3 Böhl, *Gilgamesj-epos*, p. 147.

4 B 4, p. 53.

5 *op. cit.*, p. 99.

6 See Böhl, *Opera minora*, p. 153.

astral essence 'rises' or 'rises again' among the star-gods".¹ This must, of course, be considered in connection with the Babylonian astrological doctrines. F. Cumont remained convinced, despite the different opinion put forward by Reitzenstein, that the doctrine of the journey of the soul through the seven spheres of heaven which later became very widespread in the West originated in Babylonia.²

In this context, Cumont not only mentioned a series of places, but also wrote about the frequently occurring theme of the garments of the soul: "It is a very old Eastern belief that the souls, thought of as material, wore clothes". These tunics or *chitōnes* were removed in turn by the soul as it rose through the seven spheres of the planets. Cumont maintained that this idea is met with up to the very end of the pagan world. These spheres, he went on, were the seven ethereal garments of Isis (Ishtar?) who was later called the "one with seven stoles, (*heptastolos*)". The higher the soul rose in these spheres, the more were passions and other "capacities", Cumont said, "cast off like garments".³

If, then, this idea, which was very widespread in the ancient world and was, moreover, undoubtedly hylic pluralistic, really originated in Babylonia, several other ancient passages may perhaps be linked with it. Böhl has summarised a part of the Gilgamesh epic (XI, p. 234 ff), in which Gilgamesh comes to the island of Utanapishtim, the Distant, thus: "The pool on the magic island unexpectedly turns out to be the source of rejuvenation in which not only people, but even garments are renewed and rejuvenated. This pool contains the secret of eternal youth".⁴ "Even garments"—this is not so surprising if it relates to the garments of the soul.

In conclusion, let me make one final comment. Bottéro, writing about an Assyrian myth, said: "Thus the goddess *Ninagal* made the *skin* (= the body?) of man similar to the *skin* (= the body?) of a god".⁵ Bottéro thus suggested, by placing the word in brackets, that "skin" here meant "body". He was also discussing the similarities between men and gods. This "skin" or "body" of the gods was also possibly thought of in a hylic pluralistic sense. (This may be compared with

1 Bottéro, *op. cit.*, p. 143. The author was, of course, using the word "astral" here in the sense of belonging to the stars, not in the sense of "astral body".

2 *Les religions orientales dans le paganisme romain*, (4th edn., 1929), p. 147; see also p. 282, note 69. German translation (2nd Edn., 1914), p. 293; see also p. 312, note 54

3 *ibid.*, see also above, p. 50.

4 *op. cit.*, p. 86.

5 *op. cit.*, p. 86.

Epicurus' later attribution of a rarefied body to the gods.¹) On the other hand, the "garments of skins" of Gen. 3. 21 have also sometimes been regarded as a body (that is, the last, of coarse matter).²

24. ANCIENT PERSIA

To the East of Assyria and Babylonia, there was another ancient civilisation which was not predominantly Semitic, but Indo-Germanic. Not very much is known about the ancient Iranian, "animistic" stage of this civilisation, which was closely linked with ancient India. What, however, stands out very clearly here is the religion of Parsism or *Mazdeism* which was founded by Zoroaster or Zarathustra. (The period during which Zarathustra lived has not yet been fully established.) Here, then, we are for the first time concerned with one of the "great" religions, which even today still has adherents in India in the form of the Parsis, who originally emigrated from Persia. The (central) deity in this religion is Ahura-Mazdah (later also known as Ormuzd), whose evil counterpart is Ahriman. Other aspects of this religion that are well-known are the importance attached to fire and the "towers of silence" in which the bodies of the dead were—and still are—left for the vultures so as not to pollute the earth. Mazdeism is far less primitive than any of the other expressions of civilisation dealt with in this part of my book—it has an extensive literature, especially the sacred writings of the Avesta of varying and sometimes very great antiquity. The older books had a great influence, even in the West. Democritus is said to have been influenced by them,³ the influence of the teaching of the "Magi" on Plato has, according to Bidez, always been underestimated⁴ and the influence that these writings had on neo-Platonists such as Porphyry is beyond dispute.⁵ The worship of Mithras, which had existed in Persia since the earliest times alongside Mazdeism proper and to which I shall return later in this work, came into prominence at a later period and flourished, for example, in the Roman Empire. Manicheism also arose in the same Persian civilisation and the Mandaean sect is connected with it. In later centuries, Mazdeism in Persia became more and more overshadowed by Islam, although ancient Persian in-

1 See above, p. 37-38.

2 See Dodds, B 33, p. 308.

3 J. Bidez, *Eos ou Platon et l' Orient* (B 12), p. 138; see also Hopfner (B 70), I, p. 94.

4 *ibid.*

5 *ibid.*

fluences continued to be felt, together with neo-Platonic influences among the Persian mystics, even though these belonged to one of the mystical tendencies in Islam, Sufism. With our special theme in mind, we shall also have to return to a fairly recent movement such as Sheikhsism.¹

Here, however, we will confine ourselves to Mazdeism in ancient Persia. It is not difficult to find a theme in this religion with which the ideas of hylic pluralism are in accordance—that of the *fravashis* or *fravartis*, known in later Persian as *feruers*, comes to mind at once. In his book *Psyche*,² C. G. Carus, a nineteenth century author, quoted from E. Rohde's *Die heilige Sage des Zendvolkes*³ on this subject: "The whole primordial image of man, even including his body, was thought of under the heading of *feruer*. For this reason, a human shape and even an infinitely fine body were attributed to the *feruer* even before its union with the real body". This is clear enough. Other authors too have linked the *feruers* with what I have called hylic pluralism. In Eisler's lexicon, they were called an example of teaching about the etheric body,⁴ du Prel and Mattiesen expressed a similar opinion⁵ and Hamberger⁶ pointed to them as an example of "heavenly corporeality", though not entirely in the sense that he meant it. As we have already seen, Erwin Rohde, the author of *Psyche*, called both the *fravashi* and the *ka* of the ancient Egyptians the *eidōlon* repeating man's visible self".⁷

Nathan Söderblom (1866-1931), who later became Lutheran archbishop of Uppsala, was for a time minister of the Swedish church in Paris and, while he was there, wrote a thesis, *Les Fravashis* (1899), for a diploma of the Ecole pratique des Hautes Etudes, Section des sciences religieuses. This monograph on the *fravashis* dealt in particular with the cult of the dead, which probably goes back to a period before that of Mazdeism, and examined the various meanings of *fravashi*. Not only both the living and the dead, but also the gods, the animals and indeed everything, Söderblom maintained, had their *fravashi*. Distinguishing the *fravashi* from the soul, Söderblom came to

1 Founded by Sheikh Ahmad Ahsa'i (d. 1826).

2 1846, 2nd edn. 1851, p. 536.

3 p. 39 f.. I have not managed to consult the book itself. The author is not Erwin Rohde (1845-1898), who wrote the well-known book *Psyche* (B 132).

4 B 39, under *Fravashi*.

5 B 122, p. 148; B 98, p. 570.

6 B 62, p. 14.

7 B 132, I, p. 6; see also above, p. 112.

the following conclusion: "What continues to exist is not the spirit or the soul, but a personified being, more or less analogous to the living being, usually invisible, but more or less material."¹

This clearly indicates the occurrence of hylic pluralistic views in Mazdeism. It is obvious that the epsilon standpoint, anthropological dualism, was not recognised in ancient Persia. We are less certain whether there was any tendency to accept dualistic materialism or the beta standpoint (as elaborated, for example, by the Stoics). We certainly have a strong impression that the Magi—as the Greeks called the Persians in the sphere of philosophy—tended in the direction of the delta standpoint. The ancient Persians were undoubtedly capable of an abstraction such as that of an immaterial deity and, because of the dualism between Ahura-Mazdah (or Ormuzd) and Ahriman, they were probably also inclined to keep all idea of matter from their concept of the highest deity. They were probably also quite capable of distinguishing the soul itself from its vehicle. The affinity which the neo-Platonists, who explicitly accepted the delta standpoint, felt with them also points in this direction.

I do not propose to discuss this question any further here, but intend to examine briefly certain other characteristics of the religion of ancient Persia, the first being the part played by *light* in this religion. The mysticism of light, which occurs again and again in later centuries, obviously had one of its most important origins in ancient Persia. Hamberger, for example, already said that the Parsis believed that Ormuzd was covered with a "light-body", that a radiant world of spirits existed around him, that the dead rose in glorified, ethereal bodies and that this light was at the limit of materiality.² Henry Corbin, a professor at Teheran and Paris, also discussed these questions in detail in his interesting study, *Terre céleste et corps de résurrection d'après quelques traditions iraniennes*, especially in the first half of this book, which is devoted to Mazdeism.³ Corbin seems to me to have penetrated far more deeply into the heart of the Mazdean teaching than Söderblom. Writing about the seven great spirits or archangels, the *Amerta Spentas*, he said: "The heavenly powers have very subtle bodies of light".⁴ The persistent view of a whole series of Christian authors⁵ about the rarefied bodies of the angels is, of course, in accord-

¹ *op. cit.*, p. 67.

² See B 62, p. 12 ff.

³ *Eranos Jahrbuch* 1935 (Zurich 1954), p. 97 ff.

⁴ *op. cit.*, p. 106; referring to Yasht XI, 21-22.

⁵ See above, pp. 17-18, 28.

ance with this Mazdean doctrine. Corbin was therefore able to find parallels with this "light of glory", suggesting, for example, that the aura or aureole, the "luminous halo, the *aura glorioe*" which recurs regularly in iconography, had its origin here.¹ In a dialogue between Zarathustra and the Archangel, which Corbin quoted, Zarathustra is ordered to remove his garment, "that is to say, his material body" (another instance of the ordinary body being called a garment²), since the inward events which were to take place "have the subtle body of light as their seat and organ".³ All creatures will, at the ultimate transfiguration or *apokatastasis* (called here *frashkart*), possess "an incorruptible body of luminous fire".⁴ What we have here, Corbin maintains, is "visionary physics",⁵ reminiscent of Hamberger's "sacred physics" (Corbin was probably not acquainted with Hamberger's work). Corbin concluded this part of his study which dealt with Mazdeism by discussing an "intermediary world" which achieves a connection in the universe between, on the one hand, what would otherwise be "pure physics" and, on the other, a "subjectivity affected by isolation". This connection is made by "something like a spiritual kingdom of subtle bodies".⁶ Corbin then went on, in the second half of his book, to examine what became of these ideas in the later schools of thought in Persia. As far as this metaphysics of light, these rarefied light-bodies, are concerned, all this clearly takes place at the level of the sublime *pneuma*.⁷

To a very great extent, the *fravashis* also belong to this level. These are regarded by many scholars in this field as guardian angels, but, as Söderblom has pointed out, the *fravashi* is not this in the Jewish or Christian sense, because it is not sufficiently independent of the person concerned to be his guardian angel.⁸ According to the Avesta, the *fravashis* were "light and of an aerial nature, moving quickly from one place to another and resembling birds with beautiful wings"⁹ (a recurrence of the bird theme!). On the other hand, they were also a force in man and not so much a "double" as what Söderblom called

1 *op. cit.*, pp. 109-110.

2 See above, p. 120.

3 *op. cit.*, p. 133.

4 *op. cit.*, p. 149.

5 *ibid.*

6 *op. cit.*, p. 155.

7 See above, section 9.

8 *op. cit.*, p. 60, note 3.

9 *op. cit.*, p. 68; referring to Yasht XIII, 75.

a *homunculus in homine*.¹ The name *fravashi* means "the one who has made the choice", in other words, the one who has chosen not to remain with the Lord, but to descend and to be invested with a (coarse) body in order to fight in this world against Ahriman, the evil one. Before making this choice, they existed in a more spiritual world and even then possessed a body—a finer body. Since not only men, but also all things were thought by the ancient Persians to possess a *fravashi*, they have also been regarded in this wider sense as prototypes, like the Platonic ideas, but giving form, as "*idées forces*", ideas capable of exerting influence and power (and thus not simply and solely noetic²).

There is, however, another level, apart from that of the sublime pneuma, which is involved in the religious ideas of ancient Persia. A later text, the "Grand Bundahish", defining the Avesta more precisely, enumerates the parts of which man consists and includes, in addition to the (coarse) body or *tan* and the *frohar* or *fravashi*, life or *jan*, connected with the wind. At death, the body returns to the earth, whereas life—called *ahu*, the "living breath", in the Avesta—returns to the wind.³ What is clearly meant by this is the level of the *physiological pneuma*.⁴ In any case, the question of breath is once again raised here.

25 TEUTONS AND KELTS

Turning now to the ancient Teutonic (and Keltic) ideas which have a bearing on our special subject, what strikes us at once is the rougher, more primitive and less "spiritual" character of this civilisation, especially in comparison with the civilisation that we have just been considering, that of ancient Persia. Battle and war were regarded by the ancient Teutons as man's highest destiny and the courage and honour of the individual man and the vengeance of the family were paramount in their thought.⁵ We do, it is true, find an eschatology here, but, instead of the *frashkart*, the ultimate transfiguration of beings and things,⁶ what is spoken of here is the *Ragnarök*, the downfall of the world, sometimes referred to as the "twilight of the gods". All the

1 *op. cit.*, p. 59.

2 See above, p. 19.

3 See Soderblom, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-52.

4 See H. Lommel, *Die Religion Zarathustras*, p. 174: this life-force was, for them, "expressed in modern terms, something physiological, not psychological".

5 See, for example, Jan de Vries, *Over Germaanse wereldbeschouwing*, B 169, 34, 4 p. 185 ff; *Die geistige Welt der Germanen* (1943).

6 See above, p. 123.

same, the Teutonic mythology has many points of similarity with other mythologies. As far as psychology and anthropology are concerned, there is here too a complete absence of all theoretical writings and we are obliged to ascertain what these people thought about the soul, the relationship between the soul and the body, continued existence and so on by indirect means.

Two of the ideas that were current among the Teutonic peoples, however, would seem to be especially promising in connection with our subject—*fylgja* and *hamingja*.

It is as difficult to define *fylgja* precisely as it is to say exactly what the Egyptians' *ka* or the Persians' *feruer* means. The word is, of course, etymologically connected with the English "follow", which is the reason why it is customary to translate it by "attendant spirit", but *fylgja* is also "the spiritual self which accompanied the body and which could also leave it and continue to live in the form of an animal (soul-animal), until the body to which it was bound woke from sleep or was completely destroyed".¹ It has also been called a "conception of an animal form closely connected with an individual, which is visible to others in dreams, and, to those who have the power of second sight, in waking life also".² It is therefore "a conception not so much akin to the soul as to the shadowy double or 'fetch' which is a widespread belief in various European countries". If, however, it is a kind of double, it is not a double in human form³—there is no question of a "mannikin", for example, here. There are also no indications that this *fylgja* was regarded as being of fine matter.

Hamingja is also not a concept which can be clearly defined. It is often translated as "luck" or "good fortune" and was also regarded as a supernatural female guardian spirit, able, at the death of the protected person, to pass over to one of his descendants.⁴ What is remarkable, however, is that *hamingja* was often seen in connection with kings or princes, who could give it to their warriors "as though it were something concrete they could carry with them".⁵ J. de Vries also wrote that it was innate, but that it also radiated, for example, from the

1 *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche* (1932), IV, under *fylgja*.

2 Hilda Roderick Ellis, *The Road to Hell. A Study of the Conception of the Dead in Old Norse Literature* (1943), p. 127.

3 *op. cit.*, p. 130; see also p. 138.

4 Ellis, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

5 *op. cit.*, p. 133.

king.¹ The *hamingja* of a prince communicated itself to those around him and on a difficult expedition the request was sometimes made to be given part of the king's *hamingja*.² This is certainly very reminiscent of the concept of *mana* among the primitive peoples and de Vries did in fact refer to this (p. 166). Above, I put forward the idea that, in the case of *mana*, a suggestion of power went together with the (possible) influence of a fluid of fine matter, an influence which magnetisers and psychometrists claimed to use.³ Ellis mentioned that it was said in an old source of a Christian bishop, Jon, that people would continue to benefit from his *hamingja* for a long time—apparently long after his death.⁴ This is surely reminiscent of what is sometimes called personal magnetism! J. de Vries also said that Teutonic man thought in this way: "An object that I possess is not simply a thing of a certain value—it is also a piece of myself. It is a part of my own being and has a part of the fluid which flows through my body". By the transference of possession, a man thus acquired the opportunity to exercise a magic influence on the new owner. "What Teutonic man thought precisely in this case is, of course, difficult to reproduce in our present rational language; it might be possible, however, to compare it with the emanation of electric rays from the human body which can also have an influence on the environment".⁵ This is clearly very much in accordance with primitive man's ideas about the great significance which what I have called the physiological *pneuma* can have for the man who believes in it and is sensitive to it.⁶ The concept of *hamingja* and all that is connected with it thus yields a rather more positive result with regard to possible hylic pluralistic ideas among the Teutonic peoples than that of *fylgja*.

The following can, however, be considered indirectly. What is most striking is the frequent occurrence among the Teutonic peoples of the theme of *excursion*.⁷ A man's *fylgja* can leave him while he is asleep and join in a battle, especially in the form of an animal.⁸ Ac-

1 *Die geistige Welt der Germanen*, p. 77. There is also reference here to a blessing which radiates from the king, but which is independent of his moral attitude (p. 162), thus *ex opere operato*.

2 B 169, 34, p. 202.

3 See above, p. 96 ff.

4 *op. cit.*, p. 133.

5 *op. cit.*, p. 198. De Vries' "electric rays" are also not very rational, but his meaning is quite clear.

6 See above, p. 99.

7 See, for example, above, p. 125.

8 Ellis, *op. cit.*, p. 122 ff..

cording to various ancient accounts, it can also go ahead of someone on a visit and thus announce this visit to whoever is capable of perceiving it.¹ "Dr. F. Johansen" (in other words, Dr. Gerda Walther, who wrote under this pseudonym) examined a number of accounts in which the theme of excursion played a part in one of her articles on "the old Germanic hero-sagas in the light of parapsychology".² It is moreover a fact that occult powers even nowadays still occur far more frequently in the northern countries of Europe than in the rest of the continent. The late Dr. A. G. van Hamel (1886-1945), who was professor of Old Germanic and Keltic at Utrecht University (1923-1945), wrote about this both in his book, *IJsland, oud en nieuw* (1933), and in a paper entitled "Supranormale verschijnselen op IJsland".³ In this article, van Hamel stated that detailed and well documented research, named by him in the article, had established that dream visions are general there. They may relate to the future or to contemporary, but remote events. By dream visits are meant appearances of well-known people, often of those who are dying. What also occurs quite commonly is that a visitor is seen before his arrival. Cases of this are "legion".⁴ On the other hand, however, I have already pointed out that, in the analysis of apparitions for example, of living persons in contemporary parapsychology, the term "the projected body" is used.⁵ Something is perceived, something acts and perceives. To speak of this as of a body is obvious, but this body must be of a different nature. It must be a *finer* body. The disposition towards occultism cannot, however, be greater in Northern Europe in the present century than it was in past centuries. The power of clairvoyance and so on is certainly stronger at the beginning, in a more primitive stage of man's development, than it is in a later, more developed stage.⁶ However closely interwoven with mythological and other motives the accounts and sagas which have reached us from ancient Teutonic sources may be, it is to some extent obvious that the accounts of excursions and apparitions (for example, those when a visitor is seen before he arrives) are bound to go back partly to real parapsychological experiences which took place then. In that case, we may reason thus: although

¹ *op. cit.*, p. 129.

² "De Oud-Germaanse heldensagen in het licht der parapsychologie", *Menschen Kosmos* II (March 1939), p. 153.

³ *Tijdschrift voor Parapsychologie* VI, p. 177 ff.

⁴ *op. cit.*, p. 187.

⁵ See, for example, above, p.

⁶ See above, p. 95 (A. Lang).

there is no explicit reference in the known data (known to us) about the ancient Teutonic peoples to an external soul of fine matter (or psychological *pneuma*), as there is elsewhere, for example, in the case of ancient Persia (the *feruer*), it is nonetheless quite probable that the *fylgja* was thought of in this way by the Teutons. If a cautious research worker like Prof. Hornell Hart was able to speak of a projected body, then these primitive peoples probably also thought of their appearances as possessing a body and, what is more, a body that was shadowy and more subtle and supple. I admit, however, that this conclusion has only been reached via a very indirect argument.

What I have said so far is, however, to some extent confirmed by what we read in literature about the *Kelts*. There is quite a large measure of similarity between the ideas and customs of the Teutons and those of the Kelts. We do not, however, need to go into these points of similarity and difference here—what is of interest in connection with our special subject is the following. An early specialist in the field of Keltic studies, H. d'Arbois de Jubainville (1827-1910) had this to say in the chapter on "the belief in the immortality of the soul in Ireland and Wales" ("La croyance à l'immortalité de l'âme en Irlande et en Gaule", pp. 348-349) in his book *Le cycle mythologique irlandais et la mythologie celtique* (1884): "According to Keltic teaching, the common law is that men, after death, find the new life and the new body that are promised to them by their religion in a different world". The Kelts did in fact believe that it was possible to be born again on earth in a new body, but that this only applied to exceptional cases, the "common law" being that life was continued elsewhere. Jubainville went into this question of the extent to which belief in metempsychosis occurred among the Kelts in a footnote.¹ Several authors, even in antiquity, believed that a similarity and a connection with the Pythagoreans could be detected here and thus appealed to a passage in Caesar's *De Bello Gallico*, VI, XIV, 5: "Non interire animas, sed ab aliis post

1 As we shall see, hyllic pluralism (man in possession of a body of fine matter after death) occurs again and again with belief in metempsychosis, although the first regularly occurs without the second. The occurrence of the doctrine of metempsychosis is sometimes uncertain (it frequently merges into the more general theme of palingenesis or rebirth) or disputed. Thus Herodotus included a report about the occurrence of the doctrine of the transmigration of souls among the Egyptians in his *Historiae* II, 123, but its correctness has often been denied (see Tylor, B 168a, II, p. 13; Cazemier, *op. cit.*, p. VII, 109). On the other hand, however, I am inclined to wonder whether the return of Gilgamesh, in the epic concerned (*op. cit.*, p. 87), to his native town does not in fact amount to a reincarnation theme, since he was unable to share in Utanapishtim's kind of immortality.

mortem transire ad alios". On the other hand, Lucanus said of the Kelts:

... regit enim spiritus artus

Orbe alio: longae (canitis si cognita) vitae

Mors media est".¹

Jubainville, however, maintained that these two passages only seemed to contradict each other, because "the other body to which, according to the teaching expressed by Caesar, the soul of the Kelt transferred itself after death was, as a general rule, to be found in the other world and only very rarely in this world".² Jubainville's comment is, in my opinion, important in connection with our special subject for the following reason. He was writing about metempsychosis according to the Kelts and had to admit that this did, in their view, occur, but only as an exception (in the case of certain heroes.) The new body referred to is, as a rule, not a new body in this world, but a new body in a different world. That other world was regarded as a continuation of this world, to such an extent that all kinds of relationships (for example, debts to others) continued to apply in it and a dead prince at least took his carriage and horses and even his slaves and his wife with him to this new world—all that belonged to him was burnt together with his corpse. *In this context* and in order to reconcile the apparently contradictory statements of Caesar and Lucanus, Jubainville spoke of a *new body*. This new body must be one of a *different* materiality from that of the ordinary body, because the antithesis is precisely that between going to another body in another world and reincarnation in an ordinary body on earth. In other words, the author was obliged, following Lucanus, who wrote about members in a *different* world, to write about a different and apparently finer body. It seems unlikely to me, however, that Jubainville, who was a professor at the Collège de France and a Membre de l'Institut during the second half of the nineteenth century (which was inclined towards monistic materialism), would personally have seen anything in the idea of a finer body (for example, as the after-effect of romantic views, to which I shall return later). On the contrary, he was obliged to state that a primitive nation like the Kelts conceived life in the other world or in the hereafter *literally*—that they thought of man in the hereafter as being in possession of a real body (of a different materiality). But is it not very much the same in all the other cases where there is reference, in more or less primitive peoples, to a continued existence elsewhere, without there being any cause to

¹ *Pharsalus*, I, 456-458.

² *op. cit.*, p. 349, note 1.

ascertain this? Surely this is so in the case of the closely related Teutons, whose *fylgja* shows all kinds of characteristics—the ability to make excursions and so on—of a new body, without our being able to confirm this view explicitly in their case. Various things were, if not entirely certain, then quite probable in the case of Assyria and Babylonia as well. As far as ancient Egypt and especially Persia were concerned, there were certainly clear indications of a view that a higher part of man consisted of (fine) matter—the *ka* and the *feruer*. It is therefore extremely probable that the *general view* both of the primitive peoples and of the more civilised ancient peoples is and was that, after death and even for a time before death, man made use of a different, equally real, but finer and suppler vehicle of rarefied matter. This emerges again and again if the comments and summaries which are provided by the ethnologists and historians of comparative religion as the views of the primitive peoples about what succeeds the ordinary body are compared with each other. This impression emerges even more clearly the closer these scholars keep to the views of the peoples themselves. The fact that these scattered comments have been seen so little in connection with each other, in a context which includes all these peoples and civilisations, can probably be traced back to the almost automatic acceptance of anthropological dualism, of the immateriality of everything that comes after the ordinary body. This is why it is illuminating when a scholar like Jubainville was obliged to write about the *new body* according to the view of—in this case—the Kelts. Then one sees, however, that by no means all of the peoples mentioned accept the standpoint of anthropological dualism—that standpoint does not really arise until later and I shall have to deal with it in due course. In the meantime, however, what can be said is that, up to the point that we have reached so far, a common opinion in favour of hylic pluralism—in various forms, but usually as the beta standpoint—has emerged with fair certainty.

26. DIGRESSION. THE VEHICLE THEME

Now that we have almost reached the end of the first part of this work, it is perhaps worth while to pause for a moment at this point and to look back as well as forward.

My last conclusion about a general view of the ancient peoples is, of course, rather too rash—it is based only on a consideration of several “more or less primitive civilisations” and not on the primitive

stages of other civilisations which did in fact come to the point of theoretical reflection. We shall therefore have to examine these as well to see whether they were inclined towards hylic pluralism with regard to the relationship between the body and the soul. Looking ahead, however, I may say that this was in fact the case and it does seem as though what was experienced more or less consciously by these people was expressed philosophically above all by Stoic metaphysics and the more primitive the people were, the more clearly were their ideas expressed,¹

Rather than confine myself simply to a general statement, I should like to say a little more here about another question which is not simply concerned with primitive civilisations or the primitive stages of civilisations. Although I shall be more concise, I shall do this in the form of those summaries of certain themes which I propose to give between the second and third parts of this work. Here, however, I shall not do this after having discussed the various thinkers and schools of thought, but before this discussion.

I have called this book by the general title of *Ochēma*² because I am principally concerned with the vehicle of fine matter of the soul. It is also above all this *ochēma* "at the level of the psychological *pneuma*" which forms the heart of our subject.³ There is therefore every reason for us to examine this term *ochēma*, and this theme of the *vehicle* of the soul in rather more detail at this point.

In Greek, *ochēma*, means not only vehicle, but also vessel and this is not without importance in connection with our subject. The word comes from the root from which *ocheō* to carry, also comes. The Latin word *vehiculum* can also refer to being transported both on land and by sea.

On the other hand, however, there are various other words in Greek for vehicle or carriage, for example, *to harma*, a word which also means carriage, but which has the special meaning—"in general use since Homer"—of a chariot with two wheels. It comes from the root *aro* to join together, to build, to equip; the team of horses in front of the chariot is also indicated by this word, which can to some extent be

1 It was the least primitive of the civilisations discussed, that of Persia, which inclined more towards the delta standpoint than towards the beta standpoint. See above, p. 122.

2. See above, p. 8-9.

3. See above, p. 26.

compared with the Latin *currus* (from *curro*, to run), which was used especially for triumphal chariot.

Greek also has the word *hē hamaxa*, with the meaning of carriage or cart with four wheels.

It will, of course, be obvious that the possible use of these words in connection with our special subject will only be a fraction of their general use in classical antiquity.

Something else that must also be borne in mind is that a far more important part was played by the horse-drawn carriage among ancient peoples than it is now. The motor-car had not yet replaced the carriage, there were no trains, trams or buses at that time and no aeroplanes in the air. The interest, romantic feelings and fantasies which these mechanised means of transport evoke in our own times must have been aroused in the past by the vehicle with horses and, to a lesser degree, by the ship (which was regarded as very dangerous). In addition, the vehicle with horses was always expensive and a powerful means in battle, so that it remained the privilege of kings and leaders.

It is no wonder, then, that the horse-drawn carriage (and the ship) played an important part in ancient religion and in religious practices and actions. It played a part simply as a means of transport—in the removal or carrying round of the images or statues of gods or other cultic objects, for example, or in the taking of a corpse to the place where it was to be cremated or buried. This journey by carriage was also a sign of power and honour and thus a *symbol* of that power and honour—the entry, the return of the triumphant general was greeted with rejoicing, but the *deity* was also, by analogy, thought of as powerful and triumphant and riding in a carriage.

This is in itself an extensive subject. It and other occurrences of the carriage theme in religion were discussed in detail by S. Prausnitz in his book, *Der Wagen in der Religion, seine Würdigung in der Kunst*.¹ Generally speaking, there has always been a tendency to regard the deity as omnipresent, but also as especially present at one particular place in this world—the sanctuary, the altar or his throne. The carriage can become his *moving throne*. The whole process of creation can even be seen in the motion of the carriage or at least a part of it, such as the progress of the Sun God from East to West. What we have here, then, is the *cosmic carriage*. In the *Phaedrus*, which Praus-

¹ Strassburg (1916), p. 1: "Through the religious history of mankind, the carriage given to the deity as an attribute runs like a red thread".

nitz did not mention, because he was especially concerned with the representation of this theme in art, Plato spoke of Zeus riding in his winged chariot or *ptēnon harma*. According to Plato, other gods also rode out, in carriages (*Ochēmata*) light and with a well controlled, team of horses.¹ In a text which was ascribed to Aristotle, *De mundo* we read that what the pilot is in a ship, what the driver is in the carriage and the general is in the army, God is in the world.² This idea is more fully developed elsewhere, for example, in one of the hermetic books, "The Perfect Sermon of Asclepius to the King", in which the deity, or the Sun, is referred to as a good charioteer who safely handles and controls the cosmic team (literally *harma*).³ In Dio Chrysostomos, we read of a Mithraic myth which refers to the Most High as the first charioteer of the cosmic vehicle drawn by four horses symbolising the four elements (this is incidentally a hylic pluralistic theme) which he sometimes reins in and sometimes drives, while the fiery horse from time to time comes into conflict with the horse which symbolises the earth.⁴ In the Old Testament, Yahweh is again and again represented as riding in a carriage or chariot known as *merkābhāh*.⁵ (See, for example, the strange vision of Ezekiel, 1. 15-21.) Attempts have been made to reproduce this "mystical chariot" pictorially in illustrations of the Bible.⁶ The *merkābhāh* has also played a part in Jewish mysticism.⁷ In the ancient Persian texts, we read that Zarathustra was invited to take his place in the "triumphant chariot" of Godin Ashi Vanuhi.⁸ All this, however, has to do with the use of the carriage or chariot especially as a *cosmic* symbol and it was my intention in this study to deal less with cosmological questions than with those of anthropology.⁹

To what extent, then, has this theme of the chariot also been used with regard to man, either in general or as a symbol or in any other special sense? Our point of departure here must once again be the everyday use of the vehicle as a means of transport, to carry loads, in contest, in triumphal processions and to take the dead to their place

1 *Phaedrus*, 246c; 247b.

2 *De mundo*, v, p. 400b, 6-16. The *De mundo* was a product of the Peripatetic School, with the result that the similes are Aristotelian.

3 Mead, B 102, II, p. 270.

4 Mead, B 100, V, p. 49 ff. The place in Dio Chrysostomos is *Orat.* XXXVI Borysth. 39 ff. (See also Cumont, *Textes et monuments relatifs aux Mystères de Mithra*, III, Brussels, 1896, pp. 60-64).

5 Prausnitz, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

6 Prausnitz, *op. cit.*, p. 58 and his picture 38.

7 See G. S. Scholem, *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism* (1946), p. 40 ff.

8 Yasht XVII, 17-24. See also H. Corbin, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

9 See above, p. 12-13.

of cremation or burial. This lastmentioned use is of special importance in connection with our subject. In a study of the theme, M. Ebert wrote: "The vehicles and vessels which serve 1. as a means of transport at funerals and 2. as burial portions appear here 3. as a means of conveyance into the hereafter".¹ This author pointed out that both chariots and boats were found in very many graves—ancient Egyptian, Scythian or Teutonic and Keltic. The reason for this was undoubtedly so that the dead man would lack nothing—as we have already seen,² a dead ruler's carriages and horses, weapons and food and even his male and female slaves and his widow were given as part of the burial portion and burnt along with the dead man. It is probably that the practice of *suttee*—the custom in earlier India, for example, of the wife allowing herself to be burnt on the death of her husband—was connected with the idea of the hereafter. H. Roderick Ellis at least drew an analogy between this practice and similar customs among the Norsemen, as reported by, among others, an Arabian writer.³ What is more, what was given to the dead man as his burial portion was by no means always burnt—it was often given a place in his grave. This took place on a great scale in ancient Egypt and among the Teutons. As Ebert has reported, the idea of burial in a boat was expressed on a more monumental scale among the North Germanic tribes during the first thousand years after Christ than among any other people at any other time. In this connection, Ebert referred to the well-known Oseberg burial ship discovered in 1903.⁴ It is, however, important to make a clear distinction between various different points of view. The dead man may be given weapons, so that he can fight his enemies with them in the hereafter—which was thought of as a continuation of *this* life—or given food to nourish himself. (This also gave rise to the idea, for example, in ancient Egypt, that, as long as the corpse—in the case of Egypt, the mummy—was to some extent preserved here on earth, the person was—at least in a certain sense—not yet dead. This is also reminiscent of the practice of a second burial, connected with a second death—when the body is to a great extent decayed—among certain Indonesian peoples.⁵) A second step is that the dead person

1 "Die Bootfahrt ins Jenseits", *Præhistorische Zeitschrift*, XI-XII (1919, 1920) p. 185.

2 See above, p. 129.

3 *op. cit.*, p. 44 ff. "Human Sacrifice". See also, among others, Tylor, B 168a, I, p. 458 ff.

4 *op. cit.*, p. 185.

5 See Fischer *op. cit.*, p. 186; Kluin, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

was given a vehicle or a boat with his *new* state of being in mind, so that he could accomplish the journey to his destination in the hereafter. It is, in theory, possible to say that a person who was not or was only seldom in the habit of using a carriage (or chariot) or a boat in ordinary life (for example, the *daughter* of a king) nonetheless needed such a means of transport for the journey of his or her soul. This idea undoubtedly prevailed among all kinds of early peoples and was regularly expressed in their art. Ellis, for example, referred to "a gravestone depicting the dead in a chariot leaving the earth"¹ and Ebert included an illustration² of the right hand side of the chariot of Monteleone—I also include a reproduction of this (see frontispiece)—of which he said: "The hero is raising himself in a chariot drawn by winged steeds from the earth, which is represented by a reclining woman in a chiton, into the air. Scenes of this kind on Bolognese tombs leave no doubt that what was intended was the journey into the hereafter".³ This bronze chariot from Monteleone di Spoleto near Norcia, which is now in the Metropolitan Museum in New York, one of "the finest and most complete example of ancient metal-work that has been preserved", is a specimen of Etruscan art which, according to estimates, dates from the sixth century before Christ.⁴ What is especially remarkable about this chariot is, on the one hand, that it gives such prominence (by depicting the theme of the chariot in fact on a chariot—perhaps in order to show man's higher destiny alongside his destiny here on earth?) to the idea of the journey to the hereafter and, on the other hand, that this idea clearly existed at such an early period, in other words, long before the doctrine of the neo-Platonists concerning the *ochēma* and *pneuma*.

It is obvious that this should all be regarded purely as a *symbol*, a symbol of the raising of the soul after death to a better state. But, one may ask, what has this to do with our special subject of *hylic pluralism*? There is no doubt that grateful use was made of ideas such as these as symbolic themes in the plastic and graphic arts. Various changes in emphasis can, however, take place, sometimes from a realistic point of view in favour of the metaphor and at others to the disadvantage of the metaphor in the direction of realism.⁵ All

1 *op. cit.*, p. 28.

2 Plate 4.

3 *op. cit.*, p. 184-185.

4 K. Pfister, *Die Etrusker* (1940), p. 45.

5 See above, p. 104.

kinds of civilisations other than our own—both contemporary primitive peoples and earlier civilisations—have and had, moreover, a much more sharply defined, a more realistic view of the hereafter than ordinary twentieth century man, whose attention immediately relaxes when this question is discussed and who tends to regard all this as a figment of the mind and therefore, when it comes to the point, as about one hundred percent figurative language. What the ancient peoples themselves, however, undoubtedly had in mind was a journey of the soul, an expedition on the part of the person concerned into a certain kind of world, which was partly different from and partly similar to this world. This does not mean that they never made use of symbols. They certainly did—this is clear from the parallel use of the carriage and the boat for the “journey to the hereafter”. (What is more, it often happened that, to be sure and once again thinking in very real terms, both a boat and, in it or on it, a carriage were given to the dead person.) In this context, we can also think of the *soul-bird* as a widespread designation of the *soul in itself*, the external soul, after death. This bird moved and travelled easily through a medium with little resistance and furthermore the horses drawing the chariot in our illustration have wings. But, however much the representation changed, they clearly had something that really happened in mind. This was, moreover, not seen as pure subjectivity, as an event taking place within the psyche and only (although it might have been also) as a succession of states of consciousness. On the contrary, it was seen as an objective and, in that case, perceptible event in a world, space or sphere. It may only be a question of language, but it is extremely difficult to get away from this. Above, I spoke of “the raising of the soul after death to a better state”. In this statement, “raising” is a spatial image and so is “state”. It would have been just as natural to say “to better regions” or “to other spheres”. I deliberately avoided this, but language inclines so much towards hylic pluralistic modes of expression. It may, of course, be that the kind of figurative language that is closely associated with our ordinary space is very persistent because our ordinary environment and situation in this world are given to us so forcefully and we therefore attempt to render purely immaterial ideas in this way. (I am not denying the significance of purely immaterial, eidetic or noetic constructions in this.¹) It may however, be that these spatial images are so very persistent because apart from this noetic content, ideas

¹ See above, p. 39, note 3.

(in their greater or lesser adequacy—the noetic content is always quite adequate in itself) lead a real existence in a different kind of space. We are simply totally unaccustomed to viewing it in this light, but man both in primitive and in ancient civilised society was not and we must at least take into account the possibility that he was not entirely mistaken.

In any case, he saw the relationship and the dividing line between symbol and reality differently from ourselves. As far as the *vehicle* is concerned, this is in one sense certain. The Greeks, especially in the Hellenistic period—not only the neo-Platonic school, but also very many other movements at that time—used *ochēma*, which meant vehicle or vessel, for the real body of fine matter or garment (another well-known image !) of the soul.¹ In this case, an *addition* must be made to Ebert's series concerning the chariot—to 1. funeral hearse, 2. burial portion or decoration of the tomb and 3. means of conveyance into the hereafter² must be added 4. the vehicle of fine matter of the soul, with the help of which the soul moves from one place to another. It is only then that the series is complete—the theme of the vehicle is also used in this way. In this series, however, a complete abstraction is made in the case of the last from the chariot as a vehicle on wheels. What we have here is the form in which the soul itself appears and shows itself to whoever is able to perceive it and with the help of which it expresses itself and, if necessary, moves from one place to another.

If this reasoning is correct, then it is also possible to reason in the reverse order. *If the chariot of the soul on its journey into the hereafter is illustrated in art, to what extent have attempts been made to render the ochēma in the neo-Platonic sense?* In any case, it contains a certain symbolism—we have only to think here of the choice between the chariot, the boat or the bird. What is more, instead of one of these, it is also possible to choose the *horse*—something to which I shall return later. But, in view of the general attitude of primitive or ancient man, who certainly did not incline towards the epsilon standpoint, that of anthropological dualism, which regarded the psychical element as purely immaterial, but tended more towards hylic pluralism, in the manner of the beta standpoint of Stoic metaphysics, it is quite certain that he saw much more in illustration of this kind than pure symbolism. In these cases, the chariot *pointed* to what he believed was the real vehicle of the soul, its body of fine matter.

¹ See above p. 16 ff.

² *op. cit.*, p. 185; see also above, p. 133 ff.

The question that confronts us is, where did primitive or early civilised man draw the line between symbolism and realism?¹ In those cases in which the vehicle theme appears in art, some symbolism was clearly always present as a factor. This was not so in the case of the illustration of the soul as a human shape—I have above tried to establish that this shape was in many cases regarded as consisting of fine matter.² But the chariots and the wings of the horses and also the rising line, the leaping upwards,³ symbolised flight, the ascending movement, the raising of the soul on high. To give another example, the golden ear-ring depicting Psyche with two horses, dating from about 350 B.C. and now in Boston Museum (see plate 3),⁴ is certainly reminiscent of the widespread use in later Hellenism of *ochēma* as the vehicle of the soul.

On the other hand, however, the vehicle theme also occurs *only* as a symbol, without there being any reason for us to think that its use indicates a body of fine matter.

In this case, we are reminded above all of the *Bhagavad Gītā*, the "Song of the Lord", that part of the *Mahābhārata* (VI, 25-42) which is so highly valued in India and so well known throughout the rest of the world because of its religious and philosophical content. The main theme of the *Bhagavad Gītā* is Arjūna's reluctance to continue fighting on the battlefield of Kurukshetra and the eighteen chapters are all in the form of a dialogue between Arjūna and his charioteer, who finally emerges as the God Viṣṇu. The stage is therefore the ancient chariot and the inner battle within one soul between the tendencies of doubt and irresoluteness on the one hand and, on the other, a higher insight which ultimately makes Arjūna accept battle is allegorised in the dialogue in the chariot, in which not the king's son, but his charioteer emerges as the wiser. In my opinion, there is no reason to see any indication of fine matter in this use of the theme of the chariot. But the soul as a whole is once again indicated here by means of the image of the chariot.

The use of the chariot theme to indicate different factors within the soul is apparently very ancient in India. This occurs in various

1 Professor W. B. Kristensen pointed out emphatically in an article in *Gids* ("Symbool en Werkelijkheid", July 1931) that man in antiquity saw this relationship differently from ourselves—he saw it more as a reality and less as a symbol.

2 See above, p. 102 ff.

3 See Prausnitz, p. 48.

4 For the interpretation of the ear-ring as representing Psyche, see B. Schweitzer-Platon und die bildende Kunst der Griechen, Tübingen (1953), p. 64: since Plato's *Phaedrus*, Psyche gripped the imagination of artists.



Plate 3

ways in the Upaniṣads in imitation of the Yajūrveda, where Manas or the spirit is called the charioteer of the soul.¹ In the Katha Upaniṣad (II, 3 and 7), the body is compared with the chariot, the senses are compared with the horses and Manas (the mind) is compared with the reins.² Here the principle of Buddhi is the charioteer. In the Maitri Upaniṣad, this is worked out differently.

The same theme is similarly employed by Buddhism. In one of the Jatakas (VI, p. 252), we read, in the translation of Mrs. Rhys Davids :

“The body is a chariot light, mind is the charioteer,
With steeds of equal training, mind pursues the mastered road . . .
Smiting with wisdom’s whip the team that makes for things of sense.
Herein, o King, thyself alone must be charioteer”.³

Is this “chariot light” (an expression which we shall encounter again later—*levis currus*) still the body of *coarse* matter ? The allegory does seem to relate to a hylic pluralistic idea and the purely symbolic character does seem to be lost here. From here to the *ochēma*, the vehicle of the soul, is no more than a step.

This is even clearer in the case of the Maudgalya legend in the *Mahā-bhārata* (III, Adhy. 261, 13 ff⁴) in which it is said of the inhabitants of heaven that those who attain heaven acquire “fiery bodies” there ; later we read : “with such divine chariots you are equipped, o Brahmana !” This fully establishes the connection between the body of fine matter and the chariots.

For the application of the symbol of the chariot of the soul in the West, one is, of course, at once reminded of Plato’s *Phaedrus*. Plato, distinguished in general between two parts of the soul, a higher Part, the rational soul, which existed before the world and was immortal and a lower part, the irrational soul, which in turn consisted of two unequal parts. These two parts of the soul were, according to Plato involved in constant conflict. To illustrate this, Plato used the image of a team of two winged horses and their driver.⁵ The driver is the immortal soul. Of the horses, the two parts of the lower soul one is relatively noble and of divine origin, the other is not. It is this that, makes it so difficult to drive them. This is, of course, reminiscent of

1 See E. Abegg, *Indische Psychologie* (B 1), p. 12.

2 *op. cit.*, p. 35 ; see also B 46, p. 160. See also D. J. Hoensin *Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift*, June 1954, p. 265.

3 C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology* (1914), p. 36.

4 See Windisch (B 178), p. 186.

5 247 B.

what we have read elsewhere about the cosmic carriage, drawn by the four elements, the earth being the element that pulls the others down.¹ Plato for that matter also wrote in the *Phaedrus* about the winged chariot of Zeus which, like the carriages of the other gods *ta theōn ochēmata*, generally speaking had an even motion.² I shall have to return to Plato and his attitude towards hylic pluralism and discuss this in detail later. Here, I shall simply ask of Plato what I have already asked of the primitive and early civilised peoples—was this intended metaphorically, as an image, or also literally and realistically? The horse is, of course, a symbol. Professor Dodds has pointed explicitly to the figurative character of these passages in the *Phaedrus*³ and it is generally assumed that the use of *ochēma* for the vehicle of fine matter of the soul arose at a later period and that it was only during neo-Platonism that it became current. Yet the neo-Platonists themselves appealed to these passages in the *Phaedrus* for their use of the word in this sense!⁴ It is not entirely out of the question that the modern interpretation of “simply image” is less correct than the neo-Platonic interpretation—that the *ochēmata* in the *Phaedrus*, the chariots pulled by horses, were at least partly intended realistically, in other words, that they were intended—especially in the figure of the one horse—to include a material factor which pulled the soul down.

The theme of changing place, especially in a vehicle or carriage and even more especially in the sense of going up, has also been expressed characteristically in the idea of the *ascension*, that of being assumed into a higher world. Not only are there accounts of ascensions in the Bible—for example, those of Enoch and Elijah in the Old Testament and that of Christ in the New Testament—but there have also been numerous cases elsewhere.⁵ It is not really possible for me to go into this datum here with any degree of thoroughness, not even in connection with our special subject. I will therefore make do with the following observation. In most cases of ascensions into heaven, what are regularly to be found are, on the one hand, the *image* of going or riding, often in a carriage drawn by horses, and, on the other, the conception of this as relating to a “vehicle” of fine matter. This is not simply a

1 See above, p. 228. Prausnitz refers (*op. cit.*, p. 96) to a mural painting in a grave of a later period representing a carriage drawn by a good white demon and a black evil demon. (See his illustration 59.)

2 246 E, 247 B and above, p. 133. See also Bidez (B 12), p. 60.

3 B 33, p. 315. See also Bidez, B 12, pp. 142 and 64.

4 See Dodds, *ibid.*

5 For example, Empedocles and Apollonius of Tyana. See the list provided by E. Rohde (B 132), II, p. 431.

connection which I alone have established. I had already been aware of this for a long time when I read pp. 15-18 of the provisional publication on the Codex Jung by H. C. Puech and G. Quispel.¹ What I have called hylic pluralism is also met within this Codex as a part of a greater whole: "Gnosticism also regarded the *pneuma* as similar to an *ochēma*". In the context, the authors recall in the first place the "winged chariot", the *ptēnon harma* of the *Phaedrus* (246e), the "chariots of the gods", *ta theon ochēmata* of the same dialogue (247e³) and the *ochēmata* of the stars in Plato's *Timaeus* (41e). It would appear therefore that they see a closer link in the realistic sense between these passages in Plato and the later use of *ochēma* as the vehicle of fine matter of the soul by the neo-Platonists than Dodds—who is also quoted—was prepared to see. In the second place, the authors recall the text of an oracle about the Emperor Julian, in which it was said that he was taken to Olympus in a "blazing chariot" (*purilampes ochēma*).⁴ Thirdly, they refer to the similarity between these ancient "apotheoses" and illustrations of the ascension of the triumphant Christ (both, for example, greeting with the right hand). In the fourth place, the authors speak of the ascension of the prophet Elijah (2 Kings 2. 11-12), saying that the fire referred to in this passage can, on the basis of a well-known Stoic teaching, easily be connected with the *pneuma*—with a "fiery or ethereal breath". The reason for this comparison is that it is said in the Codex Jung that the Redeemer went up, in order to sit at the right hand of the Father, in "the chariot (*harma*) of the Spirit (*pneuma*)".⁵ There is therefore good reason for the authors to recall the teaching of the neo-Platonists about the *ochēma* and the *pneuma* in this context and even to recall certain passages in Plato's *Phaedrus*, which was written so many centuries before. As far as Elijah's ascension is concerned, I have so far hesitated to speak about this in connection with hylic pluralism, the doctrine of an *ochēma* of fine matter. In the places concerned in the Old Testament, there is certainly reference, on the one hand, to the prophet's going up to heaven and, on the other, to a fiery chariot with fiery horses,⁶

1 "Les écrits gnostiques du Codex Jung", *Vigiliae Christianae VIII en Amst.* (1954).

2 *op. cit.*, p. 17.

3 Puech and Quispel give 274b, but this is clearly a printing error for 247b.

4 See, for example, F. Cumont, *Recherches sur le symbolisme funéraire des Romains* p. 175 note 3.

5 *op. cit.*, p. 15.

6 In the Septuagint, the Greek translation of the Old Testament which dates from the third century B. C., the Hebrew word used in this place—a word which is derived from the same root as *merkābhāh*, it is true, was not translated by *ochēma* but by *harma*.

but it is not said that the prophet went up to heaven *in* the chariot. Puech and Quispel, however, do see a link between them, presumably, for the following reason. Prausnitz also affirmed that, according to the wording of the Bible, Elijah did not go up to heaven in the chariot, but he showed in a number of examples, that it was generally regarded that he did in Christian iconography (this emerges very clearly, for example, in two illustrations provided by Prausnitz, nos. 25 and 26.¹) Early and medieval Christians—who were in noway averse to holic pluralistic ideas²—thus regarded it as obvious that the ascension to heaven was made in a vehicle (an *ochēma*?) In my view, what we have here is one of those cases in which we have to ask wheather the chariot the vehicle is only weakly intended to be a symbol that is suitable for illustration), but is to a very great extent essentially intended to be a vehicle of *fine matter*. Whether this is so or not, other figures, such as Francis³ and even Jesus himself,⁴ were represented as going up to heaven in a carriage.

What is remarkable is that Saint Gregory seems to have emphasised, as a kind of warning to artists, that, although Elijah went up to heaven in a chariot and with the help of angels, Christ himself did not—God's Son had no need of help of this kind.⁵ Indeed, the chariot is only an image here and there must be, from the hylc pluralistic point of view, several even more rarefied *ochēmata* possible (one is reminded here of the “sublime *pneuma*”), which can hardly be called vehicles any more. On the other hand, there are also *other* possible images which are different from that of the vehicle or chariot. In the first place, the horse can itself be sufficient as an image. The word *harma* means not only carriage or chariot, but also the team of horses. Thus, the horse sometimes functions as *psychopompos*, as the leader of souls to the underworld.⁷ Just as Zeus and other gods rode in their heavenly carriages, so too did the Teutonic god, Odin, ride on his horse Sleipnir. What is more, the symbol of the bird also occurs here once

1 *op. cit.*, p. 47. See also my illustration, plate 4, taken from Cod. Lat. 13002 in the Bayrische Staatsbibliothek.

2 See above, p. 17-18, 45.

3 See Prausnitz, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

4 See Puech and Quispel, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

5 Prausnitz, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

6 See above, pp. 131-132.

7 See M. Eliade, *Le chamanisme et les techniques archaïques de l'extase* (1951), p. 406.



Plate 4



more.¹ Whereas the theme of the chariot had the advantage of recalling glory and honour, the "soul-bird" called to mind associations of easy movement—the ancient carriage was not a modern motor car with tyres!—because, among the elements, the air was relatively subtle. A common belief was that one grew wings when one crossed to a more rarefied world.² The angels were also usually thought of as possessing wings and illustrated as such and the horses in the *Phaedrus* possessed wings, as do the horses illustrated in my plates 1 and 3.

There is therefore a large choice of images, but what they all seem to have in common is a movement upwards³ and a preference for the image of the vehicle or *ochēma*. I should like to conclude this book with two examples taken from very different periods.

Boethius (ca. 480-524 A. D.), the Roman philosopher who was so widely read during the Middle Ages, also used the image of the carriage for the finer body of the soul, referring, in his *De Consolatione philosophiae*, to *leves currus* (III, 9). I has often been admitted that this passage can be interpreted hylic pluralistically—Überweg and Prächter referred in this context to "twofold corporeality"⁴ and Boethius' commentator, A. Fortescue, once again referring to Plato's *Phaedrus* 246 a-b, also spoke about *duplex corporeitas*. This meaning of *levibus curribus* does not, however, emerge clearly in all the translations of Boethius, although we do find, in a sixteenth century version by D. Vzn Coornhert (1522-1590), entitled *Van de Verstroosting der Wijsheid* ("On the Consolation of Wisdom"),⁵ the passage rendered thus :

"Thus, Lord, thou leadest kindly

The souls and smaller members/

In chariots light/to highest heaven's peace".

Several centuries later, when interest in the "ethereal body" had revived during the romantic period, the Dutch poet Willem Bilderdijk (1756- 1831) wrote in his *De Geestenwaereld* ("The World of Spirits"

1 In the article to which I have already referred on p. 217, Dr. Gerda Walther expressed the opinion that swans and so on should be regarded in legends as symbols of ethereal or astral bodies (p. 154). Ought we perhaps to regard the swan on which the knight Lohengrin comes bumping on to the stage in the opera, in this light? If so, it would be a case of a descent from a higher world. In the stage setting that he prescribed, Wagner leaves no doubt at all about the high descent of the knight of the swan.

2 See above, pp. 201.

3 In various illustrations, the horses are, as it were, shown as rising up. See Prausnitz, *op. cit.*, p. 48 and my illustrations 1, 3 and 4.

4 B 170, p. 654.

5 Amsterdam (1616), p. 111.

"Yes, it is so. Thou ordainest and that fate is also blessing.

The coarse, material body is at last cast off.

Decay must grow and end in loss,

the act of death release the captive part,

a pure and finer matter surround the fluent soul.

This instrument, destroyed, belongs to this finite life.

A better instrument, already formed, rises from within

And the noble butterfly emerges from the chrysalis".¹

He then went on to define this more precisely with regard to the spirits :

"The vehicle that carries them is heavenly crystalline.

Show me, paint for me their coach in which they are raised

And with joy oppose their brothers on this earth,

Surround them in their peril and cover them in need

And receive them tenderly into their arms at death !

Show me their coach, that garment, body, covering.

Concentrate of pure light, immune from stain,

That pure fluid, which no earthly power divides,

No bolt excludes, through which God's breath plays".²

Bilderdijk thus spoke at the same time of "coach", "garment"—another ancient image³—and body. Coornhert spoke of "chariots light" and Boethius himself of *leves currus*. Classical antiquity spoke of *ochēmata* and in every case there has been mention of the soul. In the case of Elijah, there was reference to *rekhebh*, to *hārma*, a chariot. I have therefore been able to establish, however cursorily, that the theme of the carriage or chariot, the vehicle theme, has been very popular in connection with experiences of and the analysis of the soul, so popular in fact that one suspects that the intention has been to indicate by means of this theme a reality of a different kind, a reality of fine matter, as is certain in Hellenistic circles that this occurred.⁴

1 Verse 89-96; "the fluent soul", cf. the "free soul", the "external soul".

2 Verse 284-292. See my "Willem Bilderdijk en het fijnstoffelijk lichaam", *Theosophia* LIV, p. 86 ff.

3 See above, pp. 29, 116, 119 and below section 93.

4 It was only after having written this, that I was able to obtain the posthumous work of F. Cumont (1848-1947), *Lux Perpetua* (1949.). Under the heading of "Le voyage vers l'au-delà" ("The Journey to the Hereafter, p. 275 ff), the author discussed the following themes: the ladder (*Echelle*, p. 282), the boat *Barque* p. 283 ff), the horse *Cheval* p. 286), the chariot *Char* p. 289) and the bird *Oiseau* p. 295), giving numerous examples, especially from the history of art. The theme of the horse has, for example, to be regarded again and again as referring to the hereafter (see above, p. 245). Cumont has devoted special attention to the winged being of horses, both in itself and in the case of horses in a team drawing a carriage. He also deals com-

[Continued on next page

D. HYLIC PLURALISM IN A SERIES OF ANCIENT CIVILISATIONS WHICH HAVE PRODUCED A SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY OR PHILOSOPHY

27. RECAPITULATION

In the first part of this work, the problem of "hylic pluralism" was raised and I gave my reasons for preferring this term to the one usually employed in philosophy, namely "dualistic materialism". Certainly the doctrine that there are, broadly speaking, two great divisions of matter in the world does not in itself imply materialism, according to which matter is the highest reality. Dualistic materialism is only one form of the doctrine that there is, in addition to ordinary matter, also another variety of matter which is more subtle and which is especially connected with the human soul. I therefore suggested the use of a wider term—"hylic pluralism"—for the standpoint which considers whether there may not be several species of hyle or matter and possibly a pluriformity, not necessary only two. Thus, the view that the soul possesses a vehicle of fine matter, although the soul itself and God are immaterial, may also be included among the views that have to be investigated in this study.¹

I also declared my intention, in the first part of this book, of dealing with this hylic pluralism in the first place as a *historical* question, asking,

Continued from previous page]
prehensively with the theme of the *carriage* or *chariot*. He claims that it is an established fact, for example, in the case of the scenes depicted on the Etruscan graves, that the theme of the chariot has to be related to the "Journey to Hades" (p. 290) and mentions the chariot of Monteleone in this context. He also discusses the winged chariot of Zeus in Plato's *Phaedrus* and various apotheoses in the form of an ascension. At the conclusion to this chapter of his book (p. 298), Cumont observes that what is common to all these themes is the idea of a certain weight that has to be lifted, so that the typical antithesis between the body and the soul ceases to apply here. In other words, the point of departure was certainly not, in the terminology used in my work, anthropological dualism. As far as the interpretation of these themes is concerned, Cumont says that the crowd certainly accepted them quite literally, as physical ascensions and so on, in most cases, although the ancient theologians regarded them at least partly as symbolic and "like the neo-Platonists, explained the vehicle (*ochēma*) which took the souls to the sun as a power of attraction exercised by the rays of the creative and saving heavenly body or as an astral or aerial covering which the soul had put on like a garment while going down to earth" (p. 293). This statement made by the well-known author Cumont reinforces the suspicion that I have expressed above in my concluding sentence, namely that what must be seen in all these themes—of vehicles, winged horses and so on *tombstones* and other places—is more than simply a symbol or a decoration. In other words, they also included an allusion to a reality of hylic pluralism or of fine matter. Cumont, after all, also links them with the *ochēma* of the neo-Platonists.

¹ See above p. 1 and 2.

in other words, where it has occurred as a theme and as a movement in the history of thought. In the second place, I proposed to question its meaning and to ask whether there was any truth in it for us and whether it was at least a philosophically possible view.

Hylic pluralism is, however, as we have seen, not only a very widespread doctrine, but also one which has been thrust into the background or else completely neglected in modern times. As a result of this, the historical treatment of the subject is bound to occupy much time and space. So far in Part II, I have dealt with hylic pluralism among the primitive peoples and then with its occurrence in a series of civilisations which may be regarded as primitive in a certain sense—ancient Egypt, Assyria and Babylonia, ancient Persia and the Teutonic and Keltic civilisations. In this section, I propose to continue with the study of hylic pluralism in a number of civilisations which, after passing through a primitive stage, gradually developed a systematic theology or philosophy which was often admirably profound. This section will also be entirely historical in its approach, considering hylic pluralism firstly in the civilisations of India and China, in other words, in Eastern thought, and secondly in ancient Greece and Rome, Israel, early Christianity and the Middle Ages and so on.

The work is preceded by a detailed *introduction*, which constitutes the whole of Part I. This is intended to introduce not only the whole of the historical part of the present work, that is, Part II, but also the later Part III, which will deal with the sense of hylic pluralism. The rest of Part II and Part III will appear in later volumes.

Apart from posing the problem, I have aimed, in this introduction, to formulate a number of concepts, by means of which the various forms, under which hylic pluralism has occurred at different times and in different civilisations, may be determined. Thus, the idea of a finer materiality occurs with *different levels* in mind. I have distinguished different species of *pneuma* immediately connected with these different levels. (The term *pneuma* has been used *only* in the sense of fine matter; I have, on the other hand, used the term "spirit" only in the immaterial sense). The physical *pneuma*¹—the air or the wind (one is reminded here of pneumatic tyres and so on)—does not raise the problem of hylic pluralism, although the gaseous state is more subtle than that of solid matter, which gives rise to the use of *pneuma* or of other terms, which signify air or breath, as the image of a subtlety

1 See Part I, 6.

which is intended at a higher level. The physiological *pneuma*¹ is, on the other hand, to be found mainly at the same physical level, but, in the context of the living organism, the existence of "animal spirits" of fine matter, *spiritus vitales et animales* or *pranas*, has often been accepted in the history of philosophy. These "animal spirits" certainly amount to a view which has to be mentioned in our context. Whereas this physiological *pneuma* is regarded as something belonging to this world—wherever there has been any mention of a continued existence after death, this has always been of very short duration—the situation is quite different in the case of the psychological *pneuma*.² Here we hear of something which certainly continues to exist after the death of the ordinary body (of coarse matter) and of all that belongs to it, at least for a short time. Insofar as a body of fine matter is attributed to angels and demons, this is also to be included within the category of the psychological *pneuma*, with which physical death is not therefore in any way concerned. The psychological *pneuma* could be subdivided even further, but I have not done this in the introduction provided in Part I. All that I have done is to point to one special form of it, which I have called the *sublime pneuma*³ to indicate that it is a particularly exalted form of *pneuma*. According to this view, man ultimately receives a radiant, luminous body, which the angels and certain other spirits also have at their disposal.

Another term that I have introduced is *psychohylism*.⁴ Just as hylozoism is the doctrine that, viewed from the outside, matter is always animated, even where this is not expected, so too is psychohylism, in my terminology, the view that the soul is always or almost always accompanied by a material form of expression (material in the sense of fine matter), in other words, that the soul is always spiritually corporeal. This would similarly, and even especially, be the case when the ordinary body of coarse matter had ceased to exist. According to this theory, then, the soul always has something like a subtle *vehicle* or *ochēma*.

The marginal comment must, however, be made here that the aspect of the soul which is of fine matter is not always regarded as completely organised into a body, vehicle or *ochēma*. There may also be reference to simply a germ or foundation of fine matter. Nonetheless, this also

1 See Part I, 7.

2 See Part I, 8.

3 See Part I, 9.

4 See Part I, 4.

comes within "hylic pluralism". The doctrine of the *ochêma* of the soul is therefore a completion, a special form of hylic pluralism. The latter is wider than the former.

How can this theory of fine materiality be seen against a philosophical, metaphysical background?¹ In this connection, *six metaphysical standpoints* may be distinguished and to these I have given the names alpha, beta, gamma, delta, epsilon and zeta standpoints.² Two of these are decidedly negative with regard to our problem. The alpha standpoint or *monistic materialism* does not acknowledge in any sense an independently existing soul or the continued existence of this soul after death. The epsilon standpoint or *anthropological dualism* makes an extremely sharp contrast between, on the one hand, the soul or the consciousness or thought as completely immaterial—it can therefore not possess a form of expression of fine matter after death—and, on the other hand, the substance of ordinary matter which is extended throughout space. The most fundamental opponents of the possibility of hylic pluralism accept the epsilon standpoint. The other four metaphysical standpoints represent the four forms under which hylic pluralism occurs as a philosophical conception. The first of these is the beta standpoint or *dualistic materialism*, according to which there is nothing which exists as real other than matter, but which also accepts more subtle forms of this matter, including the material form in which the soul may continue to exist for a certain time. If God exists, he is also material. The beta standpoint, then, does not accept any kind of immaterial being. This is different in the case of the gamma standpoint, according to which God is truly immaterial, although every other reality consists of matter of different degrees of density or subtlety. The delta standpoint goes a step further. According to this standpoint, not only God, but also the soul is immaterial, even though it does possess a vehicle of fine matter of which it makes constant use, but especially after death. This increasing immateriality, this spiritualisation, goes beyond the epsilon standpoint, to which I have already referred above, and which regards all psychical being as immaterial, but which allows matter to exist alongside it as real. and reaches its highest point in the zeta standpoint. This represents a complete spiritualism (or psychic monism) which denies the independent existence of any matter or body at all—according to the zeta standpoint, these are only phenomena in the consciousness. Species of different density

¹ See Part I, 10.

² See Part I, 11-16.

may, however, occur among this matter which exists only in appearance. Lastly, I should mention that I provided examples of thinkers or movements representing each of these standpoints.

By distinguishing these three kinds of *pneuma* and these six different standpoints, I hoped that I had succeeded in constructing an apparatus by means of which it would be possible to determine hylic pluralistic ideas as they occurred in history.¹

After this long general introduction, I began with the historical part (Part II) and have so far dealt with hylic pluralism among primitive peoples in section B² (since it is so difficult to know anything about the chronologically early primitive peoples, I took primitive peoples living today as my basis) and, in section C, with hylic pluralism in the civilisations of ancient Egypt, Assyria and Babylonia, ancient Persia and the Teutons and Kelts.³ At the end of this section, I included a digression in which I considered the vehicle them: in general.⁴

INDIA

28. INDIAN THOUGHT IN GENERAL⁵

I now propose to discuss a number of civilisations which after having passed through a primitive stage, have produced a written culture in the form of a systematic theology or philosophy. The first of these civilisations with which I should like to deal is that which is now known as India.

In the first place, I shall attempt to review, very briefly, Indian thought in general, in other words, apart from hylic pluralism. In so doing, I shall be carrying out my intention of trying to situate hylic pluralistic doctrines within a certain framework.⁶ My treatment of the subject as a whole covers such a wide field that it seems to me to be in no way superfluous to remind the reader of a few major data connected with the field under discussion.

Indian thought is, in the first place, characterised formally by two features—on the one hand, its pluriformity and profundity and, on the

¹ See Part I, 17.

² See Part II, 20-21.

³ See Part II, 22-25.

⁴ See Part II, 26.

⁵ With regard to the transcription of Sanskrit words, I have, as far as ि and ि are concerned, followed Gonda (B 58), while omitting ण, ण, ण, ण etc. Gonda's system would seem to be the same as that used in the English speaking world.

⁶ See above p. 60.

other hand, the fact that it is relatively unknown. Let us begin with this second characteristic. In the West, anyone who is interested in philosophy is again and again provided with information about Greek thought. I do not wish to deny the great value and influence of Greek philosophy in any way—I myself began my philosophical education with this. I simply wish to draw attention to the contrast between the many publications, both large and small, specialised and popular, dealing with Greek thought and the many lectures and courses on, for example, the Ionian school and the relatively meagre number of books about Indian philosophy.¹ What is more, with very few exceptions, such as, for example, Deussen, the general histories of philosophy also neglect Indian thought. Yet Indian philosophy is so extensive—by no means all the manuscripts have been thoroughly studied or even published, let alone even translated²—and contains such a wealth of distinctions and terms that there is every reason for us to devote our attention to it. A great deal of Indian thought must also not have come to us.³

It is, however, quite possible to characterise Indian philosophy in broad outline. I shall devote a separate section to the earliest period, the primitive stage of Indian thought.

The various authors who have written about Indian philosophy are agreed that, despite differences in its constituent parts, it does form a remarkably closely knit whole. Professor Gonda commented that “Indian thought is rooted, in its different expressions, in a relatively uniform and powerful world-view and religiosity”⁴ and von Glasenapp thought that it was “based on a fundamentally unified metaphysical and ethical view of the world”.⁵ In Indian thought, philosophy and religion, theory and practice, ideas and life and metaphysics and ethics are all closely interconnected. Indian religious thought, Radhakrishnan maintained, was not dogmatic, but was open to criticism and discussion.⁶ This remark clearly refers to the fact that Indian religion, however closely it might be connected with philosophy, did not stand in the way of those discussions. It is a well-known fact that the rites and

1 Professor J. Gonda's introduction to Indian thought—*Inleiding tot het Indische denken*, 1948 (B 58) is the first comprehensive work to be published in this sphere in the Dutch language.

2 See Dasgupta, B 185, I, p. 1.

3 See B 53, p. 123; B 58, p. 193.

4 B 58, p. 219.

5 B 53, p. 12.

6 B 124, I, p. 26-27.

practices of Hinduism are very rigid. In India, however, thought is not an isolated function—the idea of the *summum bonum* in the form of man's eternal salvation or redemption is very much alive and there is a strong tendency to convert the doctrines into practice. This leads to a "unity of all systems", despite individual differences,¹ and the various *darśanas* or systems are therefore not so much mutually exclusive schools of thought as mutually complementary views.²

Those who have written about Indian thought are certainly in agreement about this unity. Nonetheless, some criticism must, I believe, be raised here. It has been suggested, on the other hand, that all the movements that are known in Western thought, movements such as materialism and spiritualism, atheism and theism, realism and idealism (and also nominalism), subjectivism and objectivism and so on, are represented in Indian thought.³ What kind of unity is it, then, that Indian thought displays? Is it a really close unity? The solution to this contradiction will probably be found in the following. In referring to the unity of Indian thought, movements such as those of the materialists (or *cārvākas*), the agnostics, the positivists and the fatalists are not included. These movements must have had quite a large number of supporters, but their writings have not come to us.⁴ We only know about them indirectly. It is therefore true that Indian philosophy as it is known to us does present us with a homogeneous whole, the unity referred to above. Moreover, those fundamentally divergent movements only flourished during certain periods, whereas there have been centuries which have been characterised by the other kind of thought. What is more, one of the six most well-known *darśanas*, the Vedānta, acquired nothing less than a position of hegemony.⁵

The fact that Indian thought itself classifies the different systems into two groups—the *āstika* or affirmative and the *nāstika* or negative group—is confirmation of the correctness of this division. The first group of systems is based on the Veda. The six most important *darśanas* belong to this affirmative group and it is here that the fundamental unity of doctrines is encountered. The *cārvākas* or materialists belong to the second or negative group.⁶ Both Jainism and Buddhism, which, with regard to orthodox Brahmanism, undoubtedly have the significance

1 B 124, II, p. 769 ff.

2 See B 58, p. 219-220.

3 See B 53, p. 8.

4 See B 53, p. 123.

5 B 58, p. 294.

6 B 185, I, p. 67-68; B 58, p. 219.

of schismatic movements, belong to the *nāstikas*. Unlike the materialists and those like them, however, these two movements have a great many doctrines in common with the six *darśanas* and as such strengthen the homogeneity of Indian thought.

What, then, are those doctrines with regard to which Indian thought, regarded as the most prevalent movement, provides a fundamental unity? Gonda¹ gives the following list of doctrines : belief in rebirth (or metempsychosis), in *samsāra* (the eternal stream of phenomenal existence in this world to which unredeemed man is bound), in *karma* (the actions, especially those performed in a previous life, by which man is more particularly bound), in the periodicity of the event of the world (in which periods of non-existence or *pralaya* alternate with periods of existence) and in the existence of a permanent *ātman*, *puruṣa* or *jīva* (or essence of personality). Although it does include very many of the basic doctrines mentioned in this list, Buddhism denies the existence of the essence of personality. In his study of Indian philosophy—undoubtedly the most detailed and solid that has so far been written—Dasgupta also mentions as points of agreement the doctrines of *karma* and rebirth, of *mukti* (or liberation; otherwise known as *mokṣa*) and of the soul—*ātman*, *puruṣa* or *jīvan*.² Dasgupta also observes that the pessimism announced by Indian thought with regard to the world in fact amounts to an optimism with regard to the last things.³ Radhakrishnan also wrote in a similar way about the contrast between optimism and pessimism in Indian thought.⁴ He also pointed out that Indian philosophy is not at all an *ex cathedra* teaching—many people in India are interested in it and the philosophers not only want the redemption of the individual, but also a social and spiritual renewal of the commonwealth. Philosophy in India is also intence and “essentially spiritual”.⁵ The interest is strongly inward looking. “Psychology and ethics are the basal sciences”.⁶ The general tendency in philosophy is to move towards a synthetic image, a monistic idealism which in deeper than the dualism or pluralism which here and there comes to light.⁷ Von Glasenapp has also drawn attention to the “unified metaphysical and ethical view” of Indian thought and to the demand

1 B 58, p. 219 and Chapter IV among other places.

2 B 185, I, p. 71 ff.

3 *Ibid.*, pp. 75-76.

4 See B 124, I, p. 50.

5 See B 124, I, p. 234 ff.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 28.

7 *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.

for unity between philosophy and life.¹ Unlike the Western thinker, the Indian philosopher has no apparatus for dealing with the meaning of history—the idea that a new and higher stage is reached again and again in thought is absent from Indian philosophy. Individual thinkers come far less to the fore in India. Finally, the emphasis is not on a culmination in thought which will be reached in the future, but rather—at least in that homogeneous complex which has prevailed in India since time immemorial—on truths from the past, the truths of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads, which still enjoy authority and in which everything is, so to speak, already contained in principle.²

I have perhaps said enough to give the reader a very general idea of Indian philosophy. Although it is less possible to speak of a development in Indian thought, it is certainly possible to divide it into a number of periods.

In broad outline, the following three periods may be distinguished: 1. the *Vedic* period : from approximately 1500 until 550 B.C.; 2. the period when the *great systems* of Brahmanism and Buddhism came into being: from 550 B.C. until approximately 1000 A.D.; 3. the *post-classical* period.³ The classical period was further subdivided by Radhakrishnan into an *epic* period from approximately 600 B.C. until 200 A.D. and the period of the Sūtras (or summaries) and the Scholastic period, both dating approximately from 200 A.D.⁴

The earliest Indian writings are to be found in the Vedas, such as the Ṛgveda—one of the earliest known writings—the Sāmaveda, the Yājurveda and the Atharvaveda. Much philosophy, in our sense of the word, is not to be found in the Vedas, which consist, to a very great extent, of hymns, ritual instructions and so on. Each Veda also consists of three parts—the mantras or hymns (this part is known as the Samhitā), the Brahmanas or religious instructions and the Upaniṣads.⁵

The Upaniṣads are independent writings which are only counted among one of the Vedas as their end. A writer has observed that they occupy the same position with regard to the Vedas proper as the writings of the New Testament occupy with regard to those of the Old Testament. The Upaniṣads deal rather unsystematically with philo-

¹ See B 53, p. 12 and 17.

² *ibid.*, pp. 16-19.

³ *ibid.*, p. 20. Gonda, however, dates the Vedic period from the eleventh until the sixth century B.C.

⁴ B 124, I, p. 56 ff.

⁵ *ibid.*, I, p. 65.

sophical and related problems. Whereas Radhakrishnan puts the date of the Ṛgveda at about 1500 B.C.—others give it an even earlier date—the earliest Upaniṣads are generally thought to have originated between 800 and 600 B.C., the later Upaniṣads at approximately 400 B.C. and the most recent Upaniṣads even later.² The thought of the Upaniṣads is, in form and content, relatively primitive. It is interesting to see how later Indian thought, which tried to keep to the Vedas (this applies especially to the *āstika* systems), believed that its concepts could be traced back to the Upaniṣads or, to express this the other way round, where the germs of the later doctrines are to be found in the Upaniṣads.

In any case, these later doctrines are much more explicit, they are more frequently clothed in the form of a regular argument and certain concepts, such as that of spiritualisation, are for the first time sharply developed. As far as this concept of spiritualisation is concerned, to some extent a process of increasing spiritualisation took place, such as can also be established, for example, in Greek philosophy.

A transition from the Vedas and Upaniṣads to this systematic literature is formed by the literary genres such as the *Mahābhārata*, the great heroic epic which was given its present form somewhere between 400 B.C. and 400 A.D. Parts of the *Mahābhārata*, like the well-known and highly valued *Bhagavad Gītā*, are extremely philosophical.

The classical period is further characterised by the formulation of the six well-known systems or *darśanas*... These great metaphysical systems of Brahmanism are the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Sāṅkhya, the Yoga, the Pūrva Mimāṃsā and the Vedānta.³ Although these six systems, which belong to the *āstika* or affirmative group, are based on the Vedas and also display a certain homogeneity, with the result that they are more to be regarded as different "views" than as sharply contrasting "systems".⁴ they do, in other respects, show some divergence from each other.

The *Purva Mimāṃsā* is hardly a philosophical system at all, but rather a treatise on ritual and on the *dharma* or duty to perform these rites. The method which was used to set out this teaching was also applied to other spheres.⁵ The *Nyāya* is above all concerned with logical problems and questions of natural philosophy. The *Vaiśeṣika* also formulates a doctrine of categories and an atomic doctrine. These two systems,

1 See B 124, I, p. 67.

2 B 53, p. 457.

3 See, for example, B 124, II, p. 28.

4 See above, p. 151.

5 See B 58, p. 164 ff; B 53, p. 142 ff; B 185, I, p. 68 ff.

both of which are very realistically constructed, were later combined to form a single whole. This philosophical movement was not very widespread and was not very highly regarded.¹ The *Yoga* system of Patanjali was directed towards mystical practices and is theoretically closely related to the Sāṅkhya.

This *Sāṅkhya* system is philosophically important. It occurs in some of the more recent Upaniṣads and is mentioned again and again in the *Mahābhārata* and the *Bhagavad Gītā*.² This earlier Sāṅkhya was not atheistic, but the classical Sāṅkhya is.³ This classical Sāṅkhya contains a consistent dualism of primordial matter or *prakṛiti* on the one hand and of the spiritual monads or *puruṣas* on the other. There are many of these *puruṣas*—the Sāṅkhya teaches a pluralism of individual *puruṣas*. The *puruṣas* do not really act—they are in an eternal state of rest, while the whole of primordial matter or *prakṛiti* is in a constant state of movement and becoming. Not only physical nature belongs to the *prakṛiti*, but also everything which we would call psychical. The *puruṣas* are conscious and knowing, but for the rest they are unmoved (not even by blessedness).⁴

The other very important system is the *Vedānta*. Unlike the Sāṅkhya, which is dualistic, the teaching of the Vedānta is monistic. *Brahman* is one and everything appears from this. The individual soul is fundamentally one with *Brahman* and, if many individual souls or *jīvas* appear to exist outside, this is because the one *Brahman* or the one *ātman* is clothed with *upādhis* or limiting qualities or factors, such as being connected with corporeality and so on. This principal idea was rather diversely elaborated in different periods. The earliest version of the Vedānta is that of Bādarāyana in his *Brāhma-sūtras*. These Vedānta-sūtras attempt to summarise the end of the Vedas (Vedānta — Veda-end), in other words, the Upaniṣads. This earlier Vedānta takes a more or less realistic standpoint with regard to the existence of the world. The well-known later Vedantic writer and commentator on the *Brahma-sūtras*, Śaṅkara (c. 800 A.D.), whose teaching had such a great influence that, when the word Vedānta is used, it is usually to his work that reference is made, took quite a different point of view. According to Śaṅkara, the whole world is *māyā* or illusion and only *Brahman* exists in reality, the one without a second (*advaita* doctrine). The Vedānta

1 See B 124, II, p. 29 ff; B 58, p. 169, 180 ff; B 52, p. 25 ff.

2 See, for example, B 1, p. 49 ff; B 58, p. 135 ff.

3 B 58, p. 136.

4 See B 1, pp. 52-53.

philosophy has played an increasingly important role in India—it has been called the national philosophy of the Hindus and it enjoys a position of hegemony in Indian thought. Towards the end of the classical period especially, as well as after this, numerous sects arose under the banner of the Vedānta, in connection with, for example, the worship of Viṣṇu and Śiva. These sects often took a far less strictly monistic standpoint than Śāṅkara.¹

So much for the six *darśanas*. This does not mean, however, that we have come to the end of Indian thought. For, in addition to these *āstika*, there are also the *nāstika* systems, such as those already mentioned, the *cārvākas* or materialists.² In a rather wider sense, the teachings of the two non-Brahmanistic movements, Jainism and Buddhism, also belong to these *nāstikas*.

Jainism, which originated in the sixth century before Christ through the work of Mahavira, is more primitive and more conservative than Buddhism. It is also less widespread, although it still has many adherents as a religion.³ As a whole, however, it belongs characteristically to the Indian civilisation.⁴

Despite its contrast with Brahmanism, the same applies to *Buddhism*. Like Jainism, Buddhism also dates back to the sixth century before Christ. Gautama Buddha (ca. 563-483 B.C.) proclaimed, in contrast to the rather rigid Brahmanism of his period, his own doctrine of salvation which was concentrated on personal attitude. He preserved, however, many doctrines which were prevalent in India, such as that of the transmigration of the soul, being bound by *karma* to the actions one had performed in a previous life (called in Buddhism the wheel of birth and death) and so on. Instead of the doctrine that the soul becomes one with *Brahman*, Buddha taught the attainment of *nirvāṇa*. Opposing an exaggerated asceticism and ritualism, he also taught a middle way.⁵

Since Buddhism originated so long ago, the Brahmanic philosophy of the classical period with its six *darśanas* was always accompanied by the schismatic teaching of Buddhism. It goes without saying, however, that this teaching has not always remained consistent. There have, for example, been important movements and sects, such as that

1 See, for example, B I, p. 37 ff; B 58, p. 227 ff; B 53, p. 181 ff; B 52, p. 146 ff; (p. 155—review of the sects).

2 See above, p. 151-152.

3 See B 179, XI, p. 443.

4 See B 58, p. 68 ff; B 52, p. 95 ff; B 124, I, p. 286 ff.

5 See B 58, p. 88 ff; B 124, I p. 341 ff; B 185, I, p. 78 ff.

of the Sarvāstivādins (the third century before Christ)¹ and others, within the main stream of Buddhist thought. Later, Buddhism divided into the two great movements of the Hinayāna (the little vehicle or path) and the Mahāyāna (the great vehicle² or path). The Hinayāna placed more emphasis on the salvation of individual man while the Mahāyāna stressed universal salvation more. Broadly speaking, it is also the southern form as opposed to the northern form. The contrast between the Hinayāna and the Mahāyāna has also been compared with that between Protestantism and Catholicism in Christianity.³ In the case of Buddhism, however, the Mahāyāna, which originated round about the beginning of our own era, was, with its organised hierarchy of priests, its ceremonies, its veneration of relics and its pantheon of higher beings, the more recent form.

Externally too, Buddhism has passed through many experiences. As a resilient reform movement, it made great progress in India and this progress came to a climax in the reign of the emperor Aśoka, during the third century before Christ. Aśoka even sent missionaries to the Hellenistic rulers of Macedonia, Egypt and Syria.⁴ Later, however, what has been regarded as a kind of counter-Reformation took place in India and this had such great success, together with the rapid rise in importance of Islam, that the existence of Buddhism in India became virtually limited to Ceylon. In the meantime, Mahāyāna Buddhism had become widespread in Eastern Asia and had become an important factor, for example, in China and Japan. It was in Japan that the sect known as Zen Buddhism originated. Buddhism has remained the predominant religion in Tibet and Burma. In India proper, however, it has almost entirely disappeared.

The reason for this was not only an inward weakening of Buddhist thought, but also a closer approach towards Hinduism in the form, for example, of Vajrayāna Buddhism or the doctrine of the "diamond vehicle", which was very close to the Hinduistic movements known as Tantrism and Śāktism.

Buddhism as a whole has produced not only a comprehensive theology and philosophy and important philosophers, such as Nāgārjuna in the

1 See B 58, p. 89 ff.

2 Properly speaking, ferry boat. The meaning of the image was that the pilgrim was able to reach the opposite bank of the river, that of *nirvāṇa* from the bank of existence which was bound to the earth and the wheel of birth and death with the help of this ferry boat. This image of the vehicle or boat is therefore not directly connected with the *ochēma* or vehicle of the soul consisting of fine matter.

3 See H. Frick, *Vergleichende Religionswissenschaft*, 1928, p. 86. ff.

4 See B 124, I, p. 582.

second century of our era and many others, but also an erudite psychology.¹ Because of their great pluriformity it is hardly possible to summarise all these doctrines here. They had a counterpart in the many different movements and ideas of Hinduism, with which they were involved in lively polemics. To a very great extent, however, they both took very much the same position. I must nonetheless point out one important point of difference with Indian thinking in the narrower sense—Buddhism put forward the doctrine not of *ātman*, but of *nātta*, thus denying the substantiality of the soul and the existence of a lasting spiritual monad, but affirming that a “migration” took place by which one life was connected to a previous life.²

I cannot unfortunately discuss the non-philosophical aspects of Indian thought here—many Sanskrit writings are concerned with such aspects, including, for example, medicine. I should also like to point, in passing, to the detailed code of law of Manu, which must have originated, in the form that is known to us, round about the beginning of the Christian era.

Finally, the question arises as to whether there are any points of relationship between the thought of India and that of the West, especially Greece. We must, of course, make a distinction here between inner affinity and influences of any kind in either direction. Very many writers have pointed to an inner affinity, including, for example, Deussen³ in the early part of this century and later Radhakrishnan,⁴ both of whom have drawn parallels between the ideas and systems of India and the West. There is also a striking similarity between Indian thought and that of various Western schools, such as the Pythagorean and the neo-Platonic schools, in the more strictly religious sense, concerning, for example, metempsychosis and liberation from being born on earth. This similarity was noticed even by writers in antiquity.⁵ It would, however, take us too far to attempt to calculate here the extent to which it has to be regarded either as possible or probable or as undemonstrable or improbable that there was any effective influence in such cases.⁶

1 See, for example, Mrs Rhys Davids, *The Birth of Indian Psychology and its Development in Buddhism*, 1936, B 186.

2 See B 52, p. 85, 91; B 178, p. 39.

3 *Vedanta und Platonismus im Lichte der Kantischen Philosophie*, 1917; see, also B 28, I, pp. 1-3 etc.

4 B 124 *passim*.

5 See B 53, p. 433.

6 Anyone interested in this question should consult B 53, p. 427 ff; B 124, I, p. 23 ff.

29. THE VEDIC PERIOD (1)

This was, for India, the period which was characterised by primitive thought, a period during which, as far as we know, there was no other, more abstract and developed thought which contrasted with this primitive thinking. One thing, however, is quite certain—it is very difficult to ascertain what the Vedic Indians really thought.¹ We are therefore forced to depend either on assumptions, such as what ideas must have been at the basis of certain rituals, or on the earliest writings. The more abstract and systematic writings become, however, the less they express the mind of primitive man in any given civilisation. Thus the Upaniṣads, and especially the later Upaniṣads, cannot simply be called really primitive writings, even though they are included among the Vedas, admittedly as the end of the Vedas.² If we wish to consider the primitive period proper in Indian thought, we shall have to draw a line somewhere through the Vedic period, which is regarded as having lasted, as a whole, from approximately 1500 until 500 B. C.³ The earliest Upaniṣads, which date back to about 800 B.C.,⁴ thus seem to belong to this primitive period, whereas those of the middle period and the most recent Upaniṣads do not. This division is, however, more or less arbitrary and uncertain. It is arbitrary because “primitive” elements recur again and again even in later thought in India⁵ and it is uncertain because so little is known with absolute certainty about the real age of all these writings.

All the manuals on Indian thought include a study of the Vedic period.⁶ Here, of course, what concerns us especially is what was thought at that period about the soul. The Swedish scholar, Ernst Arbman, who was professor in the history of comparative religion at Stockholm, wrote a study of the primitive idea of the soul with special reference to ancient India which is extremely useful in this context.⁷

Gonda, for his part, has provided the following summary: “In the R̥gveda and the Atharvaveda, we find widespread belief in an aeriform

1 See above, p. 69.

2 See above, p. 153.

3 See above, p. 153.

4 See B 53, p. 457.

5 See below, section 31.

6 See, for example, B 58, p. 9 ff; B 53, p. 25 ff; B 52, p. 9 ff; B 124, I, p. 63 ff B 185, I, p. 10 ff.

7 In *Le Monde oriental*: I (“Untersuchungen zur primitiven Seelenvorstellung mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Indien”) in 1926; II (Altindischer Seelenglaube, sein Ursprung und seine Entwicklung”) in 1927; see B 187.

or shadowy "being" which leaves the body, temporarily in sleep or in unconsciousness, permanently at death, and which survives the burning of the body and leads its own existence, at least for a short time". He also went on to say that the word "being" is less correct, because the texts provide more than one potentiality, more than one aspect of what the term "being" is thought to denote. It would therefore appear that *asu* referred to the vital and physical aspect, whereas *manas* (which may be rendered as "consciousness") denoted the potency of willing, feeling and so on which was "represented as of fine substance". The loss of this "small, flying *manas*, which lives in the heart" led to death. This *manas* also guided man's psychical functions, as a good charioteer guides his horses.¹

The reader will, of course, be reminded here of what I have already said about hylic pluralism among primitive peoples in an earlier section of this part of the book, namely that this soul-being is aeriform—a kind of breath-soul²—and shadowy.³ It continues to exist after death, at least for some time—it is therefore not immortal in itself.⁴ It can also leave the body temporarily—in other words, it can make an "excursion" and return afterwards.⁵ The "vital and physical" aspect resembles what I have called the physiological *pneuma*⁶ and this is distinguished from the *manas* of consciousness which flies, in other words, that which makes an excursion—the free soul, psyche or "external" soul, that is, the psychological *pneuma*.⁷ It is also small.⁸ *Manas* guides the psychical functions like a good charioteer—in this aspect, we meet the vehicle theme.⁹ Both potencies are moreover "of fine substance". Fine materiality or hylic pluralism in a certain, simple form is therefore present in primitive Indian thought, as in the thought of primitive peoples today.¹⁰

This might be regarded as sufficient proof of the occurrence of hylic pluralism in general in primitive Indian thought. I shall not, however, confine myself simply to this, but would like to verify a number of aspects of the question by going into a few further details.

1 B 58, p. 41.

2 See above p. 72, 77-79.

3 See above p. 80-81.

4 See above p. 27.

5 See above p. 78.

6 See above, p. p. 22 ff 99, 147.

7 See above, p. p. 25, ff, 99, 147.

8 See above p. 81.

9 See above, p. 130 ff.

10 See above, p. 100-101.

Arbman was also of the opinion that "the disembodied soul was represented, in India as well, as an etheric, aerial and, as a rule, naturally invisible being".¹ The deceased became "aeriform", in other words, it became air or *vāyubhūta*.² He also went on to say that, in this, the idea of the breath-soul, which escapes at death through the mouth, is here met with again. This was, however, very much more than the "last breath", even though there were also indications of "breath" at the basis of various concepts of the potencies of the soul.³ Once more, we can observe, here too, a grateful use of words for breath and air in order to indicate the etheric soul-being, probably because the air in our ordinary world is already relatively subtle.⁴ Several cases of this can be quoted in Indian thought. The word used in the Ṛgveda for the soul—*asu*—means "vital breath"⁵ or "life-breath".⁶ The term *prāna*, which remained very important even later, originally meant simply "breath".⁷ Presumably, the same can also be said of *ātman*.⁸ This last word constitutes a remarkable case. At a later stage, *ātman* and *puruṣa* became the characteristic terms for the immaterial individual spirit, as conceived in various systems. For this reason, among others, the *ātman* problem has sometimes been called the essential problem of Indian philosophy.⁹ In this, however, *ātman* was certainly no longer regarded as something of fine matter, although, in the earlier phase of Indian thought with which we are now dealing, *ātman* was still used very much in its original sense and meant little more than breath or *prāna*.¹⁰ At an even later stage, it denoted the whole person, including the body.¹¹ The term *prāna* also passed through a whole process of development, although the direction in which it moved was not so spiritualistic.¹² With the passage of time, it ceased to mean "ordinary

1 B 187, II, p. 105.

2 *ibid.*, I, p. 195; II, p. 68.

3 *ibid.*, I, p. 196. In other words, the concept of the "breath-soul" in primitive India (see also B1, p. 5 ff) forms a kind of transition between an immediate body-soul and a psyche which exists on its own, as we have seen above p. 78.

4 See above p. 19-20.

5 B 185, I, p. 26.

6 B 187, II, p. 14; B 1, p. 7.

7 B 187, II, p. 3.

8 B 90, p. 257. See also R. Garbe, *Die Samkhya-Philosophie*, 2nd edition, 1917, p. 355.

9 B 52, p. 61 ff.

10 See B 187, II, p. 9.

11 See B 52, p. 45 ff; B 58, p. 42.

12 In the word "spiritualistic", on the other hand, the immaterial meaning in *spiritus* or "spirit" gained the upper hand (see Part I, 5), as in *ātman*.

breath", but, although other meanings also occurred, it continued to remain, so to speak, at a level which was only a little higher than that of breath, in other words, it stayed at the level of the *spiritus animales et vitales*, the "animal spirits".¹ Writing about the *prānas*, Radhakrishnan called them "vital spirits"² and Abegg called them "animal spirits" (*Lebensgeister*).³ The word has also been translated as "vital airs" and "life-breaths". Echoing Macdonell, Dasgupta has observed that a distinction must be made between *prana* in the narrower sense, in which the word indicates one of the "vital airs" (the others being known as *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna* and *samāna*) and *prāna* in the wider sense, in which the term is used to denote "biomotor force, energy or vitality".⁴ It is also my impression that the word *prāna* came to mean predominantly vitality, in other words, something that is one step higher than the ordinary body of coarse matter, but which remained very close to the body. In other words, it came to mean what I have called the physiological *pneuma*. This is also the level at which it has been assumed in the West that the "animal spirits" or *spiritus vitales* functioned. It therefore seems to me that the Western concept of animal spirits and the Indian notion of *prānas* (or *prāna*) are very similar.

In this context, it is also interesting to note the ancient Indian idea of what happened when the soul temporarily left the body, in other words, when it made an excursion. According to the early Vedic writers, the fires of the *prāna* watched over the city of the body when this took place,⁵ in other words, a distinction was made between the wandering soul (the psychological *pneuma*) and the "animal spirits" (the physiological *pneuma*), which preserved a close link with the coarse body. This distinction is similar to the one made by Lavater between the "animal and life-spirits" and "Bonnet's ethereal machine", to which I referred above on p. 26.

Arbman was also aware of these two levels and said that the ancient Indians distinguished between the functional "body-soul" and the wandering "psyche-soul", the soul after death. The first, *prāna*, had only a "very ephemeral" existence after death and then perished. The

1 See above, pp. 22 ff. 147.

2 B 124, I, p. 254.

3 B 1, p. 19.

4 B 185, II, p. 259.

5 *Praṇa Upaniṣad* IV, 1 ff; see B 187, II, p. 83; B 1, p. 20; Deussen, *Sechzig Upanishads des Veda*, 1921, p. 566-7; B 28, I, p. 248 ff.

second did not perish, but was reincarnated.¹ This is clearly the same distinction as the one which, as we have seen earlier in Part II of the present work, ethnologists have, generally speaking, made between the "body-soul" and the "external soul", which amounts to the distinction which I have made between the physiological *pneuma* and the psychological *pneuma*.²

We cannot, of course, here go into all the similarities between primitive thought in India and primitive thought elsewhere, which Arbman and others believed could be established. I should, however, like simply to mention the following. The idea that someone who was sleeping should not be roused too quickly also occurred in India.³ A further idea found in India as well is that physiological *pneuma* was assimilated at the same time as food.⁴ Arbman (II, p. 158) equated *manas* in the Vedic period with Homer's *thumos* and also made a comparison with the concepts of *tanoana* (II, p. 147) and *tondi* (II, p. 63) which I discussed earlier in Part II of this work. Gonda has also observed that a powerful effect proceeded from the blood, the bearer of the life-force *par excellence*.⁵ The image of the bird was also used in India.⁶ As we have already seen,⁷ the being making an excursion was also called "shadowy" in India.⁸

I should, however, also like to say a little more here about the theme of the *form* of the soul.⁹ It is said again and again in the early Indian writings that the soul is *very small* and *in the shape of a man*. The bearer of the personality, the *puruṣa*—which literally means "mannikin"¹⁰—is, according to von Glasenapp, certainly not a "simple, immaterial spiritual monad", in other words, the soul as conceived according to the anthropological dualism that is prevalent in the West, but rather "a 'man within the man', as big as a thumb, living in the heart and finer

1 B 187, II, p. 12-13, 96 ff; see also above, p. 24-25. In this respect, Arbman does not agree with those scholars who believe that the doctrine of metempsychosis was not known in the earliest period, but only later. Even though no written evidence has come down to us, he claims, there must have been an elementary belief in metempsychosis, closely connected with the concept of the wandering psyche.

2 See above, p. 99.

3 B 1, p. 18; B 187, II, p. 86; see also above 125.

4 Chand. Up., 6, 5; see Deussen, *Sechzig Upanishads des Veda*, op. cit., p. 462 n.; Part II, p. 114.

5 De Vedische Godsdienst, p. 38; see also above p. 71.

6 See, for example, B 1, p. 8, 17.

7 See above, p. 160.

8 See above, p. p. 80-81 ff

9 See above p. 81.

10 B 1, p. 7 and 49.

than the body . . . thought of as something of subtle substance".¹ It is, according to Abegg, "an inch high—*angūṣṭhamātra*".² It is mentioned, for example, in the Katha Upaniṣad, IV, 12 :

As big as a thumb here in the body
lives the *puruṣa*.³

It is also mentioned again later in the same Upaniṣad, VI, 16 f, in the translation by Mrs. Rhys Davids :

Man of thumb-measure is the self within,
Sitter in heart of creatures shrined :
Him from one's own body should one draw,
Firmly like pith from reed.⁴

Further references to the *puruṣa* will also be found in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, VI, 38 and in the Maitrayāna Upaniṣad, VI, 38.

Arbman discussed it in rather more detail,⁵ saying that the idea of the soul as a *miniature being* occurred frequently. Sometimes it is as big as a thumb in size, sometimes smaller —no bigger than a grain of rice or the "point of an awl". Sometimes it is thought of as the little image of a man in the pupil of the eye. Arbman also drew comparisons with ideas of the soul occurring elsewhere—with the *psyche* of the Greeks, "a little winged human being" and with the medieval idea of "a little child dressed in a linen cloth". The idea of the soul that was prevalent among the Indians was also linked with their idea of what happened at conception and birth.⁶ Heroes were also thought of as "little soul beings". What is interesting is that Arbman saw an essential continuity, even an identity, between this little, fine body in human form and the later idea of the *linga-śarīra* or fine body. (I shall have more to say about this "fine body" later). Arbman maintained that the "*psyche* as big as a thumb" and this *linga-śarīra* were "identical things in the mind of the educated Hindu".⁷ I should, finally, like to point, in this context, to a passage in the well-known legend of Śāvitṛī, which occurs in the Vana-Parva, a part of the Mahābhārata. This version is of a later date than the Vedic writings, but the idea is the same. Yama, the god

1 B 53, p. 42; see also p. 391.

2 B 1, p. 7, note 7.

3 Deussen, *Sechzig Upanishads*, op. cit., p. 281.

4 B 186, p. 57; see also Deussen, *Sechzig Upanishads* op. cit., p. 287.

5 B 187, II, pp. 105-127.

6 Dasgupta (B 185, II, p. 305) has a section on "The Foetus and the Subtle Body" in which he says that this subtle body (which is furthermore a concept belonging to a period later than the Vedic period) is, according to a certain writing, "no bigger than a thumb".

7 B 187, II, p. 127.

of death, comes to take Sāvitrī's husband and draws "a person of the measure of the thumb" out of his body.¹

The idea of the *homunculus* or thumbing as the form of the soul thus occurred frequently in ancient India. According to von Glase-napp, this man within the man was regarded as "of subtle substance".² What survived the burning of the body³ was not thought of as a purely spiritual substance, but as something quite different—von Glase-napp, for example, entitled a chapter of his book "Life after Death. 1. The Corporeal Resurrection in the World of Heaven".⁴ This is reminiscent of what we ascertained earlier in Part II of this work (pp. 129-130) in connection with the Kelts, namely that these people could not regard man's continued existence after death as anything other than a continuation of this earthly existence, with a body and so on.⁵ In the same way, Arbman also affirmed, with regard to the Indians, that, according to the R̥gveda, the dead person was united with his body, which was purified and "transfigured" by cremation.⁶ In that case, the explicit conclusion that must be drawn is that this divergent materiality was therefore thought to be of finer matter. This is why von Glase-napp, even though he did not go into the question in detail here, described the thumbing as "of fine substance". And the same conclusion that we came to earlier in Part II (p. 103) must also be drawn here—namely that primitive man regarded the *form* under which he imagined the soul to be as of fine matter.

30. THE VEDIC PERIOD (2)

It will be clear from what I have said in the preceding section, not only in my summary of Gonda's affirmation that belief in an aeriform or shadowy being was generally widespread in the Vedas and that the potencies of the consciousness were regarded as "of fine substance" but also in my discussion of these views in a number of details that hylic pluralism or the idea of fine materiality was certainly not alien to the primitive Indians. To what extent did they hold this view,

1 Mahabharata II, Adh. 296 (edn. Calcutta, 1889, p. 875); see B1, p. 7.

2 B 53, p. 42; see also above, p. 164.

3 See B 58, p. 41; see also above p. 160.

4 B 52, p. 25.

5 See above, p. 129-130

6 B 187, II, p. 74.

however? Was it clearly defined? Did they hold any other view which contrasted with it? Did they also accept anything immaterial? This was certainly so in the case of Indian thought of a later period. Did this not occur to a very much less degree in this earlier period or did it not even occur at all then? An answer to this question will also include an answer to the question as to what metaphysical standpoint the primitive Indians (either consciously or unconsciously) took.

Earlier in Part II of this work (p. 83 ff.), we have seen that, according to the ethnologists, the dualism which is customarily accepted in the West as existing between the soul and the body did not exist in the minds of primitive peoples. It is furthermore obvious that no clear distinction was made in Indian thought between the psychical and the physical and, what is more, that this absence of anthropological dualism even continued for a long time in Indian thought. I should like now to substantiate this affirmation in more detail.

I have already quoted a passage in von Glasenapp's work, in which the author said that the *puruṣa* was not regarded in the early Indian writings as a "simple, immaterial spiritual monad", but rather as a "man within the man", of miniature size (thus of a certain spatial extent!) and "of subtle substance".¹ Elsewhere, this scholar affirmed the same thing, but added several details—"A fundamental contrast between spirit and matter . . . was not recognised in the earlier Upaniṣads";² "the idea of an immaterial spirit was alien to the Vedic period. The individual functions were thought of as potencies of fine substance";³ in the earliest speculations of the Indians, "no clear and fundamental distinctions were made between the living and the lifeless, between the spiritual and the material, between the abstract and the concrete or between substances and qualities".⁴ This is noticeable in the earliest philosophy both of India and of ancient Greece. All that can be observed is "a gradual, not a general distinction" between the living and the lifeless and the spiritual and the material, the first being simply finer than the second.⁵ Von Glasenapp made exactly the same point in an earlier work, but discussed it in greater detail: "Vedic man believed that he was surrounded by a fullness of beings resembling him. He did not therefore make a clear distinction between spirit and matter,

1 B 53, pp. 42, 391; see also above, p. 282.

2 *op. cit.*, p. 42; see also p. 126.

3 *op. cit.*, p. 388.

4 *op. cit.*, p. 440.

5 *op. cit.*, p. 443.

between what was living and what was not living or between substances and qualities, states or processes which were obvious in these".¹ Whether they were substances or qualities, all these potencies—or, as von Glasenapp called them, "powers of being" or *Daseinsmächte*—had, according to the Vedas, an "independent reality". Von Glasenapp also provided a full list of these powers of being under ten headings. Both psychical and physical potencies and spiritual and non-spiritual potencies appear side by side on this list and they are clearly all on the same level. Whether they had to do with the present, the past or the future and whether they applied to limbs, smell or hearing, sleep, anger, happiness, death or proximity, these powers of being were represented as things and occurred sometimes as impersonal fluids and sometimes as beings endowed with reason.² In this, they also seem to have been rather intermingled.

Other authors are apparently in agreement with this rendering of the Vedic ideas. Abegg has written that, however difficult it may be for us to understand, "no sharp dividing line is drawn between the physical and the psychical" in Indian thought.³ Gonda noted that "with every quality there is a corresponding subtle quantity, the effect of which we explain as quality" and that "the same processes have a psychical and a physical aspect".⁴

This seems to me to be quite a clear proof of the fact that a lack of any sharp distinction between the psychical and the physical characterised the earliest period of Indian thought just as much as it characterised the thought both of the primitive peoples⁵ and of several ancient, more or less primitive civilisations, such as ancient Egypt,⁶ Assyria and Babylonia⁷ and the Kelts and Teutons.⁸ Anthropological dualism did not occur in ancient India.

We can therefore go a step further and try to answer the question (if it can be answered without other possibilities): towards which metaphysical standpoint did the primitive Indian incline? He certainly did not incline towards either the epsilon standpoint, that is, anthropological dualism, or the delta standpoint, according to which a clear

1 B 52, p. 9.

2 *op. cit.*, pp. 287-289.

3 B 1, p. 55.

4 B 58, p. 142.

5 See above, p. 83.

6 See above, p. 108.

7 See above, P. 118.

8 See above, p. 130.

distinction is made between the immaterial being and its vehicle of fine matter. We do not, moreover, encounter the alpha standpoint or monistic materialism here—the primitive Indian believed that something survived the burning of the ordinary body¹ and that what survived in this way was “of subtle substance” or of fine matter.² He did not think of matter as monistic, that is, as being only of one species. It is therefore evident that the *beta standpoint*, dualistic materialism, is completely in accordance with the feelings of the primitive Indian as it was with those of other primitive peoples and those of the more or less primitive civilisations already referred to. To this extent, then, the earliest Indian texts clearly occupy a hylic pluralistic standpoint. It is, however, still possible to hesitate between the beta and the gamma standpoints. The gamma standpoint is that which regards the whole world as consisting of matter (of differing degrees of fineness), but which also accepts an immaterial deity. It would, however, lead us too far if we were to try to find out here where ideas which point in the direction of the gamma standpoint occur in the earliest writings of India, that is, in which of the Upaniṣads they occur and whether or not they are used by, for example, Yājñavalkya.

31. THE TRANSITION FROM PRIMITIVE TO LATER INDIAN THOUGHT

What concerns us more here is the question as to which form the idea of fine materiality assumed later in Indian thought or to what extent the primitive idea of fine matter continued to exist. Several remarkable statements about this question are to be found in the works that have been written about this subject. As I have already said,³ Arbman regarded the notion of the psyche of the size of a thumb which was held during the Vedic period and the later idea of a subtle body or *linga-śarīra* as continuous. He believed, in other words, that the first notion merged into the second.⁴ What did Arbman call the section in question of his study? He called it “*Psyche and Linga-śarīra. Primitive Characteristics in the Post-Vedic Philosophy*”.⁵ This part

1 See above, p. 165.

2 See above, p. 160, 164.

3 See above, p. 165.

4 B 187, II, p. 127.

5 *op. cit.*, II, p. 121.

of Arbman's work certainly contains a point of view which we shall have to take into account here. As we shall see later in greater detail, the classical Indian philosophy includes, both in the system or *darśana* known as Sāṅkhya and in the other system known as Vedānta, an explicit teaching about a body of fine matter, usually called in the first case *linga-śarīra* and in the second *sūkṣma-śarīra*. Here, therefore, it is not the more vague form of hylic pluralism or fine materiality which occurs elsewhere at the initial stages of thought in a given civilisation that is met with, but rather the explicit concept of a body of fine matter or *ochēma*. This doctrine is, however, simply primitive, according to Arbman. In addition, he is also of the view that a process of spiritualisation has undoubtedly taken place. Whereas the idea of immateriality cannot really be found in the earliest Vedic thought,² immaterial factors were gradually introduced into the concept of the soul, among others, by Yājñavalkya.³ This process reached a considerable peak both in the Sāṅkhya and in the Vedānta. The Sāṅkhya teaches that there is a plurality of purely spiritual monads or *puruṣas* and that these individual monads are extraordinarily sharply distinguished from nature or primordial matter (*prakṛiti*), which is opposed to the *puruṣas*. Unlike the Sāṅkhya, the Vedānta teaches, that not a plurality of souls, but the existence of the one, similarly purely spiritual *Brahman* with which one can see, as soon as one is no longer blinded by *māyā* or illusion, that the individual soul or *ātman* is basically one. Arbman wrote in this connection about a "process of peeling off" everything that was not spiritual was, in these two *darśanas*, so to speak, peeled off—and he added that this "spiritualisation" went further here than it has "hardly" ever done "in the West".⁴ Nonetheless, these doctrines about *linga-śarīra* and *sūkṣma-śarīra* in the two *darśanas* should not have formed, for example, the necessary opposites or counterparts of the purely spiritual idea of the individual, but should, on the contrary, have been based on the remaining primitive characteristics in the post-Vedic philosophy. I shall return to the first assumption when I discuss both these systems in greater detail.

In this context, however, a theory of von Glasenapp, which he elaborated in his earlier work, *Entwicklungsstufen des Indischen Denkens*

1 See above, pp. 11, 101.

2 See above, p. 265 ff.

3 See B 52, p. 49.

4 B 187, II, p. 121-130; see also p. 81.

("The Stages of Development in Indian Thought"),¹ is particularly interesting.

Von Glasenapp's title and his argument in this book make one inclined to wonder—what does he mean by development in Indian thought? In his later book, *Die Philosophie der Inder*, he put forward a view which was, at least at first sight, in contradiction with this idea of development. As I have already observed, citing his later book,² von Glasenapp was of the opinion that Indian thinkers had little understanding of the meaning of history and that, as far as Indian philosophy was concerned, it was far less possible to speak of stages in the development of thought, leading ultimately to a culminating point. Indian thinking was, so to speak, orientated towards the past, von Glasenapp maintained—it looked back towards the authority of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads.³ Yet this same author, in his earlier publication, dealt precisely with the stages of development in Indian thought! The probable solution to this contradiction is that, although Indian thought—and especially the philosophy contained in the *āstika* systems, which continued to be the subject of discussion⁴—was firmly orientated towards its beginning and consequently did not undergo a process of startling development, it did all the same pass through some development.

The development which can be ascertained and which von Glasenapp discussed in his earlier publication is that Indian thinking passed from a phase in which there was not any, or hardly any, place for the concept of the immaterial to a stage in which this concept was explicitly formulated and emphatically adhered to. In other words, there was a development from indifferentism towards the distinction between the spiritual and the nonspiritual and between the psychical and the physical to an attitude in which justice was at last done to the immaterial. What took place, then, was an increasing *spiritualisation* and this process of development was accompanied by the problems that are always bound up with it.

We may, of course, ask ourselves whether this development was analogous to the development which took place in Greek thinking and which has been described by, among others, Verbeke, in his *L'Évolution de la doctrine du pneuma du Stoïcisme jusqu'à S. Augustin*.⁵ Since we

1 B 52, 1940.

2 See above, p. 153.

3 B 53, 1947, pp. 16-19.

4 See above, p. 151 ff.

5 B 174; see also above, p. 66.

have not yet considered the problem that Verbeke has posed and the whole question of Greek philosophy, however, we cannot easily give an answer to this question here. But something of this kind also clearly happened in the case of Indian thought and a certain parallelism is evident. In any case, a period during which no explicit distinction was made between the spiritual and the material was followed in both cases by another period in which the purely spiritual, the immaterial was recognised as such.

I do not intend to investigate the various aspects of this process of spiritualisation here, but simply wish to mention the following point. In some of the Upaniṣads, the idea of a spiritual essence which manifests itself in matter is developed.¹ In connection with this, the concept of *ātman* acquired a different function and meaning—from having a function which was co-ordinated with the natural potencies, it acquired a special and guiding function,² to which the later, radical spiritualisation could become joined. Furthermore, Jainism also taught, at quite an early date, the existence of immaterial spiritual monads.³ A lengthy discussion of these details would, however, take us too far. What is more, although it may be possible to establish, on the one hand, that a certain system of thought shows certain differences from an earlier conglomeration of ideas, it may not be possible, on the other hand, to show, in very many cases, the link between the two or to prove that the one was derived from the other.

I do, however, feel obliged to consider here a theory which von Glasenapp put forward in connection with this problem in his earlier publication on the "stages of development in Indian thought". What I have in mind here is his theory of the potencies or "powers of being" which, according to Vedic thinking—however heterogeneous the list which von Glasenapp provides may make them seem to be⁴—all possessed an "independent reality" in which no distinction was made between substance and quality or between the psychical and the physical. Von Glasenapp gave an important place in his book to this theory and, according to Abegg, he "demonstrated for the first time in a far-reaching way how this idea continued to have an effect through the whole of the later development of Indian thought".⁵

1 See B 52, p. 49.

2 B 52, p. 48 ff; see also above, p. 161.

3 B 52, pp. 55, 58; see also B 53, p. 443.

4 B 52, pp. 239–290; see also Gonda, B 58, p. 9 ff and 25.

5 B 1, p. 55, note 21.

What we have here is the fact that qualities—like states and events—are regarded as independent realities in Indian thought. What we regard as abstract qualities—for example, a season of the year, hearing, jealousy, birth and so on—were regarded by the Indian as separate beings, on the one hand as impersonal substances or fluids and on the other as beings endowed with reason.¹ This is a way of looking at things which is certainly alien to modern man. Von Glasenapp pointed out that a similar view occurred, for example, in ancient Persia² and also in ancient Greece, among the Stoics, who also displayed an interestingly “material view of existence” which made it seem to them that the soul and even God were bodies.³ They also said that man was musical because he had the matter of music in him. Von Glase-napp saw parallels with Indian thought here and said that something similar still persisted “even in the most advanced systems” in the West, giving as an example the continued effect of medieval conceptual thought in Hegel.⁴

He did not hesitate either to reject such views simply as a matter of course. He said, for example, of classical Sāṅkhya that “the whole system is ultimately based on the ancient view of independent, materially existing potencies”.⁵ We would also not be very wide of the mark if we were to assume that Arbman had something like this in mind when he called the doctrine of the *linga-śartra* a primitive characteristic in post-Vedic, classical Indian philosophy.⁶

The word “primitive” was, in fact, used here by Arbman in a denigrating sense. I should like, therefore, to discuss this question of appraisal for a moment. Ideas such as those of a finer body or *linga-śartra* or and both hylic pluralism in the more elaborated form of a theory about a body or *ochēma* and hylic pluralistic notions in a simpler form (purely of fine materiality, while all that is immaterial is rejected) are frequently, as here, dismissed as simply “primitive”. Although I do not intend to deal in earnest with the question of the truth of hylic pluralism and with its significance until the last part of this work, it is evident that I cannot ignore this aspect of the study entirely now, all the more so because an appraisal such as that made by von Glasenapp and Arbman, both of whom have, implicitly or explicitly, called hylic

1 B 52, p. 16-17; see also above, p. 167

2 B 52, p.9.

3 B 52, p. 445.

4 *op. cit.*, p. 446.

5 B 52, p. 107; see also B 58, p. 141, about the *gunas*.

6 See above, pp. 169; von Glasenapp, B 52, p. 25, note 2 mentions Arbman, B 187.

pluralism "primitive", is not simply a description and certainly not a considered judgement, but rather a prejudgement.

My intention in writing this work, *Ochēma*, has been to draw attention to a neglected doctrine which nonetheless occurs very frequently—hylic pluralism. This implies, of course, that I am bound to protest against any automatic reasoning on the basis of a standpoint, such as the epsilon standpoint or anthropological dualism, which regards any material aspect of the psychical (any aspect of fine matter) as implausible. It is reasoning on the basis of anthropological dualism which is accepted as a matter of course that calls highly elaborated and abstract philosophical systems such as the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta primitive, simply because and insofar as they contain doctrines about a finer body (*linga* or *sukṣma-śarīra*) of the soul.

Granted a readiness to refrain from reasoning of this kind, the next step is to ask whether a somewhat different light is not in this way thrown on primitive ideas in the purely neutral chronological sense, in this case those of the Vedic Indians.

In arguing thus, I am certainly not claiming to defend all the views of chronologically primitive Indian thought—there can be no doubt that it contained much that was strange and insufficiently thought out. Abstraction and logical classification, for example, was clearly not something at which the early Indian thinkers excelled. No doubt here are many elements contained in their thought which are now beyond our understanding, but it cannot be denied that this thought was also immature.

When, however, von Glasenapp wrote that we have only to look at medieval conceptualism, elements of which are to be found even in Hegel's thought, to establish how untenable such "archaic" ideas are,¹ then one is bound to be aware of how many fundamental philosophical problems are involved here. To raise another, related question—William Stern (d. 1938) taught in his *Person und Sache* a "psycho-physical neutrality". By this, he meant that the antithesis between *psyche* and *physis* had to be replaced by an antithesis between persons (taken in the widest sense of the word) and things and that these two did not belong to two quite separate spheres—it was far more a question of two ways of looking at the same realities.² Stern's theory is obviously to some extent similar to the doctrine of the different potencies or "powers of being" of the Vedic Indians, which were some-

1 This is the implication of the passage concerned in B 53, p. 446.

2 See B 173, pp. 612-613.

times thought to be impersonal substances and at others regarded as beings endowed with reason.¹ Should we, then, simply call Stern's philosophy primitive or should we just reject his standpoint because it contains analogies with archaic views ?

Once again, then, I must stress that I do not wish to defend the whole of primitive, in other words, initial Indian thought. With regard to one definite consequence of this early thought—the doctrine of the subtle *śarīra* (which was, according to Arbman, connected with the teaching of the “*psyche* as big as a thumb”)—I do, however, emphatically deny that this doctrine ought to be rejected as primitive or as anything else simply because it may possibly be connected in this way with the teaching that Arbman suggested. It is clear that this attempt to stigmatise this doctrine is untenable because the doctrine was *accompanied* in later Indian thought by an immaterialism which went so far that “hardly any” counterpart of it can, according to Arbman himself, be found in the West. What is more, this also occurred in neo-Platonism—a doctrine about the immaterial spirit (the model for related doctrines in Christianity!) on the one hand and a doctrine about a subtle *ochēma* on the other. It would not be right, on the basis of anthropological dualism, either to overlook this second doctrine of the *ochēma* or to brand it as a primitive survival.

There was, however, naturally a certain development or progress in Indian thought and this is clearly discernible if the classical Indian systems are compared with the Vedic ideas. Primitive Indian thought did not, after all, even know the concept of the immaterial. It was therefore not even capable of formulating a doctrine such as that of the delta standpoint, according to which an immaterial soul or spirit is accompanied by a covering or vehicle of fine matter. To this extent, it is certainly possible to speak of “stages of development”.

Although I have not discussed all kinds of writings and doctrines in great detail, I hope that I have made a number of fundamental points of view which are appropriate in the transition from primitive to later Indian thought clear.

32. THE UPANIṢADS

I must now say a little more about one particular literary genre, that is, the Upaniṣads, and what I shall have to say in this section will, of

1 B 52, pp. 16-17; see also above. p. 167, 172.

course, refer especially to hylic pluralism. The Upaniṣads are texts at the end of the Vedas. There are many of them, but they are often quite short. Deussen, for example, published sixty of the most important Upaniṣads in one book. They were written at different times and it is not easy to establish their dates.¹

In the preceding section, we saw that it is possible to detect in several of the Upaniṣads an incipient spiritualisation, the emergence of the concept of the immaterial. What is the position here with regard to hylic pluralism? Does this occur in these writings only in the form of fine materiality in general, that is, vaguely? This form is in any case characteristic of this thought, in which no fundamental distinction was made between spirit and matter.² On the other hand, however, the possibility of excursion is accepted³ and even the possibility of the soul making this excursion in a very small shape, in which case it is extremely probable that this "mannikin" was thought of as being of fine matter.⁴

Now, however, we come across another and more sharply defined variation of hylic pluralism, that is, the doctrine of a body of fine matter as a vehicle or *ochēma* of the soul. This idea occurred very frequently, as *linga-śarīra* and *sūkṣma-śarīra*, in later Indian thought. We shall also see that the same happened in the case of Greek thought—the idea of fine materiality in general existed to begin with and it was not until later that the idea of a body or *ochēma* of fine matter developed.⁵ Is it, then, possible to discover at least a vestige of this second concept in the earlier Indian writings, the Upaniṣads or perhaps in some of them? Does the more precise definition of the subtle body occur at all in them?

Various specialists in the field of Indian philosophy have expressed views on this question. Mrs. Rhys Davids summarised her ideas as follows: "Teaching in the Upaniṣads is vague and vacillating about this dual body".⁶ Other authors have said that, if *linga* (or "mark", "characteristic") does occur in various places, it does not mean *linga-śarīra*. Those who held this view were, with regard to the Brh. Up. IV, 4, 5-8, Deussen,⁷ Garbe⁸ and Oltramare, who believed that it *almost*

1 See above, p. 154.

2 See B 53, p. 42; see also above, p. 167.

3 See above p. 162, 163t Up. 3, 10 and other places.

4 See above, pp. 163-164; 166.

5 See above, p. 168-169.

6 B 186, p. 329.

7 B 28, I, p. 254.

8 *Die Samikya-Philosophie*, p. 29.

meant *linga-śarīra*.¹ Radhakrishnan has said that, according to various Upaniṣads, the soul gathered the "vital spirits" (*prāṇa*) at death and took them to another body in which they were reincarnated. "This view is developed in the later doctrines into the conception of a *linga-śarīra*".² Von Glasenapp's view can be summarised as follows. Indian commentators wanted to insert the idea of a "spiritual monad surrounded by fine matter" in such places, but no distinction was made in the earliest Upaniṣads between spirit and matter, "the itinerant being" having been regarded as "a psycho-physical entity".³ All this is, however, only a "preliminary stage" of the later doctrine of the orthodox Vedānta, according to which the soul left the ordinary body clothed with a *linga-śarīra*, even though it is not entirely out of the question that the *linga-śarīra* was given this name as a result of the passage in the Brh. Up. which refers to a caterpillar which sways from one leaf to another and in which *linga* also occurs.⁴

Thus the experts agree that there are early indications in the Upaniṣads of the later doctrine, but that a certain caution is needed with regard to the acceptance of the existence in these early writings of a fully worked out doctrine, that is, a doctrine which defines a body or *ochēma*, of what I have called hylic pluralism.

There do, however, seem to be a few exceptions to this rule. In writing about the occurrence of the term *linga* in the Maitreyana Up. 6, 10, Deussen translated this simply as "fine body" and observed that this fine body also occurred in this literature as *bhūtātman*, that is, the material or natural *ātman*.⁵ Deussen has, however, often been criticised for reading more into the texts than they strictly speaking contain.⁶ What is more, he also gave particularly close attention to those places in several of the earliest Upaniṣads where a vestige of the later doctrine of the fine body could be perceived.⁷

We must, however, turn now to consider another important place—that is, the Taittiriya Upaniṣads, 2. Abegg⁸ had this to say about this text: "Here . . . an attempt is made to classify, according to levels, the capacities of the soul as revealed in the doctrine of the coverings

1 P. Oltramare, *La théosophie brahmanique*, p. 246.

2 B 124, p. 254.

3 B 52, p. 40.

4 *op. cit.*, p. 52.

5 *Sechzig Upanishads*, p. 337, n. 2; see also B 28, I, 3, p. 63.

6 See B 58, p. 58.

7 See B 28, I, 2, p. 252-254.

8 B 1, p. 32.

of the soul or *kośas*. The body is the outer covering, which embraces the spiritual being. Beneath this covering is the "life-breathlike" self or *prāṇamaya ātman*, the region of the animal and physical functions. But this also becomes a covering which in turn conceals the intellectual self or *manomaya ātman*. Underneath this layer, the knowing self or *vijñanamaya ātman* is finally reached, which contains the blissful self or *anandamaya ātman*, the consciousness as such". Von Glasenapp also discussed this text and came to the conclusion that there were five different *ātmans* which were "all similarly modes of action of the one *ātman*, coarser and finer layers, as it were, of the same *ātman* which covered each other".¹ Deussen has devoted a section, entitled "Five Different Atmans" (*Fünf verschiedene Atmans*) to this question in his history of philosophy² and has provided the text together with a commentary in his *Sechzig Upanishads*.³ He called this "genealogy of the *ātman*" the "much quoted passage on creation".⁴ In the same work, he has also provided a translation of a later and shorter Upanisad, the *Sarva-upanishat-sara*, in which the same division into five occurs, but in this case with the explicit addition of *kośa* or covering.⁵ Deussen translated the names of these five *ātmans*—*annarasamaya*, *prāṇamaya* and so on—as "consisting of nutritious juice, consisting of life-breath, consisting of *manas* (imagination, will, wish), consisting of knowledge, consisting of bliss".⁶ In an English translation, the five *ātmans* have been translated as "man formed by the juice of food; a self formed by vitality; a self mind formed; a self formed by reason; a self by bliss informed".⁷

I should like to comment on one or two aspects of this passage in the *Taittiriya Upaniṣad*. In the first place, does the distinction really relate to five *ātmans* or to five *kośas*? The text certainly refers to *ātmans* and this is connected with the development of the concept of *ātman* to which I have already referred, that is, the development from purely corporeal man, a thing among things, to *ātman* in an exceptional position as the beginning of spiritualisation.⁸ The first of the five mentioned in the text is the self of coarse matter which coincides with the ordinary

1 B 52, p. 49; see also B 53, p. 153.

2 B 28, I, 2, p. 89-90.

3 p. 228-231.

4 *op. cit.*, p. 225.

5 *op. cit.*, p. 622 f.

6 *op. cit.*, p. 228-230.

7 *The Upanishads*, by G. R. S. Mead and J. C. Chattopadhyaya, London, 1896, II, p. 21-29. See also the Dutch translation of this edition, Amsterdam, 1908, pp 13-15.

8 See above, pp. 161-162, 170.

body. The last of the five approaches the immaterial spiritual monad of the later philosophy.

The term *kośa* or covering is apparently not encountered in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad. If I have understood Deussen correctly, then the word does not occur until the Maitrāyana Upaniṣad, 6, 27, and Deussen links this directly with the above-mentioned passage in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, 2.¹ Arbman has said, moreover, that the doctrine of the *kośas* or coverings of the soul did not occur in the earlier Vedānta or in the writings of Badarāyana or even of Śankara,² but that it did occur explicitly in the Vedāntasāra of Sadānanda.³ On the other hand, there is reference in a history of philosophy to the five "sheaths"—the word *kośa* has often been translated as "sheath"—being present in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad.⁴ With reference to the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, Deussen has also written about "husks or pods (later known as *kośas*)".⁵ The solution to this problem of apparently contradictory statements is probably that the term *kośa* did not become widely used until later, but that the idea itself was so clearly reproduced in the relevant passage in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad that everyone involuntarily made use of it. The idea of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad 2 is namely that each of these five *ātman*s is concealed in the following *ātman*—the *ānandamaya ātman* is concealed in the *viññānamaya ātman* and so on until the outside *ātman*, the *ānnamaya ātman* or ordinary body, which contains the other four, is reached. This is precisely what is said in my first quotation from Abegg's book.⁶ If the term *kośa* itself, then, does not occur in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad 2, the idea of "covering" or of being enclosed certainly does.

This doctrine of the five *ātman*s, then, one of which was later called the *kośa* of the other, certainly goes a long way towards the formation of the concept of bodies or *ochēmata* of soul. To this extent, then, the passage in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad does seem to be in conflict with Mrs. Rhys Davids conclusion, that the Upaniṣads are "vague and vacillating" with regard to the concept of a "dual body" (or *duplex*

1 Sechzig Upanishads, pp. 349-350.

2 B 187, II, p. 130.

3 Deussen has also pointed to this: B 28, I, 3, p. 619.

4 S. Radhakrishnan and others, *History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western* p. 67.

5 B 28, I, 2, p. 89.

6 B I, p. 32; see above, p. 176-177 What Abegg says is that each previous *ātman* is filled by the following *ātman*.

corporalitas).¹ Is it perhaps possible for this conflict to be resolved by claiming that the text concerned is relatively recent? But the Taittiriya Upaniṣad is apparently one of the earliest Upaniṣads.² On the other hand, different parts can be distinguished in this Upaniṣad and, whereas the Taittiriya, a part of the “black” Yājurveda, is generally called disordered, our passage belongs to the part known as Ananda-valli, which is “a completely homogeneous work deriving from the most mature period of Upaniṣad thought”.³ In that case, the truth of the statement that the earlier Upaniṣads had nothing explicit to say about anything other than the ordinary body is in no way diminished.

What is moreover most striking in this passage in the Taittiriya Upaniṣad is that this division into five includes the fundamental concept of a *hylic pluralism*. If the idea of only *one* species of fine materiality had occurred, then it would have sufficed to speak simply of *hylic dualism*. *Hylic pluralism*, however, is wider—it is open to the possibility of several species. We have already seen, for example, that Proclus postulated several *ochēmata* or vehicles of the soul.⁴ In Indian thought too, a similar multiplicity was also taught in quite an ancient text and at a relatively early period.⁵

It is, furthermore, important to consider briefly each of the components of this division into five. The first of the five refers to the ordinary, visible body of coarse matter. The second of the five, the *prāṇamaya ātman* or *kośa*, is usually rendered by “life-breath”, “vitality” and so on. It is clear that we are here concerned with the level of the physiological *pneuma*—the name *prāṇa* itself also makes this to some extent obvious.⁶ We can, however, go even further. The *manomaya ātman* or *kośa*—*manas* meaning “imagination, will, wish”—and the *viñānamaya ātman* or *kośa*—*viñāna* meaning knowledge—we are clearly brought to the level of the psychological *pneuma*. I have, however, bearing in mind my special purpose, decided not to subdivide this psychological *pneuma* any further.⁷ Nonetheless, there is yet another form of *pneuma*—the level and the concept of the sublime *pneuma*.⁸ It is

1 B 186, p. 329; see above, p. 175.

2 See *Sechzig Upanishads*, p. 211 ff.

3 *ibid.*, pp. 211, 224.

4 See above, p. 29.

5 Later authors, such as H. P. Blavatsky, who have advocated a similar pluralism of vehicles, have also appealed to this division into five which appeared as early as the Taittiriya Upaniṣad. See *The Secret Doctrine*, B 14, I, p. 212.

6 See above, p. 162.

7 See above, p. 177.

8 See above, pp. 29, 147.

9 See above, pp. 29 ff, 147.

remarkable that the fifth or highest *ātman* or *kośa*, the "finest covering, is called *ānandamaya*—that of bliss.¹

Finally, it should be pointed out that the idea, the image or the theme of coverings or *garments* of the soul is in principle contained in this doctrine of sheaths or coverings. The neo-Platonists, and in particular Proclus, referred explicitly to the *chitōnes*, the tunics or garments of the soul.² The same kind of pluralism is met with there as in the Indian doctrine of the *kośas*. The image of the garments of the soul is, however, one which is frequently encountered elsewhere.³

In conclusion, it is possible to say that, even if it may in general be true to say that fine materiality is not explicitly defined in terms of a subtle *body* in the Upaniṣads, there are several clear indications in the Upaniṣads of an incipient movement in this direction. A striking example of this is the Taittiriya Upaniṣad 2, which distinguishes coverings at various levels. On the other hand, there is also the theme of the "mannikin", which, as we have seen in section 29, occurs frequently in the Upaniṣads and which is another way of approaching the problem. This "mannikin" was very probably thought of as of fine matter⁴ and, as a shape, it certainly already had the form of a body. Arbman had good reason for believing that there was a continuity between the idea of the mannikin or thumbing and the later *linga-śarīra*.⁵

33. HYLIC PLURALISM IN CLASSICAL INDIAN THOUGHT (I)

It is obviously possible to follow two methods in this book. One can either take a definite literary *genre*, such as the Upaniṣads, or a certain system or movement as one's point of departure and then try to establish the forms in which hylc pluralism occurs in this *genre*, system or movement. Otherwise, one can proceed from the opposite point of departure and try to find out in which genres, systems or movements a certain form of hylc pluralism in particular or hylc pluralism as a whole occurs. It is, in my opinion, useful to alternate these two methods of approach. I shall, therefore, investigate now the extent to which hylc pluralism *as a whole* occurred during the *classical*

1 B 28, I, 3, p. 624; Mead's translation, p. 24; Dutch translation of Mead, p. 16.

2 See above, p. 30.

3 See above, pp 119-120. In the Ṛgveda 1, 116, 10, the (ordinary) body is compared with a garment.

4 See above, p. 164-165

5 B 187, II, p. 127; see above. p. 165.

period of Indian thought and, in particular, the extent to which various authors who have written about Indian philosophy have made it clear, from their generalisations, that what I have called hylic pluralism is, in their opinion, present in classical Indian thought. After doing this, I shall then go into the occurrence of hylic pluralism in certain writings or systems that have come down to us.

To begin with, I should like to draw attention to a general statement made by S. Radhakrishnan, who was born in 1888, was for a long time professor of Eastern religions and philosophy at Oxford and was later president of India, in his chapter on "The Ethical Idealism of Early Buddhism" in his *Indian Philosophy*: "The Buddhists, along with Indian psychologists in general, believe in the material or organic nature of mind or *manas*".¹ This statement is, of course, fairly generalised and in any case refutes the idea that Indian thinkers might predominantly take the standpoint of anthropological dualism, that is, that they might hold the view that the spirit and the psychical element were purely immaterial. What is particularly striking is that Radhakrishnan speaks of "material nature" in general, without defining this more precisely. Is *manas* of *fine* matter or is it of ordinary matter according to the Indian psychologists? This makes quite a difference and, if the view concerned is made a theory, the difference is that between monistic and dualistic materialism. The distinction between these two is, as far as I can see, to be found nowhere in Radhakrishnan. It is evidently his intention, or it is in any case known to him that this "material nature" is thought of as of fine matter, because he mentions several times the doctrine of the subtle body; for example, that the Sāṅkhya taught a "subtle body" (II, p. 284), which idea of a *linga-śarīra* is developed from certain doctrines in the Upaniṣads (I p. 254). He also says that the Jains discussed "various kinds of *śarītras*" (I, p. 317 f) and that "the conception of the *linga-śarīra*, or the subtle body" also occurred in the Mahābhārata (I, p. 505). But it was hardly possible for him to do less than he has done in mentioning this doctrine of the subtle body, which occupies an extremely limited space in the two volumes of his work. It is clear that he is not interested in the problem of hylic pluralism. This is also evident from the following. Radhakrishnan is on the whole very much inclined to make comparisons between Western and Indian thought. He is also very well versed in Western philosophy and it would not be an exaggeration to say that

¹ B 124, p. 400.

his work abounds with the analogies that he draws between East and West. Yet, when he comes to consider the neo-Platonists—Plotinus, for example—he fails to discuss the very obvious affinity between the neo-Platonic doctrine of the *ochēma* of the soul and the Indian teaching about the covering (*kośa*, *śarīra*) of fine matter of the soul of various schools.¹ One could almost say that Radhakrishnan is ashamed of what I have called hylic pluralism and of what occurs in his work as the doctrine of the “material or organic nature of mind or *manas*” of his fellow-countrymen. In other words, he has made the anthropological dualism or epsilon standpoint² of Western thinkers, which has blinded so many scholars to the problem of hylic pluralism, very much his own. It is indeed fortunate that this has happened far less in the case of other specialists in the field of Indian philosophy. Radhakrishnan also mentions that the doctrine of the subtle body also occurs in the Vedānta,³ but does so in only one paragraph, which is rather little in comparison with the two hundred or more pages that he devotes to this system. Other scholars, such as Deussen,⁴ are far more detailed in connection with this point.

In itself, the statement that the Indian psychologists (and, of course, philosophers) postulate a “material nature”,⁵ in other words, a nature of the mind that is of fine matter, is true enough. It is only if this is elaborated—which is something that Radhakrishnan does not do—that it becomes clear how far it goes. The Indians distinguished a number of factors of the soul, such as *ahamkāra*, *buddhi*, *manas*, *antahkarana* and so on. These are usually translated as consciousness of self (the “I-maker”), basis of the intelligence, the capacity to think and the inner summing up organ.⁶ It should, however, not be imagined that these factors of the consciousness were regarded as purely psychical or immaterial. On the contrary, they were thought of as consisting of fine matter. This was certainly the case in the Upaniṣads and it remained

1 Von Glasenapp (B 53, p.432) is clearer than Radhakrishnan too in connection with possible Indian analogies with Democritus' doctrine of the fine atoms of the soul; for Radhakrishnan's reference to this, see especially B 124, p. 202 elsewhere, where he mentions Democritus, he says nothing about atoms.

2 See above, p. 148.

3 B 124, II, pp. 596-597.

4 B 28, I, 3, pp. 603-606; see also Deussen's *Das System des Vedanta*, 2nd edn., Leipzig, 1906, pp. 399 ff.

5 Why did Radhakrishnan speak of “the material or organic nature of the mind or *manas*”? What did he mean by “organic”? Did he intend to weaken the word “material” by adding “organic”?

6 For *antahkarana* see also the *sensorium commune*, the inner sense of Western thought.

so in later classical Indian thought. It was also characteristically so in the Sāṅkhya system, but it was also the case elsewhere—if something immaterial was assumed, it was certainly not (as I hope to show later on) this complex of factors of the consciousness. I should like to demonstrate, with the help of a number of quotations, that I am not exaggerating when I say that these factors were regarded as consisting of fine matter. Von Glasenapp, for example, said that *buddhi* was “the higher capacity to know which was imagined to be of fine matter.”¹ “The distinctive aspect of the view under discussion here is that, according to this view, not only sensory perception, but also the whole capacity to think was conditioned by organs of fine matter.”² “*Buddhi, ahamkāra, manas* and so on (are) both spiritual faculties and organs of fine matter. . . .”³ “*Manas* is both the capacity to know, which has the faculty to have and to connect ideas, and the thought-substance of fine matter, whose functions and expressions are reflection, willing and so on.”⁴ Windisch says: “The three inner organs—the organ of judgement (*buddhi*), the organ of consciousness of self or the I-saying organ (*ahamkāra*) and the organ of sensory perception and will (*manas*)—are all three of material origin, originating from the *prakṛiti* or primordial nature”.⁵ Abegg writes in the same spirit: “These translations should not, however, tempt us to see a purely spiritual principle in the *buddhi*—it is indisputable that what we have here is a product of fine matter developed from the *prakṛiti*”.⁶ “The psychical processes are transferred in the Sāṅkhya system to organs of fine matter and the same applies to the sensory functions”.⁷ Garbe discussed the fact that *buddhi, ahamkāra* and so on consisted of fine matter in some detail.⁸ Dasgupta wrote about “the stuff of thought and matter”, saying that, according to these thinkers, there was, in addition to “gross matter”, also “subtle thought-stuff” or *buddhi*, which was translucent.⁹

Although Radhakrishnan does not discuss the question of the fine materiality of the factors of the soul—even when he is dealing with the Sāṅkhya, in which this question is characteristically quite prominent,

1 B 53, p. 157.

2 *op. cit.*, p. 159.

3 B 52, p. 3.

4 *op. cit.*, p. 18.

5 B 178, p. 82.

6 B 1, p. 55.

7 *op. cit.*, p. 69.

8 *Die Sāṅkhya-Philosophie*, p. 307 f.

9 B 185, I, pp. 241-242.

he discusses it only very briefly¹—other authors clearly have done so, with the result that this so general characteristic of Indian psychology is established in some detail.

The various thinkers and systems have all accepted a different number of these factors of the soul or components of the consciousness (which are moreover apparently thought of as existing at different levels). Sometimes a total of thirteen and at others a total of seventeen or eighteen has been accepted, according to the number of subdivisions (for example, a subdivision into five passive and five active senses² and so on). What is also of importance is that it is stated explicitly that these inner organs together constitute the psychical body.³ It would therefore seem probable that fine materiality or hylic pluralism was in fact a frequently occurring theme in classical Indian thought.

Several specialists in the field of Indian thought have discussed this theme more particularly.

P. Oltramare (1854-1930), who was a professor at Geneva, devoted a whole section to the subtle body—"Le corps subtil"⁴—which he called "an important doctrine concerned with the especially close grouping of a certain number of principles in order to form the "subtle body", *sūkṣma-śarīra*, or the "characteristic body, *linga-śarīra*". "Coarse being . . . has, as its cause, the same being in a subtle state". "This concept, which is systematically worked out in the Sāṅkhya school, has become, thanks to the achievements of this school, the common property of all the Hindu theosophies". (In the second volume of his work, Oltramare discussed Buddhism under the title of "La théosophie bouddhique". I shall return to this later.) He also made a brief comparison with related concepts among the primitive peoples, with the *ka* of the ancient Egyptians, the genius of the Romans and so on.⁵

Arbman has also said of the concept of the *linga-śarīra* that it was elaborated by the Sāṅkhya and became a common good in Indian philosophy.⁶

1 B 124, II, pp. 284-285; see also p. 291 ff, where the fine materiality of *buddhi* and so on is not brought out.

2 B 58, p. 143 and elsewhere.

3 Garbe, *op. cit.*, pp. 307, 327; Deussen, B 28, 1, 2, p. 218; I, 3, p. 448; B 185, II, p. 75; see also B 186, p. 129; B 178, p. 81.

4 In *L'Histoire des idées théosophiques dans l'Inde*, I, *La théosophie brahmanique*, 1906, p. 245 ff. By "theosophy", Oltramare meant Indian thought itself: see B 179, XI, p. 179.

ibid.

5 *ibid.*

6 B 187, II, p. 122.

Mrs. Rhys Davids, a well-known writer specialising in Buddhist subjects, devoted a chapter (Chapter VI) entitled "The Other World Mind" to this theme in her *The Birth of Indian Psychology and Its Development in Buddhism* (B 186, 1936). This book is the third impression of her *Buddhist Psychology* of 1914—it is impossible to find this chapter or anything like it in the first impression. It looks therefore as though she gradually became convinced of the importance of what I have called hylic pluralism. In the third impression of 1936, she spoke quite clearly about it, however: "On the other hand, the refusal at present of Western writers (let alone many of the East) to take seriously the hypothesis of the "other", subtle, or astral body, so long and widely hinted at in both East and West, together with the easy compliance shown by many in the hypothesis of man, *qua* individual man, existing in a "discarnate" state, tends to make the expositions of writers as confused as in this old text".¹ Indeed, all kinds of writers, both Western and Eastern (such as, for example, Radhakrishnan?) have no objection at all to the idea that man, especially after death, should exist in an entirely "discarnate" state, that is, without a body. This is, therefore, the epsilon standpoint or anthropological dualism and this is also why so many authors have refused to consider further the hypothesis of another, subtle body. Mrs. Rhys Davids was of the opinion that even texts as ancient as those in which Yājñavalkya gave his doctrines took the point of view that, whenever man left his ordinary body, he did so *in a second body*. This doctrine was later developed into that of the *linga-śarīra* or *sūkṣma-śarīra*. All this is not clearly stated in the Upaniṣads,² but this idea very probably formed the basis for this—man alternately living in two worlds, in the ordinary world, that of waking life, or, during sleep, in that of the "other-world mind". If the ancient texts were to be examined carefully on the basis of the "subtle body hypothesis", this could no doubt be brought out even more clearly. In general, Indian thinkers were, however, inclined to regard our true nature as "a possessor of more instruments than we credit ourselves withal", that is, of "a different mind, a different body".³

It is, however, not true to say that most of the earlier scholars simply by-passed the question of the hylic pluralism of the subtle body in

1 B 186, p. 124-125. Is it possible that Dr. G. R. S. Mead, the author of *The Doctrine of the Subtle Body in Western Tradition*, B 99, drew her attention to this question? The first impression of Mrs. Rhys Davids' book appeared in the "Quest" Series and Dr. Mead was the editor both of this series of books and of the Journal *The Quest*, 1909 ff).

2 See above, section 32.

3 B 186, p. 125-127.

Indian thought. Although P. Deussen (1845-1919) was as inclined as Radhakrishnan to make comparisons with ideas current in Western thought, he did nonetheless bring out the questions concerned clearly enough. In his *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, he devoted short chapters in connection with the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, for example, to "the fine body and moral determinism",¹ in connection with the theme of "cosmology and psychology in the epic period" to "the fine body" (*bhūtātman*, *lingam*)² and, in connection with the theme of "the Vedānta of Cankara and Sadānanda" to "the extension (*vikshepa*) of the fine body and the fine world".³ Any one, then, who is particularly attentive to this question will find that the theme of the subtle body returns again and again. Although Deussen, like Radhakrishnan, did not mention the neo-Platonic doctrine of the *ochēma*, he did compare the state of being surrounded by increasingly coarse coverings according to Sadānanda with the four stages of emanation according to the neo-Platonists (B 28, I, 3, p. 616). Windisch also included a separate discussion of "the fine body" in his book (B 178, p. 81).

Finally, I should like to point to a remarkable chapter by another specialist in this sphere—Dasgupta. This is entitled: "The Foetus and the Subtle Body".⁴ It is a section in the chapter entitled "Speculations in the Medical Schools" (Chapter XIII).⁵ In this section, Dasgupta discusses above all the view of the physician and philosopher Caraka (ca. 100 A.D.),⁶ who was influenced by, among others, the Sāṅkhya, but who also considered the theme in a broader context. The basic idea is this—fertilisation is not sufficient to bring about an embryo or a child; an *ātman* "with its subtle body, constituted of air, fire, water and earth, and *manas*" has also to be added and all this is "connected . . . by means of its *karma*".⁷ This is also the subtle body (*sūkṣma deha*) which continues to exist through several births. Dasgupta discusses various aspects of this doctrine in detail. This *third factor* which plays a part is very small—"no bigger than a thumb".⁸ What is also remarkable is the doctrine that, when the *ātman* is inclined

1 B 28, I, 2, pp. 252-255.

2 B 28, I, 3, pp. 63-65.

3 B 28, I, 3, pp. 626-628.

4 B 185, II, pp. 302-312.

5 *op. cit.*, p. 273 ff.

6 See B 58, p. 135.

7 *op. cit.*, p. 302.

8 *op. cit.*, p. 305; see also above, p. 163-164. Arbman (B 187, II, p. 107) also says that the foetus and the thumbling are originally one. See also Windisch (B 178, p. 86 ff) on the "Development of the embryo" and Deussen (B 28, I, 3, p. 599).

to be born again, these subtle bodies come from the air to earth, are then absorbed via the rain by plants and are consequently assimilated by people who eat the plants and thus end up in the wombs of women.¹ Strangely enough, similar views occurred in Germany in the eighteenth century.² I shall return to these later. Generally speaking, the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta are in agreement with Caraka's teaching about the subtle body in connection with the foetus and rebirth.³

We may therefore conclude from all that these expert authors have said that hylic pluralism, even in the more specialised form of the doctrine of a subtle body or *ochēma* was a well-known and widespread theme in classical Indian thought.

In contrast to primitive Indian thought, in which hylic pluralism occurred especially in the form of the beta standpoint,⁴ the subtle body is accepted here against a different philosophical background. This is the result of Indian thought, after having developed in a spiritualistic direction,⁵ explicitly teaching, in the classical period, the existence of the immaterial, which the beta standpoint rejects. We cannot, generally speaking, say precisely which of the standpoints—gamma, delta or zeta, all of which combine a doctrine of the immaterial with teaching about a vehicle of fine matter—classical Indian thought takes. In order to ascertain this, we shall have to consider separately several of the most important *darśanas*.

Nonetheless, we can say that hylic pluralism does undoubtedly occur, certainly in the most important and very widespread systems of the Sāṅkhya and Vedānta. Is it possible to generalise and extend this to the whole of classical Indian thought? If two authors say that what I have called hylic pluralism was a "common good" in Indian philosophy,⁶ then one is naturally inclined to corroborate this.⁷ It would, however, not be strictly correct to do this.

34. OPPONENTS OF HYLIC PLURALISM IN INDIAN THOUGHT

Not all the Indian systems contain the doctrine of a subtle body or of hylic pluralism—there were also opponents of this view.

1 B 185 II, p. 311, see also Arbman, B 187 II, pp. 108, 120.

2 Especially in Hennings, B 65, p. 995 ff, who makes a connection here with Leibniz.

3 B 185 II, p. 312.

4 See above, p. 168.

5 See above, section 31.

6 See above, p. 184.

7 Under the heading of "body" (*Leib*), Eisler says, in B 39: "Indian philosophy teaches the existence of a soul body".

In the first place, there were the *materialists*—the Cārvākas or those who supported the Lokāyata. This movement denied the existence of the suprasensual and of a soul which lived longer than the ordinary body.¹ I have already made a criterion of this point of view the question as to whether we have to do with monistic materialism or with dualistic materialism.² It ought therefore to follow that the Cārvākas were monistic materialists and not hylic pluralists.³ Some doubt is, however, fully justified. Our knowledge of them is very fragmentary—the Lokāyata belonged to the *nāstika* systems, of which very little has been handed down.⁴ Abegg has claimed that it is not correct to say that they did not accept any soul at all—all that they denied, he maintains, is that this soul did not survive the body.⁵ Furthermore, we read, in a symposium, a comparison between the Cārvākas and Epicurus—who was undoubtedly, I might add, a dualistic materialist.⁶ On the other hand, however, all that we read in this book is that the Cārvākas say “almost the same” as Epicurus. It is also possible to suggest that they did not support an equative materialism, but a causative materialism,⁷ both of which are, however, forms of monistic materialism. It seems to me, then, that it is very possible that the Cārvākas as a whole—or at least some of them—supported a monistic materialism. To this extent, then, they are an exception to the general rule which we are investigating, namely that it is possible to speak of a universal hylic pluralism in Indian thought. Their denial of a continued existence certainly points in this direction. And, even if they might have accepted a *prāṇa*, in the sense of a physiological *pneuma*,⁸ this might have come within the category of the physical.⁹

It is also possible, however, to point to even more exceptions. The Yoga system, one of the six well-known *darśanas*, is, in very many respects, very closely connected with the Sāṅkhya, but in a few respects it is not.¹⁰ Thus we read in Vyāsa’s commentary on the Yoga-sūtras

1 See B 1, p. 101, B 58, p. 158 ff.

2 See above, pp. 148.

3 See above, p. 36.

4 See above, p. 151 152.

5 B 1, p. 101.

6 See above, p. 37 and below.

7 See B 68, chapter 17 ff.

8 See above, p. 162.

9 See above, pp. 23-24, about Lanettrie.

10 See B 58, p. 150.

of Patanjali that it is *not* the case that the soul needs a subtle body in the period between death and a new incarnation. The soul or *citta* simply unfolds its activity in the body of the next incarnation.¹

The subtle body is rejected even more clearly in the NyāyaVaiśeṣika system. (As I have already said, these two *darśanas* gradually merged to form a single whole.²) Von Glasenapp has said of the Vaiśeṣikas that they "teach that the soul, provided with these qualities, migrates from body to body; they accordingly dispense with the acceptance of a subtle body (*sukṣma-śarīra*) which is, according to the Sāṅkhya, the receptacle that is necessary for rebirth".³ Dasgupta writes similarly: "The Vaiśeṣika declines to believe in the existence of a subtle body, and assigns to it no place in the development of the foetus".⁴ "The Nyāya . . . also denies the existence of a subtle body".⁵ All the same, both accept metempsychosis as a fact.

In other words, what we are concerned with here is a movement which was, as far as we know, opposed to hylic pluralism. Since they were not materialists, but, on the contrary, ascribed an independent reality to the soul,⁶ we are clearly in contact here with a case of anthropological dualism or the epsilon standpoint in Indian thought.⁷

How, then, does this affect the assertion that hylic pluralism is a universal characteristic in Indian thought? How does it affect the affirmation that it was a "common good" in Indian philosophy? I would give the following answer to this question. Something that is a common good does not have to be entirely without exception. Something can be called a common good if it is *predominantly* adhered to. Even though the doctrines of the cārvākas might have been very widespread at a given time,⁸ we know very little about them because they were almost completely eclipsed and probably not even tolerated. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system was *not* at all widespread and was not very highly regarded.⁹ On the other hand, the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta, both of which explicitly taught hylic pluralism, were the two best-known systems. The Vedānta system was ultimately almost entirely triumphant,

1 See B 185 II, p. 305-306; B 52, p. 124.

2 See above, p. 154-155.

3 B 52, p. 128.

4 B 185 II, p. 306.

5 *ibid.*

6 B 58, pp. 185-186.

7 See above, p. 148 and Chapter 15.

8 B 1, p. 101.

9 See above, p. 155.

to such an extent that it has been called the national philosophy of India.¹ In view of this. I am bound to say therefore that hylic pluralism can be called a very typical characteristic of Indian thought—both of primitive Indian thinking² and of classical Indian philosophy.

35. HYLIC PLURALISM IN CLASSICAL INDIAN THOUGHT (2)

I should like now to discuss a few special questions in connection with hylic pluralism in classical Indian philosophy as a whole.

What, then, are the terms used for the subtle body? The most commonly used and the best known are *linga-śarīra* and *sūkṣma-śarīra*. One would imagine that there might be a possible difference of level between these two concepts, just as there is, for example, between the physiological and the psychological *pneuma* or the psychological and the sublime *pneuma*,³ but this is not the case. Both are apparently used at the level of the psychological *pneuma*. There is, then, no difference in meaning—only a terminological difference. Oltramare, for example, has written about “*sūkṣma-śarīra* or *linga-śarīra*”.⁴ The term *linga-śarīra* is the term which is used for preference in the Sāṅkhya system and *sūkṣma-śarīra* is more commonly found in the Vedānta.⁵ *Linga* means “characteristic” or “mark” and *sūkṣma* means “fine”. Both terms are also used in other contexts, with the result that one cannot always be certain whether *alinga* in a given context means “without marks” or “without *linga-śarīra*”,⁶ while *sūkṣma* is also used in a figurative sense.⁷ As I have already observed above on p. 91, the word *sukma* is used in Java as a synonym for *lelembotan* or the “fine” body. Over and against *sūkṣma* or *linga-śarīra* for the subtle body, there is also *sthūla-śarīra* for the ordinary, coarse body.⁸

I have already discussed one or two aspects of another terminology and classification, that of the coverings or *kośas*.⁹ Here the *sthūla-śarīra* is known as the *anna maya kośa*. The fine body is subdivided here into different *kośas*, such as the *prāṇa-maya*, *mano-maya* and *vijñāna-maya-kośa*. These differences of level are connected, as far as

¹ B 52, p. 157.

² See above, p. 289.

³ See above, Chapter 6 ff.

⁴ *op. cit.*, p. 245; see also above, p. 184; B 185 II, p. 75.

⁵ See Garbe, *Die Samkhya-Philosophie*, p. 327, not 2; Deussen, B 28, I, 3, p. 626

⁶ See Deussen, *Sechzig Upanishads*, p. 286, note 1.

⁷ See B 185, Indices.

⁸ See, for example, B 53, p. 392.

⁹ See above, p. 176 ff.

the consciousness is concerned, with different degrees of depth of sleep.¹ In the question of classification into *śarītras*, the Indian often accepted the *karmana-śarītra* or *kāraṇa-śarītra*, the "causal body" as being even finer than the *linga-śarītra*. It is the body of "the causal self (*kāraṇa-ātman*), the relatively permanent human self, which persists through successive rebirths determined by the law of *karma*".² This "causal body" corresponds to the fifth *kośa* or *ānanda-maya-kośa*,³ the covering of blessedness, with regard to which I have already indicated a similarity with Western ideas, which I have designated as the sublime *pneuma*.⁴ There is also mention of a *kāraṇa-śarītra* or "causal body" of Iśvara, the personal God of the Indians.⁵ It should also be borne in mind that there is also a place for *prāṇa* in the most frequently used meaning of "physiological *pneuma*"⁶ between the *sthūla-śarītra* and the *linga-śarītra*.

There are also other terms for the subtle body in Indian literature. There is, for example, reference to the *sūkṣma-deha* (B 185 II, p. 304) or *linga-deha* (*ibid.*, IV, p. 317), but *deha*, *body*, is clearly only another word for *śarītra*.

Bhūtātman, the self built up of the elements or *bhūtas*, also occurs in the sense of "subtle body",⁷ as does *āśraya*, bearer or substratum. In this, a distinction is made between a *bhūta-āśraya* or the substratum of fine matter and the *karma-āśraya* or the moral substratum which determines fate. According to Deussen, these should be thought of in the Vedānta as changeable, over and against the *sūkṣma-śarītra* as the unchangeable element accompanying the soul throughout all time.⁸

Another term for subtle body is *purīyām śete*⁹ and for the subtle body of Brahma *purī-aṣṭaka* (*purī* = body; *aṣṭaka* = consisting of eight parts).¹⁰ The first of these terms is used in the *Puranas*, in which the term *yātana-deha* is also used to denote the "torment-body", the body in which the soul does penance after death.¹¹

1 See the comparative table in B 53, p. 394.

2 B 124, II, p. 597.

3 B 53, p. 394.

4 See above, p. 179-180.

5 B 28 I, 3, p. 623.

6 See above, p. 162.

7 B 28 I, 3, p. 63; see above, p. 176; B 185 II, pp. 303, 304.

8 B 28 I, 3, p. 606; see also *Das System des Vedānta*, p. 404; also B 39, under the heading "Leib", in which *acraya* is also mentioned.

9 B 185 III, p. 504.

10 B 185 II, p. 245.

11 B 187 II, p. 68.

A very important term for bodies of different degrees of fineness in man is *upādhi*, meaning limitation, limiting definition, especially attendant limitation coming from outside, and as such also used in logic, for example, in the Nyāya system.¹ In addition to this, *upādhi* is also used for the vehicles or bodies of the soul with a philosophical secondary intention—the *jīva* (or the individual self) is the *ātman* (the one, cosmic self) clothed with the *upādhis*.² Correspondingly, Max Müller entitled one chapter of his Three Lectures on the Vedānta Philosophy (1894) "The Upādhis as the Cause of Difference between the Soul and God" (p. 92 ff). The same idea is also found in *linga-śāstra*. *Linga* means characteristic and, as we shall see when we come to discuss the Sāṅkhya in greater detail, this system ascribes all individual differences not to divergent qualities of the immaterial souls or *puruṣas*, but to differences situated in the *śāstras*.³ In other words, these limitations, characteristics and differences in bodies act as the *principium individuationis*—they produce the individual person, the "infrsubject"⁴ with all its special qualities. I shall return to this question later, when I deal with the most important systems.

Light is also thrown from this perspective on another question which I must also mention in this section. In Indian philosophy, not only are bodies regarded as consisting of fine matter—*karma* is also thought of, at least in certain schools of Indian thought, as composed of fine matter. The connection between the "law of *karma*", which forms a bridge between qualities and events in one life and the next, and the doctrine of subtle bodies is therefore established, in that the body at a fairly high level of subtilty is called the "causal body" or *karmanā-śāstra*.⁵ This body continues, according to these views, to exist from one life to the next and thus transfers certain qualities. With this inclination to regard all kinds of abstract qualities as material,⁶ *karma* itself can therefore be called material. In the Sāṅkhya, *karma* is "also traced back to the *prakṛiti*" (primordial nature or matter). "*Karma* is therefore something 'material'".⁷ In the later Brahmanas at least, *karma* is represented as a power of fine matter which clings to man.⁸

1 B 58, p. 170.

2 See *op. cit.*, p. 254.

3 See below, p. 213-214.

4 See my *Tweeërlei Subjectiviteit*, B 114, p. 540 and *passim*.

5 See above, p. 191.

6 See above, p. 172 ff.

7 B 52, p. 115.

8 J. Gonda, *De Vedische Godsdienst*, p. 84.

According to the Vedānta, man is accompanied not only by a fine body or *bhūta-āśraya*, but also by a *karma-āśraya*, "that is, the moral determinism which conditions the future course of life".¹ Jainism especially affirms very positively that this *karma* must be regarded as consisting of fine matter. "Karma... is nothing but a fine matter which is active".² "Karma is a substantive force, matter in a subtle form."³ In connection with views of Jainism, Abegg said: "Karma is regarded in this case as a fine imperceptible matter which infects the soul and deprives it of its original purity and perfection".⁴ Jainism assumes a "multiplicity of spiritual monads which, polluted by *karma* matters, has to wander around in the *samsāra* until they are liberated by purification from this association without beginning".⁵

One has the feeling that this idea and the concept of the *upādhi* are rather closely related. Individual man is characterised by certain qualities which are typical of him. These conditions are limitations, by which man loses, for example, the omniscience which is really his, as *ātman*.⁶ All this is worked out in a hylic pluralistic manner. It is matter in a broad sense which brings about this falling away, either as an "infection" by *karma*, a fine matter, or because the soul is enveloped by *kośas* or *śarīras* of increasing density.⁷ These bodies are therefore also called *upādhis*, limitations, and the fine body is called *linga-śarīra*, the characterising *śarīra*.⁸ On the other hand, there is also a body by means of which the individual limitation is active from one life to the next—the *kāraṇa-śarīra* or "causal body". We shall see later the extent to which this is expressed in Buddhism as well.

In the first part of this book I put forward the concept of *psychohylism*, according to which the soul is *always* accompanied by a material vehicle (of fine matter), even where it is—as, for example, after death—not expected. It is only in this way that the soul can express itself⁹. In the most consistent form, this view affirms that the soul, not only from a certain level downwards,¹⁰ but also during its whole existence, has a material form of expression as a separate unit.

1 B 28 I, 2, p. 252; see also above, p. 191.

2 B 52, p. 99.

3 B 124 I, p. 319.

4 B 1, p. 103.

5 B 52, p. 95; see also p. 98.

6 B 1, p. 103; B 52, p. 68.

7 See above, p. 29, 115, 118 for related ideas in neo-Platonism; and elsewhere; see also below.

8 See above p. 190 and Oltramare, *op. cit.*, p. 245: "It is the *linga* which makes distinct individualities of living beings".

9 See above, chapter 4 and p. 147.

10 See above, p. 41 and below.

This view, to which I have given the name of psychohyalism, is regularly encountered in Indian thought. According to the Jains, for example, the *karmana-śartra* is the special body "which does not leave the soul till its final emancipation".¹ "The soul is never completely separated from matter until its final release".² According to Jainism, "as long as the soul continues to wander around in the *samsāra*, it is surrounded by a fine 'karma body' ".³ A similar idea is also encountered in the Sankhya. When *pralaya*, the (periodic) re-absorption of the universe, begins, the fine body is dissolved along with all the rest, but when the manifested world begins again, the inner body comes into being once more, especially for the souls which have not yet attained redemption.⁴ We may therefore say that "this connection between each soul and its *upādhi* exists in the form of a continuity without beginning which is only interrupted during periods of dissolution of the world and which lasts until distinguishing knowledge is attained".⁵ The subtle body, however, perishes on redemption.⁶

In the Vedānta, it is no different. Bādarāyana taught that the soul was accompanied by a *sūkṣma-śartra* which lasted until redemption.⁷ Śankara also taught that the connection between the soul and the *upādhis* continued throughout the whole "metempsychosis".⁸ The teaching of the Vedānta, then, is that the psychic organism—the *sūkṣma-śartra* and so on—"clings to the soul throughout all time in life and death".⁹ The same idea, with different shades of meaning, is also encountered in the other schools of Vedānta. According to the school of Rāmānuja, for example, the relationship between the soul and the body has always existed as determining and determined (*aprithak-siddha*); it is not something external, but is constitutive for both, with the result that even emancipated souls are connected to bodies. The body which is destroyed on death is, moreover, not the one with which the living soul was (directly) connected.¹⁰ One is surely reminded here of Leibniz' souls "which never leave all their bodies".¹¹

1 B 124 I, p. 319.

2 *ibid.*, p. 324.

3 B 53, p. 394.

4 Garbe, *Die Samkhya- Philosophie*, p. 329.

5 *ibid.*, p. 367.

6 *ibid.*, p. 388.

7 B 58, p. 230.

8 B 1, p. 40.

9 B 28 I, 3, p. 606; see also Deussen, *Das System des Vedanta*, p. 402.

10 B 185 III, p. 299-300.

11 See above, p. 14.

At the same time, however, there are certain differences between the various doctrines. One view is clearly that redemption is the end of psychohylicism and that the subtle body ceases at that point to exist. "The state of emancipation is brought about by the dissociation of the subtle body . . ." ¹ According to Jainism, one is—finally—abandoned by the *karmana-śāstra* on redemption. According to the Sāṅkhya, if one is, on the other hand, not redeemed, one acquires, at the end of the period of *pralaya* or rest, another inner body. ² The school of Rāmānuja, on the other hand, teaches that even redeemed souls are associated with bodies. ³ Deussen has, moreover—as we have already seen ⁴—mentioned the distinction that is sometimes made in the Vedānta between the *karma-āśraya* which is changeable and the *sukṣma-āśraya* which is the unchangeable element accompanying the soul. ⁵ These differences clearly relate to questions of level, to the antithesis between absolute and relative and to the question as to whether psychohylicism is consistently philosophical or not. The dissociation of certain lower subtle bodies —the psychological *pneuma*, which is, after all, neutral in itself and can even be bad ⁶—can be regarded as a definitive, absolute redemption or not. In the first case, this can mean the cessation of the existence of the individual soul within all revelation (one is reminded here of *nirvāṇa*, as it is often conceived to be) or a continued existence as a purely spiritual entity. The second amounts to a purely partial psychohylicism —psychohylicism simply from a certain level downwards. This redemption can, however, also be regarded as simply relative—at higher levels too, there would always be a need for a material form of expression (for example, in the form of a sublime *pneuma*) and (relatively) redeemed souls would, to this extent, continue to be connected to fine bodies. This would therefore be a consistent psychohylicism—at whatever level the individual souls might be in possession of a material organ (of fine matter). The philosophical meaning of this would be that, *without* these organs, limitations or *upādhis*, the souls would no longer be individual and one of many, but the one, unlimited *Atman* itself. ⁷

1 Vijnana Bikshu: B 185 III, p. 445.

2 See above, p. 194.

3 Garbe, *Die Sāṅkhya-Philosophie*, p. 329.

4 See above, p. 191.

5 B 28 I, 3, p. 606.

6 See above p. 29.

7 See above, p. 192.

However this may be, Indian thinkers clearly hesitated between these possible views. There were moreover opponents of the idea of psychohylicism. Schools of thought arose which denied the existence of a subtle body and the need for an "intermediate body" between successive incarnations.¹ One of the figures in these schools, Vācaspati, indulged in polemics with those who advocated a psychohylicism. If the bond between the soul and the body is so close, how can the soul inhabit another (intermediate) body at death? And, if yet another body is necessary for this, then yet another body can be necessary later and so on into infinity. If, on the other hand, it is argued that the soul or *citta* has been linked with a subtle body "from beginningless time", then the reply is that no one has yet perceived such a body.²

What is, however, quite certain, despite the criticism of such thinkers as Vācaspati, is that what I have called psychohylicism was very widespread in Indian thought. One is bound to conclude that a great deal of attention was given in India to hylic pluralism in the form of various species of subtle bodies.

36. THE EPIC PERIOD

Having considered various hylic pluralistic themes in general in the classical period of Indian philosophy, I should now like to turn³ to the different historical Periods and systems. An epic period has often been distinguished as the beginning of the classical period of Indian thought.⁴ Writings such as the Mahābhārata, which includes the important Bhagavad Gītā, and the other great heroic epic, the Rāmāyana, as well as other texts come within this period.

Under the heading "Epic Philosophy", Radhakrishnan deals with the *Mānavadharmaśāstra* or the *Laws of Manu* and I should like to begin this section with a few remarks about this work. It is a detailed code of law, or ethical code, which had a deep influence and was highly regarded. Its authorship and its date of origin, in connection with different editions, are, however, very uncertain.⁵ There are nonetheless certain elements in the twelfth book of the version that has come

1 See above, p. 188 ff.

2 See B 185 III, p. 305.

3 See above, p. 180.

4 See, for example, B 124 I, p. 271 ff, 477 ff; see also above, p. 153.

5 B 124 I, p. 515 ff; (see also B 28 I, 3, p. 11.)

down to us that are of interest in connection with our subject. This twelfth and last book deals with life after death and metempsychosis. In the translation of XII, 16 in the relevant volume (XXV) of *Sacred Books of the East*, we read: "Another strong body, formed of particles (of the) five (elements and) destined to suffer the torments (in hell), is produced after death (in the case) of wicked men".¹ As I have already pointed out,² and as we shall see later in the case of early Christianity, a connection is established here between the suffering of torments after death and the possession of another, finer body. This apparently accounts for Radhakrishnan's comment that, among all kinds of ideas, that of the *sūkṣma-śarīra* is also encountered in the "Laws of Manu".³ This was also known to L. von Gölldenstubbé⁴ and to Du Prel:⁵ "After separation from the body at death, the souls of men are clothed with this ethereal matter. (*Gesetze des Manu* XII, 16 und 21)".⁶ Thus hylic pluralism is also encountered in the Mānavadharmaśāstra, which was, for the Hindus, very authoritative.

The epic known as the Mahābhārata, consisting of eighteen books and describing the battle between the royal Pandavas and Kauravas, forms a very important part of the literature of the period under consideration. In addition to all of colourful stories and legends, which are reminiscent of the Iliad, there are also philosophical and reflective passages in the Mahābhārata, far more than there are, for example, in the Old Testament. Deussen has published the most important of these philosophical parts in *Vier philosophische Texte des Mahābhārata* (1906). These four texts are the Sanatsujātaparva (Mahābhārata V, 1565-1790), the Bhagavad Gītā (VI, 830-1532), the long Mokṣadharmā (XII, 6457-13943) and the Anu Gītā (XIV, 407-1477).

The contents of this heroic epic are very divergent. It includes primitive ideas, like those contained in the Vedas, but also philosophical reflections and treatises on yoga which are partly very abstract and form a more advanced stage in the development from Vedic thought towards the classical philosophy of the *darśanas* than the Upaniṣads. The Sāṅkhya system, one of the earliest *darśanas*, reached quite a considerable development in the Mahābhārata.

1 p. 487.

2 See above, p. 191.

3 B 124 I, p. 517.

4 *Positive Pneumatologie* (1857), p. 222.

5 120, p. 166.

6 See also W. Y. Evans-Wentz' remark in *The Tibetan Book of the Dead* (1927), p. 47, note.

As far as characteristics that are reminiscent of the primitive period are concerned, I am bound to refer to the *legend of Sāvitrī*, which occurs in the Vana Parvan (Mahābhārata III, Ad. 296, 16) and to which I have, of course, already referred earlier in this book.¹ According to this legend, Yama, the god of death, drew "a person of the measure of the thumb" out of the body of Sāvitrī's husband and Sāvitrī later succeeded, after stubborn efforts, in wresting him from the grip of the god of death and making him return to the body. In this legend, then, the soul is clearly thought of as a mannikin, a thumbling.² Although it is said in this passage that Yama took the *prāna* or "vital essence" of the husband, Radhakrishnan calls this place evidence that the concept of the *linga-śarīra* or subtle body also occurs in the Mahābhārata.³

The term *prāna* is frequently met with in the epic. There is a short treatise on it in the same Vana Parvan (section CCXII). The translator⁴ renders *prāna* as "subtle ethereal air" and elsewhere as "vital airs". Something in the style of the Western *spiritus animales et vitales*—what I have called the physiological *pneuma*⁵—is clearly accepted in this epic and, what is more, a distinction is also made, like the one made in the West between ordinary and more subtle air, between various species of *agni* or fire (section CCXX).⁶ This is, of course, reminiscent of the Stoics, who also made a distinction between ordinary fire and creative fire, although they believed that both were material.⁷

Prāna should not, however, be thought of as always meaning simply and solely physiological *pneuma* (in other words, the *spiritus vitales*, which are certainly subtle, but which are also in the closest possible contact with the ordinary body and do not in practice survive this),⁸ but also as being a transition⁹ between the physiological *pneuma* and the other *pneuma*, the psychological *pneuma*, the *pneuma* of the free soul or the *psyche*, and possibly even as this free soul itself. Something like this occurs even in the Upaniṣads, where it is said that the soul gathers the *prānas* at death and departs with them.¹⁰ In this case, *prāna*

1 See above, p. 164 - 165.

2 See above, p. 163. In Mahābhārata V, 1764, the *puruṣa* is also referred to as being "as big as a thumb" (*Vier Texte*, p. 27).

3 B 124 I, p. 505; see also above, p. 181.

4 Translation by Pratāp Chandra Rāy, Calcutta 1889, pp. 656, 675.

5 See above, p. 22 ff, 162, 179.

6 *op. cit.*, p. 674 ff.

7 See above p. 21, note 1.

8 See above, p. 162.

9 As probably happens—see above pp. 25 - 26.

10 See B 124 I, p. 254; see also above, p. 175 - 176.

is therefore in fact the same as the *linga-śāstra* or the psychological *pneuma*. In the light of an identification of this kind, Radhakrishnan was able to use the legend of Sāvitṛī as proof that the concept of the *linga-śāstra* occurred in the Mahābhārata, although the text only refers explicitly to *prāṇa*.¹

Other scholars also share this opinion, in other words, that the concept of the *linga-śāstra* is encountered in the Mahābhārata, whether this occurs simply as *linga* or whether it is called *bhūtātman* or whether it can be inferred from the context. An example of the last mentioned occurs in the Mokṣadharmā (Mahābhārata XII, 13756), where there is reference to the "seventeenfold aggregate". Although the *linga-śāstra* is not explicitly mentioned here, Garbe simply assumed that what was meant here was the "seventeenfold division of the inner body (*linga-śāstra*)",² since, in this passage, what is under discussion are ideas common to the Sāṅkhya system and the doctrine of the many parts of which the fine body consists is very frequently encountered in that system.³ In verse 11385 of the Mokṣadharmā, we also read "free from his *lingam*" and it is clear from his addition "(from *buddhi* etc.)" that Deussen too was of the opinion that the psychical apparatus was intended here.⁴

The theme of the wandering of the soul, separated from the ordinary body, in other words, the theme of *excursion*, either temporarily before or permanently after death, also occurs regularly in the Mahābhārata and, what is more, in a more elaborate and more clearly hylic pluralistic manner than in the Upaniṣads. The idea of excursion is discussed in some detail in the Mokṣadharmā especially (XII, 11703 ff), in which various kinds of excursion are distinguished.⁵ In one passage, it is said explicitly that the fine *ātman*, the *sūkṣma ātman*, makes an excursion.⁶ Abegg has said about this place: "There is also mention of the soul's leaving the body in a dream in a yoga part of the Mahābhārata (XII, 301), in which it is said that the "fine" (*sūkṣma*) *ātman* wanders around in sleep, feeling and seeing consistently as during waking moments".⁷ Here, then, it is affirmed even more positively than in the Upaniṣads

1 B 124 I, p. 505; see also above, p. 198.

2 *Die Sāṅkhya-Philosophie*, p. 56; see also *Vier Texte*, p. 861.

3 See above, p. 184 and below, p. 208 ff.

4 *Vier Texte*, p. 625.

5 *Vier Texte*, p. 657 ff; see also B 28 I, 3, p. 104 ff; see also M. Eliade, *Le chamanisme et les techniques archaïques de l'extase*, p. 365 ff.

6 XII, 11185: *Vier Texte*, p. 606.

7 B I, p. 18, note 44.

that the free or "external" soul is of fine matter. The *ātman* wanders "on fine roads" through zones which correspond to the senses, to the wind, the ether, to *manas*, *buddhi* and so on (*ibid.*, verses 11188-11192) and finally overcomes the whole of this *prakṛiti* or primordial nature and reaches the highest *ātman* (verse 11193).

We also have a typical impression of hylic pluralism when we read elsewhere in the epic that the soul has six *colours* as a way of measuring the value of the state in which the soul finds itself (Mahābhārata XII, 10058 ff). This idea will also be encountered elsewhere, for example, in Plutarch.¹

The *Bhagavad Gītā*² is short in comparison with the Mokṣadharma, but it is important and very highly valued. It would, of course, be wrong to say that the doctrine of fine materiality is present in a very striking manner in the *Gītā*. Among other things, the doctrines of the Sāṅkhya are expounded in some detail in the *Gītā* and, as is well known, the Sāṅkhya regarded the whole of *prakṛiti* or primordial nature, including the factors of the soul such as *buddhi*, *manas* and so on, as consisting of fine matter.³ It is therefore quite permissible to say that factors of the soul consisting of fine matter are discussed in the *Gītā* and that hylic pluralism consequently occurs in it. Although this is a deduction, it is one that is quite permissible. Von Glasenapp also said that, according to the *Gītā*, God manifests himself not only as the one spirit who is the essence of every living being, but also as "the one force-substance (*prakṛiti*, "nature" or "primordial matter") which unfolds itself in the multiplicity of all fine and coarse material capacities (organs of thought and so on) and elements",⁴ thus, among other things, it develops into organs of thought of fine matter. This, however, is von Glasenapp's *conclusion*. "According to the philosophical assumptions of the *Gītā*", it is necessary for "souls to be provided with a fine body and with fine organs". But—"we find nothing of all this in the *Gītā*."⁵ In other words, the *linga-śarīra* and so on are not explicitly mentioned in the *Bhagavad Gītā*.⁶ One is bound to wonder if the many people who have read this famous didactic poem, but are not very well

1 See also G. Meautis, *The Theosophist* XLVI. II, p. 591 ff.

2 Mahābhārata VI, 830-1532; *Vier Texte*, p. 31 ff. and many other editions.

3 See above, pp. 183-184 and below, Section 37.

4 B I, p. 18, note 44. B 53, p. 171.

5 *op. cit.*, p. 178.

6 A. Besant's translation (*The Bhagavad-Gītā or the Lord's Song*, 1904 etc.) of XVII. 6 (= 1432) is "Me... seated in the inner body". Deussen (*Vier Texte*, p. 97) has "I who stay in your body". The original has *Śarīrastham*, that is, "standing in the body". *Śarīra* is thus named, although *linga-śarīra* is not.

acquainted with Indian thought, realise that *buddhi*, *manas* and so on are usually intended to be thought of as of fine matter here? One is also inclined to wonder whether those who write about the *Gītā* really make this characteristic, which is in itself quite certain, emerge with sufficient clarity.

There is also repeated reference to *prāṇa*—"life-breaths" or "inhalation and exhalation"—in the *Gītā*. I should also like to point out that, in II, 22, the image of taking off clothes is used: "so casting off worn out bodies", "thus the bearer of the body (the soul) puts off the old bodies and puts on new ones".¹ This can, however, be explained easily as referring to the transmigration of souls and to the entering of new, ordinary bodies—it may, but does not necessarily, refer to the using and casting aside of subtle bodies. The well-known image of clothes for the body is certainly used here,² but this is also employed for the ordinary body.³

The theme of the *Gītā* may be regarded as being situated at the "level of the subject"⁴—the dialogue between Arjuna and his charioteer, who turns out to be the divine Kṛṣṇa, is, as it were, a "conversation" between two tendencies within one and the same soul.⁵ In the case of the *Gītā*, the soul as a whole is represented as having its place in a chariot, in which both figures are seated.⁶ What, then, is the situation with regard to the theme of the *vehicle* in Indian thought? This chapter is probably the best place in which to make an attempt to answer this question.

It is important to make certain distinctions here. In section 26 of this part of the book, I discussed the vehicle theme in general, with special reference to its occurrence in the history of religion and art. The point of departure for this was that the image of the vehicle or *ochēma* was used especially by the neo-Platonists for the body of the soul which consists of fine matter. Reasoning backwards from this point, I asked myself whether ancient man might perhaps also have thought of something of fine matter in contexts in which it was not said quite so explicitly as in neo-Platonism, whenever there was mention of a carriage or chariot, in which man rode, for example, after death to heaven. This might, for example, have been the case in the *Phaedrus*,

1 *Vier Texte*, p. 40.

2 See above, pp. 29, 180.

3 See above, pp. 119-120.

4 See C. G. Jung, for example, *Über die Energetik der Seele*. pp. 162-163.

5 See A. Besant, *Hints on the Study of the Bhagavad Gita* (1906), 1946, p. 9.

6 See above, p. 138.

when Plato compared the soul with a chariot drawn by two horses and talked about the carriages in which Zeus and the other gods went out. The neo-Platonists themselves established a link between their use of *ochēma* and for the vehicle of fine matter of the soul and these well-known places in the *Phaedrus*.¹ One can also go a step further and wonder whether the artist who portrayed the soul as a chariot drawn by two horses was thinking of something of fine matter.² Of course, he used an *image* and other images are also possible and have in fact been used, a good example being that of the soul-bird.³ Did he, however, think of anything of fine matter in this context? We certainly have an analogous case or precedent here. Whenever ancient man—like primitive man—discussed the soul as a *form*, for example, as a miniature man or “mannikin”, we may assume that he did not think of this shape or form as something completely immaterial, as modern man does in accordance with anthropological dualism, but rather as a fine ethereal being.⁴ This is also, in my opinion, a characteristic of Indian thought.⁵ What, then, is the situation with regard to the vehicle theme in Indian philosophy?

In Indian antiquity too, the carriage and the chariot with a charioteer were, of course, things which attracted a great deal of attention.⁶ They were therefore obvious material for use as images. I have already pointed out, earlier in this part of the book, that the comparison of the soul with a carriage drawn by horses and guided and controlled by a charioteer is frequently met with in Indian literature, for example, in the Yajurveda,⁷ in certain places in the Katha Upaniṣad,⁸ in the Maitri Upaniṣad⁹ and in one of the Buddhist Jātakas.¹⁰ In this, sometimes *buddhi* and sometimes *manas* is called the charioteer who keeps the lower factors of the soul—represented by the horses—in check. To this list, we can also add, for example, the Anu Gītā 51, 3 (—1426), where we read “The *manas* harnesses the organs of the senses, as the charioteer

1 See above, pp. 139-140.

2 See plate 3 and p. 138.

3 See above, p. 136. In Indian thought, the theme of the bird as the soul occurs especially in the form of a *swan*. See, for example, B. I, p. 17; see also above, p. 143, note 1.

4 See above, pp. 101-102.

5 See above, p. 163 ff.

6 See above, pp. 132-133.

7 See above, p. 139; see also B I, p. 12.

8 II, 3 and 7.

9 III, 2; see also B I, p. 35.

10 VI, p. 252; see also above, p. 139,

harnesses good horses".¹ There is certainly a striking analogy here with the passage in Plato's *Phaedrus*, in which the soul is compared with a chariot drawn by two horses of very different calibre, while the higher element in the soul drives them.²

What is there, however, to be said about fine materiality in connection with this vehicle theme? All that one can say with certainty is that there is, in Indian thought, no direct analogy with the Greek usage of such a word as *ochēma* (vehicle) for the body of the soul consisting of fine matter. A word or term which is comparable to the Greek word is not known to me at least and no such word occurs among the various terms which I listed in section 35 for the subtle, inner body. It is, of course, true, that one can reason indirectly and say that, since *buddhi* and *manas* were as a rule thought of as being of fine matter,³ fine materiality was also thought of at the same time as the image of the chariot of the soul driven by them was used. In neo-Platonism too, *ochēma* was only an image (like the soul-bird and so on⁴). But Indian thought does not say explicitly that the body of fine matter is intended by the chariot. What is more, in neo-Platonism, *ochēma* was used as a single image. In the example that I have given, both in the *Katha Upaniṣad* and elsewhere in Indian thought and in the *Phaedrus* of Plato, the image is not a single one—the charioteer and the horses are contrasted with each other.

There is, however, in Sanskrit literature, a word which at once arrests our attention in this context. This is *vimāna*, which, according to Böhtlingk and Roth's dictionary, means "a) a carriage of the gods similar to a palace and flying through the air (in legends generally a carriage travelling through the air) . . . b) palace; c) ship, boat; d) horse". The first is the principal meaning—*vimāna* is above all a heavenly chariot and it is as such that it occurs again and again in the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyana*.⁵ In the first place, then this is a mythological datum like the hammer of Hephaestus or the body of the Centaurs. The descriptions of the *vimānas* in the *Mahābhārata*, however, are so literal that a writer such as V. Raghavan, in his *Yantras or Mechanical Contrivances in Ancient India*, called them "aerial vehicles" (p. 14) or "aircraft" (p. 19). It has even been suggested that what we have here

1 *Vier Texte*, p. 991.

2 247 B; see also above, p. 139.

3 See above, pp. 182, 200.

4 See F. Cumont, *Lux Perpetua*; see also above, p. 144, note 4.

5 See Böhtlingk, under the word *Vimāna*.

is perhaps a tradition concerning people who might have possessed their own kind of aircraft or a type of flying saucer.¹ I prefer to remain at a safe distance from this assumption. What really interests me is not aircraft at the physical level, but the question as to whether something that is situated at the level of fine matter is possibly indicated by these *vimānas*. As I have already observed, this has not been the case explicitly either with the other Sanskrit words for vehicle or with this term, at least as far as I know. Has it then been so implicitly? The first thing that strikes us in this connection is that *vimāna* was not usually employed for a permanent vehicle belonging to one individual and, what is more, especially in connection with gods. The following passage occurs, for example, in Book I, Canto, XLIV ("The Descent of Ganga") of Valmiki's Rāmāyana:

The Gods themselves from every sphere,
Incomparably bright,
Borne in their golden cars drew near
To see the wondrous sight.
The cloudless sky was all aflame
With the light of a hundred suns
Where'er the shining chariots came
That bore those holy ones.²

The Mahābhārata also refers again and again to the gods being transported in *vimānas* (translated as "celestial cars") and to messengers from heaven arriving in this way.³ The *vimāna* of Indra, the principal god, which is driven by Mātali, the "celestial charioteer", is one that is especially mentioned.

There is a striking similarity here with the Phaedrus which not only contains the vehicle theme as an image of the soul (with the two horses, one of which sometimes pulls the chariot downwards), but which also mentions the riding of the gods—especially Zeus—in vehicles (literally *ochēmata*). What is more, these chariots of the gods run smoothly, unlike those of men.⁴ Apart from the fact that all the chroniclers of these myths were more or less primitive men and therefore thought, not in abstract and immaterial terms, but in fairly realistic and material terms,⁵ so that it is certainly possible to deduce that these images were

1 B 14 III, p. 424.

2 Translated by R. T. H. Griffith, 1915, p. 62.

3 For example, Vana Parva XLII; LV; CLXVII; Udyoga Parva CIII.

4 246 E, 247 B; see also above, pp. 132, 140.

5 See above, p. 138 (Kristensen); see also above p. 166-167.

used by them in a fairly literal and perhaps even fine material sense, we may, with a little good will, reason in the following way. In the first place, *ochēma* or vehicle is used explicitly in neo-platonists for the body of the soul consisting of fine matter. Secondly the, neo-Platonists themselves were aware of a connection between this theory, which they held, and the use of *ochēma* (*ta*) in the Phaedrus. Thirdly, the *theōn ochēmata* in Plato's myth are very similar to the *vimānas* or "celestial cars" of Indian mythology. In the fourth place, it cannot therefore be ruled out that *vimāna* also has a meaning which is intended to signify the appearance (in fine matter) of an inhabitant of higher spheres.

This deduction is made even more probable by a number of details. The *vimānas* are not simply used as vehicles in which the gods are seen—they are also connected directly with men. For example, as a special favour, Indra lends his *vimāna* to Arjūna, who is permitted to use it to visit other worlds, in other words, during an excursion or ascension to heaven.¹ This is, of course, reminiscent of Elijah's ascension (2 Kings 2. 11-12) in a chariot of fire to heaven. There are also other cases of men being taken up to heaven in a chariot. I have already written about this earlier in Part II of this book and asked then whether the higher, finer vehicle of the soul itself was not meant by this chariot, as it was by the *ochēma* of the neo-Platonists.²

The use of Indra's chariot does not, moreover, take place entirely without Arjūna's participation: "He that hath not ascetic merit it not competent to even see or touch this car, far less to ride it".³ And, when Arjūna rides in Indra's chariot on another occasion, he is praised by the "celestial charioteer", Mātali, who may perhaps be the *psycho pompos* on this excursion, because it is unprecedented that he has been in the chariot without swaying when it moved. Even Indra himself is usually jolted when the many horses begin to pull the chariot.⁴ It is apparently because of Arjūna's "ascetic merit" that he experiences the opposite of what happens in the Phaedrus, where the rider of the human *ochēma* has insufficient control over the vehicle and the horses threaten to go in different directions, whereas the *theōn ochēmata* the chariots of the gods, ride smoothly.

1 For example, Vana Parva XLII ff; CLXVI.

2 See above, p. 140.

3 Vana Parva, Section XLII, ed. P. C. Ray 1889, p. 133.

4 *ibid.*, Section CLXVIII, p. 500.

In another part of the Vana Parva, the Maudgalya legend, a "celestial messenger" comes up to this figure in a "car yoked with swans and cranes"¹ and says to him: "O sage, do thou ascend into this chariot, earned by thy acts. Thou hast attained the fruit of thy asceticism!" The messenger then describes heaven, which is full of "celestial cars". Atheists, untruthful people and those whose lives have not been ascetic cannot, however, go to heaven. Those who live there are "resplendent" in appearance (this can be compared with the mysticism of light), because of their own actions, not because of those of their parents. People no longer soil their clothes (the theme of garments again!) and their "garlands" (these can be compared with the garlands or crowns of Apoc. 4. 10, Prov. 4. 9 and so on) no longer wither in heaven. "And, O Brahmāna, they yoke such cars as this (that I have brought)."² Windisch's translation of this passage is as follows: "Those who reach there are given fiery bodies, coming from their *karma* and not from a father or a mother... Their delightful garlands full of celestial perfume do not wither and they are equipped with such chariots of the gods!"³ Windisch also says that the origin and the nature of the inhabitants of heaven are particularly clearly formulated in this passage in the Mahābhārata. When man becomes active in that sphere, then he receives a *vimāna*, a "celestial car". It looks therefore as though *vimāna* does (also) have a meaning similar to the one that *ochēma* has—that of an individual vehicle of fine matter. If, however, I am mistaken in this opinion and there is in fact no analogy between *ochēma* and *vimāna* in this sense, this is not a disaster for my argument, because the existence of a body of fine matter is explicitly taught, and quite sufficiently so, elsewhere in Indian philosophy in a different way (as *linga-śartra* and so on). Since this is undoubtedly the case, it is obvious that fine materiality was also thought of in Indian philosophy in a number of other cases, such as that of the form or shape of the soul and also, at least implicitly, in this case of the *vimānas*, insofar as they are "celestial cars".⁴

1 Here the themes of the vehicle and the bird are clearly united.

2 *op. cit.*, Section CCLVIII-CCLIX, pp. 770-772.

3 B. 178, p. 186) see also above, p. 139.

4 I have unfortunately not succeeded in finding anything in the history of Indian art which has as its subject a *vimāna* as a flying chariot. My illustration (plate 6), taken from H. Zimmer, *The Art of Indian Asia*, 1955, plate 354: Konarak, Temple of the Sun, photograph by Eliot Elisofon, copyright Time Inc., shows the other aspect of the concept of *vimāna*—a chariot of the size of a palace or temple. See above, p. 203.




Plate 6

37. THE SĀNKHYA

Now that I have discussed one or two aspects of our subject in the epic period, I should like to consider the classical period in rather more detail.¹ This is the period of the great systems and, as far as Brahmanism is concerned, of the six classical *darśanas*. There is, of course, no need for me to give a full exposition of the whole of Indian thought during this period, as all that really interests us here is what has to do with our special subject. As I have already pointed out in section 34, the combined *darśana* Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika was opposed to the doctrine of the subtle body, whereas the Yoga system was, in this respect at least, very much in tune with it.² The Purva Mimāṃsa is more properly a treatise on ritual and *dharma* and not, strictly speaking, a philosophical system.³ This absolves me of the duty of discussing these four *darśanas* further in this book. What is, however, very interesting is that the other two *darśanas*, in which hyllic pluralism does occur, are at the same time the best known and the most widespread systems. The Sāṅkhya is rather less well known and widely spread than the Vēdānta, but there can be no doubt that it is a very important and influential philosophy.

Like the ideas contained in the Vedānta (the "end of the Vēda"), those of the Sāṅkhya system go back to very early times and writings. Mrs. Rhys Davids, for example, spoke of a "proto-Sāṅkhya" in her *The Birth of Indian Psychology and its Development in Buddhism*.⁴ In his *Die Samkhya-Philosophie, eine Darstellung des Induschen Rationalismus* (1894, 1917), R. Garbe discussed explicitly in which of the Upaniṣads these ideas first occurred and there has also been at least one publication devoted entirely to this question of the "early" Sāṅkhya.⁵ Sāṅkhya ideas are also expressed in the Mahābhārata—for example, in the important part of it known as the Bhagavad Gītā.⁶ On the other hand, however, later forms of the Sāṅkhya also occur, in an attempt to overcome the sharp dualism of the system.⁷ The influence of the Sāṅkhya system, then, lasted for centuries, although its influential period was, of course, shorter than that of the Vedānta, which ulti-

1 See above, p. 153.

2 See above, pp. 188-189.

3 See B 124 II, p. 28; B 185, p. 483 ff; see also above, p. 154.

4 B 186, p. 135.

5 E. H. Johnston, *Early Samkhya*, 1937.

6 See, for example, B 1, p. 49 ff; B 58, p. 135 ff.

7 See B 52, p. 108 and elsewhere.

mately predominated. I shall, in this section, be principally concerned with the classical Sāṅkhya.

I have already given a very brief summary of the content of the Sāṅkhya system.¹ What characterises this system is the consistent dualism of *puruṣas* or spiritual monads on the one hand and *prakṛiti* or primordial matter on the other. What is very remarkable and directly concerns our theme is that it is not a question here of a Cartesian dualism,² according to which the soul, with its attribute or basic quality of thought, is sharply contrasted with the body, with its attribute of extensiveness and quantitative, not qualitative definition. On the contrary, the dividing line is elsewhere in the Sāṅkhya—one might almost say higher. According to Indian philosophy, it is precisely thought—all the factors of the soul as *buddhi*, *ahamkāra*, *manas* and so on—were on the other side, that of primordial nature or *prakṛiti*. Abegg had this to say about this matter: "It is fundamental to the psychology of the Sāṅkhya . . . that it attributes the consciousness as such to the *puruṣa*, but teaches that the empirical events of the soul take place in the soul. . . . In this way, psychology is placed within the wider framework of the natural philosophy of the Sāṅkhya. . . ."³ This would be inconceivable to Cartesianism. All kinds of consequences result, of course, from drawing such a different dividing line. Descartes' thinking soul is active. The Sāṅkhya system, on the other hand, places all activity, all becoming, in nature or *prakṛiti* (and especially in the changing combinations of the three *gunas*,⁴ which are at the basis of all visible changes). The only function that is left for the *puruṣas* to fulfil is that of a spectator—they are conscious and knowing, but they are also unmoved, even by blessedness.⁵ This relationship between the *puruṣas* and the *prakṛiti* is, of course, strange, but it clearly leads to far fewer difficulties with regard to the interaction between the two heterogeneous factors and their influence on each other than is the case in Cartesianism, according to which two active factors are opposed to each other.

It will be immediately clear from this fundamental dualism of the Sāṅkhya why the doctrine of the *linga-śarīra*, the body of the soul consisting of fine matter, was bound to occupy such an important place

1 See above, p. 155.

2 See, for example, J. Sinha, *Indian Psychology* (1934), p. 125.

3 B 1, p. 54.

4 These "subtle substances": B 185, I, p. 244; see also B 52, p. 116.

5 See, for example, B 1, pp. 52-53; see also above, p. 155.

in it. What is more, the whole of the psychical reality, all the phenomena of the consciousness, come, according to this philosophy, under the heading of *prakṛiti*—primordial nature or matter. Since these phenomena are, to some extent, clearly different from ordinary matter, they are bound to consist of *fine* matter. This however, is precisely what I said, on the basis of detailed argument, in section 33, which dealt with, among other things, Indian psychology in general, in other words, that the different factors of the soul are not, as usually happens in Western psychology, regarded as immaterial in Indian psychology and above all in the Sāṅkhya system, but as “organs of fine matter”.¹ Furthermore, the subtle body or *linga-śarīra* consists of these organs, of which a varying number has been listed,² Connected with these are the fine elements, usually known as *tanmātras*.³ Even *karma*, the bond between one life and the next, is traced back to the *prakṛiti* and is regarded as material.⁴ When the (periodic) world pause ends, the inner body comes into being once more for the non-redeemed souls.⁵ In this way, the *event* takes place continuously within *prakṛiti* and, as far as the psychical element is concerned, something is of fine matter is always involved in this process—either each of the “organs of fine matter” or the *linga-śarīra* as a whole.

The *puruṣas* are, as it were on the other side of this dividing line. These are “pure consciousness”,⁶ “a purely spiritual being”,⁷ “a mere witness”, “an eternal subject which can never become an object”⁸ and immaterial.⁹ To this extent, the Sāṅkhya is a —pluralistic-spiritualism.¹⁰ In other words, unlike earlier, more or less primitive Indian thought, in which the immaterial did not figure at all, development in the direction of spiritualisation had clearly reached a milestone in the Sāṅkhya.¹¹ As Arbman has said, by this “process of peeling off”, through which everything that was not spiritual was referred to the other side of the dividing line, that of *prakṛiti*, “spiritualisation” went further in India than it has “hardly” ever done “in the West”.¹² The *neti neti*—the

1 See above, pp. 182-183) see also B 1, p. 59.

2 B 28, I, 3, p. 448; B 185 II, p. 74) see also above, p. 184.

3 See, for example Garbe, *op. cit.*, p. 300; B 178, p. 82.

4 B 52, p. 115; see also above, pp. 192-193.

5 Garbe, *op. cit.*, p. 329; see also above, p. 194.

6 B 52, p. 376.

7 B 53, p. 390.

8 B 53, p. 209.

9 B 58, p. 139.

10 *ibid.*, p. 137.

11 See above, section 31, for example, p. 169.

12 B 187 II, pp. 121-130; see above, p. 169.

ātman or *puruṣa* is neither this nor that—has therefore been, since the time of Yājñavalkya,¹ a typical theme in Indian philosophy, a negative method, which is also expressed in this “peeling off” of the Sāṅkhya.

Even though there are fewer concrete difficulties concerning the *influxus* than there are in Cartesianism, for example, the relationship between the *puruṣas* and the *prakṛiti* is still not easy to imagine. It is true that there is, according to the Sāṅkhya, no *influxus physicus*, because the *puruṣa*, being entirely passive, does not influence the body, or more correctly, the bodies, since the *linga-śarīra* is also included here. What kind of relationship is it, then? The image used for this relationship in the Sāṅkhya is that of the blind man³ non-spiritual but active matter, carrying the lame man, the passive but conscious spirit, out of the primeval forest.² This is, however, only an image and it is true, as Abegg has said, that “all connection between them is merely apparent”.³ I have, in other books, used the expression “a relationship *quand même*” for any relationship which is not present and yet which is, in one way or another, present.⁴ This referred precisely to the subject which could never be made the object.⁵

Be this as it may, this sharp and consistent division of all that happens, including the psychical, from the purely spiritual principle is, in any case, a very profound idea. If what emerges from this division is that all that happens is called material, if not of ordinary, then of finer matter, then it is, in my opinion, not reasonable to dismiss this idea of organs of thought composed of fine matter, united with a subtle body or *linga-śarīra*, as a survival from primitive thinking. According to von Glasenapp, the Sāṅkhya is based on primitive ideas of “material potencies”.⁶ Arbman also has a heading entitled “Psyche and Linga Śarīra. Primitive Zuge in der nachvedischen Philosophie” (“Psyche and Linga-Śarīra. Primitive Characteristics in the Post-Vedic Philosophy”).⁷ Clearly, something does not quite tally here, if it is true, as Arbman has said, that spiritualisation reached a higher peak here than it has “hardly” ever done “in the West”.⁸ The opposite could perhaps be true, namely that the psychical, precisely because of this, presents it-

1 B 185 I, p. 44.

2 Sāṅkhya-Kārikā 21; see B 28, I, 3, p. 434; B 1, p. 79; B 58, p. 139.

3 B 1, p. 78.

4 *Tweeërlei Subjectiviteit* (B 114), p. 390 and elsewhere.

5 *op. cit.*, p. 388, 144.

6 B 52, p. 107; see above p. 172.

7 B 187, II p. 127; see above, p. 168, 172.

8 B 187, II, p. 121; see above, p. 169, 209.

self as something material in a wider sense, in other words, as consisting of fine matter, since Indian philosophers took fundamental objectivisation,¹ the *neti neti*, so seriously.

Within this whole context, we can now try to find an answer to this necessary question: to which of the four *metaphysical standpoints*,² which can form the background to a philosophy which teaches hylic pluralism, can the Sāṅkhya, and especially the classical Sāṅkhya, be said to belong? It is quite certain that the Sāṅkhya does teach hylic pluralism in the striking form of a subtle body, known as the *linga-śāstra*. According to Oltramare, it was even under the influence of the Sāṅkhya that the doctrine of the subtle body became "common property" in Hinduism.³ The Sāṅkhya probably also had an influence on the similar doctrine of the *sukṣma-śāstra* of the Vedānta. Hylic pluralism is therefore firmly established.

Two of the four possible standpoints can thus be eliminated at once. Since the Sāṅkhya in any case also teaches an immaterial being—the *puruṣas*—the beta standpoint or dualistic materialism, which regards matter of various degrees of fineness as the highest reality, cannot be applied here the same is true of the zeta standpoint—there is no indication that matter—for example, ordinary matter, but clearly also subtle matter—is not regarded as real in the Sāṅkhya. Consistent idealism is met with elsewhere, in the Indian doctrine of *māyā*, especially in the Vedānta, but it is not encountered anywhere in this *darśana*.

We are therefore left with the delta and the gamma standpoints. The delta standpoint teaches not only that God is immaterial—this is precisely the position taken by the gamma standpoint—but also that the immortal souls are immaterial. At first sight, then, it seems as though we should opt for the delta standpoint—the purely spiritual *puruṣas* are in that case on the same footing as the immortal souls of, for example, the neo-Platonists or the thinkers of the Renaissance, who also taught that these souls had a body of fine matter or an *ochēma* at their disposal. Other considerations, however, become apparent on closer examination. The classical Sāṅkhya was definitely atheistic.⁴ This cannot be said of the epic Sāṅkhya⁵ and it was not affirmed in the earlier views that there were many *puruṣas*—what was affirmed was

1 See also above, p. 16.

2 See above, p. 148.

3 *op. cit.*, p. 246; see above, p. 184.

4 See, for example, B 58, p. 136; B 52, p. 108.

5 *ibid.*

that there was basically only one *puruṣa*.¹ But this was not consistent Sāṅkhya teaching, but rather a mixture of philosophies, approximating either the doctrine of the one *ātman* of some of the Upaniṣads or the typical basic theme of the Vedānta. Similarly, other writers tried to diminish the sharp contrast between the *puruṣas* and *prakṛiti* in the Sāṅkhya.² This, however, is eclecticism in the bad sense. What we are now concerned with here is the classical Sāṅkhya which was taught as a great philosophical system and which exerted a great influence.

In view of the fact that this classical Sāṅkhya was atheistic, this system cannot simply be called an example of the delta standpoint, which accepts the existence of God.³ Can we therefore include it under the gamma standpoint? We cannot, because, according to this standpoint, everything is material, consisting either of ordinary or of fine matter, with one exception, namely God, who is immaterial. Even the soul is, according, for example, to Origen, of fine matter.⁴ The Sāṅkhya, on the other hand, teaches a pluralistic spiritualism, in other words, that many immaterial souls exist. It cannot therefore be included either under the delta standpoint or under the gamma standpoint.

I should like to suggest that it forms a *transition* between these two standpoint. It is, in my opinion, not an entirely new standpoint, which would upset my whole division into metaphysical standpoints, but a pure transition of such a kind that the *puruṣas* take over, as it were, the part played by the transcendent deity of the other two standpoints. In this transitional stage occupied by the Sāṅkhya, the transcendent deity of the gamma standpoint on the one hand ceases to function and, on the other hand, the normal souls of the delta standpoint, which are active within the world, cease to play a part.

The *puruṣas* are just as *transcendent* as the deity of the gamma standpoint. Just as this is situated in its uniqueness above the whole of creation, so too are the *puruṣas* of the Sāṅkhya placed unaffected above the *prakṛiti*. Just as the whole of creation is, according to the gamma

1 B 53, p. 209.

2 B 52, p. 108.

3 Garbe has compared neo-Platonism with the Sāṅkhya and was of the opinion that the Indian system had an effect on the Greek philosophy. (Op. cit., p. 130 ff.) He did, however, point out other similarities apart from a possible transcendent deity. Plotinus was explicit in his teaching about the latter and, to this extent, his philosophy was certainly an example of the delta standpoint. (See above, p. 45.)

4 See above, p. 40.

standpoint, of (fine) matter ("everything that works is material"¹), so too is everything that happens to be included under the *prakṛiti* in the Sāṅkhya. Just as Origen and others regarded the soul as always expressing itself by means of a body, even, for example, after death, so too did the Sāṅkhya regard all the factors of the soul—even those as high as *buddhi*, *manas* and so on—as "organs of fine matter". The homogeneity of the whole of material creation (of fine matter) of the gamma standpoint of the West is thus equalled by the homogeneity of everything—*śarīras*, *gunas*, *tanmātras* and so on—belonging to the *prakṛiti* of the Sāṅkhya. On the other hand, the *puruṣas* are burdened with the same conceptual difficulties as the transcendent deity. In my *Tweeterlei Subjectiviteit*, I suggested that the supra-subject, the subject that can never be made the object, amounts to the aspect of the deity which is related to the theory of knowledge² and that it can only be known *quand même*,³ whereas the relationship between this supra-subject and the whole multiplicity could never be fully thought out and was a fundamental paradox.⁴ The same difficulties are encountered in thinking out the relationship between the conscious, but passive and unmoved *puruṣas* and the *prakṛiti*. The *puruṣas* resemble God in the form of the unmoved mover of Aristotle, in which, in my opinion, the fundamental paradox is also to be found.⁵

As far as the similarity between the classical Sāṅkhya and the delta standpoint is concerned, this standpoint teaches that there are many normally active and immortal souls (which also possess a vehicle of fine matter—without this vehicle of the soul, we should be dealing with the epsilon standpoint). The *puruṣas*, on the other hand, are not active, but are as passive as Aristotle's God and possess so few qualities that the "negative theology", as composed with regard to God, could not wish for anything better. Here we have to bear in mind a point to which I have not yet explicitly drawn attention. It is this. It is not the *puruṣas* which possess, according to the Sāṅkhya, all kinds of qualities, such as goodness, wisdom, asceticism, strength and so on as well as their opposites; on the contrary, all these differences

1 See above, pp. 39-40, 148. This saying applies to the gamma and to the beta standpoint. The gamma standpoint also accepts an immaterial deity, but, precisely because of this statement, is inclined to regard this deity as non-active.

2 B 114, p. 516 ff.

3 *op. cit.*, p. 515, note 1; see also above, p. 210.

4 *op. cit.*, p. 508.

5 See B 177, p. 230 and B 114, p. 480.

can be traced back to differences in the respective *linga-śartras*.¹ The different, active souls of the delta standpoint are therefore included, according to the Sāṅkhya, under *prakṛiti*. It should furthermore not be forgotten that *linga* means characteristic,² with the result that *linga-śartra* has been called the "characteristic body".³ In other words, is the *principium individuationis*, the reason why there are many individuals, perhaps to be found in the divergent *śartras*? Here, however, we must call a halt. If this idea is thought of in its strict sense, then we leave the Sāṅkhya and enter the Vedānta, which teaches that the individual differences are situated in the *upādhis* or limitations, and here we are at once dealing with an individual soul and not with God—the *jīva* is the *ātman* clothed with the *upādhis*.⁴ The Sāṅkhya does sometimes speak about *upādhis* or limitations,⁵ but does not go so far as the Vedānta. The Vedānta, in its most consistent form, that is, in Śaṅkara, says basically nothing but the one *ātman* exists and that the individual souls are really nothing but that one *ātman*. The classical Sāṅkhya, on the other hand, teaches explicitly a pluralism of *puruṣas* and nothing about this except perhaps that these *puruṣas* do not diverge from each other in their qualities.

This pluralism is a point which one cannot, in my opinion, fail to criticise. The Sāṅkhya is certainly associated with the ordinary reality which makes us aware of the existence of many individuals. If, however, the *neti neti*, through which more and more is attributed to the *prakṛiti*, is consistently applied, the *multiplicity* of the *puruṣas* must also be given up, as belonging to the *prakṛiti*. The transcendent is, after all, one. The Sāṅkhya is trying to maintain two ideas at the same time here. Radhakrishnan apparently agrees with me here, since he has this to say about the philosophy of the Sāṅkhya: "Only a pluralistic prejudice which has no logical basis asserts itself, and we have a plurality of souls. When the pluralism collapses, as it does at the first touch of logic, the Sāṅkhya theory becomes identical with the pure monism here sketched"—a "pure monism" such as that of the "Advaita Vedantins".⁶

1 See Garbe *op. cit.*, p. 330; see also above, p. 192. (If this is accepted, what are the consequences of it for accountability? See also B 115, p. 79 ff.)

2 See above, p. 192.

3 Oltramare, *op. cit.*, p. 245; see also above, p.

4 See above, p. 192.

5 *Aupadhiśa*: see B 1, p. 80.

6 B 124, I, p. 37, note 1.

It is, however, precisely because of this weakness of the multiplicity or pluralism of the *puruṣas* that the Sāṅkhya forms a transition between the delta and the gamma standpoints—if the multiplicity of souls were regarded as belonging to the homogeneous *prakṛiti*, then a full gamma standpoint, that is, complete homogeneity of everything created, of everything that exists in the concrete and in multiplicity or primordial nature with, on the other hand, only one different and really transcendent factor, would be attained. In that case, there would no longer be any multiplicity of immaterial, inactive *puruṣas* or “spiritual monads” or any classical Sāṅkhya.

In conclusion, I should like to make one more point. In one other respect, the Sāṅkhya is not entirely consistent. It called the *puruṣas* spiritual or immaterial, but at the same time also called them spatial¹ and it was disputed whether the *puruṣas* had to be regarded as infinitely small or as infinitely large.² They were also referred to as a constant, “pure and calm light of consciousness”.³ Both of these ideas seem to be rather hylic pluralistic and, insofar as the *prakṛiti* is characteristically composed of (fine) matter, it would also seem as though the dividing line between the *puruṣas* and the *prakṛiti* was not entirely exact. From the purely logical point of view, the system ought, for these reasons, to collapse.

Furthermore, if one wishes to break down the content of the Sāṅkhya, then it is possible to go in two directions. In the first place, it is possible to tend in the direction of the Vedānta, which teaches that there are not many immaterial *puruṣas*, but that there is only one—the one, eternal *Atman*. One can, however, also go in a different direction. If the many souls disappear in this way, it can be said that no souls at all remain and that this one *Atman* is so intangible that not very much difference exists between it and, for example, *nirvāṇa*. At the more real level, however, there are also no more souls and, unless these are introduced in one way or another, there is only *prakṛiti*, that is *śartras* and *upādhis* or limitations, at that level. Instead of many souls, it is therefore possible to propose the one soul or spirit (*ātman*) or to conclude that there is no place at all for souls. As we shall see later, this is the way followed by Buddhism. According to its content, then, the Sāṅkhya is, on the one hand, quite close to the Vedānta.

1 A variation of the delta standpoint also occurs, according to which the soul is immaterial, but also has spatial qualities.

2 Garbe, *op. cit.*, p. 360; see also B 58, p. 139.

3 B 53, p. 209.

On the other hand, however, it also allows for the development from its doctrines of Buddhism, the teaching of which is also often called atheistic. An affinity has certainly been accepted between the Sāṅkhya and Buddhism¹ and Garbe was of the opinion that no Sāṅkhya doctrines occurred in pre-Buddhistic Indian literature.²

38. THE VEDĀNTA

We now come to the most well known *darśana*—the Vedānta. It should be noted first of all that this philosophy covers a very long period of time. On the one hand, its roots extend farther into the past than those of the Sāṅkhya—as the name Vedānta, Veda-end,³ indicates, it is linked to the early Vedas. On the other hand, it gradually acquired a leading position in Indian thought,⁴ with the result that it is regarded as the national philosophy⁵ of the Hindus. It is therefore only to be expected that its content will be rich and pluriform and that it is bound to have undergone many changes in the course of time. Nonetheless, one doctrine is central in the Vedānta—the essential unity existing between the *jīva*, the individual *ātman* or soul, and the world-soul, the one *Atman* or *Brahman*. The differences that exist between various thinkers or schools of Vedantic philosophy refer more to the elaboration of this basic theme and to elements of secondary importance.

I have already mentioned the Vedānta repeatedly⁶ and I do not wish to repeat what I have already said. As a philosophy which claims to provide the best interpretation of the real content of the Vedas, it was created by Bādarāyana,⁷ while the later texts often take the form of a commentary on his rather obscure Vedānta-sūtras or Brahma-sūtras. Gaudapāda (ca. 750 A.D.) gave an idealistic orientation to the Vedānta. The system was later elaborated extremely consistently by Śaṅkara (born ca. 788 A.D.). According to Śaṅkara's doctrine of *advaita*, the One Self is without a second (*a-dvaita*) and, after *Brahman*, everything is basically *māyā* or illusion. Śaṅkara thus clearly affirmed a strict monism. Later thinkers, such as Rāmānuja, did not agree

1 There is, for example, a striking similarity between the *gunas* of the Sāṅkhya and the *dharma*s of Buddhism; see B 58, p. 141.

2 *op. cit.*, p. 26 ff.

3 B 53, p. 147, B 52, P 140.

4 B 58, p. 294.

5 B 52, p. 157.

6 See above, for example, pp. 155-156; 169; 178; 190 ff, etc.

7 The period when he lived is not known; see B 28, I, 3, p. 583.

with this theory. I cannot, however, go into the many later schools of thought, which often developed into sects, here.¹

An obvious and important place is occupied in the Vedānta, just as it is in the Sāṅkhya, by hylic pluralism, in the form of the doctrine of a fine body, usually called here *sukṣma-śartra*, *sukṣma* meaning fine. The extremely far-reaching spiritualisation that took place in the Vedānta—Gaudapāda and Śāṅkara regarded the whole of the outside world as spiritual—does not detract from this fact of hylic pluralism in any way and I am, for this reason, bound to reject once again² von Glasenapp's affirmation that a subtle *śartra* is a relic of "primitive objectivisation".

Different Vedantists taught a somewhat different form of hylic pluralism. *Prāṇas*, life-breaths or vital capacities, are regularly mentioned in the Vedānta.³ This life-breath is the "organising principle of the coarse body",⁴ which is apparently situated at the level of what I have called the physiological *pneuma*.

The *sukṣma-śartra* is the subtle body in which the soul "migrates" from one coarse body to the other.⁵ The fine body, which survives after death, is thus situated at the level of what I have called the psychological *pneuma*. Deussen discussed the doctrine of the "fine body" in some detail.⁶ It is also referred to as *karma-āśraya*, which is what transfers the consequences of *karma* from one life to the other.⁷ On the other hand, like the Sāṅkhya, the Vedānta agreed with the physician Caraka that a third factor, in addition to the parents, also played a part at birth, namely the subtle body of the reincarnated soul.⁸

Among the later Vedantists, an explicit pluralism is also met with in connection with the subtle body. This was not the case with Bādarāyaṇa or even with Śāṅkara,⁹ but it is quite explicit in Sadānanda's Vedāntasāra (c. 1500 A.D.). Sadānanda made an explicit connection between the doctrine of the *sukṣma-śartra* and that of the five *kośas* or sheaths in the Taittiriya Upaniṣad.¹⁰ Von Glasenapp has included

1 See above, p. 156, note 1.

2 See above, p. 172 ff; 210-211.

3 See B 58, p. 230; Deussen, *Das System des Vedānta*, 1883, 2nd ed., 1906, p. 353 ff.

4 B 53, p. 393; See also above, p. 22.

5 See, for example, B 178, p. 80.

6 *op. cit.*, p. 309 ff; see above, p. 186.

7 *op. cit.*, p. 405; see also above, p. 193. Some of the Vedantists made a distinction between this causal body or *karana-śartra* and the *sukṣma-śartra*; see B 53, p. 393.

8 B 185, II, p. 312; see also above, pp. 186-187.

9 See B 187, II, p. 130.

10 See B 28, I, 3, p. 619, 627; see also above, p. 178.

(in B 53, p. 394) a table showing how these five *kośas* correspond with the ordinary, the fine and the causal body (which is named separately). I have already pointed out earlier in this book that the fifth sheath, or *ānandamaya-kośa*, is apparently situated at the level of what I have called the "sublime *pneuma*" (*ānanda*—bliss).¹

The various levels which I have distinguished in connection with hylic pluralism (not, it should be noted, dualism) are thus also apparent in the Vedānta.

I have already drawn attention to the fact that a very philosophical term was used in the Vedānta for the bodies of the soul—*upādhis* or limitations.² The basic idea here is that, without these limitations or qualities, the *jīva* or individual soul would not be the individual soul as such (the "infrsubject"), but the one *Atman*, *Brahman* or God. It is therefore clear that, as in the Sāṅkhya,³ but even more fundamentally, the idea of fine bodies is closely connected with the very heart of the Vedānta. Despite the fact that all these Indian systems constructed theoretical doctrines, they still remained first and foremost practical philosophies, directed above all and primarily towards man's redemption.⁴ Subtle bodies played a very important part in this redemption. The Indian view was certainly not that man, after discarding his ordinary body, would be ready to be taken up into an everlasting heaven.⁵ On the contrary, the Indians believed that he was bound to return to earth and that he could only achieve redemption gradually. For the whole of this time, he was tied to matter and not, at least according to the Sāṅkhya, the Vedānta and other systems, simply to the matter of the ordinary body, but also—and especially in the intervening time, that is, the period spent between two bodies—to the matter of the finer body, the *linga* or *sukṣma-śarīra*. These express his being bound to matter and form, as *karmana-śarīra*, the bond of fine matter between his different existences. Hence, when the world comes into being after a period of rest or *pralaya*, the unredeemed *jīvas* are at once clothed again with a fine body, which accompanies them constantly

1 See above, pp. 179-180. *Taijasa*, the luminous (see B 28, I, 3, pp. 528, 651). the expression used by Sadananda, also makes one think of the sublime *pneuma* in other contexts; see Part I, p. 50.

2 See above, p. 192.

3 See above, pp. 207-208, 212-213.

4 See above, pp. 152-153.

5 According to Christian theology, this would not take place until the resurrection. There is great diversity of opinion about what happens during the intervening period. According to one of these opinions, man perfects himself further in this intervening period while at the same time making use of a fine body; see above p. 31.

during their revealed existence (=psychohylism).¹ It is for all these reasons that the *śartras* are called *upādhis* or limitations. Without these limitations, or this limitation, the *jīva* would be equal to *Brahman*. These limitations are therefore the *principium individuationis*.²

The Vedānta takes the most consistent standpoint here as well. Other thinkers are of the opinion that an existence without a subtle body is possible—of many purely spiritual monads, individuals without limitations.³ According to Śāṅkara, however, the redeemed *jīva* is equal to Brahman and ceases to exist individually and to possess *śartras* with it, and *vice versa*. It is therefore not surprising that his opponents regarded him as pro-Buddhistic, even though he himself tried explicitly to disassociate himself from Buddhism.⁴ According to the Buddhist, limited individual existence also ceases when *nirvāṇa* is attained.

The Vedānta is, as I have said, more consistent than the Sāṅkhya, which accepts many spiritual *puruṣas*. This multiplicity or pluralism is rejected by the Vedānta, which teaches that, when the *jīva* discards all *upādhis* or limitations, it is identical with the one *Brahman*. This multiplicity is also a limitation.⁵ This is indeed a very grandiose conception—every small self or infrasubject is basically the one great self or suprasubject.⁶

To which of the metaphysical standpoints which I have distinguished does this system belong, then? I will try now to ascertain this as far as the founder of this system, Bādarāyana, and the philosophy of *advaita* of Gaudapāda and Śāṅkara are concerned.

As far as the Vedānta as a whole is concerned, several of the six standpoints can be discarded at once, as in the case of the Sāṅkhya.⁷ The alpha and the epsilon standpoints can be eliminated, because, unlike these two standpoints, the Vedānta proposes a hylic pluralism, and the beta standpoint or dualistic materialism can also be ruled out, because the Vedānta teaches the existence of something purely spiritual or immaterial, that is, the one *Brahman*, which is raised far above

1 See above, p. 193 ff.

2 See above, p. 192, 214.

3 See above, p. 195.

4 See B 52, p. 147.

5 With regard to the *upādhis* or *śartras*, the Vedānta therefore goes farther than the Sāṅkhya. According to the Sāṅkhya, individual differences are situated in the *śartras* (see above, p. 367-368), while a multiplicity of colourless *puruṣas* exists alongside these. According to the Vedānta, on the other hand, not only are the different qualities to be found in the *śartras*, but multiplicity itself, the basis of individual existence, is also situated in the presence of *upādhis*.

6 See B 114, among other places, pp. 526-527.

7 See above, p. 211.

the rest of the world and because of which the Vedānta reaches a high degree of spiritualisation.¹

The choice will therefore have to be made between the gamma, the delta and the zeta standpoints. In this case, we are not confronted by the difficulty which faced us in connection with the classical Sāṅkhya, which was atheistic, whereas both the gamma and the delta standpoints accept an immaterial, transcendent deity. Since the Vedānta accords a similar place to *Brahman*, we can therefore opt both for the gamma standpoint and for the delta standpoint in this case.

We must now make a distinction between the Vedānta of Bādarāyana and that of Gauṣapāda and Śaṅkara. The principal difference between these two forms of the Vedānta is that the first is realistic,² whereas the second is a far-reaching philosophy of idealism, which teaches that the whole of the known world, compared with *Brahman*, is simply illusion or *māyā*. The latter is typically what is taught by the zeta standpoint, which represents the most far-reaching spiritualism³ and which denies independent existence to all matter.

Bādarāyana did not go quite as far as this. Although a great deal of his teaching is very obscure, what is certain is that he did not advocate the *māyā* doctrine of the later Vedantists and that we have every reason to assume that he had a realistic view of the world. This means that his philosophy cannot be included under the zeta standpoint. Can he, then, be regarded as belonging to the gamma standpoint? According to this standpoint, the transcendent, immaterial principle is sharply contrasted with the rest, all that is manifested. This sharp dualism was characteristic of the Sāṅkhya, which was, as we have seen,⁴ very close to the gamma standpoint even though it did *not* accept, on the one side of the dividing line, the one transcendent deity as existing, but a multiplicity of purely spiritual *puruṣas*. Such a sharp dividing line does not exist in the case of Bādarāyana. In almost the whole of Indian philosophy, *buddhi*, *manas* and so on may have been regarded as consisting of fine matter, but Bādarāyana emphasised this less than, for example, the Sāṅkhya. Sometimes it even seems as though he accepts a multiplicity of immaterial *jīvas*. The *jīvas* may participate in the one *Atman* or *Brahman*, but Bādarāyana does not go so

1 See above, p. 169.

2 *Brahman* on the Vedānta of Bādarāyana is simply the cause of the emanation of the world; see B 58, p. 237.

3 See above, p. 56 ff. 148.

4 See above, pp. 214-215.

far as Śāṅkara in this—for him, the *jīva* is not strictly speaking identical with Brahman.¹ If, then, he appears to accept firstly, the one transcendent Brahman, secondly, many more or less immaterial and eternal² souls or *jīvātmas* and thirdly, that these souls are accompanied by a *sukṣma-śarīra*,³ then Bādarāyana's standpoint is practically the delta standpoint, like, for example, the neo-Platonists.

It is different in the case of Śāṅkara. Gaudapāda's philosophy was idealistic—the world is only a dream or *māyā*.⁴ His disciple Śāṅkara worked this out in detail. This "illusionism" belongs typically to the zeta standpoint, which represents extreme spiritualism, in which matter is seen to exist only as a phenomenon. In chapter 16 of Part I, which dealt with the zeta standpoint, I observed that hylic pluralism may or may not be possible within this standpoint. Even though everything is, according to Śāṅkara, appearance or *māyā*, differences of ordinary (apparent) matter and finer (apparent) matter can occur within these appearances. These differences were accepted by G. Berkeley, for example.⁵ The same is the case with Śāṅkara. He was an extreme spiritualist, according to whom nothing existed apart from the one Spirit, *Brahman*, the One without a second, *advaita*. At the same time he was also a hylic pluralist: "The fine body . . . together with the psychical organs exists as the garment of the soul from eternity and accompanies it on all its migrations".⁶ These fine bodies, *upādhis* or limitations are regarded as very fundamental in the Vedānta—far more than in the Śāṅkhya⁷—and the view is taken that without the *upādhis* the *jīva* would be equal to God, *Brahman*. Bādarāyana postulated the *jīvas* to some extent in contrast to God. Śāṅkara did not do this—for him, their multiplicity was a widespread illusion, but no more than an illusion. On the other hand, however, according to his teaching, all phenomenal or manifested reality had a certain unity or homogeneity, that is, of all the many as a totality. In this way, this whole of the many approaches, in my opinion, the homogeneity of the *prakṛti*, as taught by the Sāṅkhya. In the case of the Sāṅkhya, however, the multiplicity of the *puruṣas* was above this. This was not so in the case of Śāṅkara, who taught that only the one *Brahman* was

1 B 58, p. 238; see B 52, p. 146; B 124, II, p. 439.

2 B 124, II, p. 439.

3 B 58, p. 230.

4 B 58, p. 240.

5 See above, p. 57.

6 B 28, I, 3, p. 596; see also pp. 605, 626.

7 See above, pp. 214, 219.

above this, on the other side of the dividing line. This dividing line therefore is higher than in the case of the Sāṅkhya.¹ The objection that was valid in the case of the Sāṅkhya, namely that this system could not be regarded as belonging to the gamma standpoint because it did not teach one transcendent God situated above material creation, thus ceases to apply. Śāṅkara's doctrine is, however, not an example of the gamma standpoint, because this standpoint regards only God as immaterial and creation, on the other hand, as material and real. Śāṅkara also regarded creation as immaterial and for this reason his teaching has to be included within the zeta standpoint. It does, however, come in some measure close to the gamma standpoint because of the homogeneity of all the multiplicity. As we have seen in Part I of this book, there is, in connection with this homogeneity, a certain analogy between the zeta and the gamma standpoints.² This is confirmed here. The result is therefore that, in the varieties of the Vedānta that we have examined, the standpoints are divided—Bādarāyana's standpoint is the one that I have called the delta standpoint, while Śāṅkara's is the zeta standpoint.

39. MISCELLANEA

Having discussed the most important elements of the philosophy of the Brahmins in which hylic pluralism occurs, I should now like, in this chapter, to deal with several isolated questions which deserve to be mentioned.

First of all, there is the question of those beings who are in certain respects similar to angels in the West. The Indians also believed in the existence of higher beings who were not human. These were usually called *devas*, generally translated as "gods". They were gods explicitly in the plural and their status was often rather low. They were also assumed to be subject, like men, to *karma*.³

I have already pointed out in the Introduction to this book (Part I) that the existence of a finer body was attributed, not predominantly, it is true, but certainly quite frequently, to the angels in the West.⁴ I have also established that the doctrine of the subtle body, the *linga* or *sūkṣma-śarīra*, belonging to men, was very widespread in Indian

1 See above, p. 208.

2 See above, p. 56.

3 B 53, p. 44.

4 See above, p. 28.

thought and that the Indians were inclined to regard everything that happened as belonging to *prakṛiti*, primordial nature or matter, with the result that psychical functions or factors of the soul, such as *buddhi*, *manas* and so on, were thought of as consisting of fine matter. It is therefore an obvious assumption that all this was also applied to the *devas*—that they, in other words, also belonged to the *prakṛiti* and had a body consisting of fine matter at their disposal.¹

I have, however, not found any detailed confirmation of this assumption in the works I have consulted. I suspect that the leading specialists in Indian philosophy have seen no reason to go into this point and that an investigation into the original literature with this aim established from the outset would reveal far more.

I should like, however, to mention what I have come across in this connection. Fr. C.W.J. van der Linden SVD has gone no farther than I, *The Vedic Age* (Utrecht, 1954) in his *The Concept of Deva*, but he does in any case say: "Anyhow, the Indian does not see the *devas* as pure spirits without any relation to place and material" (p. 61). According to the Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa 1, 15, 5, they have bodies (p. 75). Generally speaking, however, their existence is thought of as being material—they drink, eat and fight, ride on animals and so on. It is possible to reason indirectly, as I did in the case of the views of the Kelts concerning the hereafter,² in order to demonstrate that all this was intended in the sense of fine matter, but this aspect of fine matter is not apparently mentioned in the Vedic texts.

In the description of Arjuna's ascent into heaven on Indra's chariot in the Vana Parvan, Mahābhārata III, XLII, it is said that he saw the *Gandharvas*—a kind of *deva*—there "of bodies blazing like the sun".³ This, however, is a different conception.

In connection with the transmigration of man's soul after death, Dasgupta has written: "Just as a goldsmith taking a small bit of gold, gives to it a newer and fairer form, so the soul after destroying this body and removing ignorance, fashions a newer and fairer form as of the *Pitrs*, the *Gandharvas*, the gods . . ." ⁴ This "fairer form" is very reminiscent of the *shape* or form of the soul after death, which

1 According to the Indian view, a soul, which was in the first place a man, can become a God or a *deva* in a following life. His *sukṣma-śarīra* will, in this case, probably still be present.

2 See above, pp. 128-130.

3 Mahābhārata, ed. P.C. Ray, Calcutta, 1889, p. 135.

4 B 185, I, p. 55.

was regarded, so I concluded, as consisting of fine matter.¹ This would be the fate not only of man, but also of the *devas* after death.

Oltremare has said quite explicitly: "According to the Yoga, the gods, or rather certain gods (*devatāviśeṣa*) have a *linga-deha* and not a coarse body".²

It therefore seems probable to me that closer inspection would reveal a more clearly hylic pluralistic view of the *devas*.

So far, we have only discussed gods. To what extent, however, did the Indian philosophers think of God, *Brahman*, or, at a rather lower level, *Isvara*, the Creator, as possessing a body? We do, of course, enter a different sphere here, that of *cosmology*, and I decided to leave cosmological problems in the background in this work.³ Nonetheless, it is important to say something about this here.

Even outside India, the world is known as *God's body*. In this case, either the world as a whole is called the body of a deity conceived as monotheistic—in which case, the problem arises as to whether it more or less coincides with the deity in the pantheistic sense, but if this is so it is less possible to speak of the world as the body of the deity—or a part of the universe is called the body of a more limited deity—as Fechner, for example, wrote about the earth as the body of the "soul of the earth". All kinds of theological distinctions are, of course, involved in this question. Even in India, a difference was made between the one *Brahman*, with regard to which all the rest ceases to exist (Śankara's "acosmism") and a more personal and creative⁴ but rather less absolute deity, known as *Isvara*. It is possible to speak of the world as God's body, especially in connection with these latter, more ordinary theistic views, and also of a certain part of the universe being the body or *śarīra* of a deity. Since so much is heard about fine materiality in Indian thought, it may also be expected that there will also be reference to the fine body of *Isvara*, which does not alter the fact that the visible world is regarded as his last and lowliest body.

In fact, ideas of this kind are encountered again and again in Indian thought. Passages can be found in the Upaniṣads where the elements—the sun, the moon and so on—are called Brahman's body, which is directed by him from within.⁵ This idea is further elaborated, espe-

1 See above, pp. 103, 165.

2 *op. cit.*, p. 246, note 1; *deha* = *śarīra*, see also above, p. 191.

3 See above, p. 13.

4 This can be compared with the demiurge in Greek thought.

5 B 58, p. 274.

cially in the more theistically orientated writings and sects. The Bhagavad Gītā XI, 7, for example, refers to "the whole world, moveable and unmoveable, united in my body" (or "as my body"?). A fully elaborated doctrine, which is very relevant to this question, can be found in one of the later tendencies which I have not discussed—the Viṣṇuism of Rāmānuja, which was engaged in polemics against the other form of Vedantism, that of Śankara. According to Rāmānuja's teaching, "the individual souls and the material world" form "the body of God (*śarīra*)".¹ This "body of God" exists before creation—as *cit* and *acit*—in a subtle form and at creation this fine body changes into a coarse body, the existing universe.² Similar ideas are encountered in the work of another sectarian Vedantist, Madhva: "Viṣṇu is God. He has a non-material body which consists of *sat*, *cit*, *ānanda*".³ Dasgupta has said, in this connection: "Hiranyagarbha.....is the god who presides over the combined subtle bodies of all living beings".⁴ According to the later Vedānta, the Omnispirit is surrounded in stages by a non-knowing (*avidyā*) which becomes closer and closer and is, as such, known as *Īśvara*, *Hiranyagarbha* and *Virāj*, in that order. It is therefore the whole of the separate beings which are provided with a fine or a coarse body.⁵ According to the Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha, there is an infinite number of worlds fitted into each other, but each of these is an individual world-soul. Von Glasenapp observed that Fechner was anticipated here.⁶ In a similar context, *prakṛiti* as a whole is referred to as *upādhi* of *Īśvara*⁷ and these worlds are referred to as *upādhis* or limitations of God.⁸

There is also repeated reference to hylic pluralism here, to a body of God consisting of *fine* matter. On the other hand, when these worlds are being discussed and the intention is to confine attention to them, worlds of finer matter than ordinary are also included. It is, after all, obvious that these *linga* or *sukṣma-śarīras*, these subtle bodies, must find themselves *in something*. They are furthermore thought to find themselves in a space that is different from ordinary space—matter is, after all, everywhere automatically associated with extensiveness or spatiality and the Indian thinkers generally imagined the soul as occupy-

1 B 185, III, p. 297 ff.

2 J. Gonda, *Het Hindoeïsme*, p. 77; see also B 58, p. 273 ff.

3 B 58, p. 286.

4 B 185, II, p. 76.

5 Vedāntasāra.

6 B 52, p. 144; see also B 185, II, p. 244.

7 B 185, III, p. 478.

8 *op. cit.*, p. 489; see also pp. 24, 156, 245 (see also above, p. 192) 481, 504.

ing space, even in those cases where they did not regard it as of fine matter¹—a different finer world or, if there is reference to several *śāstras* at different levels, in different finer worlds. Writing about the Vedānta-sāra of Sadānanda, Deussen very correctly headed one section “The Extension (*vikshepa*) of the Fine Body and of the Fine World”,² thus extending the idea of the subtle body to that of a subtle world.

A great deal more could, of course, be said about these other worlds,³ but I do not want to go too deeply into the Indian cosmology here. We cannot, however, entirely ignore certain aspects of these questions. One of the doctrines with which this problem is closely connected is that of the ancient *elements*. Generally speaking, both in the West and in the East, there were five of these—earth, water, air, fire and ether or space (*ākāśa*)⁴ Indian thinkers, however, made an explicit distinction between fine and coarse elements—all five occur both in the coarse form as *mahā-bhūtas*⁵ and in the fine form as *sūkṣma-bhūtas*.⁶ This is clearly a hylic pluralistic idea. I suggested in Part I of this book that a distinction ought perhaps to be made in the ancient doctrine of the elements between the elements in the narrower sense—those of the world as normally known to us, that is, the “earth”, in which, in addition to the element earth itself, the other four occurred in a subordinate position—and this world as a whole as the *cosmic* element earth, with which the other cosmic elements were contrasted, in which another of the elements set the tone.⁷ In connection with this, I pointed to the fact that the Stoics explicitly distinguished two kinds of fire—ordinary fire and another kind—while *aēr* and *aithēr* also indicated two different kinds of air.⁸ A similar situation exists in Indian thought, in which a distinction is made between as many as five different kinds of fire or *agni* in, for example, the doctrine of the five fires of the various Upaniṣads⁹ and in the Mahābhārata¹⁰ It is possible to ask here whether

1 See above, p. 214, note 1.

2 My italics; see B 28, I, 3, p. 628, also p. 647.

3 See also Mrs Rhys Davids, “The Other-World Mind”, B 186, p. 289 ff.

4 See above p. 10.

5 I must correct an error which I made in Part I of the Dutch version of this book, on p. 10. I was under the impression that the “fine transcendent form” of the elements referred to by Windisch (B 178, pp. 81-82) were known as *mahā-bhūtas*. Precisely the opposite is, however, the case—the *mahā-bhūtas* are the coarse elements.

6 According to Indian thought, all these elements are themselves composed of the three *gunas* in different proportions; see above, p. 208 and B 178, p. 82.

7 See above, p. 10-11.

8 See above, p. 21.

9 See B 52, p. 39 ff; B 28, I, 2, p. 300.

10 Vana Parva, Section CCXX (op. cit., p. 675).

all these statements would not be more understandable if they were applied to *different levels* of finer matter, in which each of the ancient *cosmic* elements indicated a definite world with a certain degree of subtility—as states of aggregation in a different and broader sense.¹ Be this as it may, the Indian thinkers quite certainly spoke about finer elements, *sukṣma-bhūtas*, from which the coarse elements or *mahā-bhūtas* came.² The two species of *bhūta* belonged to the eighteen or twenty-five principles which were listed, in different classifications, by the Sāṅkhya and other schools.³ The *linga-śartra* or subtle body is closely linked with these fine elements from which it is constructed. This is why it was also known as the *bhūtārman*.⁴ Since the factors of the soul—*buddhi*, *manas* and so on—were regarded in this context as consisting of fine matter, all these principles—elements or *bhūtas*, bodies or *śartras*, factors of the soul and so on—whether they were coarse or fine, belonged to one homogeneous whole. Von Glasenapp gave a good review of this in his treatment of the Sāṅkhya.⁵ Another name that was often used, not only by the Sāṅkhya, but also elsewhere, for the fine elements or *sukṣma-bhūtas* is *tanmātras*.⁶ The subtle bodies were formed from these tanmatras and, on the other hand, so were the coarse matters as well. This, then, is the hylic pluralistic cosmology of the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta.⁷

This teaching about the elements also played an important part in the traditional *medicine* of India—as indeed it did in the West as well. Caraka, the Indian philosopher and physician whom I have already mentioned, used this doctrine of the elements as a basis for all kinds of theories that were of importance to medicine.⁸ The male seed, for example, consisted, according to Caraka, of the four elements, air, fire, water and earth, and the fifth, ether or *ākāśa*, was added later.⁹

1 See above, p. 11.

2 See, for example, Deussen *Sechzig Upanishads*, p. 323; B 52, p. 112.

3 See above, p. 184.

4 See above, pp. 176, 191.

5 B 52, p. 112.

6 For example, in the Puranas; see B 185, II, p. 74; Garbe, *Die Samkhya-Philosophie*, 300; B I, p. 75, note 69.

7 See B 185, II, p. 73 ff. Other *darśanas*, such as the Vaiśeṣika, for example, refused to accept this teaching (see above, pp. 325-326). With regard to the elements, the Vedānta and the Sāṅkhya both taught very much the same. The fifth element, ether or *ākāśa*, was equated with space or "space consisting of fine matter" (see von Glasenapp, *Der Stufenweg zum Göttlichen*, *Shankaras Philosophie der All-Einheit*, 1948, p. 80).

8 See G. Srinivasa Murti, *The Science and Art of Indian Medicine*, 1923, 2nd edn., 1948, pp. 77-78; B 185, II, p. 273 ff: "Speculations in the Medical Schools".

9 B 185, II, p. 302; see also above, pp. 186-187.

Air or *vāyu* was explicitly called subtle or *sūkṣma*.¹ The *prāṇas*—which can be compared with the *spiritus animales* in the West²—also played a part in medicine or physiology.³ The teaching about the nervous system according to the Tantras was rather differently structured.⁴

We have now come to the end of what I wanted to say about hylic pluralism in Indian thought in the narrower sense of that of the Brahmins. It can hardly be denied that the concept of fine materiality occurs again and again in Indian thought. I do not, of course, flatter myself that I have been complete in this investigation—there has so far been no conscious research at all into the occurrence of these ideas in the original texts. If, then, such a large contribution can be made by what is provided simply in books and articles on Indian philosophy and religion, then there can be no doubt at all that a great deal more could be found by a Sanskritist specialising in this particular field of study.

In addition, I have, of course, had to limit myself. If a work like Arthur Avalon's (Sir John Woodroffe's) *The Serpent Power* (1919) is consulted, it is easy to ascertain that hylic pluralism occurs again and again in Tantrism as well.⁵ For example, there is the well-known doctrine of the *chakras* or nerve-centres.⁶ The author observes that, although these refer to the coarse body, they were not thought of as exclusively physiological, but as being *prāṇavāya*—"a *sūkṣma* or subtle vital force".⁷ Apart from the need to limit myself, there is another reason why I have not dealt with this work, a translation of two Indian writings with a detailed commentary. The author is completely convinced of the meaning of what I have called hylic pluralism. He may be right here and he may also be right in his belief that the texts can only be understood by making a comparison with what a modern occultist such as C. W. Leadbeater has said, in this context, about the *chakras*, for example.⁸ Sir John Woodroffe was, in any case, certainly not the first scholar to suggest this and his opinion deserves to be mentioned. Nonetheless, it is important for someone like myself, who cannot judge the original text, to be cautious in this and similar cases.

1 *op. cit.*, p. 332.

2 See above, pp. 161-162.

3 *op. cit.*, pp. 340, 345.

4 *op. cit.*, p. 352 ff.

5 See B 179, XVII, p. 325; B 58, p. 205 ff; B 124, II, p. 735 ff.

6 See B 185, II, p. 355.

7 p. 34.

8 *ibid.*

The same applies to a work such as *The Pranava-Vāda of Gārgyāna*, a text which only existed in oral tradition and was summarised and translated partly by and partly under the supervision of the well-known Hindu author and theosophist, Bhagavan Das (b. 1869).¹ Both the translators and the commentators of this text were clearly convinced of the correctness of hylic pluralism and one does have, to some extent, the impression that they were very anxious to draw parallels with doctrines of subtle bodies in modern theosophy. Let me say once more that it is quite possible that these early texts can only be understood in this way, while, without this, many distinctions that are made will continue to be futile assertions and simply beating the air. It is quite possible that hylic pluralism is one of the most important keys to our understanding of much of what is taught in Indian philosophy, but it is also very easy to make a mistake here. As an example of possible error, D. van Hinloopen Labberton, who compiled the index for the *Pranava-Vāda* (III), gives, within the context of a summary of the seven bodies (III, pp. 217-218), *sukṣma* as astral body and *linga* as ethereal body. There is nothing in any of the sources that I have drawn on to indicate a difference in level—of the kind that certainly exists between the meaning of the astral body and the ethereal body in modern theosophy²—between *sukṣma-śāstra* and *linga-śāstra* in Indian thought. On the contrary, they are synonymous. They both mean “subtle body”, probably at the level of the psychological *pneuma*, the Vedānta preferring to use the first and the Sāṅkhya preferring to use the second.³ Clearly, Labberton has read this difference into the words.

To conclude this section on miscellaneous questions, there may also be examples in early Indian *graphic art* or sculpture which show that the artist may possibly have had something in mind which he thought of as consisting of fine matter.⁴ This might be the case, for example, with representations of the *vimānas*⁵ or of a “mannikin” or “thumbing” escaping from the body of coarse matter.⁶ I have not been able to find any representations especially in connection with the *vimānas* (see above, p. 206, note 4) or with a “mannikin” or “thumbing” in which it was at least to some extent obvious that they had a secondary meaning of fine materiality (as in the case of figures 1, 2 and 3 earlier

1 3 volumes, Adyar, 1910-1913; see also B 124, I, p. 185, note.

2 See above, pp. 16-17 and elsewhere.

3 See above, p. 190; B 28, I, 3, p. 626.

4 See above, p. 163 ff.

5 p. 89. ff.

6 p. 25. ff.

in this book). It is also possible to think, in this context, of the Sanskrit term *vāhana*, which means "vehicle", especially in the sense of an animal. The reader will recall that F. Cumont pointed out that not only the carriage or chariot occurred as an aid to the journey to the hereafter, but also animals such as horses and birds and so on. Cumont also linked these themes to the neo-Platonic idea of the *ochēma* of fine matter.¹ The explanation can also perhaps be applied, in a number of cases, to the themes of the animal in Indian art. As far as the *vāhanas* are concerned, this is probably rather far-fetched—in Indian art, the gods do not ride on *vāhanas*, but *stand* on them. This also merges into the idea that the animal which is thought to be associated with the god in question is situated very close by, as, for example, in representations of the lion close to the maid of the Netherlands. On the other hand, the *garuda*, or celestial bird, is more often thought of as something that is ridden on, by Viṣṇu, for example (see our plate 8, "Visnu on Garuda", taken from H. Zimmer, *The Art of Indian Asia*, 1955, Plate 564). There is more reason here for us to think of a secondary meaning of fine materiality. In the West, as we shall see later, the *eagle* is similarly closely associated with the idea of a journey to the hereafter—an ascension, as, for example, in the case of the apotheosis of the Roman emperors. Cumont was also aware in this case as well of an analogy with an *ochēma*.²

40. JAINISM

Now that we have discussed Brahmanism, we have to go back in time and consider two movements which are, with regard to the thought that is based on the Vedas, schismatic. These are Jainism and Buddhism, both of which still exist as religions. What is remarkable about them is that, like the Cārvākas or materialists, they reject the authority of the Vedas and can therefore be included among the *nāstikas*, but that they are, despite this, in many respects—because of their doctrine of metempsychosis and redemption, for example—closer to the *āstika* systems than to the materialists. Despite the fact that they have broken away, they still belong characteristically to Indian thought.³

1 Lux Perpetua, p. 275 ff; see above, p. 248 ff.

2 See F. Cumont, "L'aigle funéraire d'Hiéropolis et l'apothéose des empereurs", *Etudes Syriennes*, 1971, p. 35 ff, especially p. 104 ff. It is, however, quite possible that more detailed research might show that *vāhana* was simply used in Sanskrit literature for a vehicle of fine matter of the soul.

3 See above, 151-152, 156.



Plate 8



Of the two movements, Jainism has always been less widespread and less well-known. It is rather older than Buddhism. It is also more consistent.¹ I also have the impression that this philosophy has not resulted in extreme clarity or monumental structure, but it should not be forgotten that, even though the classical *darśanas* are also orientated towards redemption, Jainism is primarily a religious doctrine and far less a philosophical system.

I cannot discuss the teachings of Jainism in detail here. All that I can do is to indicate to which of the six metaphysical standpoints it most closely approximates.

Jainism was the first movement in antiquity to distinguish the living from the lifeless and the spiritual from the non-spiritual.² (In this, the Jains can be compared with the early Greek philosopher Anaxagoras, with his theory of the *nous*.) This can be acclaimed as a milestone on the way towards spiritualisation, like the preference for anthropological dualism which is so prevalent today, and the question which arises at once is whether the Jains assumed the epsilon standpoint. The answer to this, however, is emphatically no—they taught explicitly the theory of fine materiality and, what is more, in the elaborated form both of bodies of fine matter and of a multiplicity or pluralism of these bodies. Von Glasenapp has this to say about their teaching in this respect: "The Jains accepted several bodies. As long as the soul continues to wander around in the *samsāra*, it is surrounded by a fine "karma body". Gods and infernal beings also have a fine transformation body (*vaikriya*) which easily changes its form. Terrestrial beings have, instead of this, a body of coarse matter (*audārika*). In addition, two further bodies are accepted—the fiery body (*taijasa*), which makes digestion possible,³ and the transposition body (*ahāraka*), with the help of which the ascetic is able to leave his coarse body and visit another world".⁴ It is clear, then, that what is taught here is psychohylism⁵ and also the possibility of excursion. The fact that the gods possess a subtle body is affirmed more explicitly here than anywhere else in Indian thought in the narrower sense, at least as far as I have been able to establish. In addition, the Jains regarded *karma* especially as a fine matter which pollutes the soul. Without this *karma*, the soul would be, among other things, omniscient.⁶

1 See above, p. 156; B 58, p. 68 ff; B 124, I, p. 286 ff; B 52, p. 95 ff; B 1, p. 103ff.

2 B 53, p. 443; B 52, p. 100.

3 Gonda (B 58, p. 72) calls this fiery body the "bearer of potential energy".

4 B 53, p. 394; see also B 58, p. 72.

5 See above, p. 194.

6 B 1, p. 103; B 52, p. 99; see also above, p. 192-193.

It is therefore indisputable that Jainism teaches hyllic pluralism. It is at the same time also clear that it cannot possibly belong to the epsilon standpoint or teach anthropological dualism, which rejects all forms of expression of the soul as fine matter.¹ The gamma standpoint is also equally out of the question, because this accepts only elements of (fine) matter within revelation and a very early discovery of the spirit is clearly indicated in Jainism. Should Jainism therefore be classified under the delta standpoint, which teaches that immaterial souls are accompanied by *ochēmata* of fine matter? Certainly the combination of these two ideas is characteristic of Jainism, in which it occurs even more clearly than in the case of *Bādarāyana*, whose teaching can, in my opinion, be regarded as belonging to the delta standpoint.² There is, however, one serious objection to including Jainism within this category, namely that the doctrine of the existence of one transcendent deity—of God and souls being immaterial—is inseparable from the delta standpoint. *Bādarāyana* accepted the existence of the one Atman or Brahman, even though he did not draw such far-reaching conclusions from this as Gaudapāda and Śankara did. What is the position taken by Jainism here? It is certainly impossible to affirm simply that the Jains postulated one immaterial and transcendent deity—on the contrary, they engaged in polemics against those who insisted on the unity of the Absolute.³ Radakrishnan believed that their view could be expressed as “There is no God except the soul in its ideal integrity”.⁴ They rejected God as cause and they found this the best way of disregarding the presupposition of God entirely. Dasgupta headed the section in which he discussed this aspect of Jainism “Jaina Atheism”.⁵

In other words, one of the distinct characteristics of the delta standpoint—the doctrine of one transcendent deity—is absent from Jainism. Another standpoint ought therefore perhaps to be added to the six that I have already listed, a standpoint teaching immaterial souls with vehicles of fine matter, but not a transcendent monism.⁶ My six standpoints are, however, more intended to define ideas than to summarise all the possible categories within which all philosophical movements can be included. I have, moreover, indicated in the introduction to this book (Part I) that something of this kind does in fact exist—the

1 See above, p. 46 ff, 148.

2 See above, p. 220-221.

3 B 124, I, p. 338.

4 *op. cit.*, p. 339. This is reminiscent of some of J. Krishnamurti's statements.

5 B 185, I, p. 203-206.

6 Jainism is therefore characterised as a “pluralistic realism” (B 124, I, p. 286 ff). In this respect and in some others, it resembles the Sāṅkhya. (See B 124, I, p. 292).

example that I gave was that of certain romantic philosophers, such as a later representative of this movement, G. T. Fechner, who were close to the delta standpoint insofar as they taught an immaterial soul plus a soul body—but that these romantic thinkers could not be classified unhesitatingly under this standpoint because of their pantheistic tendency, which made the acceptance of a transcendent deity uncertain and their classification under the heading of the delta standpoint, as I have defined it, very dubious.¹ This need not, however, be the last word as far as Jainism is concerned. I have already mentioned that the teaching of the Jains is not characterised by extreme clarity. This lack of clarity may be partly the result of the difficulty of the subject itself—one is reminded here of the difficulties experienced by the Sāṅkhya in formulating the relationship between the passive *puruṣas* and the active *prakṛti*. This was basically the difficulty of objectivising the one subject.² Similarly, the “negative theology”³ regarded God as so exalted that there was hardly anything to be said about his qualities.⁴ It is possible that the Jains, however confused their teachings may have been, were not so far removed from this. Their polemics against God as cause and as one certainly point in this direction. Like the Buddhists, they also taught about reaching *nirvāṇa*.⁵ This is also a concept about which nothing can be said. (This is something that will be seen more clearly when Buddhism is discussed in the following chapters.) My conclusion, then is that a movement such as Jainism, which, on the one hand, teaches a pluralism of monads and atoms, may, on the other hand, also be convinced of the reality of the one immaterial and transcendent principle, even though it can say nothing about this reality. To this extent, then, the necessary culminating point of the delta standpoint is not entirely absent in Jainism, with the result that it is not far removed from that standpoint.

41. HYLIC PLURALISM IN BUDDHISM (1)

Buddhism—so called after its founder, Gautama Buddha (ca. 563-483 B.C.)—is an extremely important movement which is not only

1 See above, pp. 46-47. I pointed there to a variant of the delta standpoint, according to which the soul was immaterial, but nonetheless spatial (pp. 81-82). A similar doctrine is found in Jainism—the *jivas* are immaterial, but even those redeemed from *karma* occupy a certain space. (B 58, p. 73).

2 See above, pp. 212-213.

3 See, for example, B 40, IX, p. 271.

4 In the section referred to, Dasgupta talks especially about “antitheistic arguments”. The “atheism” of the Jains thus appears to amount to anti-theism.

5 B 58, p. 69; B 185, pp. 169, 190.

one of the great world religions, but has also produced many thinkers and philosophical ideas. It is this movement which we must consider in greater detail now. I have, of course, already given a very brief outline of Buddhism, which, despite the fact that it was schismatic, having broken away from the main tradition of Indian thought, and was therefore included among the *nāstika* systems, had, like Jainism, a great deal in common with the well-known *darśanas*.¹ A very ancient movement, it originated and flourished at the same time as the great Brahmanic philosophical systems were coming about.² Some of these systems, like the Sāṅkhya for example, are more or less correlative with Buddhism.³ Space prevents me from adding here to what I have said in my general outline in chapter 28⁴ and, if the reader wishes to go more deeply, for example, into the history of Buddhism, its philosophy⁵ or its psychology,⁶ he must consult other works. Unlike Jainism, Buddhism did not remain entirely consistent.

My main concern here, of course, is the occurrence of hylic pluralism in Buddhism—that it does so at various points is beyond dispute. In this more detailed consideration of hylic pluralism in Buddhist thought, then, I propose first of all to review these various points of occurrence and then to discuss several of them more fully, at the same time paying attention to their connection with a particular phase in Buddhist thought. In chapter 44, I shall examine the extent to which it is possible to affirm that Buddhism shows an affinity with one of the metaphysical standpoints that I have formulated with regard to hylic pluralism.

In chapter 33, "Hylic Pluralism in Classical Indian Thought (1), I quoted⁷ a general statement by S. Radhakrishnan: "The Buddhists, along with Indian psychologists in general, believe in the material or organic nature of mind or *manas*".⁸ This affirmation referred not only to Indian thought in the narrower sense, in other words, Brahmanic thought, but also to Buddhism. What I have called hylic pluralism thus apparently also applies to the schismatic movement of

1 See above, pp. 151-152, 156-158, 230-231.

2 See above, p. 156.

3 See above, p. 216.

4 See above, pp. 156-158.

5 See B 58, p. 88 ff; 196 ff; B 52, p. 66 ff; B 53, p. 302 ff; B 124, I, p. 341 ff; 581 ff; B 185, I, p. 78 ff.

6 B 1, p. 107 ff; B 186, p. 183 ff.

7 See above, p. 181.

8 B 124, I, p. 400.

Buddhism. On the other hand, the community of ideas also emerges clearly here.

Apart perhaps from a few subordinate movements,¹ we cannot therefore expect any sharp contrast, of the kind that exists in anthropological dualism, between spirit and matter, the psychical and the physical, in Buddhism as a whole. What is encountered, however, especially in the earliest period of Buddhism, is that homogeneity in the concept of the psychical and the physical² which we have met elsewhere in relatively early thought.³ Mrs. Rhys Davids therefore wrote a book which dealt, in this connection, successively with *The Birth of Indian Psychology and its Development in Buddhism*⁴ and in which the remarkable chapter on "The Other-World Mind",⁵ to which I have already referred, appeared.⁶ She comes to the conclusion that insufficient attention has been given to the idea of a second, subtle body, since it is only when this has been done that all kinds of passages will become clear.⁷ To what extent does what Mrs. Rhys Davids has written in this chapter refer both to Indian thought in the narrower sense (of the Upaniṣads, for example) and to Buddhism? She *also* constantly discusses all kinds of terms connected with Buddhist psychology in this chapter, thus clearly posing the problem—does this also refer to Buddhism? Her answer, however, is rather hesitant. She does certainly mention several cases which are clearly characterised by what I have called hylic pluralism and which I shall discuss more fully when I come to deal individually with various Buddhist ideas. Mrs. Rhys Davids is, however, very cautious and says, for example, that she cannot tell to what extent *iddhi*, or abnormal activity, has to be attributed to a situation in the *dual* body.⁸ She was apparently unable to find any conclusive passages. On the other hand, however, she leaves the reader in no doubt about her conviction that all this has to be borne in mind when the question is considered. For her, it is clearly a situation like the one that we observed in connection with the Bhagavad Gītā—even though fine materiality or the subtle body are not explicitly

1 I am thinking here mainly of the idealism of the *Vijñāna vāda*, the doctrine of the mind or consciousness only. (See B 58, p. 206). But matter, the objects, whose existence is denied, play no part here *over and against* the mind.

2 See B 53, p. 388.

3 See above, p. 165 ff.

4 B 186.

5 *op. cit.*, p. 329 ff.

6 See above, p. 185.

7 See also *op. cit.*, p. 126.

8 *op. cit.*, p. 338.

mentioned, hylc pluralism is nonetheless present in the background of the teaching expressed in the text.¹

Another question which inevitably makes one wonder to what extent hylc pluralism can be said to exist in Buddhism as a whole is this. An author, R. Linssen, has fairly recently written a book on Buddhism in which he discusses the general thought of this religion rather than all kinds of details. What is more, in this book, he characterises Buddhist thought as "spiritual materialism".² Buddhism has been called atheistic or nihilistic, Linssen argues, but this is not so—it is far more spiritually materialistic.³ The "one totality" of the psychophysical universe is a reality which is sufficient in itself, or, to express this idea more simply, there is nothing of importance *above* us. This psychophysical reality, however, is a whole, a totality or a homogeneity. This is, in my opinion, a hylc pluralistic view. What is said here is *not* that there is only *one* kind of reality and that matter is only ordinary matter—which would be simply monistic materialism—but that this reality is psychophysical, in other words, that the psychical forms a part of this homogeneity. Since the differences between ordinary matter and psychical existence can hardly be denied and are furthermore also not denied here—the Buddhist does, for example, accept the possibility of excursion—this view in any case accepts *twofold hyle*.⁴ If it is materialism—and we still have to investigate whether this psychophysical homogeneity does in fact accept matter as the *highest* reality, in which case only it is possible to speak of materialism—then what we have here is *dualistic* materialism. But dualistic materialism is one of the species of hylc pluralism. If Linssen is right in his characterisation of Buddhism as a spiritual materialism, then this religion is also a hylc pluralism. When we come to investigate to which of the six metaphysical standpoints Buddhism is most close, we shall have to go more deeply into this problem raised by Linssen.

So much, then, for hylc pluralism in Buddhism in general. In the next two chapters, we shall see that there is no lack of individual doctrines in different periods of Buddhism in which hylc pluralism is clearly revealed.

I should like to repeat here what I have already said earlier on⁵ namely that *yāna*, which is used to designate movements within Buddhism, for

¹ See above, pp. 200-201.

² *Essais sur le Bouddhisme en général et sur le Zen en particulier*, Paris and Brussels, 1954.

³ I, p. III ff.

⁴ See above, p. 84.

⁵ See above, p. 157 note 2; see also below, pp. 246-247.

example, Hināyāna and Mahāyāna, means vehicles, but is not connected with the concept *ochēma* as the vehicle of fine matter of the soul. The meaning of this image was that this *yāna*, or ferry boat, took the pilgrim from his existence on this earth to *nirvāna*, the other bank of the river.

42. SOME BUDDHIST CONCEPTS 1: VINNANA; GANDHABBA

In Buddhism, there are five *skandhas* or *kandhas*, partial human functions or factors constituting personality.¹ One of these factors is called *rūpa* or form. This is the ordinary body. The other four are the higher factors or factors of the soul. *Vedanā* is the feelings or sensation, *saṃjñā* or *sannā* is perception, *samskāra* or *sankhāra* is subconscious potencies or formative powers² and finally, at the summit, *viññāna* or *vinñāna* is pure consciousness or mind. These factors are often subdivided in various ways. The four psychical factors are contrasted, as *arūpa*, formless, with the ordinary body or *rūpa*. With regard to this contrast, I should like to suggest that *arūpa* here may perhaps mean *relatively* formless. In Part I, the introduction to this work, I observed that *ahūlon* or immaterial was often used in the West for what was really only relatively immaterial, especially in comparison with ordinary matter.³ *Arūpa* may be a similar case. In Buddhism, *arūpa-loka* is used to mean a world—or really a space—of non-forms.⁴ This is, of course, a contradiction, if it is not thought of as relative. What is more, the consciousness (of others) can be *seen*.⁵ It is clear from this that *arūpa* or “formless” here means without a shape or form for ordinary perception and that *rūpa* means the form (as a rule⁶) of the ordinary body.

Radhakrishnan's general statement, which I have quoted above,⁷ can now be applied to the four psychical factors—like the Indian psychologists, the Buddhist psychologists regarded the capacity to think or the mind, that is, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *samskāra* and *vinñāna*, as material. But even more can be said about this. Windisch said again and again

1 See B 178, p. 37; B 53, p. 311; B1, p. 111; B 52, p. 345; B 186, p. 319 ff.

2 B 1, p. 112.

3 See above, p. 17.

4 See below, pp. 245-246.

5 B 52, p. 85. Von Glasenapp adds to this: “represented as something of fine matter”.

6 There is also reference to “heavens” which are included among the *rūpa*. See B 58, p. 206.

7 See above, p. 181.

that *vinnāna*, which is rendered as “pure consciousness” (in contrast with “perceptive consciousness” and so on), is comparable with the *linga-śāstra*, the subtle body of Brahmanic philosophy.¹ *Vinnāna* is what survives the death of the ordinary body. It is the “migrating being of the soul”, although in this sense it is only a *pars pro toto*, other factors belong to it.² In this context, there is the pleasant legend of Māna, the evil one, coming to the death-bed of two of Buddha’s disciples, seeking their *vinnāna*, but finding none because they had been redeemed and had no further need to be born again, with the result that their *vinnāna* either was no longer present or it had been released as soon as they died.³ *Vinnāna* was therefore regarded as that which was bound to the wheel of life and death and passed from one life to the next birth, like the *linga* or *sukṣma-śāstra* in Indian philosophy. What Buddhism has in common with Indian thought is, after all, the theme of metempsychosis.⁴ Even *karma* or *kamma* was taken over by Buddhism from the Brahmans and this was also regarded as “that residue consisting of fine matter of all activity in thought, words and works which is bound, with mechanical necessity, to bear its fruit and have its consequences in a successive existence”.⁵ Just as the factors of the soul were first referred to as a group of *dharma*s or *dhama*s and later given the more specialised name of *skandha*s,⁶ so too is an ancient Vedic term, *nāmarūpa* or “name and form” used for *vinnāna* (as a *pars pro toto*) for that which enters into a new existence.⁷

What must be borne in mind here is that Buddhism did *not* take over from Indian philosophy—the Sāṅkhya for example —the idea of the existence of purely immaterial (and passive) *puruṣa*s, nor does it have any teaching that is parallel with the Vedānta doctrine of the one *Atman* which has no second. The corresponding Buddhist doctrine was that of *anāṭṭa*—the doctrine of “no soul”.⁸ What do exist, according to Buddhist teaching, even though they are rather loosely connected with each other, are the *skandha*s in themselves and in their effect on the *skandha*s of others. According to the Buddhist philosophers, thoughts are not destroyed.⁹ On the other hand, consciousness

1 B 178, pp. 37, 47, 92.

2 B 178, pp. 36-37.

3 B 178, p. 37; see also B 186, p. 192-193.

4 See above, p. 156.

5 B 178, p. 29.

6 B 52, p. 66 ff; B 1, p. 115, etc.

7 B 178, p. 39; B 186, p. 17, 250; see also below, pp. 240, 241.

8 See above, pp. 157-158.

9 See B 124, I, p. 637.

can be perceived¹ and there are also the *iddhis*, which are capacities for the supranormal and which Mrs Rhys Davids has associated with what is investigated by psychical research or parapsychology.² All this is very reminiscent of the theory of "psychones" elaborated by W. Whately Carington (1892-1947) in his *Telepathy* (1945). I drew attention, in a review, to the similarities between this theory and the ideas of the late Prof. G. Heymans.³ According to Heymans, there are—as there are also for Carington—all kinds of contents of the consciousness which lead a more or less independent existence and which, after having disappeared from the central consciousness, are not destroyed, but continue to exist in the subconscious. (They may be compared with the *samskāras* of Buddhist teaching.) Both Carington and Heymans have said that they can occur to another unit of consciousness or individual, so that it is clear that both scholars were convinced of the possibility of telepathy. These units of consciousness or individuals are not absolutely, but only relatively closed units.⁴ This entire situation can be set against a different metaphysical background and interpreted differently. This is different in the case of Heymans and Carington. We shall see how Buddhism attempted to solve this problem. Like both Heymans and Carington, it taught the relative independence of the contents of the consciousness and the possibility of direct influence by means of the *iddhis* on those of other units of consciousness or individuals. These *units* of consciousness have no independent existence. There is clearly a certain empirical unit of the individual, but the idea of the purely relative closedness of this in the case of the modern thinkers is expressed even more clearly in Buddhism—there are *no* individual souls. This is the *anātta* doctrine of Buddhism. A different Western doctrine, that of substantial, singular and immortal souls, is analogous to that of the many, immaterial—although passive—*puruṣas* of the Sāṅkhya. These *puruṣas* play no part at all in Buddhist teaching, in which there is more emphasis on what is, in the dualism of the Sāṅkhya system, contrasted to the *puruṣas*—*prakṛiti* or the whole of primordial nature. All these contents of the consciousness form, together with the rest of existence, a whole which is, in the context of Buddhism, referred to as the "cosmic mind".⁵ Heymans in his turn

1 See above, p. 237, note 5.

2 See B 186, p. 337

3 *Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte* (B 169), August 1951, p. 265.

4 See Heymans, B 68, 38; see also B 114, in the index under the heading *bewust, zijnseenheid*.

5 See R. Linssen, *Essais sur le Bouddhisme*, I, p. V; 68; II, p. 26. According to Zen Buddhism, it is also the "body of Buddha" regarded as cosmic (*ibid.*).

spoke of the "world consciousness" and Carington discussed the "spirit of man" (§ 97). In India, all this comes within the category of fine matter—according to the Sankhya system, both the *linga-śāstras* and the *tanmātras* or fine elements belong to the *prakṛiti*. It is not surprising, then, that Windisch pointed to a strict analogy between what was, according to the Sāṅkhya, included under fine matter (*prakṛiti*) and the *skandhas* of Buddhism, which were, according to Radhakrishnan, regarded as consisting of (fine) matter. Let me give a quotation from Windisch to illustrate this. In connection with a passage in an early Buddhist text, (Mahā-Saṅkuludayasutta, Majjhima, II, 17) he wrote: "The migratory, psychical part of man is called *vinṇāna* here (cf. above, p. 36 ff). The term *nāmarūpa* was used for this in an earlier period (p. 39), *gandhabba* in a mythical framework (p. 12 ff), *satta* later and in medical works (Chapter III) and, in the works of the Brahmans, especially the Sāṅkhya, *linga-śāstra* (Chapter V)".¹ This orientalist, then, made a close connection between the *linga-śāstra* of fine matter which figures in Indian thought and the summit of the *skandhas*—*vinṇāna*. This is of great importance in our investigation into the occurrence of hylic pluralism in Buddhism.

I should now like to consider the other concept mentioned by Windisch in his analogy—*gandhabba*. This concept occurs in Sanskrit as *gandharva* and, according to Bothlingk's Dictionary, means "the soul after death before it has chosen a new body". It also has the wider meaning of celestial being in general and of a certain kind of angel or *deva* which is connected with music—a singing *deva*—in particular. Generally speaking, then, there are two kinds of *gandharvas*—*devas* or gods² on the one hand and, on the other, men who, after having cast off their ordinary bodies, are able to receive (this is clearly the linking factor) a "*gandharva* body" of the kind that the gods themselves possess.³ Mrs. Rhys Davids felt justified in calling the *iddhis* or supra-normal capacities by such names as "*deva-eye*" (or "clairvoyance") and "*deva-ear*".⁴ These capacities clearly belong to the body referred to here. *Gandharva*—in Pali *gandhabba*—however acquired in Buddhism the meaning of man's being between two births. Once again, then, we find ourselves confronted with the problem of birth, the problem of the *third factor*⁵ which, according to those who believe in metem-

1 B 178, p. 47.

2 This was also the case in the Upaniṣads; see B 185, I, p. 55.

3 B 178, p. 16; see also p. 186 and above p. 223.

4 B 186, p. 340 ff.

5 See above, pp. 186-187.

psychosis, plays a part in the birth of the child in addition to the factors that are derived from the father and mother. Just as the Indian philosophers and physicians were aware of a problem of "The Foetus and the Subtle Body",¹ so too was Buddhism concerned with this third, subtle factor. Windisch discussed the question in some detail. In his chapter on the Buddhist teaching about conception ("Die buddhistische Lehre von der Empfängnis")² he said that not only the father and the mother (and her fertility) were necessary for the conception of a child, but also "a soul-body coming from an earlier existence . . . which seeks a suitable mother for itself or for which she seeks a deity"—the *gandhabba* (in Sanskrit, *gandharva*) or *satta* (in Sanskrit, *sattva*).³ Windisch cites various passages in early texts where this occurs. Whereas *gandharva* was also used for higher beings than man, the word was also especially employed for man's reincarnated essence,⁴ which was impelled by *kamma* or *karma*, which was thought of as a residue of fine matter coming from previous lives.⁵ Even nowadays, these ideas are still current, as can be seen, for example, in a well-known Japanese painting showing the figure of a Buddha floating in the clouds with a child in the attitude of an embryo in a spherical container at his feet, representing the sending of a soul down to earth.⁶ Whereas the term *gandhabba* was used more poetically, the term *vinṇāna*, the most important of the five *skandhas*, was used instead of it in a more philosophical context.⁷ Both *gandhabba* and *cinnana* were strongly reminiscent of the *linga-śarīra* of the Brahmanic philosophy.⁸ In the Buddhist text known as the *Milindapaṇha* of 700 A.D. or thereabouts, then, the term *nāmarūpa* (*rūpa* meaning "form, corporeality") is used, not *vinṇāna*.⁹ This doctrine of the third factor also occurs in medical writings. (The Buddhists were especially interested in medicine.¹⁰) Both the Buddhists and the Hindus taught that there were various ways in which creatures could come to life in addition to being born via the body of the mother. There was, for example, an immediate coming into being, an immediate coming to corporeal form. This applied especially to "the bodies

1 B 185, II, pp. 302-312; see also B 178, p. 186.

2 B 178, p. 9 ff.

3 *op. cit.*, p. 12.

4 *op. cit.*, p. 28.

5 *op. cit.*, p. 29; see also above, p. 238.

6 *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30.

7 *op. cit.*, pp. 36-37.

8 *op. cit.*, pp. 37-47.

9 *op. cit.*, p. 39 ff; see also above, p. 238.

10 *op. cit.*, p. 48 ff.

of the divine *ṛsis*, who came about at the beginning of creation by the immediate joining together of the elements". The fact that the celestial beings acquired fiery bodies also has to be included in this category.¹ These are all examples of hylic pluralistic thinking.

According to Buddhism, man's ordinary body comes about by the natural process of procreation, but a part is played in this by the third, subtle factor, the *gandhabba*. A special and particularly complicated case of this is the birth of Buddha himself. This question is the main theme of Windisch's book. What is remarkable in this connection is that it has been generally assumed that one of the three factors has been eliminated—that of the father. Windisch pointed here to similarities in the later Buddhist texts between the birth of Buddha and that of Christ.² In the case of Buddha's birth, we have to do both with "the elimination of a human father and the miraculous birth of an *immaculata*"³ as in the case of Christ and with a descent, at least according to the earliest sources, on the father's side in the one case from the lineage of Ikṣvāku and in the other from the family of David. Even the Church Father Jerome was struck by the fact that Buddha was born of a virgin.⁴ Windisch also pointed out many differences between the births and the lives of Buddha and of Christ.

There are many Buddhist legends dealing with Buddha's descent from heaven (*tuṣita*⁵), after his life there, before birth into the body of his Māyā. According to one very well-known legend, Māyā had a strange dream in which the gods carried her in her bed to the Himalaya, where the Bodhisatta descended in the form of a splendid white elephant, tapped her on her right hand side and entered her body. Of the three factors which play a part in birth, then, only the mother and the soul-being coming down to earth play any part in this legend,⁶ which figures again and again in the iconography of Buddhism. (See, for example, the illustration on the opposite page which shows Māyā's dream and the birth of Buddha.⁷) Assuming that the elephant in this legend does

1 *op. cit.*, p. 186; see also the Maudgalya legend (above. p. 206).

2 *op. cit.*, p. 195.


3 *op. cit.*, p. 146, 157. The index of Windisch's book (B 178) should be consulted for further references to *immaculata*. In this, Windisch did not make sufficient distinction between Christ's birth from a virgin and Mary's exemption from original sin—the immaculate conception of Mary herself. This does not, however, make any essential difference to the analogy referred to in the text.

4 *Adversus Jovianum*, I, 42, see also B 178, p. 220.

5 See B 178, p. 165.

6 *op. cit.*, pp. 155-156.

7 From the photographic library of the Kern Institute at London—Museum Lahore, No. 2335. See also B 178, p. 7.



portray the third factor (which is, of course, the second factor in this instance), in other words, the *gandharva*, which can, in Windisch' view, be regarded as equivalent to the *linga-śarīra* of fine matter in the philosophy of the Brahmans, than what we have here is an attempt to render the *ochēma* or body of fine matter in legend and art. Whereas this *ochēma* is given the form of a bird on the papyrus in the Egyptian Book of the Dead,¹ for example, it is here represented as a white elephant. On the other hand, a recollection of the higher subtle body also clearly plays a part in the holiness of white elephants in Siam.²

In conclusion, I should like also to mention another question very briefly here. Gonda has pointed to the occurrence in Buddhism of an analogy between the stages of consciousness attained in *samādhi* and the "turning inward" practised in the yoga of the Hindus. Even greater profundity is reached in the discussion of these stages of Buddhist meditation than in the Hindu yoga. The *arhat* or advanced ecstatic, acquires supranormal powers in these stages of consciousness. These are the *iddhis*,³ which correspond to the *siddhis* in the yoga of Hinduism. The *spiritual-etheric rūpa-body* (the italics are mine), which dissociates itself from the purely "material" body, enables him to acquire these powers.⁴ In other words, what Buddhism is teaching here is that it is possible to make an excursion. It is, moreover, precisely this form of meditation or systematic ecstasy which is essential to Buddhism as the key to salvation.⁵

It is therefore possible to conclude by saying that hylic pluralism occurs quite concretely in Buddhism—our discussion of these various themes in this section has shown this even more clearly than the more general discussion in Chapter 41.

43. SOME BUDDHIST CONCEPTS 2. KAYA; LOKA

Further examples can be quoted to illustrate this. In the preceding chapter, I was generally speaking, concerned with the ideas of earlier Buddhism, which was later known as the Hīnayāna or "small vehicle". The emphasis in Mahāyāna Buddhism—Buddhism of the "great vehicle" which developed gradually alongside the earlier Hīnayāna Buddhism

1 See Chapter 22, Ancient Egypt, p. 184.

2 See B 178, p. 6.

3 See above, pp. 235 and 238-239; see also B 186, p. 335.

4 B 58, p. 86.

5 *op. cit.*, p. 87.

—was, however, less on the redemption of individual man and more on universal salvation.¹ This is just as applicable to our subject. I have so far discussed analogies within Buddhism with the Brahmanic doctrine of the *śarīra* with regard to individual man, and, even when there were instances of the miraculous birth of the founder of Buddhism, these were concerned with the remarkable form which the *gadharva*, or pre-existent being, had assumed according to the legend. This legend, however, formed a transition. It was very old,² but it was adopted eagerly by Mahāyāna Buddhism. The earlier, simple idea of Buddha changed quite radically and all kinds of complementary themes were added to it. Just as there is, in Christian teaching, the Jesus who associated with the Jews of his own period and the Christ, the second Person of the Trinity, so too is there in this form of Buddhism—and not only the Mahāyāna, but also the later Vajrayāna Buddhism, which goes back to the philosophy of the Brahmins³—a *cosmic* idea of Buddha. Although it was my general intention to avoid cosmic problems in this work,⁴ it is impossible to by-pass them entirely in this context. The *trikāya* doctrine of this later, very widespread form of Buddhism teaches that Buddha had three distinct bodies or *kāyas*.⁵ These were clearly regarded as existing on very different levels. Apart from these three bodies, a further *rūpa-kāya* or ordinary material body received from the mother of Buddha was also sometimes assumed.⁶ The first of these three bodies taught in the *trikāya* doctrine is the *nirmāṇa-kāya*, the body in which Buddha accomplished salvation for men on earth and in which he, transformed, appeared on earth: “He appears on earth with a terrestrial apparent body (*nirmāṇa-kāya*) as a man with a limited duration of life”.⁷ This is clearly reminiscent of docetism, according to which Christ went round on earth only apparently (*dokein* to appear, seem) in an ordinary body. However this may be, the *nirmāṇa-kāya* is obviously the body at the lowest level. The second of the three bodies is the *sambhoga-kāya*, the body of blessedness, in which Buddha dwells for ever at the head of a hierarchy of beings as the object

¹ See above, pp. 156-157.

² B 178, p. 6.

³ See above, p. 157-158; see also H. von Glasenapp, *Buddhistische Mysterien*, 1940.

⁴ See above, p. 13.

⁵ See B 114, p. 598 ff; B 58, p. 102 ff; H. von Glasenapp, *Buddhistische Mysterien* p. 13 ff; P. Oltramare, *La théosophie bouddhique*. 1923, p. 310 ff.

⁶ See Oltramare, *op. cit.*, p. 312.

⁷ Von Glasenapp, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

of veneration. This "supraterrestrial salvāion-body"¹ is clearly at the level of what I have called the sublime *pneuma*.² Finally, there is the *dharma-kāya*, the body of the law or of the truth. This is thought of as completely cosmic.³ It is, Radhakrishnan has written, no longer (the body of) a person, but "the norm of all existence". The relationship between *dharma-kāya* and *sambhoga-kāya* is similar to that in Indian thought between Brahman and Ívara, the personal God.⁴ The *dharma-kāya* is totality, the timeless and absolute ground of all things.⁵ This cosmic body is identified with the "absolute Being".⁶ This Buddha is thus regarded as being at the same level as God the Father in Christianity. It is therefore no longer possible to speak of a "body" and *kāya* is therefore translated in this case as "mode of being". On the other hand, however, this is reminiscent of views of the world or the universe as a whole as the body of God or of Ívara,⁷ although no distinction is made here between the two—God and his body. This is characteristic of Buddhism—above the total pluralism (Linssen spoke of "one totality"⁸) there is not something accepted. Not something and therefore nothing, but a nothing that is once again not nothing.⁹

This *trikāya* doctrine of bodies at different levels is therefore clearly permeated with hylic pluralism. Much more is involved, however, than simply bodies of different subtlety of the ordinary individual. The Buddha represents a case of *incarnation* of the highest being who nonetheless also went round as a man. The ordinary and the individual has here clearly become the cosmic. On the other hand, however, the doctrine of the three *kāyas*—of bodies at different levels—is, according to Buddhist teaching, true not only of the Buddha, but also of the individual person.¹⁰

In view of this cosmic aspect, then, it is not surprising that another Buddhist doctrine is to be found in close association with this doctrine of the *trikāya*—that of the existence of several *lokas* or worlds.¹¹ There

1 *ibid.*

2 See above, p. 30.

3 Von Glasenapp, *op. cit.*, p. 13: *kosmischer Leib* ("cosmic body")

4 B 124, I, p. 599.

5 B 58, p. 102.

6 B 179, IV, p. 411.

7 See above, pp. 224.

8 See above, p. 236.

9 See above, p. 232-233. Thus with "fundamentally paradoxical oscillation"; see B 114, p. 398.

10 B 124, I, p. 600.

11 Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology* 1914, p. 7; see also p. 117; W.Y. Evans-Wentz, *The Tibetan Book of the Dead*, 1927, p. 227, note 2; B 58, p. 206.

is, generally speaking, reference to three worlds in this doctrine—*kāma-loka*, *rūpa-loka* and *arūpa-loka*. The lowest world, which is both visible and invisible, is *kāma-loka*. *Rūpa-loka* is higher, but it is still a world of forms. *Arūpa-loka* is a world that is without forms or even entirely non-spatial¹ and immaterial. I have already ventured to suggest² that *arūpa* in the last case might perhaps be taken in the sense of simply *relatively* immaterial, that is, finer than the *rūpa-loka*, just as, in the West, *ahūlon* is often used to mean only “relatively immaterial”.³ Certainly, just as *dharma-kāya* may mean “the timeless and absolute ground of all things”, so too can *arūpa-loka* mean the very highest level, spaceless and formless. In this case, however, “world” or *loka* is used in a very improper sense. In place of this, there would also seem to be place for the concept of an extremely fine and high world. This is all the more convincing because the three worlds are further subdivided elsewhere in the literature of Buddhism, with the result that there are in all six or more worlds, all of which are on an equal footing as worlds. These six worlds⁴—*deva-loka* etc.—are connected with a definite colour,⁵ but this is not definitely regarded as immaterial. The doctrine of many finer worlds is certainly not limited to Buddhism—it is also to be found in Indian philosophy.⁶ Keeping to my intention to avoid a lengthy discussion of the cosmic aspect, I have not gone very deeply into this.⁷

In this context, however, the following has to be said. There is, in the later branch of Buddhism, Vajrayāna Buddhism, which is very close to Hinduism,⁸ reference to a *vajra-dhātu*, a “diamond world”, a world which is, among other things, full of all kinds of beings that are worthy of veneration.⁹ This form of Buddhism is furthermore

1 B 52, p. 72.

2 See above, p. 237.

3 See above, p. 17; for *rūpa-loka* there, read *arūpa-loka*.

4 See Evans-Wentz, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

5 *Das Tibetische Totenbuch*, 1948, p. 158.

6 See, for example, B 28, I, 3, p. 652.

7 See above, p. 226. The elements of the ancient world—earth, water, fire air etc.—also occur in Buddhist thought, in which they are called *dhātus*; see B 52m p. 79, 87; B 185, I, p. 121 etc. It is by no means out of the question that these *dhātus* were regarded at least partially as consisting of fine matter. An argument in favour of this theory is the close connection (see B 58, p. 136; B 185, I, p. 213) between this concept and the ideas of the Sāṅkhya, in which explicit reference is made to fine elements or *tanmātras* (see above, p. 227).

8 See above, pp. 157, 244.

9 Von Glasenapp, *Buddhistische Mysterien, Die geheimen Lehren und Riten des Diamanten-Fahrzeugs*, 1940, p. 110. A certain *mandala* is related to this world; see the illustration opposite p. 112.

圖 心 真 拱 端

未到彼岸不能無法
既至彼岸又焉用法
頂中常放白毫光
痴人猶待問菩薩

遺照於外
宅神於內
真心至趣
而與吉會

元君端拱坐玄都
三疊胎仙舞八隅
變化純陽天地合
長生因此功工夫

無心於事
無事於心
超出萬幻
確然一雲



Plate 5

Third stage of Meditation
Separation of the Soul-Body into an Independent Existence
From: R. Wilhelm—C. G. Jung, *Das Geheimnis der goldenen Blüte*
(Rascher & Cie, Zürich)

known as Vajrayāna, the doctrine of the diamond vehicle. There is no doubt that the image or metaphor of the pilgrim who reaches the other bank of the river, *nirvāna*, in a ferry boat (something that is, however, not connected with an *ochēma* or vehicle of fine matter)¹ continues to play a part in this doctrine of the diamond *yāna* or vehicle. Von Glasenapp, however, has enlarged on the various meanings of *vajra* and, in his opinion, Vajrayana as a form of Buddhism amounts to the same as *mantra-yāna*, the way of the *mantrāms* or magic formulae.² Gonda's explanation of *vajra-yāna* is that it is the diamond career, the career of the highest and the indestructible, in other words, the highest reality.³ To this extent, then, *yāna* still means vehicle, in other words, way or mode of development. It seems to me, however, that *yāna* also gradually came to be regarded hylic pluralistically in this form of Buddhism, as a concrete vehicle or *psychopompos*, an *ochēma* in the sense in which it is understood in this book. The fact that a diamond world, a *vajra-dhātu*, is also mentioned in this system also points, at least to some extent, in this direction. The Vajrayāna system is especially widespread in China and Tibet, with the result that it is first from these countries that we hear about it.⁴ What is more, Richard Wilhelm has published a text from this *vajra* environment entitled *Das Geheimnis der Goldenen Blute*, 1929, 2nd edition, 1944, with a foreword by C. G. Jung. There is reference in this book to a *diamond body*, about which Jung has written as "the idea of the 'diamond body', of the incorruptible breath-body which originates... in the golden flower".⁵ In the Chinese illustration in this book, a little human figure is shown rising from the head of a meditating Buddhist and the caption reads: "Meditation, third stage: Separation of the Spirit-Body into an Independent Existence".⁶ Elsewhere, too, Jung establishes an explicit connection between this diamond vehicle and the idea of subtle bodies in other environments. He quotes the above-mentioned text in his *Psychologie und Alchemie*, 1944 (B 78): "The inside of the 'golden flower' is a 'germinal place' where the 'diamond body' is begotten".⁷ This idea of the diamond body in Chinese alchemy points, according to Jung, to immortality attained by the "transformation of the body".

1 See above, p. 236-237.

2 *op. cit.*, pp. 20-21.

3 B 58, p. 212.

4 B 58, p. 213.

5 *op. cit.*, p. 59; see also above, p. 30.

6 Frontispiece.

7 p. 185.

Because it is transparent and hard, the diamond is a very suitable symbol. This idea is certainly connected with what alchemy was really striving to express in the West: "to establish a *corpus subtile*, the transfigured resurrection body—that is, a body which is at the same time spirit".¹ In this form of Buddhism, then, there is reference both to a diamond world and to a diamond vehicle and the diamond vehicle has been connected by C. G. Jung with the idea of a *corpus subtile*, a body of fine matter, which occurs elsewhere. "Of diamond" is clearly a suitable image for this. (It may be compared with our "sublime *pneuma*".²) On the other hand, however, *yāna* has been used from the very earliest times in Buddhism for "vehicle" or "way" (career or carriage-way). Clearly, two images have merged here, in which the abstract idea of attaining *nirvāna* has been thrust into the background by the more concrete notion attaining a definite heaven.³ In the West as well, the ideas of an ascension into heaven and of a vehicle of fine matter were similarly very closely related.⁴ It is therefore not possible to assert that the term *yāna* or vehicle in Vajrayāna Buddhism has nothing to do with *ochēma* or vehicle of fine matter, as in the case of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna Buddhism.⁵

It is therefore clear that, in the concepts *kāya*, *loka* and even in the concept *yāna*, just as in the concepts *vinnāna* and *gandhabba*, hylic pluralism is quite distinctly expressed.

44. HYLIC PLURALISM IN BUDDHISM (2)

I should now like to return to Buddhism as a whole and consider the most characteristic and comprehensive doctrines which, although they have not always been preserved everywhere in an equally pure form, have never been entirely relinquished. Secondly in this section, I should also like to consider whether a connection can be established between these doctrines and any one of the six metaphysical standpoints that I have elaborated with regard to hylic pluralism.

Let us first of all examine more closely the doctrine which distinguishes Buddhism so clearly from the Brahmanic systems—the doctrine of *anātman*, (*a*) *nātta* or "no soul".⁶ According to this teaching, the

¹ *op. cit.*, pp. 573-574.

³ See B 179, IV, p. 410.

⁵ See above, p. 236-237.

⁶ See B 52, p. 82 ff; B 53, p. 307; B 58, p. 93 ff; B 124, I, p. 384; B 178, p. 39; see also above, pp. 158, 215, 239.

² See above, p. 30.

⁴ See above, p. 140-141.

soul does not exist as a unity, either in the form of many immaterial *puruṣas*, as taught by the Sāṅkhya system, or in the form of the one *Atman* of the Vedānta. What do in fact exist are the *skandhas*¹ and separate thoughts, which are not so easily destroyed.² These have an effect on each other, even apart from the channels of the ordinary senses.³ But the unity is lost and precisely the opposite to the Western concept of immaterial, singular and as such immortal⁴ souls is taught here. According to Buddhist teaching, there is no unchangeable, eternal principle in man, no real self and also no absolute Self; there is neither an active individual nor an unknown substratum. Nonetheless, something is born again, continued in a following existence on earth, with a karmic link between one life and the successive life. Metempsychosis without a soul as bearer—which is what this is—may seem rather strange, but it should not be forgotten that it is also the fine body, the *linga* or *sukṣma-śartra*, in the Sāṅkhya and Vedānta systems which forms the link between the various incarnations.⁵ Individual differences are not, according to these Brahmanic *darśanas*, to be found so much in the souls (according to the Sāṅkhya, the *puruṣas* have only a colourless, passive part to play⁶) as in the *upādhis*.⁷ It is therefore only a short step to saying that there are no individual souls. On the other hand, the strict (*advaita*) Vedānta also taught that there was no plurality of individual souls—basically there is *only* the *One Self* or *Atman*.⁸ We may ask whether this concept of the one *Atman* is perhaps as strange and difficult to determine as its counterpart in Buddhism, the concept of the multiplicity of *skandhas* and so on, that is, whether it may be as strange as the idea of *nirvāṇa*.⁹ This doctrine of *anātta* was, moreover, first taught in Buddhism without proof—it was only at a later stage that attempts were made by Buddhist thinkers to give it a basis of reasoned argument.¹⁰

We must now go on to consider the doctrine of *nirvāṇa* (in Pali *nibbāna*¹¹) which is so characteristic of Buddhism. The original mean-

1 See above, p. 237.

2 See B 124, I, p. 637.

3 See above, pp. 238-239.

4 See Part I, p. 73.

5 See above, pp. 209, 219.

6 See above, p. 210.

7 See, for example, B 178, p. 39; above, pp. 214, 218. What is more, Buddhist thinkers regularly called the (*s*)*kandhas upādhis*. See L. de la Vallée-Poussin, *Nirvāṇa*, 1925, p. 171 ff.

8 See above, p. 216.

10 B 58, p. 93.

11 B 58, p. 80; B 124, I, p. 447; L. de la Vallée-Poussin, *Nirvāṇa*, 1925; etc.

9 See above, p. 370.

ing of the word was “blown out” or “extinguished”. This refers to the human passions, to his thirst for life, to his being bound to the “wheel of birth and death”. A distinction is made, however, between two kinds of *nirvāna*—ordinary *nirvāna* or *upādhiśeṣa*, in which only the passions are extinguished, and *anupādhiśeṣa* or *parinirvāna*, in which an end is made to all existence. The *arhat* can attain the first state during his existence on earth; in the second state, he completely leaves the realm of the transient.¹ In this state, he needs no longer to be reborn.² In the first case, then, there are still remnants of *upādhis* or limitations; in the second there are no longer any *upādhis* at all.

It is this concept of *nirvāna*, especially in its absolute significance, which forms the counterpart to the homogeneous whole in which no substantial souls occur, but which consists of the *skandhas* of the relative unity which man is and moreover of human thoughts and, generally speaking, of the *dharmas*.

The teaching of Buddhism has in this way been characterised in many very divergent manners—as relativism, as nihilism, as agnosticism or scepticism, as positivism, as materialism and as atheism. This makes a confusing and even contradictory impression. I shall now try to show that all these different characterisations do in fact correctly represent, at least to some degree, the homogeneous whole that I have referred to above and its counterpart, *nirvāna*. At the same time, it will also become apparent to which of the six metaphysical standpoints Buddhism is most close.

*Relativism*³ is certainly not an incorrect definition of Buddhist teaching, which maintains that things are in a state of flux, a constant stream, as was taught in the West by Heraclitus. Everything is “a perpetual process with nothing permanent”. Neither the body nor the soul are lasting. “Man seems to be a complex composed of five *skandhas*”. There seems to be nothing apart from these *skandhas* or constitutive elements developed from the *nāmarūpa* of the Upaniṣads.⁴ All the “factors of existence” or *dharma* are causally connected—the one being dependent on the other.⁵ The *skandhas* form a rubric of the *dharmas*.⁶ It is from this homogeneous whole, which the Buddhist also calls *sam-sāra*, that man wishes to free himself. This whole is an interconnected

1 See B 124, I, p. 447.

2 This can be compared with the legend mentioned above, p. 238.

3 B 53, p. 454.

4 B 124, I, p. 383-384.

5 B 52, p. 66 ff; p. 82.

6 *ibid.*, see also above, p. 238.

homogeneity in which everything is linked with everything else, but in which nothing is lasting. There is no place for sharp contrasts, such as that between spirit and matter or between souls and bodies. There is no place in this teaching for substantial souls as taught by the epsilon standpoint or anthropological dualism, which of course means that Buddhism cannot be classified under the epsilon standpoint. The epsilon standpoint teaches, after all, that the psychical aspect is immaterial and this is a further reason why Buddhism does not belong to this standpoint—the *skandhas* are of fine matter. Buddhist psychology is materialistic,¹ even though this is not a monistic, but rather a dualistic materialism.² It has, however, not yet been decided whether it is possible to speak of materialism at all in the case of Buddhism. However this may be, what I have called the physical and the psychical aspects do in any case form one single homogeneous whole for the Buddhist.³ Both of these aspects are at the most only relative factors within that single whole. Since everything moreover “originates in dependence”⁴ for the Buddhist, relativism is certainly not an incorrect definition of the Buddhist view.

Sometimes, however, this relativism takes on extreme forms. The “followers of the middle way” or the sect known as the Mādhyamikas yielded to the inclination to complete relativism. Buddha himself had wanted to follow the middle way between asceticism and ordinary life, but these Buddhists tried first of all to preserve, in metaphysical questions, the middle way between extreme affirmation and extreme negation. After all, everything consists only of continuously changing combinations of *dharma*s.⁵ Buddha and his earliest followers had set the example in this and had refrained from taking up a firm position in various metaphysical questions—an attitude which may be called agnosticism.⁶ The Mādhyamikas, however, went even further than this and even denied negation itself, although they began their arguments again and again with tiresome repetition with the phrase “there is no . . .”.⁷ This led to a kind of *nihilism*. Nagārjuna, who by the way was one of the greatest Indian thinkers, formulated the *sunyavada* or doctrine of vacuism. The *dharma*s—the *skandhas* and others—are

1 See B 124, I, p. 599; see also above, p. 234.

2 See above, p. 236.

3 See above, p. 235.

4 B 52, p. 82.

5 See B 58 p. 104

6 B 58, p. 79.

7 B 58, p. 104.

really nothing. They have no independent reality and only exist in mutual dependence on each other. All coming into being and passing away is only a dream or *māyā*. Everything is empty, a vacuum.¹ This standpoint can to some extent be visualised if *nirvāna* also has no positive content and is regarded as a state of being radically extinguished. In that case, however, there is a tendency to say that this state of being extinguished is at least positive. Although he continued to be a Buddhist, Nagārjuna went even further, as far as complete scepticism, even going so far as to say that *nirvāna* and *samsāra* were in no way different!² This doctrine of vacuism was, however, explained by other, later thinkers in the following way, namely that this emptiness was the only positive value, the non-relative foundation of all the phenomenal.³ The nihilism of Buddhism was given a more fortunate meaning in this teaching. It is then a nothing that is nonetheless something.⁴ There is clearly a difficulty in thinking about such a nothing, this special vacuum. It would seem as though this kind of difficulty or *aporia* automatically arises as soon as this level is reached. On the other hand, however, this is typically the level of *nirvāna*, where everything is blown out or extinguished and, just as in the case of the negative theology, so too is it impossible to say here that what is involved has no content, no meaning or no existence because nothing concrete can be said about it. This must always be borne in mind in any attempt to answer the question as to whether Buddhism is ultimately simply relativism or nihilism. As far as the world of many things and concrete concepts is concerned, Buddhism, like Heraclitus of Ephesus, undoubtedly gave prominence to the relative character of things, their state of flux. According to them, no absolute or absolutes, for example, no substantial souls, can occur. Is this relativism or nihilism however the last word? Judging by sceptics such as Nagārjuna, who even denied negation and treated *nirvāna* and *samsāra* alike, this is certainly the case. One can see, however, that this standpoint is really a kind of degradation of another point of view which is meaningful and which in theory (for in practice Nagārjuna and his followers continued to adhere to Buddhism) remained closer to the fundamental idea of Buddhism. According to this other point of view, there is something positive and a fixed point, namely the state of being extinguished, the emptiness

1 B 58, p. 105 ff; see also B 52, 88 ff.

2 B 58, p. 107.

3 B 58, p. 108.

4 See above, p. 230.

itself in other words *nirvāna*. In the last resort, then Buddhism is *not* relativism or nihilism.¹ One can understand, however, that, if the emptiness or void is regarded as the only fixed point, there is a serious temptation to proclaim a complete relativism or nihilism. All the same, there is an important difference in standpoint between the sceptic pure and simple and the essential teaching of Buddhism. By placing the relativism of Buddhism against the background of the concept of *nirvāna*, the real extent of this relativism can be made clear.

Although it is far less common to characterise Buddhism as *positivism*, this is nonetheless done sometimes. Abegg, for example, has written: "This view of the psychical is strictly positivistic in that it only regards the immediate present as real and does not accept any substratum to the psychical processes".² Indeed, positivism in general limits itself to the purely positive, that is, to what is factually given, and refuses to accept all kinds of backgrounds that are not given. The *anātta* doctrine of Buddhism fits perfectly into this pattern —the many immaterial *puruṣas* of the Sāṅkhya system and the one *Atman* of the Vedānta are both rejected by Buddhism. But does Buddhism refuse to accept *all* non-given backgrounds and limit itself *completely* to what is concretely given? This seems to me to be very doubtful. Certainly it rejects the many, concrete substrata such as the *puruṣas* (and thus arrives at a homogeneous whole of all the psychophysical) and equally it rejects *Atman* as a real substratum, an existing Self. But there is, all the same, a difference between the Western positivist and the Buddhist. For the Buddhist there is at least *nirvāna*, which cannot be called a substratum or a Self,³ but can be called the boundary or the abyss of things. It seems to me, then, that, *insofar* as the Buddhist rejects all kinds of concrete substrata (such as substantial, immortal souls) and real subjects, he may correctly be called a positivist, but that he *cannot* be called a positivist in the last resort, because he accepts one very small concrete datum as valid, something that is least of all positive in the ordinary sense of the word, namely the positiveness of the emptiness or of negation itself. In deciding whether Buddhism can correctly be called positivistic, we have therefore to consider the question against the background, once again, of the concept of *nirvāna*.

1 It could to some extent be compared with *historicism* in Western thought. A historical approach that it carried to its ultimate conclusion leads to relativism and to a refutation of all striving. The opponents of historicism, on the other hand, have to appeal as much to imponderables as the Buddhist philosopher who calls the void the only positive value.

2 B 1, p. 116.

3. See B 53, p. 307.

I have already briefly discussed the question of *materialism* with regard to Buddhism. Buddhism—for example, Hinayana Buddhism—has also been called materialistic, but I think caution is called for here. Linssen was, in my opinion, right when he characterised Buddhism as “spiritual materialism”,¹ but what can this definition mean precisely? In the first place, it means that this materialism is not an ordinary monistic materialism, but a dualistic materialism which also accepts finer species of matter than ordinarily perceptible matter and, for example, a continued existence after death. The standpoint of Buddhism, however, is certainly not that of monistic materialism—it accepts a continued existence in the form of metempsychosis (unless *nirvāna* has already been attained) and also the possibility of making an excursion. A dualistic materialism of this type—a form of hylic pluralism—could, if need be, be called a spiritual materialism. In any case, Linssen means something of this kind. According to him, the Buddhists accept a “one totality”,² which is what I am inclined to call the homogeneous whole of the physical plus the psychical. He has also written about the “cosmic mind”,³ which makes a distinctly hylic pluralistic impression and is far removed from the spiritual or psychical as an epiphenomenon of the ordinarily material, as monistic materialism conceives it. What is more, he also made a connection between the “body of Buddha”, that is, in the highest sense of the *dharma-kāya*⁴, and this “one totality”.⁵ This *dharma-kāya*, the highest of the three *kāyas*, is no longer a body in the ordinary sense of the word—it is called not only the body of Buddha, but also the body of the law or of the truth⁶ and even the timeless and absolute ground of all things.⁷ If, however, the latter is seen in the *dharma-kāya*, then, in my opinion, another level has imperceptibly been reached. Linssen does not, on the other hand, go along with me in this, maintaining that this “one totality” is sufficient in itself. But this is the second possibility—that what is meant by “spiritual materialism” is not simply a dualistic materialism in contrast to an ordinary monistic materialism, but a transi-

1 *op. cit.*, I, p. III; see also above, p. 236.

2 *ibid.*,

3 *op. cit.*, I, p. V, 28; II, p. 26.

4 See above, p. 245.

5 *op. cit.*, I, p. 67 ff; see also II, p. 109 ff.

6 See above, p. 245; see also John 14.6: “I am the way, and the truth, and the life”, in which there is hardly any more reference to the person of Jesus. Linssen also makes a brief comparison between the “body of Buddha” and the “body of Christ”; see II, p. 109 ff.

7 B 58, p. 102.

tion from *kāya* or body to another and fundamentally more profound level. This level, however, is the same as the one in connection with which *nirvāna* is, on the other hand, referred to.¹ Buddha in his highest form—as *dharma-kāya*—remains *continuously* in *nirvāna*, while the *sudden* attainment or becoming aware of *nirvāna* is rather more something of him in the lower form in which he went around on earth. The situation may therefore be briefly summarised as follows. The body of Buddha in its highest form, that is as *dharma-kāya*, is no longer a body, but rather *nirvāna*, a situation that certain schools of Buddhism have called *śūnya*, the (positive) vacuum or emptiness. From this we may safely draw the following conclusion. If Buddhism is thus characterised as a materialism, this is, in the first place, far from being an ordinary, monistic materialism. Insofar as it is, in the second place, not simply a dualistic materialism, but a spiritual materialism in the sense of a materialism with a background at a deeper and fundamentally different level, then it is clearly true to say here that this characterisation, in this case of “materialism”, is only tenable if it is seen in connection with the concept of *nirvāna*.

It is, of course, doubtful whether Linssen saw the situation in this light. His view was rather the “one totality of the psychophysical universe” was sufficient in itself and he then called this idea “spiritual materialism”. In other words, there was, in his opinion, nothing above this “one totality”. It would be quite correct to assert this in the case of materialism, because, according to materialism, matter is the highest reality (even though it may be a question here of two kinds of matter, ordinary matter and a finer matter). But Linssen is clearly as interested in *nirvāna* as a convinced Buddhist, with the consequence that, for him too, there is also something of a different nature and, to this extent, it is only in the improper sense that it is possible to speak here of metaphysical materialism. It is therefore true of Linssen’s view as well that his characterisation as “materialism” has to be seen against the background of the concept of *nirvāna*.

Mutatis mutandis, a similar problem is met with in another characterisation of Buddhism, namely that it is *atheistic*. It is indeed true to say that atheism is frequently attributed to Buddhism and Buddhists are often regarded as atheists.² One thing in any case is certain—the

1 See B 58, p. 103: “Even the ancient canon taught that Buddha and *dharma* were equivalent. Seen from the point of view of “the path”, it is *nirvāna*”. See also B 124, I, p. 592-593.

2 See, for example, B 151, pp. 35, 61.

Buddhists are not and have never been theists, nor do they accept any God who is outside and confronting the world, who has created this world and who himself possesses all kinds of concrete qualities and functions (such as omnipotence, providence and so on). The Buddhists are certainly opposed to all anthropomorphism with regard to the Absolute or God. Is there therefore no place in their thought for anything of this nature? Clearly they are not simply atheists. Linssen said: "I believe that atheism, as we generally understand it in the West, does not correspond in any way to the special form of atheism which certain Buddhists profess".¹ Thus, whereas atheism in the West is generally equated with the rejection of all religion, Buddhism is in any case a religion and would therefore appear to be an atheistic religion.² Is it, however, permissible to call everything that is not theism atheism? Let us not quarrel about words. The Buddhists are, in any case, not atheists simply in the sense of people who are irreligious. The whole question of the extent to which the Buddhists are atheists and to which Buddhism can be characterised as atheism must be seen—like the question as to whether Buddhism can be regarded as relativism, nihilism, positivism or materialism—against the background of the level at which the Buddhist concept of *nirvāna* is situated. I have already commented on this aspect of the problem in connection with Jainism. This religion also taught the concept of *nirvāna* and, although the Jains were certainly never theists, it has even been asserted that they were atheists.³ I compared their situation with that of the negative theology of the West, according to which God was too exalted for anything to be said about him. One of the doctrines of Buddhism is that of vacuism or the *śūnyavāda*⁴—the doctrine of the void which is ultimately everything, but is nonetheless not nothing.⁵ Because it is so difficult to say anything about this, the appearance of nihilism and of atheism inevitably arises. But Buddhism has always taught something like *nirvāna* in its strict form⁶ and this doctrine forms the counterbalance that prevents the Buddhist religion from being purely relativism, nihilism, positivism, materialism or atheism. Certain characteristic difficulties, however, arise in any attempt to establish and to know that surplus—difficulties

1 *op. cit.*, I, p. III.

2 In the West, the concept of an "atheistic mysticism" has been discussed by F. Mauthner; see B 184, II, p. 139.

3 See above, p. 233.

4 B 58, p. 105; B 124, I, p. 592.

5 See above, pp. 251-252; see also B 58, p. 108.

6 See above, p. 250.

which I have, in a different context, called "fundamentally paradoxical".¹ In such a case, there can only be a question of "knowledge *quand même*".²

If my conclusion about the atheism or non-atheism of Buddhism is generally speaking correct, this does not mean that certain Buddhists and members of Buddhist sects have not held different views—some strongly emphasising their atheism, others, on the other hand, going in the opposite direction. (These other characterisations can also, of course, be applied especially to certain stages in Buddhist thought.)³ Māhāyāna Buddhism, for example, did accept a metaphysical substratum, called, in its ontological aspect, *bhūtatathata* or the essence of existence, in its religious aspect *dharma-kāya* and, as bringing peace to the shattered heart, *nirvāṇa*.⁴ Clearly, what is elaborated here in a metaphysical and cosmological direction is man's personal mystical experience of the ancient Buddhist doctrine of *nirvāṇa*—this is, as I have remarked earlier,⁵ something that Māhāyāna Buddhism was strongly inclined to do. As Gonda correctly observed, developments of this kind came very close to the teaching of the Hindu Vedānta.⁶ After all, is it not similarly as difficult, in the Indian philosophical system of the Vedānta, to know the one *Atman* or self as it is, in Buddhism, to know the level of *nirvāṇa*?⁷ According to the Vedānta, all individual differences are attributable to the *upādhis* or *śarīras* and there is a clear analogy here at the lower level at which Buddhism speaks of the *skandhas* with *viññāṇa* at the top.⁸ It is also hardly possible to say what this one *Atman* is and yet it is regarded as the highest and most important value. It is therefore once more apparent that, even though it is known as *nāstika*, Buddhism is fundamentally very closely connected with the rest of Indian thought.

Although the Māhāyāna may have accepted a metaphysical substratum, taught a hierarchy of all kinds of higher beings and introduced a whole cult (for which reasons it has been compared with Roman Catholicism⁹), it never lost the original and fundamental Buddhist con-

1 See above, p. 213; see also B 114, p. 515.

2 See B 114, p. 143 ff.

3 See R. van Brakell Buys, *De ontwikkelingsgang der Boeddhitische filosofie*, B 169, XLVII, 5, p. 243 ff.

4 B 124, I, p. 592-593.

5 See above, p. 243-244.

6 See B 58, p. 210.

7 See above, pp. 215-216.

8 See above, p. 249.

9 See above, p. 157.

cept of redemption in *nirvāna*. (This is, of course, reminiscent of the position of the medieval Christian mystics.) Again and again, too, inward experience was emphasised in Māhāyana Buddhism, especially in the "school of meditation"¹ which furthered the ideas and practices concerning the *dhyānas* or various stages of *samādhi* or "turning inward"² which had existed since the earliest times. So much stress was in fact laid on this inner life that the name of one of the most wellknown Buddhist sects, Zen Buddhism, was derived from this concept *dhyāna*.³ On the other hand, what is encountered in this Zen Buddhism is one of the forms of Buddhism in which the Buddhist message was most characteristically expressed at a later period. Enlightenment, in Japanese *satori*, is as central here as it is in the life of Buddha himself. Linssen and other authors have clearly devoted so much attention to this Zen because it so typically reproduces the very essence of Buddhism. It is important that paradoxes should also emerge in the manner of enlightenment that is described here. In a recent collection⁴, for example, Hubert Benoit has written about "Zen as Yoga abrupt". This author has said about enlightenment that this "*satori*-event" consists of "the instant when man suddenly ceases not recognising that he has always been in the *satori*-state".⁵ The way in which mystical experience is described here is reminiscent of the doctrines of a contemporary writer, J. Krishnamurti, a mystic who makes one wonder whether or not he is an atheist. He refuses, for example, to speak explicitly about God. At the most he speaks—and obviously deliberately vaguely—about "Truth or Life of God".⁶ This does not mean, however, that he does not acknowledge the existence of a level of this calibre. This level does, in his opinion, exist and, what is more, it is attained—or rather, realised—"abruptly" and not as the result of a progressive and gradual ascent. Linssen is also clearly conscious of these similarities and, in his book on Buddhism, has devoted one chapter to the similarities and another to the differences between Zen Buddhism and Krishnamurti.⁷

1 See B 43, p. 103.

2 See B 58, p. 85, 153, 206; B 186, p. 71 ff, 331 ff.

3 B 43, p. 103. Zen is, in Chinese, Ch'an.

4 P. A. Sorokin *et. al.*, *Forms and Techniques of Altruistic and Spiritual Growth*, Boston, 1954, p. 139 ff.

5 *op. cit.*, p. 141. (See the paradox in *approaching God*: B 115, p. 67 ff.).

6 See my article "J. Krishnamurti en de wijsbegeerte", B 169, XLIII, 3, p. 131.

7 *op. cit.*, II, p. 131 ff: "Similitudes entre le Zen et Krishnamurti"; p. 147 ff: "Differences between Zen and Krishnamurti".

I would therefore conclude that, according to Buddhism, a definite level¹ exists and that this level must always be taken into account in any attempt to characterise this religion as relativistic, positivistic or whatever. This level of *nirvāna* forms the counterpart of that homogeneous whole of which the world consists at the ordinary level according to Buddhism and of what each of the different characterisations of Buddhism has attempted to express from a different point of view.

This rather long digression was necessary before making any attempt to establish to which of the *six metaphysical standpoints* Buddhism belongs. As I have already indicated to some extent, several of these standpoints can already be discounted as far as Buddhism is concerned. Buddhism can also, generally speaking, be regarded as hylic pluralistic.² What is more, various particular elements in Buddhism, such as *vin-nāna* and *gandhabba*,³ *kāya* and *loka*,⁴ can also be regarded as characteristic of what I have called hylic pluralism. It is therefore not possible to apply the *epsilon standpoint* or anthropological dualism, which rejects all kinds of fine materiality in connection with the soul, to Buddhist teaching. What about the *delta standpoint*, then, which accepts a certain anthropological dualism, namely the existence, in addition to ordinary material things, of immaterial, immortal souls which, as a rule, possess a vehicle of fine matter?⁵ This standpoint too is not applicable to Buddhism, because Buddhism denies the existence of substantial souls in its doctrine of *anātta*.⁶ What is more, it is not in favour of the idea of a dualism between the psychical and the physical aspects.⁷ As for the two materialistic standpoints, it is hardly possible to maintain that the standpoint of Buddhism is that of monistic materialism—the *alpha standpoint*—since it accepts a continued existence, the possibility of “excursion” and *fine materiality*.⁸ Is it, then, perhaps closer to the *beta standpoint*, that of dualistic materialism? This is rather more possible—Buddhism has sometimes been described as a materialism and, in this case, clearly as a dualistic materialism rather than a monistic materialism.⁹ What about the *gamma standpoint*?

1 In considering this “level”, we should not, however, think of a scale or gradual ascent, but of something radically different.

2 See above, section 41.

3 See above, section 42.

4 See above, section 43.

5 See above, p. 41, 148.

6 See above, p. 248.

7 See above, p. 235.

8 See above, pp. 236, 254.

9 See above, pp. 236, 254.

This standpoint is, very close to the beta standpoint, after all—what they both have in common is that they regard the entire ordinary reality, both its psychical and its physical aspects, as material, the psychical being regarded as of fine matter and the physical as of ordinary matter.¹ The difference between these two standpoints, however, is that the gamma standpoint also accepts another, non-material factor in addition to this ordinary reality of created plurality, which may be material—the deity is not material according to the gamma standpoint, it and it alone is immaterial, *Monon theon asōmaton*.² The question, then, amounts to this—is there, according to Buddhist teaching, another factor that is different from this entire material reality (of coarse and of fine matter) and, if there is, can this factor be placed on the same footing as the immaterial deity who has, so far, been regarded as an indispensable factor in the gamma standpoint? As far as the first point is concerned, I have already argued at some length³ that it is very difficult, indeed hardly possible to assert that matter is, according to Buddhist teaching, the only and the highest reality. If the whole of concrete pluralistic reality is regarded by Buddhism as consisting of (fine) matter, this has to be seen against the background of the concept of *nirvāṇa*. To this extent, Buddhism is not materialistic in the metaphysical sense—it does not regard matter as the highest and the ultimate reality and cannot therefore be classified under the beta standpoint. This judgement, however, is *negative*—matter is *not* the highest reality. Does another, higher reality exist, then, for the Buddhist? A reality which is experienced in *nirvāṇa*? Is that, however, a *reality*, something that *is*? These categories can hardly be applied to Buddhism. A well-known Buddhist school proposed the doctrine of *vacuism*, of emptiness. Similar questions also arise in connection with the second point, whether the other, non-material factor recognised by Buddhism can be placed on the same footing as the immaterial deity, a part of the teaching of the gamma standpoint? We have in fact already been confronted with a similar problem in the case of Jainism, although the situation was rather different there because the Jains, as we have seen, accepted an immaterial being within the pluralism plus bodies of fine matter, with the result that their teaching can be regarded as representative of the delta standpoint, but not of the gamma standpoint.⁴

1 See above, p. 148.

2 See above, p. 41.

3 See above, p. 254 ff.

4 See above, p. 232 ff.

This is, however, irrelevant here—with regard to what is situated above the whole pluralistic reality, the problem is the same as in the case of Buddhism. After all, like the gamma standpoint, the delta standpoint teaches an immaterial, transcendent deity. It was clear, however, when we were considering this problem in connection with Jainism, that the Jains were against the concept of God—that they were opposed to the idea of God as cause, to the idea of the unity of the Absolute and so on. I argued then that they might therefore accept a factor of a different kind. The difficulty was probably that the Jains, like the negative theology, were reluctant to attribute any concrete qualities to this factor.¹ It is evident that the same situation existed in Buddhist teaching. Only one school accepted a metaphysical substratum or *bhūta-tathata*.² The other schools of Buddhist thought were concerned with the *śūnya*, the void or emptiness. Although some of these schools seem to have fallen into complete nihilism, the more probable explanation is that this emptiness was the only positive value.³ This seems to me to point indisputably in the direction of the acceptance by Buddhism as a whole of a factor of a different kind, indeed of a radically different kind. It is this factor which is experienced in *nirvāṇa* and the possibility of experiencing this factor is the thread that runs through all the various forms and sects of Buddhism. On the other hand, it is hardly possible to demand that the gamma standpoint should attribute all kinds of concrete qualities, such as omnipotence, omnibenevolence and so on, to the deity who, according to that standpoint, is placed above the material plurality (of fine matter). This standpoint is, like the other metaphysical standpoints, only a classification which helps us to define our ideas. Not only thinkers who regard the whole of “creation”, but not the omnipotent, omnibenevolent deity, as consisting of (fine) matter would have to be included within this standpoint, but also any system which is averse to all kinds of concrete conceptual definitions, but which nonetheless clearly postulates, in addition to and above the whole reality of (fine) matter, a factor, level, background, boundary or “abyss”⁴ of a radically different kind. Without any doubt, Buddhism does this. We have seen above how all the definitions, such as relativism, nihilism, positivism, materialism and atheism, which have been applied to Buddhism are only valid to the extent

1 See above, pp. 232-233.

2 See above, p. 257; see also B 124, I, p. 592.

3 See above, pp. 251 ff.

4 See above, p. 253.

to which they are seen against the background of the theme of *nirvāṇa*, in which case these characteristics are usually *not* valid at all in the last resort. The theme of *nirvāṇa* plays a very important part in Buddhist teaching. Among other things, it also forms a constant counterbalance to characterisations of this kind. This is why I do not hesitate to include Buddhism within the gamma standpoint. The non-material factor which belongs to the gamma standpoint does not have, in itself, to be an "immaterial deity".

The homogeneity of everything that exists in the concrete is also characteristic of the gamma standpoint. If, on the one hand, no dualism between, for example, immaterial souls and the corporeal world is permitted within it and, on the other hand, a factor of a radically different kind is accepted outside it, then everything that concretely exists (which is known, in theology, as creation and, in philosophy, as the plurality of all things) forms an even stronger homogeneous unity. The fact that this other factor is so radically different has the effect of merging all the concretely existing reality more closely together. Something of this kind is undoubtedly encountered in Buddhist philosophy. Linssen, for example, has written about the "one totality" that is met with in Buddhism and the concept of causality also plays a very important part in Buddhist teaching, which sees the flux or stream of things also as a great net of cause and effects.¹ It is from this chain or wheel of the twelve causes or *nidānas* that the Buddhist strives to free himself.² The temptation to characterise Buddhism as positivism or materialism is occasioned by the Buddhist view itself, according to which everything that exists in the concrete is seen in very sharp outline and very clearly as a whole, whereas the factor that is radically different is certainly present, but only as something intangible. The gamma standpoint, then, with its emphasis on the homogeneity of the whole of concrete existence is that of Buddhism.

There is, however, a possible objection to this classification of Buddhism within the gamma standpoint. A school which was, in itself, not without importance, occurs in Mahāyāna Buddhism—the Yogācāra of the brothers Asanga and Vasubandhu, who taught the doctrine of *viññānavāda* or of the consciousness. This school was purely *idealist*, teaching that only *viññāna* or consciousness exists and functions

1 See above, p. 250; see also B 52, p. 83; B 58, p. 83.

2 See, for example, Kwee Swan Liat, "Het probleem der causaliteit in de Boeddhistische wijsbegeerte", B 169, XLVIII, 1, p. 35.

and that the objects of the consciousness are no more than appearance.¹ How can this interesting movement within Buddhism be reconciled with my claim that Buddhism belongs to the gamma standpoint? This standpoint, after all, proposes the (fine) materiality of the whole plurality and is therefore not so very far removed from the beta standpoint or dualistic materialism.² None of this gives the impression of being idealism and this school of Yogācāra ought, itself, rather to be classified under the zeta standpoint. We have, however, already encountered something similar in the Vedānta—Bādarāyana had to be regarded as representative of the delta standpoint, whereas Śāṅkara belonged rather to the zeta standpoint.³ In other words, a fairly subtle change—that matter is not regarded as existing in itself, but only as appearing to exist—can cause a standpoint to go over to the zeta standpoint. This has nothing to do with hylic pluralism—at the zeta standpoint, it is possible to be of the opinion both that only one species of matter, namely ordinary matter, appears and that other, more subtle forms of matter occur, that is, appear.⁴ All the same, it still seems to be rather a long step from the gamma to the zeta standpoint. On the other hand, however, we can point to the following. It is precisely at the zeta standpoint that the whole of the apparent reality make as great an impression of being a single homogeneous whole—unlike, for example, the delta and epsilon standpoints, both of which teach a dualism of souls and bodies within the concretely existing reality—as is the case with the gamma standpoint. I have already observed that there is a certain link between the zeta and the gamma standpoints,⁵ because of the homogeneity of this plurality, of this concretely existing reality. The world is *not* necessarily a unity for beta standpoint or dualistic materialism. It is, however, for the gamma standpoint, as soon as the world is compared with the factor of a radically different kind, whether this is the transcendent deity of the West (in contrast with whom the world is a unity as God's creation) or the level or background of *nirvāṇa* in Buddhism. In both cases, the world in *plurality* is also of a *lesser* kind of reality than that of the factor of a different kind. (This is absent in the beta standpoint or dualistic materialism.) One has only to go a step further and the reality of the plurality of

1 See B 58, p. 205 ff; B 124, I, p. 624 ff; B 52, p. 91 ff.

2 See above, p. 259-260.

3 See above, pp. 221-222.

4 See above, pp. 57-58.

5 See above, p. 56.

(fine) matter becomes even less and all matter is regarded simply as appearance, in which case we are no longer at the gamma standpoint, but at the zeta standpoint. This step was made by the doctrine of *viññānavāda*. Those who advocate this doctrine are therefore not so very far removed from the other Buddhists. In any case, the idea of the homogeneity of the existing reality, is preserved in their teaching. As Gonda has observed, this doctrine of *viññānavāda* is also very close to the Vedānta,¹ especially to the strict Vedānta which teaches that the world is *māyā* and which has therefore to be classified under the zeta standpoint.² According to the teaching of the strict Vedānta, the world is also seen as one single whole, namely of *māyā*. Most Buddhists do not, however, go as far as the *viññānavāda*. Whereas, then, these supporters of the Yogācāra belong to a standpoint which is, in one important respect at least, closely related to the gamma standpoint, namely the zeta standpoint, we can safely continue to say that Buddhism as a whole is closest to the gamma standpoint.

I think that I have now made it sufficiently clear to which of the six metaphysical standpoints which form the background to hylic pluralism, Buddhism which is also a form of hylic pluralism can be regarded as belonging. On the other hand too, this distinction between six metaphysical standpoints may also have served a useful purpose in making the philosophical position of the various streams of thought in which hylic pluralism occurs clear.

45. BUDDHISM OUTSIDE INDIA

To conclude this discussion of the occurrence of hylic pluralism in Buddhism, I should like to turn briefly to Buddhism outside India. As I have already indicated,³ Buddhism was, in the course of time, almost entirely driven out of India proper. Now it is the prevalent religion only in Ceylon. In the Far East—Burma, Siam and so on—it is also the official religion. In these three cases, it is a question of Hināyāna Buddhism, the southern form. The Mahāyāna is very widespread in the north, sometimes to some extent mixed with other native religions, at others existing alongside them. In both cases, it is a religious movement of the greatest importance in countries such as Tibet, China and Japan, where it has millions of adherents. As we have

¹ See B 58, p. 210.

² See above, p. 221-222.

³ See above, p. 157.

already seen, although it does sometimes appear as though the Mahayana has deviated a great deal from the original pattern of Buddhism, with its pantheon, its ceremonies¹ and its special cosmological interest,² a school has continued to exist in Zen Buddhism (in Sanskrit *dhyanā* in Chinese, Ch'an) which has given striking prominence to the inward experience and its significance for the individual.³

To what extent are any hylic pluralistic elements which have not yet been discussed in the preceding sections met with in this Buddhism which is now found outside the original centre, India, and in the various peripheral regions and countries that I have indicated above?

What leaps to mind first of all in this context is Vajrayāna Buddhism, which is rather close to Hinduism.⁴ This closeness to Hinduism is, however, only a proximity to the content of the Hindu religion and should not be regarded as any reconquest of territory in India. Although it may have originated in India proper, this form of Buddhism was also driven out of India and made victorious inroads into the neighbouring Asiatic countries at the same time as Mahāyāna Buddhism and as a kind of secret doctrine connected with it.⁵ Its approximation to Hinduism is also clear from the continuous link preserved between Vajrayāna Buddhism and the movements of Tantrism⁶ and Śāktism.⁷

I have already mentioned several aspects of Vajrayāna Buddhism⁸ and of Tantrism.⁹ To a very great extent, this was applicable to Buddhism outside India proper. The text dealing with the mystery of the golden flower (*Das Geheimnis der Goldenen Blüte*) in which the "diamond body" is mentioned originated in a Chinese society.¹⁰ This was a typical case of hylic pluralism, but there is no reason for me to add anything to what I have already said here.

The text which calls for our attention now, however, is known as the *Tibetan Book of the Dead*. A mixture of Vajrayāna Buddhism, Tantrism and esotericism is to be found in this document as well. *The Tibetan Book of the Dead or the After-Death Experiences on the Bardo Plane, accord-*

1 See above, p. 157.

2 See above, p. 244.

3 See above, p. 258.

4 See above, pp. 157, 246-247.

5 See H. von Glasenapp, *Buddhistische Mysterien. Die geheimen Lehren und Riten des Diamant-Fahrzeuges*, 1940, pp. 68-69.

6 See B 58, Chapter XVII; see also von Glasenapp, *Buddhistische Mysterien*, pp. 70 ff.

7 See von Glasenapp, *op. cit.*, 154 ff.

8 See above, p. 246 ff.

9 See above, p. 228.

10 See above, p. 247.

ing to Lama Kazi Dawa-Samdup's *English Rendering*, to give it its full title, was published in 1927 by W. Y. Evans-Wentz of Jesus College, Oxford, with a foreword by Sir John Woodroffe. A German translation, made and introduced by Louise Göpfert-March, appeared in 1955 (2nd edition in 1948) under the imprint of Rascher of Zurich, with a "psychological commentary" by C. G. Jung. Jung was therefore interested not only in *Das Geheimnis der Goldenen Blüte*, but also in this ancient text.

This *Book of the Dead* or *Bardo Thödol* deals with states of the soul in the hereafter between two incarnations according to Tibetan Buddhist (Lamaist) views. Three states can be distinguished—*Chikhai*, *Chönyid* and *Sidpa Bardo*. Between these three states of the soul there is a difference in rank. Man has bodies in the hereafter, among others, a "radiant body" which resembles the earlier (ordinary) body and can be seen by the eyes of the Bardo-beings. He passes through various "planes", zones or *lokas*. Sometimes he is tortured, but the text tells us: "Thy body being a mental body is incapable of dying even though beheaded and quartered. In reality, the body is of the nature of voidness; thou needst not be afraid".² He also passes the various elements (water, fire and so on), each of which is connected with a definite colour.³ Elsewhere we read: "The body which thou hast now is called the thought-body of the inclinations".⁴

The various commentators follow in the same vein. C. G. Jung, for example, had this to say about the passage quoted above, referring to torture in the hereafter: "This torture depicts the aspect of danger in the most striking way—it is a question of a disintegration of the totality of the Bardo-body which, as a so-called subtle body, forms the visible reality of the soul in the deceased state".⁵ He then went on to discuss various psychological aspects of the question. The German translator makes this comment: "The text begins where the bodies of the flesh and of the spirit begin to separate from each other. . . ."⁶ Evans-Wentz points, among other things, to the connection with Tantrism, with the concepts *prāna*, *nādi* and *chakra*. The *nādi* are "psychic nerves or channels", the *chakras* "psychic nerve-

1 English version, p. 156; German version (of 1948), p. 102.

2 English version, p. 166; German version, p. 110.

3 English version, p. 201; German version, p. 144 or p. 158.

4 German version, p. 58.

5 *op. cit.*, p. 29.

6 *op. cit.*, p. 38; see also p. 162 (*Trugkörper*, "phantom body").

centres".¹ In other words, they are not purely physiological elements. In his foreword, Sir John Woodroffe also tried to place the text within a framework. What is reincarnated, after having completed the phases named in the *Bardo Thödol*, is a "fluid soul-complex"—to use, as he says,² an expression taken from de la Vallée Poussin.³ "The need of some body always exists"⁴ quite apart from "bodiless liberation",⁵ "and each of the four religions affirms that there is a subtle and death-surviving element", whether this is the *ātman* of Brahmanism, *ruh* of the religion of Islam, the Christian "soul" or the *skandhas* of Buddhism.⁶ Woodroffe also writes about the six worlds or *lokas* and the three *kāyas* in his foreword to the book. The soul goes to hell or to heaven "in a subtle body".⁷

Both these passages in the text and the various interpretations of them make a distinctly hylic pluralistic impression. Is it therefore true to say that we have found examples of concepts which are concerned with fine materiality in the Buddhism of Tibet? It would seem as though we have succeeded in this, although I am still a little hesitant. I have already observed that Sir John Woodroffe seems to have been very much in favour of what I have called hylic pluralism.⁸ More or less the same can also be said, so it would seem, of the other commentators. A great deal depends, however, on the translation of Lama Kazi Dawa-Samdup, who translated the text, which was recorded in writing not so very long ago from an oral tradition, from Tibetan into English. For example, if the English expression "mental body" is used, is this a precise and concise rendering of the original Tibetan? Samdup was not, it is true, simply the first comer—he compiled a well-known English-Tibetan dictionary and was a lecturer in Tibetan at the University of Calcutta from 1920 to 1922. He died young. Woodroffe praised him highly in his foreword.⁹ We can only conclude that everything is quite satisfactory, but that a few more data from Tibetan sources would be welcome. It is, of course, also possible to argue from the opposite point of departure—there has already been so much evidence of hylic pluralism both in Buddhism and in Hinduism—and

1 English version, pp. 214-216 (my italics).

2 p. xli.

3 *Way to Nirvana*, p. 85.

4 p. xxviii; cf. my "psychohylicism".

5 See above, p. 194.

6 *ibid.*

7 p. xxxix.

8 See above, p. 228.

9 p. xliv.

as for as Buddhism is concerned, both in general (Section 41) and in particular (Sections 42 and 43)—that it is certainly probable that similar views exist in Tibet as well and that the texts can only be correctly interpreted in this way.

It is now possible for us to leave the question of Buddhism and indeed of India as a whole and consider the possible occurrence of hyleic pluralism in other spheres.¹

b CHINA

46. CHINESE THOUGHT IN GENERAL

We must now turn to a society, the origins of which are as much "lost in the mists of time" as those of India. This is the civilisation of China, a civilisation of so many millions of people in the past and the present which is even more remote from us in the West than India.² This is, of course, mainly because of the very difficult language, which has completely different roots from those of the Indo-Germanic languages and which consists of monosyllabic words which are not inflected, declined or conjugated, and because of the remarkable writing, in which characters or ideographs are used—originally symbols, each standing for a whole concept, or rather for several concepts.³

The ideas that are expressed in the literature of China give the impression that they are very closely bound to ancient traditions and that they have developed for less⁴ in the course of the centuries than the ideas of India. Since certain concepts have persisted stubbornly in Chinese thought it is less possible to make a sharp distinction here between primitive thinking and later, more abstract ideas. There is, however, no lack of depth in Chinese thought and a profound concept such as *tao*, which was developed especially by Lao-Tzu (b. ca. 604 B.C.), originated at a very early stage.

For our purpose, that of investigating whether a particular theme occurs in China, it is important to make this observation at the very outset, namely that practical philosophy—ethics, political science and

1 I would remind the reader here that the image of the carriage or chariot for the soul also occurs in Buddhism (Jataka VI, p. 252); see above, pp. 139, 202.

2 See B 53, p. 453.

3 See, for example, Alfred Forke, "Die Gedankenwelt des Chinesischen Kulturkreises", A. Bäumler and M. Schröter, *Handbuch der Philosophie*, V. C. Munich

4 See above, p. 152.

so on—plays a predominant part in Chinese thinking.¹ “Strictly speaking, the Chinese are not a speculative people like the Greek or the Hindus”.² This is certainly not very encouraging for our investigation, which aims to point out particular doctrines and standpoints. On the other hand, however, it is explicitly denied that the Chinese as a whole produced no theoretical philosophy at all. Forke, for example, said: “We can agree that metaphysics do not occupy such a prominent place in Chinese philosophy as it does in the thought of the Indians or the Greeks or even in our own philosophy. Nonetheless, metaphysics are present and not only in their initial stages—the Chinese have been deeply preoccupied with the basic metaphysical ideas on which the different philosophies are constructed”.³ Nor are logic and the theory of knowledge absent from Chinese thought.⁴ Nonetheless, there are no great closed systems of thought, fully elaborated and in contrast with each other, like the Indian *darśanas*.

The best course to follow in our investigation would therefore be to consider in some detail the psychological concepts of Chinese thought. One advantage of this method is that, although the content and meaning of these terms have changed from time to time, they have in general remained fairly constant throughout the centuries, with the result that, as I have already indicated, the gulf between primitive thought and later thought is far less noticeable to China than elsewhere. Successive philosophers have given a different emphasis to the content of these concepts, which are represented by certain ideographs, and in this way the various “basic metaphysical ideas” have come about, in which Forke was able to distinguish materialism, idealism and dualism, theism, pantheism, and atheism etc. All the same, despite internal polemics, Chinese thought has continued to form a fairly consistent unity. What is more, not only is theoretical philosophy markedly orientated towards practice—religion and philosophy are also, as in the case of Indian thought, closely related. Thus, Taoism and Confucianism are at the same time names not only of philosophical movements, but also of religions with cults, ethical aspirations and so on. Buddhism, which came to China from India, can be added to these two philosophical-religious movements and is no exception to the

1 See, for example, B 188, p. 37, 143; E. V. Zenker, *Geschichte der Chinesischen Philosophie*, Reichenberg, 1926-1927 (B 183), I, p. 6; D. T. Suzuki, *A Brief History of Early Chinese Philosophy*, London, 1914 (B 158), p. 13.

2 B 158, p. 6.

3 B 188, p. 37.

4 B 188, p. 15 ff.

general rule—it is also a factor in Chinese thought. There are, or have been, both Taoist and Buddhist monasteries. The Chinese were usually more inclined to seek Confucianist priests when they wanted to celebrate joyous events such as weddings and other feasts and to Buddhist priests when they were afflicted with sadness, sickness and death for example.¹ The well-known Sinologist of an earlier generation, J. J. M. de Groot (1854-1912), summarised this by quoting the Chinese saying: *han san wei ji*—China has three (that is, three religions—Taoism, Confucianism and Buddhism) and yet these are only one. It was for this reason that he called his well-known book on the foundations of Chinese religion, ethics and political science *Universismus*.²

The subject of our frontispiece therefore refers primarily to Chinese Buddhism (Vāṛayana), but at the same time also has a wider, more general Chinese significance. Thus, generally speaking, a dream is represented in Chinese illustrations by a cloud issuing in the form of a spiral from the skull of the sleeping person and “the cloud is, of course, his soul”.³

I do not intend to review the whole of Chinese philosophy⁴ according to periods and thinkers. This is even less necessary because very well-known figures such as Confucius (K'ung Fu-tzu,⁵ 551-479 B.C.) are more important in practical philosophy than in theoretical philosophy. Instead of doing this, I shall simply discuss certain thinkers briefly as their names occur in the context of our particular theme.

47. HYLIC PLURALISM IN CHINESE THOUGHT (1)

Can anything be said about the occurrence of hylc pluralism in Chinese thought *in general*?

In the first place, it is important to note that Chinese philosophers were as little disposed as thinkers in other ancient cultures to accept an anthropological dualism. Zenker, for example, said that in Chinese thought “no basic distinction is made between body and soul”.⁶ Forke regarded two thinkers as dualists—Ch'eng Yi (Ch'eng Yi-ch'uan; 1033-1107), for example, taught the dualism of *li*, reason, and fluid or

1 B 28, I, III, p. 678.

2 1918; for this saying, see p. 1; see also B 28, I, III, p. 678.

3 B 188, p. 135.

4 For this, the reader should consult, for example, B 188, p. 5 ff.

5 In the very difficult, indeed tiresome, question of the transcription of Chinese names and terms, the Wade-Giles system has been followed as far as possible, although certain departures from this may occur and sometimes alternative names or spellings are given in brackets.

6 B 183, II, p. 38.

matter, *ch'i*.¹ The word "dualism" in this context should not, however, be taken to mean a sharp distinction between consciousness or thought and the body, as in the case of Descartes, for example. The well-known philosopher Chu Hsi (whose name is sometimes spelt Tchu Hsi or Tchou-Hi; 1129-1200), whose thought was very close to that of Ch'eng Yi and to whom I shall return later, also taught this contrast between *li* and *ch'i*. This *ch'i* is, however, a "gaseous or aeriform substance"² and not therefore the ordinary body or ordinary matter. What is more, both these thinkers belong to a fairly late period for Chinese concepts. De Harlez³ also provided an expression for body and soul, namely *hsing-shen*, but *hsing* (or *hing*) is the visible form and *shen* (or *shen*) was not regarded as completely immaterial, as we shall see later. There was, therefore, no fundamental dualism in Chinese thought.

Ch'i (also spelt *khi* and *tch'i*; for the ideograph, see B 188, p. 12; B 183, II, p. 32 and B 63, p. 20) is a very remarkable concept. Suzuki rendered it quite simply as *pneuma*.⁴ The basic meaning is therefore *breath*.⁵ It often means "invisible matter"⁶ and "being in a tangible form was at first invisible, in which state it is called *ch'i* (*khi*)"⁷ This concept *ch'i*, which de Harlez rendered as "breath, the *spiritus*", has various meanings according to the author using it and the system of which it forms a part.⁸ This, then, is no different from the situation with regard to the concept of *pneuma*, *spiritus* or spirit in the West. This Chinese concept is, however, generally used in the sense of fine matter, which is why de Harlez said, in connection with *ch'i*, rather apologetically, so it would seem, on behalf of the Chinese: "Many thinkers acknowledge that the spirit is inaccessible to the senses, but others cannot accept a being that is absolutely imperceptible and therefore endow the spirit with a kind of material element of infinite fineness. This is not at all surprising, since some doctors of the Catholic Church have given the angels ethereal bodies".⁹ The modern Chinese author Fung Yu-lan translated the word *ch'i* by "matter, gas, ether", but added

1 B 188, p. 64. "Fluid" was used by Forke in his book not in the sense of "liquid", but rather in the sense of "finer" radiation".

2 *ibid.*

3 *Essai d'anthropologie chinoise (Mémoires couronnés et autres mémoires publiés par l'Académie Royale de Belgique, 1896; B 63).* p. 8.

4 B 158, p. 30.

5 B 183, II, p. 32; de Groot, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

6 De Harlez, *Le Livre des esprits et des immortels (Mémoires . . . Académie Royale de Belgique, 1893)*, p. 25.

7 *ibid.*

8 B 63, p. 20.

9 *ibid.*

explicitly that ordinary "physical nature" was *not* meant by this term.¹ When the use of certain concepts by various Chinese philosophers is discussed in greater detail, we shall see how frequently this word *ch'i* denotes something like a "primordial fluid" (see, for example, *pneuma* one of the most systematic of Chinese philosophers. According to him, *li*, reason, and *ch'i*, matter, never occurred separately.² This is reminiscent not only of Aristotle's correlation between form and matter (matter in the very broad sense of the word), but also of what I have called psychohylism,³ namely the idea that the psychical aspect is always accompanied by something of (fine) matter. Chu Hsi sometimes contrasts *ch'i*, not with *li*, but with the heart or *hsin*. This *hsin* is the "purest and finest part" of *ch'i*.⁴ If *ch'i* is "life-matter", then *hsin* is "life-spirit", according to Zenker, who called the teaching of Chu Hsi not materialism, but rather a panpsychism in the manner of Fechner.⁵ His summary of Chu Hsi's view was that "all life is spiritually corporeal".⁶ Chu Hsi's dualism, then, is far removed from that of, for example, Descartes⁷ and is thus typically "spiritually corporeal", psychohylistic or, since *ch'i* and *hsin* are fine forms of matter, hylic pluralistic. In any case, we may safely conclude that something of the kind does therefore occur in a characteristic manner in Chinese thought.

The same conclusion can also be reached via a different path, namely by considering not one relatively isolated individual philosopher, but certain very widespread concepts in the whole of Chinese thought. Even in the West, almost everyone has heard of *yang* and *yin*. The Chinese philosophers were inclined to classify all the contrasts that they found in the world under the dualism of yang and yin and, rather like the Pythagoreans in this respect,⁸ they tended to make lists of contrasting concepts. The thinking of many generations of philosophers has been coloured by this practice in China. *Yang* is the male, active and spontaneous principle (it is also the warm, dry and clear principle,) whereas *yin*, with which it is contrasted, is the female or receptive (and also the cool, damp or dark) principle.⁹ The Chinese philosophers

1 *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, 1948, pp. 298-302.

2 See also B 28, I, III, p. 708.

3 See above, pp. 147; Part I, Section 4.

4 B 183, II, p. 250.

5 *ibid.*, pp. 250-251.

6 *ibid.*, p. 250.

7 *ibid.*, p. 248.

8 See B 170, p. 68.

9 See B 188, p. 106 ff; B 183, I, p. 38 ff; II, p. 30ff; De Groot, *op.cit.*, p. 7 ff.

went further than this dualism, however, and many of them regarded it as raised to a higher level and indeed cancelled out in another principle, that of *tao*. This *tao* is, however, transcendent and hence, possibly, immaterial; in any case, it is very difficult to define.¹ *Yang* and *yin*, however, belong to this world. It is, of course, possible to ask here whether this is not a case of sharp dualistic contrast. Is *yang* perhaps immaterial? To ask this, however, is to reckon without our host and to take as our starting point the Western tendency to see contrasts everywhere between partly abstract principles. *Yin* is a "light ethereal substance",² but so is *yang*. Both are *fluids*, not in the sense of liquid matter, but in the sense of finer radiations. De Groot called them the "fine breath-pair of the universe"³ and Forke regarded them as "primordial substances, fluids", saying that "neither of the two fluids ever completely disappears; even when one has attained its greatest extent, a trace of the other always remains and it is from this that it grows again".⁴ The philosophers of the Sung dynasty were especially interested in the origin and being of these two fluids, *yang* and *yin*. *Yang* is movement and *yin* is rest. According to Chu Hsi, there is really only one fluid and *yang* and *yin* are both phases of it. As Forke has said, "movement and rest are only qualities of the one material fluid".⁵ Other philosophers have, of course, interpreted *yang* and *yin* differently. But, quite apart from these philosophical interpretations, there can be no doubt at all that *yang* and *yin* have always played a very important part in Chinese thought in general—for example, in the art of soothsaying—and that they were regarded as fluids, that is, as forces of fine matter.

What I have called hylc pluralism thus clearly plays an important part as a theme in the background of the whole of Chinese thought. Obviously, what we have here is another case similar to the one that we noted in connection with the Bhagavad Gītā⁶ and with Buddhist psychology⁷—although we in the West, with our almost instinctive acceptance of anthropological dualism, are inclined to overlook it,

1 *Tao* in fact occupies the place of the concept of God. Chinese thought certainly acknowledges the contrast between heaven or *T'ien* and earth and this heaven is in fact regarded personally as well as *Shang Ti*; see B 188, p. 38. ff. This personal figure of *Shang Ti* is, however, not very important. He would therefore seem more to resemble Isvara or the demiurge than an absolute deity.

2 B 63, p. 37 note.

3 *op. cit.*, p. 11; see also p. 7: "a world-soul or world-breath pair".

4 B 188, p. 107 ff.

5 B 188, p. 114.

6 See above, pp. 200-201.

7 See above, p. 235.

very many of the concepts used in Chinese philosophy must be interpreted as relating to fine materiality.

48. SOME CHINESE CONCEPTS

Both in Indian philosophy and in Buddhist thought, we have come across a number of *factors of the soul*, such as *ahamkāra*, *buddhi*, *manās* and so on¹ in the case of classical Indian thought and the *skandhas* such as *vināna* and so on in Buddhism.² Something of this kind is also met with in China. De Harlez has spoken of "the different species of vital and intellectual agents with which Chinese thinkers endow our nature".³ Zenker provides the following list of pairs, in which the first factor always has the power of *yang* and the second that of *yin*: *shin-kwei*, *ch'i-chin*? and *hun-po*. He adds that this really has nothing to do with any idea of several souls, but is rather a question of a monism or actualism with regard to the soul, of one dynamic whole. The fact that more recent Taoists distinguish several *shins*—sometimes as many as three *yang*-souls (*hun*) and seven *yin* souls (*po*)—does not contradict this. It is more a question in these pairs of functions, for example, those of desire, of the heart and of breathing, and of *stats* of the soul, as in the case of the Buddhist *skandhas*.⁴ Forke also wrote, in his chapter on Chinese psychology, about several souls, about "spirit and daemon, *animus* and *anima*" and about "the functions of the spirit and of the life-force".⁵

Let us now briefly consider the most important of these Chinese concepts of the factors of the soul.

A distinction must be made between *shin*, the spirits of the mountains and rivers,⁶ and *shen*, the human spirit or soul.⁷ This distinction is clear from the characters—a different one being used for each concept. *Shen*, of the power of yang, is in any case the *hih*? her soul-force which came like lightning from above.⁸ De Harlez has said of this *shen*

1 See above, pp. 183.

2 See above, pp. 237 ff.

3 B 63, p. 41.

4 B 183, II, pp. 38-41. This doctrine of seven *yin*-souls (*yin* — of fine matter!) does resemble the pluralism of *ochēmata* in Proclus and others (see Part I, p. 13; above, p. 309-310). Elsewhere, Zenker draws an analogy between the Chinese doctrine of five *ch'i*s and the Indian doctrine of five *prāṇas*, although the first cannot depend on the second (B 183, II, p. 220).

5 B 188, p. 123 ff.

6 B 183, I, p. 30; II, p. 31; see also B 188, pp. 15.

7 B 188, p. 12; see also de Groot, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

8 See B 158, p. 176.

that it is that which is transformed after death, according to the earlier Chinese ideas, into "a body resembling those of the living" and which raises itself to the highest point in the heavens.¹ Apart from the fact that certain Chinese philosophers doubt man's continued existence after death, it is therefore clear that the idea that the higher soul returned to heaven at death, the lower soul was scattered and the very lowest was buried with the body was very widespread among the Chinese.² Terms and classifications, however, are very divergent in Chinese philosophy. Generally speaking, the *kwei* (or *kuei*) as the lower soul was contrasted with the *shen* as the higher soul and various scholars have compared this contrast with the relationship between *animus* and *ánima*,³ spirit and daemon. The *kwei* is thus the lower or *animal* soul, of the power of *yin* (cool, damp and dark), the "shadow of death"⁴ which, after death and especially after a sudden death, may be restless and unhappy.⁵ The word *kwei*⁶ is therefore also used for daemons apart from man. The union of a *shen* and a *kwei*, however, makes man come about—one is reminded here of Goethe's *Faust*, Part I, "Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach, in meiner Brust!" ("Two souls dwell in my breast")—as a coming together of *yang* and *yin*, of heaven and earth. *Shen-kwei*, then, is man.⁷ The ancestor cult is therefore directed, after the separation of *shen* and *kwei* at death, especially towards the *shen* of the deceased⁸ and only partly and with sacrifices of a different kind towards the *kwei*.⁹

The contrasts between *hun* and *po*¹⁰ and between *hwan* and *pek*¹¹ are apparently similar to that between *shen* and *kwei*. *Hun* is the soul rising up to heaven and *po* is the terrestrial soul which is bound to the earth after death.¹² *Hwan*, the intellectual principle, is the "spiritual and surviving soul". *Shen* and *hwan* are used indiscriminately.¹³ *Po*, like *kwei*, is the "animal soul".¹⁴

1 *Mémoires . . Académie Royale de Belgique*, 1893, p. 184 ff.

2 See B 63, p. 43; B 188, p. 124, 138.

3 B 188, p. 124. The *ánima* is the "more material soul"; B 183, II, p. 32.

4 De Harlez, *Mémoires*, 1893, p. 12; the theme of the *shadow-soul* again! (See above, p. 136.)

5 B 63, p. 31.

6 For the Chinese ideograph, see B 188, p. 12, 125, B 183, II, p. 31.

7 See de Groot, *op. cit.*, p. 9; B. 183, II, p. 31.

8 See B 63, p. 95.

9 B 188, p. 125.

10 B 183, II, pp. 36-37; B 188, pp. 14, 125.

11 B 63, p. 41 ff.

12 B 179, V, p. 804.

13 B 63, p. 11.

14 B 158, p. 44.

The emphasis is sometimes rather different from that in the contrast *shen-kwei* and it would appear that *po* and *pek* are used to indicate a factor at a rather lower level than *kwei*. This brings us to the contrast between *ch'i* (*khi* or *tch'i*) and *ching* (or *tsching* in, for example, the German spelling).

As we have already seen, *ch'i* was used with meanings which differed according to the philosopher and the period, but, generally speaking—as in the case of the concept of *pneuma*, although less commonly in this case—it did primarily convey the sense of fine matter.¹ For the time being, however, I should prefer not to consider the question of *ch'i* being used in Chinese thought in general and by certain Chinese philosophers in particular in the very broad sense of matter in general (thus *at the same time* including the meaning of fine matter, as is the case with *hyle* according to my definition²), of primordial substance or fluid. I would rather consider the original meaning of *ch'i* as breath.³ (The first aspect of this meaning that strikes one's attention is the close parallel with the use of *pneuma* in Greek thought in general and by the Stoics in particular, on the one hand, in the very broad sense of world ether and so on and, on the other, in the narrower sense, connected with the root *pne*, of blowing or breathing.⁴) On the one hand, *ch'i* can be used for the higher part of the soul, for the spirit, like *shen* and *hun*, and as such it comes within the category of *yang*. On the other hand, however, it can also be used at the lower level for breath and it is especially in this sense that it occurs in the contrast *ch'i-ching*.

First of all, however, something has to be said about the concept *ching*. The character is derived from the root for "rice" and means an especially fine rice, hence the further meaning of essence, life-force⁵ and, in general, "fine". In this last sense, it is, for example, contrasted with *chi* (or *tschi*)—which should not be confused with *ch'i*—or coarse matter.⁶

This applies especially to the combination *ch'i-ching*. This means "subtle substance".⁷ Bearing in mind the original meaning of "breath", this must therefore be a relatively low level, only a little higher than the level that I have called "physiological". *Ch'i-ching* and *ching* have

1 See above, p. 271.

2 See above, Section 24.

3 See de Groot, *op. cit.*, pp. 10, 110; B 183, II, p. 32; B 188, p. 12 B 63, p. 20.

4 See above, p. 121.

5 B 188, p. 15; B 183, II, p. 32.

6 B 188, p. 126.

7 B 158, p. 22.

in fact repeatedly been translated as life-substance or life-force¹ and this is clearly analogous to the views prevalent among many primitive people of a *breath-soul* or *body-soul* (as distinct from the *external soul*).² This is also the meaning that is most frequently attached in Indian philosophy to the term *prāṇa*.³ It is also very reminiscent of the concepts of the *spiritus animales et vitales* in Western thought.⁴ It will be recalled that I introduced the special term physiological *pneuma* for fine materiality at this level.⁵

The use of *ch'i ching* by the Chinese in precisely this sense can be confirmed in many different ways. It is a subtle substance, but its use and sphere of influence is closely connected, as in the case of the Indians, with the technique of breathing.⁶ According to this view, man "constantly absorbs soul-substance by breathing in the air".⁷ It is also closely connected with physiological states, conditions or events such as illness, birth and death. Some Chinese scholars traced illness back to a "sickness fluid"⁸ and others taught that the length of a man's life was dependent on the quantity and the quality of the fluid that he received when he was born.⁹ "*Ching* (which is a *fine force*!) is of the same species as blood—it develops and supports the body".¹⁰ A similar connection is made in the West between the *spiritus naturales* and the blood—they are believed to circulate through the veins and to be distilled in the heart into *spiritus vitales*.¹¹ Many Chinese physicians explained that the blood was the seat of the spirit. Huai-nan-tzu (Liu An), for example, said that the essence of life had its seat in the blood.¹² What is more, the Chinese had a whole technique of "making the life-spirit circulate in the body" by means of special gymnastic exercises and massage and were so enthusiastic in their use of these exercises that they almost became a nation of hypochondriacs.¹³

1 B 183, II, p. 32; U 188, p. 15.

2 See above, Section 20.

3 See above, pp. 162 ff.

4 See above, p. 22.

5 See above, p. 22 ff, 146-147.

6 B 183, II, p. 33.

7 De Groot, *op. cit.*, p. 110; see also p. 113.

8 B 188, p. 77.

9 B 188, p. 71. *Ching* is also the male seed which should "however not be thought of as being purely material" (see B 183, II, p. 33). Similar ideas will also be met with when we come to consider Greek philosophy.

10 B 63, p. 21; my comment in brackets.

11 See above, p. 22-23.

12 B 188, p. 128; for the "blood-soul", see also frequent references in the index

13 B 183, II, p. 164.

It would not be, in my opinion, too bold to conclude from this that the Chinese also cherished ideas about a fine materiality which was found, according to them, at a level that I have called that of the *physiological pneuma*.

Did the Chinese also recognise something which could be thought of as functioning at the other two levels that I have defined—those of the psychological and the sublime *pneuma*?

In Part I of this book, I accepted as the criterion for the psychological *pneuma* as opposed to the physiological *pneuma* that a continued existence was postulated for some time at least. If there is any question of a continued existence of the physiological *pneuma*, then this would only be for a short time. The psychological *pneuma* is regarded, on the other hand, as continuing to exist for a much longer time, but not for an unlimited period.¹ I do not know whether the idea of a *very short* continued existence ever prevailed in China.² The idea of a continued existence for *some time* was, however, frequent among the Chinese—frequent, but not, it should be stressed, completely universal among them, because lively discussions developed during the later period for and against the possibility of continued existence, whereas Confucius was rather sceptical about the idea of immortality.³ The protagonists appealed, for example, to the fact of spiritual apparitions⁴—history does not say whether they also set up an S.P.R. (Society for Psychical Research) in this—and there were also polemics as to whether it was possible for the soul to leave the body either during sleep or consciously.⁵ The antagonists, on the other hand, regarded this as imagination. Apart from the Buddhist teaching of the reality of reincarnation,⁶ the idea that the soul disintegrated after death, after having continued to exist for a certain time—in other words, the idea of a second death—occurred frequently even among the philosophers.

1 See above, p. 27.

2 As was clearly the case with Epicurus; see Part I, p. 42. Comparisons have been made between a Chinese thinker such as Wang Ch'ung and Epicurus, but, according to Zemke (B 183, II, pp. 116-125), the similarity does not really apply. According to Wang Ch'ung, the soul—the fine fluid—is dissolved at death; or immediately, this is not clear from our data. What is more, Wang Ch'ung accepted the existence—as Epicurus accepted the existence of Gods (see Part I, p. 64)—of *demons* which possessed a body such as that of human beings, but with the difference that they were able to make themselves invisible (see B 188, p. 78).

3 B 188, p. 137 ff.

4 B 188, p. 137.

5 B 188, pp. 135-136.

6 B 188, p. 135; see also p. 139. Many Taoists also taught that the soul was absorbed into *tao*. This can be compared with the attainment, according to Buddhist teaching, of *nirvana*.

The Chinese, then, believed that man disintegrated after death into various components, each of which went its own way,¹ but that he continued first to exist. Chu Hsi, for example, said "that the soul did not completely disintegrate at once after death, with the result that it was only accessible to sacrifices. Whether or not it was still present after a rather longer time was, however, not known. In any case, disintegration ensued."² Clearly this is a view which we have encountered elsewhere—what we have here is obviously an example of what I have called the level of the *psychological pneuma*.

The earlier and more traditional views certainly take a continued existence for a certain duration of time as their point of departure. The concept that occurs here is that of the *kwei*, the "shadow of death", which can be restless and unhappy after death. Apart from being used for man, however, the word *kwei* was also applied to *daemons*,³ which incidentally form a concept which is also related elsewhere to the level of the *psychological pneuma*.⁴

In addition, we quite commonly find views in Chinese thought which are comparable with what I have called the *sublime pneuma*. As I have already indicated, the *shen* was distinguished from the *kwei* or lower soul.⁵ This *shen*, the *animus* (not *anima*) of the power of *yang*, is what raises itself up to heaven and "becomes a bright radiance there", merging "with the brilliant ether, the *yang*-fluid" from which the soul had come.⁶ "When man dies, his *kwei* goes into the earth, but his spirit leaves it and raises itself up into a state of glorious splendour".⁷ De Groot also quotes this passage (from Tsi I or Shih-ki, usually spelt Shih Chi in English): the *k'i* (that is, *ch'i* but not in the lower sense of *ch'i-ching* here⁸) "raises itself up on high and becomes

1 See above, pp. 274-275 and elsewhere; see also, for example, the lines of verse quoted by Agrippa of Nettesheim, *De occulta philosophia*, II, p. 97, and attributed by him, although clearly wrongly, to Ovid:

"Bis duo sunt homines, manes, caro, spiritus, umbra.

Quattuor ista loca bis duo suscipiunt.

Terra tegit carnem, tumultum circumvolat umbra,

Orcus manes; spiritus astra petit".

("Men are twice two—shade, flesh, spirit and ghost. These four regions receive this twice two—the earth covers the flesh, the ghost flies about the sepulchral mound, the underworld holds the shade and the spirit flies towards the stars".)

2 B 188, p. 143.

3 See above, p. 275.

4 See above, p. 22 ff.

5 See above, p. 275.

6 B 188, p. 125 (Liki, Tchi-yi II).

7 De Harlez, *Mémoires*, 1893, p. 43.

8 See above, pp. 276-277.

a radiant light".¹ A similar idea is encountered in Buddhist teaching, though here it is found, not in connection with the dead, but in connection with those mystics who become intimate, through *dhyāna* or *samadhi*, with all kinds of forces and are able to move about freely as spirits. Forke has said that "their bodies radiate a bright splendour like Buddha and the Buddhisattvas".² We may therefore conclude that China too was acquainted with what I have termed the *sublime pneuma*.

49. MISCELLANEA

The theme of the sublime *pneuma* has further ramifications. When we were discussing Buddhism and especially Vajrayāna Buddhism, we saw that there was, within the framework of this movement, a doctrine both of the diamond vehicle and of a diamond world,³ both of which, however, come within the same context. We should not overlook the spread of this Buddhist teaching in China, but ought rather to recall that the "Mystery of the Golden Flower" (*Das Geheimnis der goldenen Blüte* or, in the German transcription of Chinese, the *Tai I Gin Hua Dsung Dschi*) is Chinese.⁴ In his *Psychologie und Alchemie*,⁵ C. H. Jung wrote about this text.⁶ This "Mystery of the Golden Flower" is not only a product of Vajrayana Buddhism, it is also a text on the subject of *alchemy*. It was, however, above all a movement among the Taoists which was interested in alchemy. In this, then, there was a mutual coming together of Buddhism and Taoism. These Chinese alchemists were, moreover, sufficiently well-known and characteristic of Chinese thought.⁷ It remains to be seen whether this Chinese alchemy contains any hylic pluralistic ideas, either with regard to the individual soul or with regard to the cosmos. As far as the soul is concerned, Jung is inclined to concur with this view, namely that the alchemists look for the *corpus subtile*, the resurrection body in the wider sense, and in this context he refers to the "diamond body" of the Chinese alchemists.⁸

On the other hand, however, there is clearly a link between alchemy and the various doctrines about the elements and about higher worlds.

1 *op. cit.*, p. 9.

2 B 188, p. 85.

3 See above, pp. 246-248.

4 See above, for example, pp. 247, 270 and Plate I, the frontispiece.

5 B 78, p. 573.

6 See above, pp. 247.

7 See B 53, p. 292; B 183, II, p. 163 ff; B 161, p. 68 ff.

8 B 78, p. 573; see also above p. 247.

De Harlez, for example, has written about the "substance of gold" which is obtained when the precise relationship between the *hwun* or the soul and the *pe* or the "life-spirit" is reached and man has returned to the "ethereal state".¹ According to Yu-tsing Ching, there were three heavens, the highest being comparable to "pure jade". Once again, we find here the idea of a connection between certain spheres and certain colours which occurred in the Bardo Thödol.²

Doctrines of this kind, dealing with the "storeys" of heaven and elements in the ancient sense, were certainly much more widespread in China than in the alchemy of the Taoists.³ The five elements or *wu hsing* of ancient China are, however, somewhat different from those customarily found in the West. They are fire, metal, wood, water and earth. Remembering my decision generally speaking to refrain from discussing cosmological questions, I will not ask whether the Chinese possibly had, in connection with these elements, something like *sukṣma* states of aggregation⁴ in mind rather than visible substances and, in connection with these spheres, something other than the visible zones of heaven and so on. Suzuki at least translated a passage—(from Lieh-tzu) as "Heaven- and-earth is no more than accumulated *pneuma*".⁵

Instead of discussing this question, then, I shall look briefly at a few other points—to begin with, the problem of *excursion*. The idea of excursion also⁶ occurs again and again in Chinese thought.⁷ To recapitulate briefly, this idea is that the soul can temporarily leave the body, for example, during sleep, but also consciously, as the result of certain exercises, and that it can then move freely, "fly through the air" and to a certain extent make (heavenly) journeys. When the soul makes such an excursion, it is anticipating the situation when it has definitively left the ordinary body after death. Plate 5, illustrates this situation. As I have already said, the Chinese philosophers engaged in polemics about whether it was possible for the soul to leave the body temporarily. The "materialist" Wang Ch'ung, who also regarded the immortality of the soul as impossible, was against excursion, as

1 *Mémoires*, 1893, p. 15.

2 See above, p. 266.

3 See B 183, II, p. 41 ff; B 188, p. 115 ff; De Groot, *op. cit.*, p. 121; De Harlez, *Mémoires*, 1893, p. 14.

4 See above, p. 12.

5 B 158, p. 33.

6 See above, p. 87, 105, 199, etc.

7 See De Harlez, *Mémoires*, 1893, p. 184 ff; B 188, pp. 82, 135.

was Fan Chen, who wrote in some detail about this question in the fourth century A.D. Tsao Sse-wen, on the other hand, was convinced that it was possible: "After death, the body remains behind and the soul departs. The soul can also separate itself from the body in dreams" and can travel then.¹ "When they were in a state of dreaming or trance brought about by mystical practices, the Taoists and Buddhists assumed that their souls left their bodies and that their dreams and visions were real."²

This theme of travelling in another sphere³ also raises another question. The most obvious interpretation of the many Chinese stories featuring dragons and so on is that they are mythological and this would be to a very great extent a correct interpretation. We may, however, ask here, as we did in the case of the *vimanas*,⁴ whether there may not be good reason for regarding a part of this theme at least as referring to the moving of, the riding in or on or the possession of a vehicle or *ochēma* of fine matter. In Section 26, in which I discussed this vehicle theme in general, I pointed out that, in the case of some of the images used in the history of religion (the carriage or chariot, the bird, the horse and so on), the user—whether he was a priest or an artist—probably had something like a body of the soul consisting of fine matter which moved easily and quickly (on wings) through the atmosphere in mind. In his *Lux Perpetua*, F. Cumont listed a number of such images which he linked with the neo-Platonic teaching about the vehicle (*Ochēma*).⁵ Something of this kind is clearly also to be found in Chinese thought. On the one hand, there is the idea of excursion or celestial travel and, on the other, there is—once again—the idea of the soul as a butterfly⁶ and of the "light body" riding on a phoenix or a crane⁷ and on the typically Chinese dragon.⁸ The chariot theme is also present in China—the great philosophers made use of the earth as their chariot, of the four seasons as their horses and of *yang* and *yin* as their charioteers.⁹ However remote Chinese civilisation appears, on the surface at least, to be from that of the West, the same themes are again and again encountered, with certain variations, there as well.

1 B. 188, pp. 135-136, 141.

2 B. 188, p. 136; for Chinese mysticism, see also B. 188, p. 80 ff and B. 183 II, for example p. 193 ff.

3 See also Alfred Rosenberg, *Die Seelenreise*, 1952 (B. 135).

4 See above, p. 203 ff.

5 B. 23, p. 275 ff: "Le voyage vers l'au an-delà"; see also above, pp. 146-147.

6 B. 188, p. 136.

7 B. 188, p. 83.

8 B. 188, p. 82.

9 B. 188, p. 83. The image is thus worked out cosmically here. See above, p. 133.

Not only mysticism occurs in the Heavenly Kingdom—there was also a great interest in what would now be called parapsychology or rather, more generally, in occultism. Mo Ti attempted, for example, to demonstrate the fact of continued existence by means of what he regarded as the datum of spiritual apparitions.¹ There are also accounts of levitations.² Lū Pu-wei wrote explicitly about what Forke rendered as “telepathic remote effect”. The members of a family, Lu Pu-wei wrote, form a unit and if something happens to one member or if he dies the others become restless—an echo of the common “life-breath” reaches them.³

In this context, we should also mention that a kind of “breath” (*pneuma*!) plays a part, according to Wen-tzu, in the perception of the life-essence, in which there are also “emanations or exhalations of the eyes and ears”.⁴ This is reminiscent of the doctrine of the *aporroai*, the discharge from the eyes (which meet other discharges which come from things) taught by Empedocles.⁵

According to the Chinese, man’s character was to a great extent dependent on the mixture of fluids in him, including, for example, the quantity either of favourable *yang* fluid or of selfish *yin* fluid.⁶ Certain Chinese thinkers believed that how long men had to live and how they were in life were connected with the mixture of different fluids in them—“if they received a fine fluid, they became eminent” or the reverse.⁷ Although no mention is made in this context of successive lives, this determination of man’s fate by fluids is certainly reminiscent of the Indian doctrine of *karma*, which was frequently represented as a fine matter.⁸ Moreover, both in the case of the Chinese fluids and in that of the Indian *karma*, man is given or already has this fine matter at birth.

Finally, there is the doctrine⁹—as taught by Chang Heng-ch’ü—of the twofold disposition, one coming from heaven etc., and which is good in all beings, but which can be obscured by the second, the material substance which comes from the body. This is reminiscent of the undefined character of the *puruṣas* according to the Sāṅkhya,

1 B 188, p. 137; see also above, p. 278.

2 De Harlez, *Mémoires*, 1893, pp. 377-378.

3 B 188, p. 132.

4 B 188, p. 130; see also B 183, II, p. 50.

5 See B 170, p. 95; B 176, I, p. 59.

6 B 188, p. 133.

7 B 188, p. 71.

8 See above, pp. 192-193, 231.

9 B 188, p. 151.

whereas, again according to the Sāṅkhya system, individual differences were attributed to finer bodies, the *upādhis*.¹

50. HYLIC PLURALISM IN CHINESE THOUGHT (2)

It is, in my opinion, safe to conclude from what I have said above that what I have called, in this study, hylc pluralism occupies a considerable place in traditional Chinese thought, that is, in the philosophy which was, at least until recently, influential in China. This conclusion is based both on the general consideration that such important principles as *yang* and *yin* were thought of as consisting of fine matter, that is as being "fluids" (see Section 47), something that must have continued to have a deep influence everywhere in Chinese thought, and on the special forms which the theme of fine materiality appears to have assumed in certain divergent cases (see Section 48 and 49).

I should however⁴ like to formulate this conclusion even more precisely and ask this question—which metaphysical standpoints,² either connected or not connected with hylc pluralism, are represented in Chinese thought?

As I have already observed, there is no sign in the philosophy of China of any preference for that favourite philosophical attitude of modern Europe, anthropological dualism or what I have called the epsilon standpoint.³

There is rather more possibility of the alpha standpoint, that of monistic materialism, since some Chinese philosophers are called materialists (and positivists) and immortality and the continued existence after death are denied by a number of them, which is characteristic of the alpha standpoint. This is, for example, so in the case of Wang Ch'ung (ca. 27-97 A.D.),⁴ who expressed the opinion that "the soul survives . . . but not the physical personality".⁵ Is Wang Ch'ung therefore a monistic materialist and does he adhere to the alpha standpoint, which denies the possibility of hylc pluralism? This conclusion would be too rapid and incorrect. In his teaching, he again and again refers to fine materiality and clings firmly to *yang* and *yin*, which are, in his opinion, modes of one and the same primordial substance. He does not, how-

1 See above, pp. 213-214, 218.

2 See above, p. 148 ff; See also Part I, Sections 11-16.

3 See above, p. 270.

4 For Wang Ch'ung, see B 188, pp. 56, 70, 78 etc; B 183, II, p. 111: "Der Positivismus Wang-Tschungs"; see also above, pp. 278, note 2, 281-282.

5 B 183, II, p. 119.

ever, express any opinion as to whether something existed before this primordial substance. The primordial substance itself is of the nature of *ch'i* or *ching-ch'i*: "That fine, gaseous *ching*, which is absorbed by the breath and which creates and receives life everywhere and under all circumstances" is the primordial matter of Wang Ch'ung.¹ This reminds us at once of Lamettrie (1709-1751), who was also a typical materialist and is well-known as such, but who nonetheless accepted a "fluid, an animal spirit". But Lamettrie, like Wang Ch'ung, was not therefore a monistic materialist.² Even Zenker denied that Wang Ch'ung was a typical adherent of mechanical materialism and maintained that the comparison between him and Epicurus and Lucretius was a false one. He was, in Zenker's view, rather a hylozoist, since he was always concerned with *living* matter.³ In any case, he also accepted a finer matter and, since, there is no sign in his teaching of any immaterial principle, he must be included among the dualistic materialists—his point of view, then, is the beta standpoint. This conclusion is also confirmed by the fact that he accepted a celestial and an astral fluid as factors in man's fate and taught the existence of daemons in possession of a body.⁴ That he was a positivist is clear from his viewing many spiritual apparitions simply as hallucinations of sick spirits and his refusal to admit the possibility of excursion—the dreams concerned were, in his opinion, false hopes held out by the life-spirit⁵. What is more, the combination of scepticism about the continuation of man's existence after death and of still believing in gods and daemons leads inevitably to a comparison between Wang Ch'ung and Epicurus.⁶

What was the metaphysical standpoint of the striking Chinese thinker Chu Hsi (1129-1200) or to which standpoint was he closest? He certainly believed that souls continued to exist after death, but he taught further that they disintegrated after some time.⁷ A heavenly fluid, he believed, penetrated everything (cf. the cosmic *pneuma* of the Stoics) and played a part in determining man's fate.⁸ This universal fluid was *ch'i* (-*ching*).⁹ In any case, Chu Hsi certainly accepted fine ma-

1 B 183, II, pp. 115-116.

2 See above, pp. 23-24.

3 B 183, II, p. 116.

4 B 188, pp. 70, 78.

5 B 188, pp. 77, 136; B 183, II, p. 50.

6 See above, pp. 37-38.

7 B 188, p. 143; see also above, p. 279.

8 B. 188, pp. 64, 71; see also above, p. 283.

9 See B 63, p. 14, note 2. (The original meaning of *ch'i*, like that of *pneuma*, is, moreover, "breath".)

teriality and was a hylic pluralist. Is his standpoint, then, the delta standpoint? This is indeed a possibility, in view of the fact that he taught a dualism of *li* and *ch'i* or of *hsin* and *ch'i*.¹ But, as I have already said,² the two are correlative and the contrast is not like that made by the neo-Platonists between the immaterial soul and the vehicle of fine matter. Zenker has therefore expressed Chu Hsi's view as "all life is spiritually corporeal", in other words, as panpsychism.³ In addition, he regarded the oppsite of *ch'i*, which he called, apart from *li*, also *hsin* (the heart), as of fine matter: "The *hsin* is the purest and finest part of the "*ch'i*."⁴ We must therefore conclude that Chu Hsi cannot be regarded as belonging to the delta standpoint, according to which there is something immaterial *within* the world. On the other hand, it is equally impossible to classify him under the beta standpoint, or dualistic materialism, because he certainly seems to have taught that something transcendent and immaterial existed outside and above the world. He did, it is true, reject the idea of a personal God,⁵ but, for him, the principle *li* was, apart from being correlative with *ch'i*, at the same time the "great unity", *tai-yi*, or the "absolute", *tai chi*. According to Forke, *li* or reason as a principle and as purely transcendent Being was, for Chu Hsi, on exactly the same level as *tao* in the case of other Chinese thinkers. *Tao* and *li* are themselves unmoved, but they produce movement (in the primordial fluid *ch'i*).⁶ In addition to the correlation between *li* and *ch'i* within the world, then, *li*, is also found without any contrasting principle above the world, rather like the Unmoved Mover of Aristotle. If the whole world is, however, permeated with a fluid—with fine materiality—and if a transcendent, immaterial principle...*li* or reason...is present above the world, then Chu Hsi belongs to the gamma standpoint.

A similar problem is also met with in the case of many other Chinese philosophers whom Forke discusses in his chapter on the metaphysics of the Chinese. One, Hsun-tzu, who incidentally seems to have become popular recently, appears to be quite close to the alpha standpoint or monistic materialism.⁷ In the case of very many thinkers,

1 B 188, p. 64; B 183, II, p. 248.

2 See above, pp. 271-272.

3 See B 183, II, p. 250; see also above, pp. 271-272.

4 *Ibid.*, This can also be compared with the situation in the case of the Sundaese, who call the *pangatjian* the finest part, the essence of the *telembotan*; see above, pp. 85, 99.

5 B 188, p. 65; B 183, II, p. 251.

6 B 188, pp. 64-65.

7 B 188, p. 55.

however, there is reference to a primordial fluid, "a very fine matter".¹ Generally speaking, these philosophers remind one of the pre-Socratics in Greek thought, although fine materiality is more clearly expressed here, or of the Stoics. Yet, in the case of several of these thinkers, a principle is accepted which is different from that of the *pneuma*—the principle of "non-being", emptiness or the "void" and so on.

This is most strikingly so in the case of Lao-Tzu (born ca. 604 B.C.) and the Taoists, a philosophical movement which even derives its name from that different and mysterious principle, *tao*. Although the concept of *tao* occurred before the time of Lao-Tzu and independently of his teaching,² it was undoubtedly Lao-Tzu who expressed this doctrine most clearly and most meaningfully, at least insofar as it was possible to do so, because what we have here is a borderline concept, such as that of *nirvāna* in Buddhism³ and that of the one *Brahman* without a second in the strict teaching of the Vedānta.⁴ (It may even perhaps be basically the same concept.) "*Tao* is not simply any thing. It does, however, exist, although in a radically different way, which cannot be imagined by us."⁵ Forke said that it could be known via a way that is similar to the *via negationis ad Deum* of the Christian mystics.⁶ In other words, what we have here is a "knowledge *quand même*", as I have called it.⁷ Lao-Tzu has given all kinds of approximate definitions of *tao*, such as "spirit of the abyss" and so on. I, however, have the task here of showing that, if anything at all can be said of *tao*, it is that it is immaterial and transcendent. That it is transcendent, at least according to the teaching of Lao-Tzu, should be clear enough from what I have said above. Lao-Tzu also called it explicitly immaterial—see Section XIV of his *Tao-te ching* (the "Classic of the Way and its Virtue"). J. A. Blok has translated this (indirectly) as "it is called immaterial" (see p. 29). Deussen has translated

1 The idea of a primordial fluid also occurs in Japan, where it is known as *ichi-genki* (see B x88, p. 213). Traditional Japanese philosophy is extremely dependent on Chinese thought (see, for example, B 188, p. 204; also B 28, I, III, p. 710 ff and *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, I, V, p. 80 ff). It does not need therefore to be discussed separately here.

2 De Groot, for example, made a distinction between "*tao*, the order of the universe" (*op. cit.*, p. 22 ff) and "*tao* of man" (p. 56 ff), that is, between *tao* as world-soul and *tao* as the human soul. See also B 183, I, p. 46 ff.

3 See above, pp. 255-257.

4 See above, pp. 215-216.

5 B 188, p. 44.

6 B 188, p. 43. Forke makes a brief comparison here with Eckehart (see B 183, I, p. 117); see also above, pp. 401, 434.

7 See above, pp. 210, 212-213; see also B 114, p. 390 etc.

wei as "bodiless".¹ In L. Giles' translation of 1909, we read "incorporeal" and R. Wilhelm said this of it in 1921: "One reaches out for it, but cannot grasp it". We may therefore safely say that *tao* is regarded here as something radically different. Although the Taoists, who went on to deduce from *tao* the pair of opposing fluids *yang* and *yin*,² also to a great extent accepted fine materiality in the world (and apparently accepted no other immaterial principle within the world), they certainly accepted something immaterial and transcendent above or outside the world (or else deep within it!). All this clearly points in the direction of the gamma standpoint. There is also a similarity between Buddhist thought³ here and that of Lao-Tzu and the Taoists who closely followed him. The fact that this transcendental element is not a personal God (according to the Chinese, the personal deity or Shang Ti was something like Ísvara or the demiurge, in other words, something on a second plane) should not prevent us from classifying Lao-Tzu and the Taoists under the gamma standpoint.

It should not be forgotten, however, that, as in the case of the many variations that occur in the Vedanta system, there were also many different forms of Taoism. One of these forms regarded *tao* as a fine substance or essence.⁴ If, however, not only *yang* and *yin*, but also *tao*, which was at the basis of both of them, were regarded as consisting of fine matter, then this teaching cannot be representative of the gamma standpoint, but must be included within the beta standpoint or dualistic materialism.

There were also, however, Taoists whose teaching diverged from the gamma standpoint and inclined towards the other, more spiritual side. The very well known philosopher Chuang-tzu (his name is variously spelt as Tschuang-Tse, Tchang-tze or Tswang-tze; fourth century B.C.)⁵ thought that life was a dream, followed by a great awakening. Ordinary reality was only subjective for him, not objective—it was, in a word, an illusion. Space and time, for example, were, in his view, mere fictions. Forke consequently called him an idealist, both in the metaphysical sense and in the sense of the theory of knowledge.⁶ He would, however, seem to have been a hylic pluralist at the same time, although

1 B 28, I, III, p. 695.

2 See above, pp. 272-273.

3 See above, p.p. 261.

4 B 188, 50.

5 B 183, I, p. 204 ff; B 63, p. 15; De Groot, *op. cit.*, p. 87 ff.

6 B 188, p. 58; see also pp. 32, 36, 159.

I would welcome clearer statements in this respect.¹ He was, for example, of the opinion that "only *tao* has no size".² Thus, according to him, all the ordinary psychical reality, for example, had size, that is, extensiveness. This is certainly in accordance with the prevalent views of *yang* and *yin* and all the rest such as fine fluids or what proceeds from them. In this case, Chuang-tzu's point of view is the zeta standpoint, according to which the real existence of matter is, on the one hand, denied—it only *appears*—and which, on the other hand, accepts a finer (apparent) matter in addition to ordinary (apparent) matter. He was therefore clearly in the same situation as Śāṅkara, who also regarded the whole world as an illusion (*māyā*), but at the same time taught (an apparent) fine materiality, for example, in the form of the *upādhis*.³

We may therefore conclude that the most frequent point of view held by the Chinese philosophers is not the zeta standpoint, but the beta and even more especially the gamma standpoints. This means that, as far as the occurrence of hylic pluralism in Chinese thought is concerned, our result is very positive.

This at the same time also brings us to the end of our investigation into the occurrence of this view in the whole of Oriental thought.

One question remains to be answered—ought this preference for hylic pluralism in various forms in Eastern thought only to be regarded as a continued existence of primitive views? I have, earlier in this book, already had one or two comments to make about this question.⁴ I shall return to it in the final part, that is, the last volumes, of this work, which deal with the "sense" of hylic pluralism.

1 In this context, this statement could be considered: "The fuel is consumed, but the fire is transferred", made in connection with death (*The Seven Internal Books*, p. 61).

2 B 188, p. 36.

3 See above, pp. 221-222.

4 See above, pp. 172-173.